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This thesis utilises the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze alongside theory from the field of 
'utopian studies' in order to think through how the concepts of utopia and utopianism 
might be relevant in an age that seems to have given up on the future. It develops - and 
argues in favour of - a 'nomadic utopianism', which proceeds through non-hierarchical 
organisation, maximises what Deleuze calls 'difference-in-itself and creates new forms of 
living as it proceeds. From this, nomadic utopias are produced, meaning that the 
relationship between utopianism and utopia IS inverted, such that the former is 
ontologically prior to the latter. I show how such an approach maintains an etymological 
fidelity to the concept of utopia as 'the good place that is no place'. I also develop the 
concept of 'state utopianism', in which a utopian vision functions as a 'perfect', 
transcendent lack orienting political organisation to its realisation and reproduction. I 
argue that this is a dystopian politics, and consequently that the state utopia is a dystopia. 
Contrary to received wisdom - which sees today's 'capitalist realism' as anti-utopian - I 
argues that the contemporary world can be seen as a state utopia in which 'there is no 
alternative'. This makes utopia a central force in contemporary ideology. 
These two forms should not be seen simply as opposites, however, and this thesis also 
shows how nomadic utopias can ossify into state utopias through the emergence of 
tyrannies of habit. These theoretical concepts are then applied to works of utopian and 
dystopian literature (Yevgeny Zamyatin's J.#, Albert Meister's The so-called utopia of the 
centre beaubourg and Ursula K. Le Guin's The Dispossessed); and the practices of 'musicking' 
(with a focus on the symphony orchestra and collective improvisation) and education. It is 
hoped that this will offer a new way of theorising utopia and utopianism, as well as 
generating a productive political approach from the thought of Gilles Deleuze, and 
contributing to debates on the political function of musical and educational practice. 
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Utopia 'after the future' 
It is easier to imagine the end of the world ... 
In recent years, those of us in the global north who seek a world beyond capitalism have 
become horribly acquainted with a paraphrased claim of Frederic Jameson's - 'it is', we 
frequently utter, 'easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism'. I That 
this phrase rings so true is testament to the horrifying power of Fukuyama's assertion that 
the triumph of liberal democracy and capitalism constitutes 'the end of history' (1993), 
and to the ability of neoliberalism to emerge from any number of crises more powerful 
than ever (Karamessini, 2012; Klein, 2008; Sears et al., 20 12;Johnson, 2tOl1). We live in 
a period of 'capitalist realism' that has utterly co-opted the social imaginary (Fisher, 
.. 
2009a): 'the real' defeating its old, idealist enemy 'utopia', such that 'socialists and leftists 
do not dream of a future qualitatively different from the present' Gacoby, 1999: 10). 
Others, meanwhile, have suggested that we do at least have VISIons of a future 
qualitatively different from the present, but that these are visions of (ostensibly, at least) a 
worse future. Where Marx and Engels once scorned those who sought 'compensation' in 
dreams of a utopian future (Marx and Engels, 2004: 46; Engels, 2008), it seems that now 
we can only escape via visions of technological and civilisational collapse (Duncombe in 
More, 2012: xix; Cunningham, 2011).2 We gorge ourselves on 'ruins porn', 'disasterbating' 
The original jameson quote is in a 1991 essay entitled 'The Antimonies of Postmodernity', and is as 
follows: 'It seems easier for us today to imagine the thoroughgoing deterioration of the earth and of 
nature than the breakdown of late capitalism; and perhaps that is due to some weakness in our 
imagination' (1998: 50). Slavoj Zizek then paraphrases this (vaguely referencing jameson) by saying 'it 
seems easier to imagine the "end of the world" than a far more modest change in the mode of production' 
(1994: I). Somewhat bizarrely,jameson then fails to recognise himself as the source of this quote - writing 
"If it is so, as someone has observed, that it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of 
capitalism .. .' (2007: 199). Mark Fisher, meanwhile, returned the quote to prominence by using it as the 
catalyst in his Capitalist Realism (2009a). . 
2 Stephen Duncombe points to 'Postcards from the Future', an exhibition held at the Museum of London 
from October 2010 to March 2011. This depicted a series of post-climate change Londons by illustrators 
Robert Graves and Didier Madoc-:Jones. In them, the city is shown flooded like Venice; the Gherkin is 
used as a high-density tower-block for refugees from the equitorial lands where there is insufficient food; 
.. 
furiously like smug Noahs - imagining that we will be among those vindicated as 
destruction is wrought on those around us (Adams, 2008). Whilst there may be a wrathful 
utopianism in such apocalyptic visions - bankers disappearing beneath the waves as our 
ark of the righteous sails on - it hardly needs to be stated that they cannot be central to an 
emancipatory political praxis. Those who advocate creating such a change via human 
agency cannot answer (or are not concerned by) the fact that such a collapse would result 
in the deaths of billions (Flood, 2008), whilst the realities of environmental disaster would 
be (and indeed already are being) heaped not upon those whose greed has caused it, but 
upon the planet's poorest, creating a 'combined and uneven apocalypse' - as Evan Calder 
Williams has it (2010).3 
After the future 
An interesting variant on the 'end of history' narrative is articulated in Franco 'Bifo' 
Berardi's 2011 book Afler the Future. For Berardi - like Jacoby - our era is one utterly 
without any sense of future (which is not to say that we do not experience the passing of 
time, but that the 'psychological construct' of the future as a space into which progress will : 
extend is no longer viable). 'In the last three decades of the [twentieth] century', he writes, 
'the utopian imagination was slowly overturned, and has been replaced by the dystopian 
imagination' (2011: 17; cf.Jacoby, 1999: 156). Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari's U'hat Is 
Philosophy?, Berardi argues that this has resulted in widespread depression: not of the 
individual subject, but as a social symptom: 'an inability to find sense though action, 
through communication, through life' (2011: 64). 
there are paddy fields in Parliament Square; and there are slums around Buckingham Palace. John 
Cunningham, meanwhile, cites the popularity of Yves Marchand and Romain Meffre's The Ruins of 
Detroit: a lavish coffee-table book of photographs of abandoned affiuence in the American city; the 
television series Lift Afler People, which depicts a world left to nature following the extinction of humankind; 
and the huge number of Flickr groups dedicated to photographs depicting industrial decay. 
3 This does not, of course, mean that utopian spaces may not arise from such destruction. Margaret 
Attwood's Oryx and Croke (2009) depicts 'pleebland' slums that take up most of the environmentally 
ravished earth as containing a certain utopian quality, and Lucy Sargisson identifies utopianism in a 
number works of fiction set after dramatic civilisational and environmental collapses (2012: 98-115). Away 
from fiction, Robert Neuwirth's Shadow Cities (2004) argues that squatters in slums around the world are 
creating new forms of community whilst Rebecca Solnit's A Paradise Built in Hell (2009) charts the 
temporary utopian communities that often form in the aftermath of disasters of various kinds. 
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Despite this depression, Berardi does not call for a renewal of futurist utopianism. We can 
no longer believe that 'notwithstanding the darkness of the present, the future will be 
bright' (18), but we should not either, for '[t]he rise of the myth of the future is rooted in 
modern capitalism, in the experience of expansion of the economy and knowledge' 
(ibid.). To believe in the future in such a manner is to reproduce the status quo, denying 
the very possibility of the future you claim to be embracing. Thus, as Berardi puts it in his 
'Manifesto of Post-Futurism', we should 'sing to the infinity of the present and abandon 
the illusion of a future' (2011: 166). We need to be able to communicate and create our 
own meanings here in the present. 'Sense isn't found in the world, but in what we are able 
to create.' (ibid.) 
Given this, it may seem surprising to argue for a utopian politics. Yet the concept of 
utopia is - as this thesis will show - not simply what it is otten thought to be. It is a 
slippery concept, imbued with an awkward sense of irony that resists even as it tantalises: 
a playfulness that is both a strength and a weakness. It is alluring and inspirational, yet like 
most things that allure it is also dangerous. By drawing on works in the field of utopian 
studies4 and the creative philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, this thesis seeks to develop a form 
of utopianism - nomadic utopainism - that answers Berardi's call to 'sing to the infinity of 
the present': a utopianism not driven by imagining a better future, but by creating a better 
present. Yet in so doing it returns the future to us: not as a glittering promise or as the-
same-but-more, but as a time and space of potential. 
This nomadic utopianism cannot be opposed to realism. It is a utopianism that - in its 
4 By 'utopian studies' I mean works that are primarily (or at least significantly) concerned with debating the 
meaning - and/or applying the concept - of utopia. This is an interdisciplinary field which draws on 
political and critical theory, philosophy, psychology, literary theory, art history, art theory, social movement 
praxis, sociology, geography, urban studies, musicology, planning and architecture (among others); 
although of these the literary is by far the most prevelant. Whilst this thesis should be thought of primarily 
as a work of political theory, it draws on a number of these traditions, and expands the field to include 
musicology and education studies (though it is not doing so alone, and references other works in these 
fields which could be thought of as examples of 'utopian studies'). 
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most ecstatic moments - might even be imbued with a little of Buzz Lightyear's 
catchphrase, heading 'to infinity and beyond!'. But it is a utopianism that is tempered by 
(and the optimism of which is dependent upon) a radical pessimism. For nomadic 
utopianism is aware of the shadow of what I call 'state utopianism'; it is aware of the 
dangers of ossification, and knows that a victory is likely to be a failure . 
Why Deleuze' 
In developing this concept of utopia, I draw heavily on the philosophical works of Gilles 
Deleuze. He is by no means a typical political philosopher. His works - those written 
alone and in collaboration with Felix Guattari - are not built around the signifiers and 
canon of the tradition, with references to Georg Riemann and Antonin Artaud rather 
than Aristotle or Rousseau; to the 'solar anus' and 'desiring machines' rather than 'rights' 
or 'democracy'. They have been utilised by - among others - geographers (Doel, 1999;. 
Bonta and Protevi, 2004; Dewsbury, 2011); educators (Roy, 2003; Semetsky, 2005; 2006; 
Motta, 2012a), musicologists and music theorists (Gilbert, 2004; Goodman, 2009; 
Alwakeel, 2009), artists and art theorists (Grosz, 2008; O'Sullivan and Zepke, 2005; 
O'Sullivan, 2006) and many more besides; and are undeniably creative, being concerned 
largely with how new forms come into existence. Yet as I show in this thesis, Deleuze's 
ontology of creation offers an ethical philosophy with a clear sense of 'the good'; and 
suggests how life should be organised in order that the new might be produced. It should 
come as no surprise, then, that his work has also been influential on a number of 
contemporary developments in politics of an autonomist (Hardt and Negri, 2000, 2005; 
Thoburn, 2003; Ruddick, 2010) and anarchist (May, 1994; Newman, 2001,2007; Day, 
2005;]un, 2007; Kuhn, 2009) persuasion. 
Like Berardi, Deleuze calls for new forms of living that operate without reference to the 
future: his ethical 'good' is created through a unity of thought and life that (drawing on a 
term of .Deleuze and Guattari's) I refer to as 'nomadic thought' (though the inclusion here 
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of thought should not be seen as excluding - or in any way oppositional to - action). To 
be nomadic is to live without reference to that which lies beyond the present and the 
material: it is a philosophy of radical immanence that proceeds from the here and now, 
but which argues that the 'here and now' reaches out into the future (as a temporal form 
rather than the psychological construct Berardi critiques)5. For this reason, he has at times 
been cast as an anti-utopian thinker (Bogue, 2011; Tormey and Townshend, 2006: 52). As 
I will show in Chapter One, Deleuze's immanence is bound up with a commitment to 
what he calls 'difference-in-itself', and to non-hierarchical forms of organisation. It also 
disrupts the opposition between the individual and the collective, and destabilises the 
rational individual as the subject (and object) of political change. Yet it is a pragmatic 
philosophy, aware of the dangers of extremism and inflexibility: there can be no 'once-
and-for-all' solutions for the nomadic subject. Thus, nomadism must continually be 
reproduced, remaining on guard against impositions and reclamations by - and 
It 
ossifications into - what Deleuze and Guattari call 'state thought': the denial of difference-
in-itself and the imposition of transcendent governing principles that 'fix' the subject, 
preventing the creation of the new. 
Given the importance he places on flows of becoming and the creation of the new, 
Deleuze is often seen as a philosopher of flux (Zizek, 2003); a thinker so concerned with 
becomings and change that no concrete gains can be made. Saul Newman likens him to 
Lacan's 'hysteric subject': someone who, 'in his desperate pursuit of the object of desire, 
overtakes it and goes beyond it' (2007: 137). There is certainly a danger of Deleuzean 
thought being utilised in such a way, and in order to prevent this it is important to take 
heed of the fact that Deleuze is also profoundly interested in how flows of becoming (and 
forces of being) (re)produce social space: his philosophy stresses the interconnectedness of 
5 Jameson has suggested that the dualism of 'nomadic' and 'statist' in Deleuze's account (I also develop an 
account of the latter) is 'a way of recontaining all this complex and heterogeneous material [in De1euze 
and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus]: something like a narrative and even ... an ideological 
frame that allows us to reorder it into simpler patterns.' (2009: 199). There is, I think, some truth in that: 
and my extension of the terms to tease out tendencies from Deleuze's wider body of work can also be seen 
in this light. I do however, seek to complicate this dualism as the thesis progresses: unravelling this 
ideological frame (though not, it is to be hoped, to breaking point). 
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becoming and being rather than simply asserting one over the other. This, I suggest, is 
where utopia can be of use for those seeking to create a Deleuzean political project. 
Why utopia' 
Coined by Thomas More with the publication of his Utopia6 in 1516, the term utopia 
comes from the Greek topos (place), eu (good), and/or ou (no). Etymologically speaking, 
then, it might be rendered as 'the good place that is no place'. Colloquially,7 it is often used 
disparagingly to refer to fanciful dreams of good places that fail to engage with the 'real', 
and which can provide only a compensatory function for the less-than-utopian realities of 
the present. Utopia, it is said, is a 'perfect' place - and perfect places simply cannot exist . 
. 
Liberal and conservative political philosophy, meanwhile (which influences that colloquial 
understanding), has sought to equate the concept with totalitarian rule and the absolute 
domination of the individual by the collective. Mankind is not perfectible, it says, and so 
to attempt to realise perfection will require extensive use of state repression. Philosophers 
in this tradition point to the horrors of Stalinism and Nazi Germany and argue that if we 
try and realise utopia, such inhumanity is the only possible outcome.8 Postmodernity, 
meanwhile, with its 'incredulity towards metanarratives' (Lyotard, 1984: xxiv), is often 
seen to be complicit with the 'end of history' Gameson, 1984; 1998), and has further 
reduced the possibility of widescale changes to the social order. It would seem that in 
living 'after the future', we are living 'after utopianism'. 
This narrative, however, is unsatisfactory for two main reasons. Firsdy, it fails to recognise 
that if we live in a post-utopian age then the very claim being levelled at utopia - that it is 
a place of perfection - is being made for the current social order; it being understood that 
for something to be 'perfect' it is 'as good as it could possibly be' (Oiford English Dictionary 
6 Translated literally (from the Latin), the book's full title is A TrulY Golden Book, No Less Benificial Than 
E n ~ a i n i n g , , qf the Best State qf a Republic, and qf the New Island Utopia. 
7 I use the term 'colloquially' here to refer to uses of the word utopia that do not offer an explanation of 
what is meant by the term. This would include a number of uses of the term in an academic context. 
8 See Sargent (1982) for an excellent critical summary of these arguments. 
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Online: oed. com). In suggesting that liberal democracy and capitalism protect us from 
utopia and are the only plausible forms of governance, thry themselves are seen as perfect; they 
come to function as the best possible form of organisation, and the world they create as a 
utopia. A utopia that - paradoxically - denies utopianism. Much academic work on the 
concept of utopia has dealt with this conundrum (although this paradox is only 
occasionally noted) and - by stressing the 'no place' in utopia's etymology - has offered a 
number of important ways in which utopia can be utilised in order to help us navigate 
beyond our present. It is my contention, however, that in stressing the 'no' over the 'good', 
the negative and critical aspects of utopianism are often overplayed, such that utopia (the 
place) comes to be conflated with utopianism (a social force seeking to create change). 
There is also a danger of academic elitism, with those who study utopia acting as 
conceptual gatekeepers and claiming that all other uses of the term are 'wrong'. Whilst I 
argue for a certain fidelity to the etymology of utopia in this thesis, it must also be 
accepted that language is constantly in flux (Aitchison, 200 I): it\hould not and cannot be 
fixed solely in reference to the past, nor to 'expert' opinion. Claims may be offered in an 
attempt to redirect the colloquial flux of meaning-making, but they cannot simply be 
utilised as a dam to prevent this flow. 
The second problem with the narrative presented above is that its account of utopia's 
colloquial uses is incomplete - 'utopia' is often utilised to refer to places created by forces 
operating in the here and now; to forms of living that, to follow Berardi, 'sing to the 
infinity of the present'. These are not imaginary places, but operate in and on the 
material present; they are not repressive, but create space in which people may explore 
who they want to be and how they want to live; and they are not perfect, but change as 
those who inhabit them change.9 (This is not to say that imagination is not important in 
9 Examples of spaces that have - fairly or not - been colloquially named as utopias for exhibiting some or 
all of these characteristics include the spaces created by social movements in Latin America (Motta and 
Nielsen, 2011); squats (Cattaneo and Gavalda, 2010); music festivals (Larsen and O'Reilly, 2008; Larsen 
and Hussels, 2011), the occupations of the Occupy movement (Gilbert, 2012), the anarcho-communist 
Spanish town of Marinaleda (Hancox, 2012), and anarchist social centres (Finchett-Maddock, 2008). I 




their creation and reproduction; nor is it to say that there are no imaginary spaces that do 
'sing to the infinity of the[ir] present'). \Vhilst many of these 'real' spaces are outside the 
realm of what would normally be considered 'the political', it is my contention that they 
function as spaces in which particular forms of social interaction are created, 
experimented with and privileged. As such, many of these spaces can - and, I would 
argue, should - be seen as important spaces in which 'new ways of making and living 
politics' - as a phrase of Sara Motta's (2009) has it - are produced. There are, I suggest, 
significant overlaps between their operation and the nomadic politics suggested by 
Deleuze's thought, with each having something to learn from and offer the other. 
Aims of the thesis 
This thesis, then, seeks to use Deleuze's thought in order to rethink the concept of utopia 
in accordance with the problems identified above. In doing so, it has two main aims: 
I. To utilise Deleuze's thoug-ht to develop an understanding- of utopia that allows for 
the term to be used to refer to 'perfect' places and to places that are characterised 
by a rejection of perfection; and to theorise the relationship between these two 
forms of utopia. 
This aim is carried out in the development of my concepts of the nomadic utopia and the 
state utopia, and in theorising how they interact. Through these, the thesis offers a 
conceptual framework that may be applied to social and political spaces in order to 
determine the forms of utopianism they are constituted by. Yet there is also a normative 
element in the creation of these concepts: this thesis advocates a nomadic utopianism, and 
seeks to show the advantages of the nomadic utopia over the state utopia. It is hoped, 
however, that the conceptual framework will prove instructive even to those who remain 
less committed to the nomadic form than I. 
It must also be noted that the relationship between Deleuze and utopia that this thesis 
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creates is not simply operating in one direction: it also offers something to those seeking to 
develop a Deleuzean political project, and specifically to those interested in how Deleuze's 
thought might be used in order to organise space. In particular, utopia can be read as 
'slowing Deleuze down': grounding his thought within a spatial conceptual framework 
such that the productive tendencies are brought out to counteract the 'hysterical' flux that 
Newman criticises. 
2. To use this understandin" of utopia to theorise places in: 
a. Works of fiction. 
b. The 'real world'. 
Here, my aim is to show how my understanding of utopia can be utilised to read places -
both 'imaginary' and 'real' (though acknowledging that this is not simply a binary 
opposition). These readings in no way be seen as an empirical 'test' of my theory, but 
rather as applications of the theory: they are designed to 'sho'r, what the theory can do'. 
Indeed, the thesis can perhaps be conceived in a non-linear m:anner (it gestures towards 
the 'rhizomatic', to use the language of Deleuze and Guattari), with the applications of 
my theory feeding back into the theory to enrich and complicate it. 
In these applications, this thesis engages with what Lyman Tower Sargent (1967, 1994, 
2010) calls 'the three faces of utopianism': social theory, literature and social practice, 
although it expands the second to 'utopian texts' (Sargent subsumes painting and music 
under the category of literature) and pushes the third to consider practices of 'everyday 
life', rather than conflating it with 'intentional communities' (as Sargent frequently does). 
Structure 
Chapter One: The Ethical Thought of Gilles Deleuze 
In Chapter One I offer my reading of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (though I am 
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careful to credit Guattari for insights from the texts they co-authored I ~ , , with the aim of 
developing an account of what constitutes his (unusual) ethical project, and how his 
thought impacts on the (re)production of space. The chapter opens, however, with an 
account of his ontological approach, in which I argue that Deleuze's thought constitutes a 
form of 'inorganic vitalism' - an approach which argues that matter is alive, and that it is 
capable of entering into productive relationships in order to create new forms. I show 
how this is dependent upon Deleuze's concept of 'difference-in-itself' (in which difference 
is ontologically prior to identity) and offer a reading of the 'virtual' and 'actual' realms, 
which are central to Deleuze's philosophy of creation. I note that for Deleuze, the 'new' is 
created immanently and not in relation to a transcendent beyond, or 'lack'. I then turn to 
consider the importance of the concept of 'multiplicity': a vital component in Deleuze's 
thought, which provides the basis for the rejection of an opposition between the one and 
the multiple; and for the rejection of the individual as an ontologically stabJe subject from 
which politics must proceed. 
I then turn to the concepts of space and place, arguing - contra critiques that accuse 
Deleuze of exaggerating the importance of flux - that the space is a vital component in 
Deleuze's thought. I show how he conceives of space as being (re)produced by the bodies 
that occupy it, and posits the task of philosophy as creating spaces in which difference-in-
itself can be maximised in order for it to be able to produce 'the new', and thus reproduce 
the space. I note the similarities with the approach of the geographer Doreen Massey, and 
I briefly utilise her thought in order to think through the relationship between 'space' and 
'place'. These extrapolations prove central to the understanding of utopia developed later 
in the thesis. 
10 I draw heavily on the works co-written with Guattari throughout my thesis, considering them to be as 
integral to the Delezean corpus as any other works. That they were co-authored does not mean they 
should be viewed as 'Deleuze watered down', however; indeed, following Deleuze's own philosophy (which 
I explicate here), it could be argued through entering into a relation with a co-author Deleuze maximises his 
capacity to act. I am careful to co-credit Guattari, however. 
The texts co-authored with Claire Parnet take the form of discussions: I only draw on words spoken by 
Deleuze here (though this is not to say that Parnet's questioning did not influence Deleuze's claims). 
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Following Deleuze in noting that much western philosophy does not share the aims of 
Deleuze's philosophical project, I then develop an account of what I call 'state thought', 
drawing on Brian Massumi's term 'state philosophy' in his translator's introduction to 
Deleuze and Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus. I note that - for Deleuze and Guattari - the 
'state' is not a geopolitical entity, but a mode of thought (upon which the geopolitical state 
is dependent). Drawing on Protevi's use of an Aristotlean concept, I argue that it is 
'hylomorphic'; which means that it seeks to give form to matter that it views as incapable 
of self-organisation. As such, it requires hierarchical forms of organisation and ordering 
principles that serve to orient life around a transcendent signifier, or 'lack'. This 
orientation provides state thought with a moral good, and this 'moral good' comes to 
govern, repressing difference-in-itself and preventing the immanent reproduction of 
space. It creates 'striated space' in which relationships are restricted to particular 
structures. I note that striated space arises not only through formally imposed hierarchies, 
but also through what I call 'informal hierarchies', in which those outside of formal 
positions of power reproduce the striation. 
I then turn my attention to 'nomadic thought' (drawing on Deleuze and Guattari's 
concept of nomadism in A Thousand Plateaus). This, I argue, is the variety of thought that 
seeks to create spaces in which flows of becoming can be maximised, such that the spaces 
themselves are continually being reproduced. I show that the subject of nomadic politics 
is not the pre-given Cartesian subject, but is instead always under construction in 
accordance with difference-in-itself, and in relation to the other bodies she encounters' , 
and how - for Deleuze and Guattari - these nomadic subjects are the 'universal creators' , 
who create new spaces for political action. I argue that these spaces relate to Deleuze and 
Guattari's concept of 'smooth space'. I also introduce Deleuze and Guattari's concept of 
the 'nomadic war machine', in which nomadic subjects non-hierarchically create a form of 
organisation that operates autonomously from the state. I then uncover the power 
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dynamics of this arrangement, drawing on Deleuze's reading of Spinoza to argue that a 
nomadic politics seeks not power-over but power-to; and I relate this to the concept of 
'affect', which refers to the manner in which bodies interact with each other to create new 
opportunities for life. Creating such opportunities, I argue, is the ethical imperative of 
Deleuze's political project. Against the morality of state thought (which seeks to govern 
life in accordance with external principles), this ethical thought seeks to create spaces for 
life. It is here, I argue, that it is possible to talk of a 'good' in Deleuze's thought. 
I note, however, that Deleuze's philosophy is not as simple as advocating the 'smooth 
space' as a once-and-for-all solution to problems of political and social organisation, and 
the next section of the chapter is devoted to an explanation of why - as Deleuze and 
Guattari note - 'a smooth space will [never] suffice to save us' (2004b: 551): a warning 
that I utilise later as the 'no' in utopia's etymology. I argue that informal,hierarchies will 
always emerge, drawing on Oscar WIlde's phrase 'the tyrannies of habit' (2008: 21) to note 
that there is always a danger of ossification into established patterns of behaviour which 
reinstate statist moralism. I also note how smooth spaces may be put to statist ends, and 
that 'pure' smooth space is at risk of dissolving into a chaos of flux that makes the creation 
of the new impossible. Utopia, I suggest, might be able to help us avoid these twin 
dangers. 
Chapter Two: Theorising Utopia(nism) 
In Chapter Two I provide an overview of contemporary debates in the field of utopian 
studies, and move on from these to develop my concepts of the state utopia and the . 
nomadic utopia. I also theorise the relationship between these forms. The chapter begins 
by analysing approaches that equate utopia with perfection. Whilst this is a charge 
commonly levelled at utopia by anti-utopians, I note that it has also been adopted by j.C. 
Davis and Krishan Kumar - two theorists sympathetic to the concept. Whilst I do not 
accept that their analyses are fully correct (they limit utopia to that which is perfect), I 
12 
nonetheless show that they do successfully describe a particular form of utopia. I also note 
that there are differences in their conceptions of perfection: for Davis, it is absolute, and 
located at the societal level (for the human is inherently deficient); whilst Kumar locates it 
at the level of the individual and states that perfection is an ongoing process. 
Drawing on the accounts of Kumar and Davis, I develop my concept of the state utopia. 
This can be likened to the first of the colloquial accounts of utopia discussed above: it sees 
itself as perfect, functions hierarchically and denies further change. It is initially ordered 
around a lack and - once this has been satisfied - continues to be reproduced around a 
vision of the moral good that prevents further change. Thus, the state utopia is seen as a 
perfect society and functions to deny any utopianism that seeks to go beyond it. I argue 
that at its most 'absolute' the state utopia creates three dimensions of utopianism: the 
design of a utopia, the implementation of a utopia, and the reproduction of a utopia. Yet 
I note that it is a paradoxical utopianism, for once it reaches the third of these dimensions 
it denies utopianism as a legitimate political force. I argue that in so doing, state 
utopianism is ultimately an anti-utopian force capable of p r o d J ~ i n g g only dystopian spaces 
which, in seeing themselves as 'the good place', ignore the 'no' in utopia's etymology. 
'Capitalist realism', I contend, constitutes such a state utopian force, and sees the world 
today as a utopia - even while it denies the validity of the concept. 
Moving away from such absolutist definitions, I turn to consider the 'function' of utopia. 
Here, I trace the works of a number of thinkers - including Levitas, Tom Moylan and 
Fredric Jameson - who argue that utopian visions should not be read as blueprints for 
implementation, but rather as tools of 'estrangement' that open up the future once again 
as a space of possibility. Whilst I am sympathetic to this turn, and draw on it throughout 
my thesis, I nonetheless argue that such an approach risks emphasising the 'no place' at 
the expense of the 'good place'. I also show how Tom Moylan's concept of the 'critical 
utopia' mixes a function based approach with an account of the content of utopian 
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places, and consider Ruth "Levitas' concept of the 'education of desire' - in which a 
positive vision is required to orient (but not determine) political action. I note that this 
avoids this negativity with the accounts that stress 'estrangement', but argue that it risks 
reasserting state utopianism. I nonetheless note the importance of the concept, which I 
teturn to - in a modified form - at later points in the thesis. I also note that the function 
based approach to utopia can be applied to texts or forms that cannot be conceived of as 
a 'utopia', and argue that - as an approach most suited to textual practices - it risks 
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operating only on individual, atomized subjects. 
I then consider process approaches to utopia, in which utopia is thought of not as a place 
at all - but as an immanent process. This, I argue, is the approach hinted at by Deleuze 
and Guattari in What Is Philosophy?, and has been developed by utopian theorists including 
Ernst Bloch (though I note that his concept of the 'Ultimuum' means that his thought 
cannot be seen as immanent in the Deleuzean sense). I note that such an understanding of 
utopia can be likened to Deleuze's concept of the ethical good, but argue that in 
understanding utopia as a process and not a place it conflates utopia with utopianism, 
risking a 'hysterical' politics that fails to capitalise on its gains through spatial grounding. 
To escape having to choose between a statist, spatially grounded utopianism and a 
nomadic utopianism that is incapable of creating utopian space, I argue that a turn to the 
content of utopia as a place is needed. Here, I draw on a number of anarchist and 
autonomist approaches to the concept of utopia (as well as approaches to 'good spaces' 
that are not explicitly named utopia), and show how they point towards - even if they do 
not fully embrace - an understanding of utopia as a place-in-process (rather than purely 
as a process). These places, I note, are non-hierarchically organised and reject the concept 
of perfection. Yet - I argue - they do not theorise the dangers of such spaces ossifying 
into a state utopian form: they celebrate the smooth space without thinking through its 





From this, I develop my concept of the nomadic utopia. I show how it is a place 
constituted by non-hierarchical social relations and difference-in-itself, but that pays heed 
to the 'no' in utopia's etymology, and knows that a smooth space cannot be sufficient to 
answer problems of political organisation. I first cover how the nomadic utopia functions 
as a 'good place' by showing it to be a space in which the capacity of bodies in it to affect 
and be affected is maximised; something which, when it works well - makes the place 
itself nomadic; it never settles and comes to be a 'no place'. Thus, I show that the utopia 
itself is nomadic - it is never fixed, but is subject to a continual process of becoming, and is 
(re)produced by nomadic utopianism. Yet in a section on why the nomadic utopia is a 'no 
place', I warn that the nomadic utopia may not operate so smoothly, and the 'no' should 
also serve to remind us that simply creating an ethically 'good place' can never be enough 
- attention must be paid to a space's becomings over time in order to observe whether it 
continues to become nomadic or begins to ossify into statism. This, I note, introduces an 
important temporal - as well as spatial - dimension to the nomadic utopia. Drawing on 
the work of Kathi Weeks, I argue that these may simultaneous!; have the function of 'the 
education of desire' - that those who experience nomadic utopias may be unable to 
return comfortably to 'capitalist realism"s dystopia, and may have a renewed belief in the 
joys of - and possibility of creating - nomadic utopia. 
The chapter concludes by noting the danger of a nomadic utopia being utilised for statist 
ends ('degenerate nomadic utopias') and by considering the difficulty of applying this 
method to read utopian places. I suggest that whilst it may be utilised as a method to read 
spaces, my concepts also have a normative element, and that my approach will be of the 
greatest use to those seeking to create nomadic utopian spaces. 
Chapter Three: Utopian Literature 
Chapter Three turns towards applying the approaches developed in the previous two 
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chapters through an analysis of three fictional works that depict utopian and dystopian 
spaces: Yevgeny Zamyatin's m, Albert Meister's The so-called utopia of the centre heauhourg 
(originally published under the psuedonym Gustave Affeulpin) and Ursula K. Le Guin's 
The Dispossessed. Zamyatin and Le Guin's texts have both been much written about in the 
field of utopian studies, whilst Meister's text is little known outside the art world. It is my 
contention that by utilising the approach to utopia and utopianism developed in the 
previous two chapters, new ways of reading these texts can be developed. They are all, I 
contend, of a nomadic persuasion - although each highlights particular dangers 
associated with nomadic utopianism - and function as tools that enable the reader to 
imagine what a nomadic utopia might look and feel like to inhabit. They also provide the 
opportunity to further develop an account of the relationship between the state utopia, 
anti-utopia and dystopia. 
The first of the texts to be analysed is Zamyatin's m. I note that this is often understood 
to be an archetypal 'classic' dystopia and briefly trace how it has been utilised by· 
conservative and liberal anti-utopians seeking to reinforce the status quo. Against this, I 
suggest that whilst the text is indeed set in a dystopia (the 'bad place' of 'OneS tate'), this 
dystopia should be seen as a state utopia. I then proceed to argue that the text also depicts 
a nomadic utopian resistance movement in the form of the Mephi, although it stops short 
of depicting a nomadic utopia. Thus, I argue that the text need not be read as one 
cautioning against utopian change, but can be understood as a work cautioning against 
not striving for nomadic utopianism. 
I then turn to consider Albert Meister's The so-called utopia of the centre heauhourg, which - I 
suggest - offers a utopian space that the Mephi would approve of. This is located in a 76-
storey structure (the titular 'heauhourg, or 'good place') underneath the Pompidou Centre in 
Paris. I show how - opened up for an undefined 'culture' by its creator Gustave Affeulpin 
- the space comes to function as an anarchist society in which a 'rabble' self-organises 
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without reference to any lack or moral principle, and in which difference-in-itself is 
allowed to flourish. To an extent, then, the beaubourg can be seen as a successful spatial 
embodiment of nomadic utopianism. However, I note that The so-called utopia oj the centre 
beaubourg is perhaps better read as a celebration of smooth space rather than a nomadic 
utopia: though it is acknowledged that the beaubourg must continue to experiment lest it fall 
victim to forces of ossification, no critical voices are heard in the narrative; and there is no 
sense of the messy pragmatism that must be worked through in order to reproduce a 
nomadic utopia. With this in mind, I draw on the function based approach to utopia to 
argue that The so-called utopia oj the centre beaubourg is best read heuristically, and that the 
beaubourg should not be viewed simply as a nomadic utopia. 
The final text I engage with is Ursula K. Le Guin's The Dispossessed. Here, I present a 
reading of the anarchist community of Anarres (in which much of the novel is set) as a 
nomadic utopia, but one that is under threat from tyrannies of habit that are allowing 
both informal and formal hierarchies to develop, and which threaten to transform it into a 
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state utopia. I first note the nomadic features of the society, snowing that it is (mostly) 
formally non-hierarchical; that it seeks a state of permanent becoming; and that there is 
no necessary opposition between the individual and the collective. I then turn to consider 
the ways in which Anarres is becoming state utopian, analysing the influence of its 
founder Odo; and showing how informal hierarchies have emerged through bureaucracy 
and the division-of-Iabour. Whilst much of this has been reproduced unwittingly, I note 
how it has also allowed people to take advantage by working themselves into positions of 
formal hierarchy. Much of the dramatic tension in the text, I contend, comes from the 
struggle between these statist forces and the nomadic forces. Though it is difficult to make 
a definite claim, I argue that - considered over time - Anarres can be read as a nomadic 
utopia: its hierarchies have not fully ossified and are set to be confronted by an enormous 
challenge from a revolutionary 'Syndicate of Initiative'. Though the book itself has an 
open ending (forcing the reader to imagine for themselves what the future of Anarres 
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must be), I note that when read alongside a number of Le Guin's other works set in the 
same fictional universe, it seems likely that the Syndicate of Initiative are""'; at least to an 
extent - successful in reinvigorating Anarres as a nomadic utopia. 
Finally, I suggest that these novels provide fictional spaces in which debates surrounding 
nomadic and state utopias - and the relationships between them - can be played out, by 
both authors and readers, who are active in co-constructing textual meaning. In this sense, 
it is important to note that they have a material utopian function and do not simply 
operate in an ideational realm. They disturb the reader's certainty that the world in which 
they live is the only possible world, and offer (heuristic) models for how a nomadic utopia 
might function, and what dangers it might face. They help us not only go beyond this 
world, but - I suggest - beyond a1!)l world. 
Chapter Four: Utopian Musicking 
In Chapter Four I move away from ground well-trodden by utopian studies to consider 
the utopian spaces created during musical performance. Drawing on the work of the 
musicologist Christopher Small, I refer to this process as 'musicking', and argue that it has 
an important political (and, indeed, utopian) dimension. My argument proceeds from the 
claim that what is colloquially understood as 'improvisation' constitutes nomadic utopian 
musicking, whilst the performance of what is colloquially understood as 'composed' music .. 
constitutes state utopian musicking. 
Before I go on to make ihis argument, however, I develop terms utilised in the chapter 
and argue that it is a mistake to think of improvisation and composition as being at 
opposite ends of a spectrum. I argue, rather, that improvisation is aform of composition in 
which it is not determined in advance what the music made will sound like - or how it will 
be made - but is decided immanently by performers; whilst that which is commonly 
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understood as the performance of 'composed' music is better understood as 'concrete' 
musicking, in which the sound and method of performance decided in advance and 
imposed upon performers. Even here, however, I note that no music conforms absolutely to 
either of these ideals, and I disrupt this opposition as the chapter progresses. 
Following this, I develop my claim that concrete musicking creates state utopian spaces. I 
do this through an analysis of the symphony orchestra. I choose this as - in the western 
musical tradition (in which this chapter is rooted) - it is in the symphony orchestra that the 
most concrete form of musicking occurs, meaning that the symphony orchestra functions 
as a state utopia. I show how it is a hylomorphic, hierarchically ordered space oriented 
around a transcendent lack (the score), in which the individual is placed in opposition to 
the collective and difference-in-itself is subordinated. I also note that the symphony 
orchestra has - historically - performed a state utopian function: its history entwined with 
the history of the nation state and other institutions of bourgeois moralityll. Recalling my 
claim that OneState is a state utopia and also a dystopia, I then argue that the symphony I' 
orchestra may be understood as a dystopia. In doing so, I draw on the (negative) 
experiences of musicians playing in symphony orchestras and note that the language they 
use to relate their experiences resonates with the language of the protagonist in Wi>. 
I then turn to consider the practice of collective musical improvisation as a nomadic 
utopian form of musicking. I note that a number of improvising musicians and theorists 
of improvisation see it as a utopian practice, and that others have linked it to forms of 
political organisation - or to political terms - that resonate with nomadism; and then 
analyse the social relations that are produced through improvisation. I note that they are -
ideally, at least - non-hierarchical and constituted by difference-in-itself; and that they 
mutualise the interests of the individual and the collective, creating an ethically good 
place in which an increase in the power-to of the individual results in an increase in the 
II I note that within their historical context these visions may have been broadly 'progressive'. 
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power-to of the collective. I also show how the improvising musician is herself constituted 
by difference, and is subject to processes of becoming. I note that the nomadic utopia of 
improvisation may have a utopian function beyond its immediate time and place by 
'educating the desires' of those involved in performance. 
I argue, however, that these social relations cannot be taken for granted - and that 
improvisation is always at risk of ossification into statist utopianism, with informal 
hierarchies emerging and preventing musicians from musicking immanently. In a section 
entitled 'Inserting death into the system' (taken from a phrase of Deleuze and Guattari's), 
I argue that - in order to combat these - improvising musicians may sometimes need to 
utilise forms of strategic identity and/or strategic hierarchy in the form of generic 
identities and musical scores (although not in the traditional sense) in order to keep the 
space open. This, I show, means that the relationship between concrete musicking and 
improvised musicking cannot simply be though of as one of simple opposition, showing 
the complexity of nomadic utopianism. 
The chapter closes by noting two dangers of uncritically applying the concept of nomadic 
utopianism to improvised music king. Firstly, I show how musical improvisation is being 
utilised as a form of organisation within the workplace, where it is believed to offer 
insights that will increase the power-over of capital. Secondly, I argue that despite 
improvisation's relative autonomy, it is not completely isolated from the social relations of 
the wider society in which the practice occurs. Thus, it is likely to reproduce forms of 
power-over from the wider society. I note that as a practice, improvisation has historically 
been riddled with exclusions based on gender and sexuality. These dangers, I argue, 
should not be fatal to my argument, but need to be engaged to avoid the danger of an 
uncritical celebration of exclusionary practices - something not in keeping with nomadic 
utopianism. 
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Chapter Five: Education and Utopianism 
Chapter Five follows the previous chapter in applying my approach to utopia to spaces 
and activities in 'real life': in this case, to education and schools. The chapter opens with a 
definition of key terms utilised: in particular 'education' (which is linked to utopianism); 
and 'school' (which is linked to utopia). In keeping with my claim that utopian spaces are 
(re)produced by the forces of utopianism that traverse them, I argue that the form which a 
school takes will be determined to a large extent by the form of education it offers (and 
vice-versa). I argue that education and schools constitute vital terrains for political struggle 
and play an important in the (re)production of wider social structures. 
Following this, I trace how education can function as a form of state utopianism. I note 
that compulsory education was developed as a project to strengthen the power of the 
nation state and the emerging bourgeoisie, and that it continues to function as a force 
preserving their interests. I also note the importance of education in a number of literary 
dystopias (that depict state utopian societies), with a particular focus on the function of 
education in Aldous Huxley's Brave New World. Drawing on tht work of Paulo Freire, I 
argue that common to these forms of education is a particular epistemological approach 
in which knowledge is viewed as a 'thing' located in a transcendent place beyond the 
subject of education (the individual). I note that this epistemological approach allows 
curricula to be designed around specific knowledges chosen by those in formal positions of 
power, meaning that 'other' forms of knowledge (including embodied and affective 
experiences) - and the social complexities of the knowledge taught - are excluded from 
education. This, I argue, is reinforced through examinations, which also serve to limit the 
capacity of teachers to explore other forms of knowledge and reduce students' enthusiasm 
for exploring the social aspects of knowledge. When structured in such a way, I contend 
that education functions as a force of state utopianism that reproduces the current state 
utopian system and prevents nomadic utopianism. I argue that it also produces the 
classroom as a state utopia: a hierarchical space that denies difference-in-itself and 
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opposes the individual to the collective, to the detriment of both. 
Yet education need not be like this, I contend, and I draw on a wide range of educational 
practices to develop an account of how education can function as a force of nomadic 
utopianism. Firstly, I argue that a radically different epistemological approach needs to be 
taken, and show how knowledge might be thought of not as a 'thing' to be obtained, but 
as something always under construction, though I note that this does not lead to an 
embrace of relativism: Such an approach, I show, is taken by a number of educators and 
theorists of education who see themselves as utopian, and I explore what they mean by 
the term utopia - finding it to be similar to process approaches of utopia. I then explore 
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precisely how education might function as nomadic utopianism. Here, I suggest that 
knowledge needs to be constructed through bringing difference into dialogue, but that this 
difference cannot simply be located in the individual learner, as each learner is 
constructed through interacting with others (meaning that the division between the 
individual and the collective cannot be maintained), and will herself be constituted by 
difference. 
From this, I draw on a number of experiments (within and outside of formal educational 
institutions) to argue that the school and the classroom can be constructed as nomadic 
utopias in which the hierarchical relationship between the teacher and student might be 
challenged in a number of ways, and in which the object of education is not pre-
determined through curricula and examinations but is continually reconstructed by those 
taking part in the education. I state that there can be no once-and-for-all way of creating 
such spaces, however, but that a pragmatic approach which pays attention to the desires 
and experiences of all those in an educational space must be adopted. This, I note, may 
well require the use of strategic hierarchy and a temporary division of labour. Finally, I 
note the dangers of constructing classrooms as nomadic utopias within formal 
educational institutions that play an important role in the reproduction of state 
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utopianism. 
Utopia after the future; utopia into the future' 
Taken together, then, this thesis offers a way of theorising how utopia might operate in an 
age that has given up on the future. It does not advocate a return to an earlier age when 
the future stood before us as a lack that beckoned us forward with a utopian promise but 
suggests that utopias - nomadic utopias - that bring the future into the present can be 
constructed immanently, and that though these utopias maintain a fidelity to the 
etymology of the term utopia, they are very different from the 'perfect' space utopia is 
often felt to be. Yet it also exercises a caution, acknowledging that these spaces will never 
simply create 'a utopia' once-and-for-all, but that they are only utopian to the extent that 
they acknowledge there is always more to do. They are good places, but they must also be 
no-places. It also cautions against uncritically creating such spaces without paying 
attention to how capital might seek to benefit from their innovations, and how such spaces 
can never be perceived of as fully autonomous from wider societal norms and 
exclusionary operations of power. .. 
In this, I suggest it offers a great deal to the field of utopian studies. The relationship 
between utopia and utopianism is rethought such that utopias are the product of 
utopianism, rather than calling utopianism into being; and practices not often considered 
from the perspective of utopia are shown to have much to offer the concept. It also offers 
a profoundly political reading of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, drawing on earlier 
works that suggest his thought has a great deal to offer the field of political philosophy. 
Whilst this thesis can be read as advocating a nomadic utopianism, it is hoped that in 
theorising two different forms of utopia - and the relationship between them - it will still 
offer something to the reader less convinced of its merits. 
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Chapter One 
The ethical thought of Gilles Deleuze 
I ntrod uction 
As I noted in the introduction to this thesis, the concept of utopia has three conceptual 
ordering points: 'good', 'no', and 'place'. Yet there seems to be an inherent tension between 
these three concepts, which means that utopia invariably loses one - or more - of its 
defining qualities. One of the main aims of this thesis is to think through how it is possible 
to bring these three conceptual ordering points of utopia into a productive relationship 
without erasing the tensions that exist between them. Such a relationship is what Deleuze 
would refer to as a 'consistency' (2007: 179) and it is his thought that I draw on utilise in 
order to show how a place might simultaneously be constituted by 'the good' and 'no'. In 
this chapter I lay the conceptual groundwork for this problematic by providing a reading 
of Deleuze's philosophy, with the aim of applying this thought to these three conceptual 
ordering points. 
Deleuze's thought, then, becomes a tool to open up the concept of utopia, in a manner 
consistent with that suggested by Deleuze himself, who - in conversation with Michel 
Foucault - stated that his theory should be used: 
exactly like a box of tools .. .it must be useful. It must function. And not for 
itself. If no one uses it, beginning with the theoretician himself (who then 
ceases to be a theoretician), then the theory is worthless or the moment is 
inappropriate. We don't revise a theory, but construct new ones; we have no 
choice but to make others. It is strange that it' was Proust, an author thought 
to be a pure intellectual, who said it so clearly: treat my book as a pair of 
glasses directed to the outside; if they don't suit you, find another pair; I leave it 
to you to find your own instrument, which is necessarily an investment for 
combat. A theory does not totalise; it is an instrument for multiplication and it 
also multiplies itself (in Foucault, 1977: 208). 
My reading of Deleuze's philosophy is undertaken in three broad stages. In the first, I 
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outline his ontological approach. I develop a reading of Deleuze as a vitalist thinker. , 
concerned with maximising the opportunities for life to unfold immanently and create the 
new. This, however, does not mean that he ascribes powers of creation to the biological _ 
rather, he is concerned with the material world. For him, everything should be considered to 
be alive, and thus capable of entering into productive relationships which create 'the new' 
through the actualisation of difference, which Deleuze believes to be primary to identity 
(though, as I note, this does not make him a philosopher of individualism). His thought is 
thus one of vitalist materialism that embraces both organic and inorganic forms of life. I 
show the importance of Spinoza's concept of eonatus for Deleuze, and relate this to 
Deleuze and Guattari's concept of desire. In developing this account, I will clarify a 
number of Deleuze's key concepts, which will be grouped thematically under the terms 
'life', 'difference-in-itself, 'multiplicity' and 'space'. 
Once a reading of Deleuze's primary ontological assertions and key terms has been 
offered I turn to consider the political relevance of Deleuze's philosophy, with a particular 
focus on what is meant by 'the good'. Drawing on an implicit vis found in Deleuze and 
Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus (2004b) - which runs from the state (understood as a regime 
of thought rather than simply as a geopolitical entity) to the nomad - I consider two ways 
of approaching this question: statism and nomadism. At first these are presented as a 
dichotomous pair, but this opposition is gradually deconstructed as the thesis progresses. 
The first approach - state thought - is shown to be hostile to the forces of life that 
Deleuze posits as the animating power for the production of the new. Its good is a 'moral 
good' and it seeks to order space in accordance with a transcendent morality external to 
life. This imposes hierarchies upo'n space, creating what Deleuze and Guattari call 
'striated space', though I note that it is important not to see these (solely) in the colloquial 
sense as visible, vertically structured organisations, but rather as operations of thought 
that restrict the creation of the new by imposing identity on difference. 
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I then turn to consider 'nomadic thought', which seeks tQ regulate space in a manner 
consistent with Deleuze's ontological claims. Against the 'moral good', it draws on Spinoza 
to create an ethical vision of the good as that which expands the capacity of bodies to 
affect and be affected, and does not deny the primacy of difference: an approach that 
leads to the creation of new formations. I draw on the resonances between nomadic 
thought and anarchism, insisting that the former should not be seen as the valorisation of 
individualism; and show how nomadic thought creates what Deleuze and Guattari call 
'smooth space', in which there is no hierarchy and connections can be made between 
bodies in any manner. I argue, however, that this must be seen as a once-and-for-all utopia 
resulting in the end of history, and I consider Deleuze and Guattari's warnings against 
seeing it as such. In doing this, the 'no' enters into the equation: Deleuze's ethics 'say no' to 
finality and permanence, although I note that this 'no! cannot be thought of apart from 
the 'yes'. This chapter thus ends by suggesting that it is possible to create a 'good place', 
but that to remain good it must be subject to further becomings. 
Deleuze's Ontology 
Life, conatus, desire 
The concept of life is central to the ontology of Deleuze, constituting an animating power 
that can be detected across his diverse body of work; even when it passes unnamed (as it 
frequently does) (Marks, 1998; May, 1991). The goal of politics is to create space for - and 
remain animated by - life, which is the force that brings the new into existence (May, 
1991: 28). Deleuze himself points to the omnipresent status of 'life' in his work in 
Negotiations, where he states that 'everything I've written is vitalistic' (1995: 143). 
Deleuze's use of the concept of life should not be understood in a biological sense 
however, as it maintains an existence quite separate from its appropriation in cellular, 
animal or human forms: this life is 'all the more alive for being inorganic' (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2004b: 550). It flows through the entire field of existence, and is appropriated by 
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- rather than defined in relation to - life-forms. 'Everything is alive', write Deleuze and 
Guattari, 'not because everything is organic or organized, but, on the contrary, because 
the organism is a diversion of life. In short the life in question is inorganic, germinal and 
intensive ... a body that is all the more alive for having no organs' (ibid.). Life, then, resides 
in the physical world of forces and matter, of which all reality consists (Deleuze, 1986: 40). 
It is thus important to take seriously Deleuze's claim that 'everything I've written IS 
vitalistic', but acknowledge that this is not vitalism in the conventional, 'metabiological' 
sense of the term in which a 'vital force' is assigned to 'living' biological organisms and 
placed in a binary opposition with non-biological (dead) matter (Deleuze, 1986: 38).1 
Deleuze's novelty here is to break down the binary between vitalism and materialism - he 
'revitalises' materialism: the 'vital force' no longer remaining within the biological realm 
but instead assigned to 'matter' and given a physical existence. What Deleuze creates is a 
vitalist materialism: an ontology in which everything is alive, and which denies the existence 
of a world beyond the material. This owes a considerable debt to Deleuze's readings of 
the works of Baruch Spinoza and Friedrich Nietzsche. 2 For the j:>rmer - Deleuze states -
It is this variety of vitalism that Deleuze and Guattari are attacking in Anti-Oedipus when they write _ 
seemingly contra Deleuze's claim in Negotiations - that the vitalist argument has been 'shattered' (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 2004a: 313). 
2 These two thinkers arc frequently made to speak to (and through) each other throughout Deleuze's work. 
Spino;:;a: A Practical Philosophy opens with the claim that 'Nietzsche understood, having lived it himself, what 
constitutes the mystery of a philosopher's life' (Deleuze, 1988a: 3), and the book's translator Robert Hurley 
notes that Deleuze creates a 'kinship of Spinoza and Nietzsche' built around a 'historical line' composed of 
their resonances (Hurley, in Deleuze, 1998: I). Indeed, for Deleuze, Spinoza was a Nietzschean thinker par 
excelknce, someone who 'philosophises with hammer blows' (Deleuze, I 988a: II). Meanwhile Hugh 
Tomlinson - the translator of Nietzsche and Philosophy - states that, for Deleuze, Spinoza was the 
'only ... predecssor' to Nietzsche aside from the Pre-Socratics (Tomlinson, in Deleuze, 1986: ix). 
It should be noted, however, that these are not 'traditional' readings of these thinkers, but constitute forms 
of what Deleuze's philosophical method of 'enculagt' (buggery), a process of 'taking an author from behind, 
and giving him a child that would be his own offspring, yet monstrous. It was really important for it to be 
his own child, because the author had to actually say all I had him saying. But the child was bound to be 
monstrous too because it resulted from all sorts of shifting, slipping, dislocations, and hidden emissions 
that I really enjoyed' (1995: 6). There may not be an excessive monstrosity in this case, however - in a 
letter to his friend Franz Overbeck, Nietzsche wrote: '''I am utterly amazed, utterly enchanted! I have a 
precursor. and what a precllrsor! I hardly knew Spinoza: that I should have turned to him just nou', was 
inspired by "instinct." Not only is his overall tendency like mine - namely to make all knowledge the f1I()st 
pou'nfol qffert but in fi\'(' main points of his doctrine I recognize myself; this most unusual and loneliest 
thinker is closest to me precisely in these matters: he denies the freedom of the will, teleology, the moral 
world-order, the unegoistic. and evil. Even though the divergencies arc admittedly tremendous, they arc 
due more to the difference in time. cuiture, and science' (1954: 92). These commonalities and diwrgences 
have been further discussed by Yovel (1992: 104-135), who contends that Nietzshce overstressed the 
similarities. and that Spinoza's immanent thought lacked the 'self-overcoming' of Nietzsche's ubermmsch. 
These. of ('ollrse. matter less for Dcleuze's (mmagf a trois) m(u/age. 
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'life is not an idea, a matter of theory. It is a way of being, one and the same eternal mode 
in all its attributes' (Deleuze, 1988a: 13). It has 'a power of thinking that goes beyond the 
ends of the state, of a society, beyond any milieu in general' (Deleuze, 1988a: 4). 
Nietzsche, meanwhile, 'often takes knowledge to task for its claim to be opposed to life, to 
measure and judge life, for seeing itself as an end' (Deleuze, 1986: 100). Life should be 
understood as 'positive [and] affirmative', and stands: 
in opposition to the semblances that men are content with. Not only are they 
content with [these semblances], they feel a hatred of life, they are ashamed 
of it; a humanity bent on self-destruction, multiplying the cults of death, 
bringing about the union of the tyrant and the slave, the priest, the judge, 
and the soldier, always busy running life into the ground, mutilating it,killing it 
outright or by degrees, overlaying it or suffocating it with laws, properties, duties, 
empires - this is what Spinoza diagnoses in the world, this betrayal of the universe 
and mankind. (Deleuze, 1988a: 12) 
The 'positive, affirmative' nature of life can be made more concrete through the concept 
of 'affect'. Taken from Spinoza, this refers to the 'ability to affect and be affected' 
(Massumi in Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: xvii), and is something that - when maximised 
- increases life's power of acting (Deleuze, 1998a: 28) creating a feeling of joy (ibid.). Life 
should thus strive to maximise affect: a process Spinoza refers to as conatus. 
Deleuze and Guattari draw upon conatus in modifying the psychoanalytic concept of 
desire in the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Boundas, 2005: 263). For them, 
desire refers to a 'process of production without reference to any exterior agency' 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 170-171): it seeks only to maximise its own capacity to 
affect and be affected. They reject Lacan's claim that desire is created in response to a lack 
and argue instead that '[d]esire does not lack anything: it does not lack its object' (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 2004a: 28). Rather, it exists in a 'field of immanence' (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2004b: 171), revelling in 'a joy that implies no lack or impossibility' (ibid). 
Desire can therefore be seen as underpinning the 'production as process [that] overtakes 
all idealistic categories and constitutes a cycle whose relationship to desire is that of an 
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immanent principle' (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 5). Deleuze and Guattari talk of 
'desiring-machines',3 writing that '[t]he rule of continually producing production, of 
grafting producing onto the product, is a characteristic of desiring-machines or of 
primary production: the production of production' (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 8). 
These machines are the site of production (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 314) and form 
part of a process whose ends cannot be separated from its means, except as a 'residue': 
Desire and its object are one and the same thing: the machine, as a machine 
of a machine. Desire is a machine and the object of desire is another machine 
connected to it. Hence the product is always something removed or deducted 
from the process of producing: between the act of producing and the product 
something becomes detached, thus giving the vagabond, nomad subject a r e s i d u ~ . .
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 28) 
Deleuze and Guattari note that these 'desiring machines ... represent nothing, signify 
nothing, mean nothing, and are exactly what one makes of them, what is made with 
them, what they make in themselves' (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 31 7). They can be 
considered as a series of 'interruptions' that cut into flows of matter, 'removing portions', 
but not terminating the flow. Indeed, these 'interruptions' should be understood as 
'conditioning' the continuity of matter's flow. 
A slightly graver tone is also sounded in A Thousand Plateaus, however, in which Deleuze 
and Guattari make clear that it would be a mistake to simply fetishize desire as an 
unproblematic key to a revolutionary politics.· It 'is never an undifferentiated instinctual 
3 With biological organisms no longer regarded as the sole possessors of life, Deleuze and Guattari reject 
any distinction between the human, technology and nature (2004a: 2, 5). Thus, their use of the terms 
'machine' and 'desiring-machines' - as well as the claim in Anti-Oedipus that '[eJverything is a machine' 
(2004a: 2) - must not be read as being in contradiction with the claim that 'everything is alive'. I have 
already shown how Dcleuze and Guattari have dissolved the binary between materialism and vitalism 
and the concept of the machine builds on this. It abandons 'common sense' notions of the machine ~ ~
non-living and places it firmly in the 'essential reality' of the living It is through 'machinic' processes that 
life strives to realise itself. 
4 In a 1980 interviewDcleuze was asked how the circumstances surrounding the publication of A Tlwusand 
Plateaus earlier that year differed from those surrounding the publication of Anti-Oedipus eight years earlier. 
The answer perhaps offers a ~ I u e e as to the s ~ g h t l y y ~ o r e e nuanced .portrayal of desire in the later text: Anti-
Otdpius, says Deleuze, 'came Just after ~ ~ y y ~ 8 , , which .was a penod, of u p h e a ~ ~ and experimentation. A 
certain economy of the book, a new polIttcs, IS responSIble for today s conformity. We see a labor crisis an 
organized and deliberate crisis where books are concerned, and in other domains as well. Journalism 'has 
appropriated increasing power i ~ ~ l i t ~ r a t u . r e . . ~ d d .a flood of novels are r e ~ ~ r i n g g the theme of the 
family in its most banal form, d ~ 1 O g g 1 O ~ m t e e vana.ttons ~ n n m o ~ m y - d a d d y . . It s disconcerting to discover a 
ready-made, prefabricated novel.1O one s own family. This year IS the year of paternal heritage, and in this 
sense Anti-Oedipus was a total f ~ u r e . . It would take t o ~ ~ long to, analyze why, but the c ~ r r e n t t situation is 
especially difficult for young wnters, who are suffocattng I can t tell you where these dire feelings come 
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energy, but itself results from a highly developed, e n g i n e ~ r e d d setup rich in interactions': 
which 'potentially gives desire a fascist determination' (2004b: 237). At times, then, desin 
may 'desire its own repression' (ibid.), which is to say that those who are subject to forms 
of totalitarian control actively reproduce this control through their desire. 
Despite these warnings, life and desire are central to Deleuzean thought; the former 
containing all the e l e m ~ n t s s necessary for creation without reference to a point beyond 
itself. Deleuze makes this point himself in a short essay entitled 'Immanence: A Life':5 
We will say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and nothing else. It is not 
immanence to life, but the immanent that is nothing is itself a life .... It is 
complete power, complete bliss ... no longer dependent on a Being or 
submitted to an Act- it is an absolute immediate consciousness -whose very 
activity no longer refers to a being but is ceaselessly posed in a life. (2005a: 27, 
emphasis in original). 
This 'ceaselessly posed' immanent life is absolute: it knows nothing outside its own 
becoming. In a key passage, and echoing Spinoza's conatus, Deleuze arid Guattari w r i t ~ ~
that: 
immanence is immanent only to itself and consequently captures everything, 
absorbs All-One, and leaves nothing remaining to which it could be 
immanent ... whenever immanence is interpreted as immanent to Something, 
we can be sure that this Something reintroduces the transcendent (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1994:45). 
To cease the flow of this immanence, then, is to act in a manner hostile to life and preven1 
the new from coming into existence. I consider such operations more closely in the section 
on state thought, below. 
Difference-in-itself 
Deleuze's claim that 'life' is capable of producing the new immanently cannot be graspec 
without an attempt to understand Deleuze's commitment to 'difference-in-itself. Danie: 
W. Smith notes that for Deleuze 'the conditions of the new can be found only in a 
from.' (2007: 175) 
5 It should be noted that Dcleuze here refers to 'a life', rather than 'life'. In this, he is talking of the potential 
for 'a life' (the life of a person, an animal or a machine) to express life to fully maximise the affections 0 
life. 
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principle of difference - or more strongly, in a metaphysics of difference' (2008: 151). Deleuze 
argues that difference is ontologically prior to identity and representation, with identities 
imposed upon difference through an 'optical "effect'" (Deleuze, 1994: xix). If identities 
were prior to difference, Deleuze argues that it would be impossible to create the new. 
Difference is thus not a negation (to be 'different from' something) but the pnmary 
building block of existence (,difference-in-itse1f) (Deleuze, 1994: xviiii, xix, 50; 1986: 9; 
Smith, 2008). To differ is to say yes to life; to usher in new modes of living. '[I]n its 
essence, difference is the object of affirmation of affirmation itself. In its essence, 
affirmation is itself difference.' (1994: 52) 
The new emerges from difference through processes of 'differentiation' (Deleuze, 1994: 
48, 55-56, 208-214; 1 988b: 43), but only provided difference does not seek acceptance 
within the rules of sameness or identity that dominate us and seeks to 'destroy the 
dominant equilibrium' (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 521). This creation is not dialectical 
in the sense usually associated with the term because - as Deleuze argued in a discussion 
with Antonio Negri - difference does not force itself into a single point of contradiction 
It 
(Deleuze in Deleuze and Negri, 1990: online at generation-online.org). Rather, it seeks to 
affirm itself as difference (Deleuze, 1994: 268), creating new relations as it does SO.6 Deleuze 
labels the moment when difference creates the new as a 'singularity'. In this, he draws on 
the language of mathematics, where a singularity is a point at which the distinguishing 
features of a figure reveals itself: the corners of a square, for example, or the moments at 
which a curve bifurcates (Smith, 2008: 156). 
In a remark with obvious significance for students of utopia, Deleuze and Guattari state 
6 There may, however, be an?ther se.nse in w h i ~ h h \ a ~ t t h i ~ ~ p r o t e s t a t i ~ n ~ ) , , D e l ~ u z e ' ~ ~ thought could be said 
to be dialectical. Robert Smnerbnnk notes surulanues Wlth Adorno s negauve dialectics' and Merleau. 
Ponty's 'hyperdialectics' (2007: ~ ~ 90). In both, Sinnerbrink a r ~ e s , , the .abstractions ~ f f identity contained in 
Hegel's dialectics are refused I ~ ~ favour of. an u n d e ~ s t a n ~ n g g of difference (which, unlike Deleuze, is 
contained in the individual subject), mearu?g that. d l ~ e c ~ c s s b ~ c o m e s s u n s ~ b l e e and always seeks to go 
beyond what exists (see 2 ~ 0 7 : : 95:100 for Smnerbnnks diSCUSSion of n e ~ u v e e dialectics; 162.168 for a 
discussion of hyper-dialecucs). :rhIS, I suggest, .may. offer ~ ~ further producuve method of reading utopian 
spaces, although it will not be directly pursued m this theSIS. 
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that singularities do not emerge on a pre-determined historical path, and we cannol 
, . 
understand 'progress' as the linear emergence of singularities - 'the movement is not frorr. 
one point to another, but becomes perpetual, without aim or destination, withoul 
departure or arrival' (2004b: 389). They are unpredictable events that can be likened tc 
Nietzsche's concept of the 'eternal return' which should not - says Deleuze - be 
understood as 'the return of something that is ... "one" or the "same''', but that which 'is 
affirmed of becoming'. That which differs returns, producing the new as it does sa 
(Deleuze, 1986: 48). 
It is important to note, however, that Deleuze is not a pure philosopher of flux for whom 
all points of a multiplicity are singularities. In Anti-Oedipus, he and Guattari note that there 
must be 'an element of antiproduction coupled with the process [of production], (2004a: 
11). Whilst Deleuze's ontology may commit to the idea that matter is alive, he alsc 
maintain a place for Freud's death instinct, noting with Guattari that 'desire desires death 
also, because the full body of death is its motor' (2004a: 9). As Steven Shaviro states, it i! 
sometimes necessary, then, for a 'dose of mortality' to be inserted so that sense can be 
bestowed upon the world. Deleuze thus states that we should to think 'in terms of speeds 
and slownesses, of frozen catatonias and accelerated movements' (Deleuze, 1988a: 129); 
the moment of creation coming when 'everything stops dead for a moment, e v e r y t h i n ~ ~
freezes in place -:- and then the whole process will begin over again' (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2004a: 8). 
These 'speeds and slownesses' can be related to what Deleuze - after Bergson - calls the 
'actual' and the 'virtual' realms (1988b). These should not be opposed (with the 'actual 
that which exists and the 'virtual' that which does not exist) - rather, the virtual is the 
realm of pure difference; the chaotic mass from which order differentiates itself (Deleuzel 
1994: 208-209). This differs from the field of the 'possible', as Deleuze notes in Bergsonism: 
the possible is a false notion, the source of false problems. The real is supposed to 
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resemble it. That is to say, we completely give ourselves a real that is ready-made, 
preformed, pre-existent to itself, and that will pass into existence according to an 
order of successive limitations. Everything is already completely given: all of the real 
in the image, in the psuedo-actuality of the possible. Then the sleight of hand 
becomes obvious: If the real is said to resemble the possible, is this not in fact 
because the real was expected to come about by its own means, to "project 
backward" a fictitious image of it, and to claim that it was possible at any time, 
before it happened? In fact, it is not the real that resembles the possible, it is the 
possible that resembles the real, because it has been abstracted from the real once 
made, arbitrarily extracted from the real like a sterile double. Hence, we no longer 
understand anything either of the mechanism of difference or of the mechanism 
of creation. (1988b: 98) 
The opposition between that which is 'possible' and that which is 'actual' is thus replaced 
by the coexistence of the 'virtual' and the 'actual': when the virtual is 'actualised' it does so 
through a process of 'differentiation' (differing from itself) (Smith, 2008: 153). 
The virtual operates on a level imperceptible to our 'daily reality' (which is only a counter-
effect of the virtual), but which may well actualise (through differentiation) to become part 
of that 'daily reality'. Manuel DeLanda likens this to the science of 'intensive 
morphogenesis'7 (2002: 6), in which apparently chaotic matter self-organises to produce 
relatively stable systems.8 DeLanda (2002 and 2006), along with Protevi (200 I) and 
Massumi (1992) have drawn links between this aspect of D ~ u z e ' s s ontology and the 
science of complexity theory, in which organisation appears from an apparently 'chaotic' 
multiplicity of matter, and this can neatly be brought back to the concept of life via the 
following extract, from the essay 'Immanence: A Life': 
A life contains only virtuals. It is made of virtualities, events, singularities. 
What we call virtual is not something that lacks reality, but something that 
enters into a process of actualization by following the plane that gives it its 
own reality. (Deleuze, 2005a: 5) 
Deleuze's ontology therefore assigns transcendental power to the immanent realm9, 
leading him to claim he achieves a 'reversal of Platonism' (Deleuze, 1990a: 300) -
7 A literal translation from the Greek gives the phrase 'beginning of shape'. 
8 Similarities can be posited with Ludwig von Mises concept of 'catallaxy' (famously taken up by F.A. 
Hayek), but for reasons outlined by Eugene W Holland (2011: 105-111), capitalism can never produce this 
kind of organisation. 
9 Deleuze positions himself as a f o l l . o ~ e r r of K ~ t t in this regard, stating in Dilfn-ence and &petition that Kant 
'is the one who discovers the prodlgtous domam of the transcendental. He IS the analogue of a great 
explorer - not of another world, but of the upper or lower reaches of this one' (1994: 135) 
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identifying the motor for change as difference-in-itself; present in the real, the here and 
the now; rather than in the absent, abstract, elsewhere and else-when. 
Multiplicity 
Given his claim that becoming is driven by the actualisation of difference, it is perhaps 
tempting to think of Deleuze as a thinker who posits the individual as the agent of social 
change. This, however, would be a mistake for two (related) reasons. Firstly, Deleuze 
believes that the opposition between the one and the multiple is false. Secondly, he 
believes that the concept of the individual is in itself an imposition of sameness upon 
difference, and so the individual cannot serve as stable ontological ground for political 
action. 
In rejecting the opposition between the one and the multiple, Deleuze draws on Dum 
Scotus' concept of 'univocity' (Deleuze, 1994: 35-36) and 'the great theoretical thesis oj 
Spinozism: a single substance [with] an infinity of attributes' (Deleuze, 1988a: 17). For 
Deleuze, this single substance is composed of difference-in-itself, and so monism must nol 
be opposed to pluralism (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 20). 'There is only one form oj 
thought' claims Deleuze - 'it's the same thing: one can only think in a monistic or 
pluralistic manner. The only enemy is two. Monism and pluralism: it's the same thing' 
(Deleuze, 2001: 95). 
Deleuze calls this 'same thing' multiplicity, drawing further on the thought of Henri 
Bergson (1988b)lO. The term refers to 'a complex structure that does not reference a prior 
unity' (Roffe 2005a: 176); it is a single entity constituted of 'different' elements (as for 
Spinoza, these elements should be considered as expressions of a single substance). II 
'escape[s] the abstract opposition between the multiple and the one' (Deleuze and 
10 Autonomist marxist thought has revived a similar notion by drawing on Spinoza's concept of the 
'multitude'. The work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000); and in Paulo Virno (2004) is 
instructive here. 
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Guattari, 2004b: 36) and should not be understood as 'a numerical fragment of a lost 
Unity or Totality or ... the organic element of a Unity or Totality yet to come' (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 2004b: 36). The multiplicity is a 'body' that is defined by the 'sum total of 
the material elements belonging to it' in their stages of 'movement and rest, speed and 
slowness' and by its potential to affect and be affected (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 287; 
Deleuze, 1988: 127). As it increases these affects (through moments of 'singularity' _ 
sometimes referred to as a process of 'assemblage'), it changes its nature (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2004b: 9); and this prefigurative element is an important part of a multiplicity's 
constitution. 
The application of this concept to a collective body is clear - the collective does not have 
a single identity that erases the identities of those who constitute it, and is something that 
is always contested and open to becoming. For Deleuze, however, the individual body 
should be understood similarly: it too is an 'assemblage' constituted by a variety of non-
identical 'material elements' in both body and mind (which cannot be separated) - and by 
that with which it interacts (that which affects it and can be affected by it): 
n 
An individual is ... always composed of an infinity of extensive parts ... These 
parts ... are not themselves individuals; there is no essence of each one, they 
are defined solely by their exterior determinism, and they always exist as 
infinities; but they always constitute an existing individual to the extent that 
an infinity of them enters into this or that relation (Deleuze, 1988a: 77, cf. 
Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 288-289). 
This individual body should not be understood as something separate from life, but 
something composed of and by life, as Deleuze and Guattari make clear when they 
directly address the reader in A Thousand Plateaus: 
You are ... a set of speeds and slowness between unformed particles, a set of 
nonsubjectified affects. You have the individuality of a day, a season, a year, a 
life (regardless of its duration) - a climate, a wind, a fog, a swarm, a pack ... Or 
at least you can have it, you can reach it' (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 289). 
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Space and Place 
Given this reading of Deleuze as someone who privileges difference and becoming, it i 
perhaps. tempting to read him as a philosopher of pure flux: a thinker solely interested ir 
flows; in the moments when life flees. Space would thus constitute a limit on life - ar 
identity placing limits on difference by assigning desire channels and resulting in th« 
cessation of becoming. Indeed, as Saul Newman notes, Deleuze's insistence on th« 
primacy of desire over lack conforms to 'one of the central tenets of the poststructuralis' 
critique of place' (2007: 102), and he is correct to say that: 
there can be no distinct place of power because power, like desire, is involved 
in a multitude of instances, at every level of society. Nor can there be a distinct 
place of resistance because we voluntarily submit to, and often desire, 
domination: thus the "place" of resistance is essentially unstable, and is always in 
danger of becoming part of the assemblage of power. (2007: 101) 
It does not follow, however, that Deleuze is not interested in space. To abandon it entirel) 
in favour of becoming would be to embrace the hysteria Newman warns against; tc 
-privilege chaos over order rather than acknowledge their inter-relation. In this he can h 
seen as a modern day Heraclitus who - though so often considered a philosopher of pun 
flux - did not embrace permanent change over a semblance of place, but rather noted tha 
'the river where I step is not the same and is' (2003: 51, emphasis added). Thus, whilst th« 
identity of the river Heraclitus steps in cannot be presupposed to the different bodies anc 
qualities that constitute it (its levels of pollution, the water level, the wildlife present, anc 
so on, all of which will vary over time) 1 I, we are still able to identify this river as the sam 
river (and name it as a place) over a period of time: it does not disappear as an analytil 
category, as Aristotle claims (2004: 152). Rather, what is clear here is that Heraclitus' rive: 
is produced by differences that constitute it (these differences themselves being the produc 
of prior differences in weather systems, geological conditions, and so on): it is ~ ~
multiplicitous body always open to further becoming. Repetition gives a spac« 
11 Some differences can be observed over very short spaces of time: different molecules of water be passin! 
from one second to the next, for example. Others - such as the course of the river - will only realisl 
themselves over years, perhaps even centuries or millenia. It should also also be noted that moments 0 
differentiation may occur suddenly, and with little warning: water-levels and speeds may change with littll 
to no warning. 
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recognisable identity and allows it to be named, but this repetition is the repetition of 
difference. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze refers to this as a 'Copernican revolution' 
, 
writing: 'that identity [should] not be [ontologically] first, [but] that it exist as a principle 
but as a second principle, as a principle become; that it revolve around the Different' 
(1994: 41). 
In A Thousand Plateaus, meanwhile, Deleuze and Guattari talk of the agency required to 
create this repetition of difference, and refer to the space created as 'milieu' (2004b: 343-
346): a 'block of spacetime constituted by the periodic repetition of the component' 
which, although 'coded .. .is in a perpetual state of trans coding or transduction' (2004b: 
345). Thus, Deleuze sees space as a form (re)produced by those who occupy it (cf. 
Buchana,n and Lambert, 2005a: 3). Against the understanding of Deleuze as a thinker 
who exclusively privileges flow, flux and becoming, however, this is not an ecstatic, 
spontaneous process: it requires moments of reterritorialisation. 
It might be said, then, that space - for Deleuze - is a form of organisation: the manner in 
.. 
which form is given to matter. In this, his approach can be likened to that of the 
geographer Doreen Massey, whose work For Space seeks (with frequent references to 
Deleuze) to understand space not simply as a container in which things happen, or a form 
of being imposed on life; but a form 'constituted through interactions' and so 'always in 
the process of being made ... never finished; never closed' (2005: 9). 'For the future to be 
open', she writes, 'space must be open too.' (2005: 12). It is, as Andrew Merrifield notes, 
'simultaneous!J a process and a thing' (1993: 521). 
Utopia's etymology, however, mentions place rather than space, and it is important to think 
through what this might mean. Deleuze does not explicitly ruminate on this - perhaps 
because 'space' as he understands it is a conceptual rather than geographical term - and 
there is little secondary literature that engages with the difference between space and 
37 
place in Deleuzean thought. Bruce B. Janz (2002), however, has suggested that - fo] 
1 
Deleuze and Guattari - 'place' refers to an unstable 'sense of place' created by the subjec 
traversing physical space; it is the 'consistency' generated through the interaction betweel 
this space and the bodies who (re)produce it and are affected by it as they do so. This i: 
also similar to the approach taken by Massey, who writes that: 
[i]f space is ... a simultaneity of stories-so-far, then places are collections of 
those stories, articulations within the wider power-geometries of space. Their 
character will be a product of those intersections within that wider setting, 
and what is made of them. And, too, of the non-meetings-up, the 
disconnections and the relations not established, the exclusions. All this 
contributes to the specificity of place.' (2005: 130). 
Places are not pregiven, fixed localisations in an ocean of spatial flux (1994) but are' spatia-
temporal events' (2005: 130, emphasis in original) that occupy the 'here and now': when the 
now changes, so does the here (2005: 139). What might be called a 'sense of place 
emerges through the 'configurations of trajectories which have their OWl 
temporalities ... where the successions of meetings, the accumulation of weavings anc 
encounters build up a history.' (2005: 139) Place is made by 'returns ... and the vel") 
differentiation of temporalities that lend continuity. But the returns are always to a place 
that has moved on, the layers of our meeting intersecting and affecting each other 
weaving a process of space-time. (ibid.) Place, then, can be seen as when a space acquire: 
some consistency: when it might be named - it is where events that create a particula] 
identity occur. Thus, place should not be ascribed a pre-given, 'authentic' consistency, bu 
one constructed by the interactions of bodies that traverse it: it is an identity that come: 
from the repetition of difference, from the events that take place. In this thesis, I move thi: 
further from strictly geographic concepts of place to conceptual places: planes UpOl 
which organisation occurs. 
The task of a spatially grounded Deleuzean political philosophy, then, is to think of (an< 
create) places produced by a multicplicities constituted by desire. When this occurs, place: 
are unstable and open to becoming. They cannot be entirely separated from the bodie: 
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that produce it in the manner that the product cannot be entirely separated from the 
forces that produce it. 
State Thought 
Deleuze cautions that thought must not be separated from life. There should, he says, be a 
'complex' unity between thought and life, in which '[m]odes of life [inspire] ways of 
thinking; modes of thinking create ways of living. Life activates thought, and thought in 
turn ciffirms life' (2005a: 66, emphasis in original). Yet most western philosophy fails in this 
task. It seeks to create places in accordance with abstract principles and should be 
understood as hostile to his inorganic life. Thus, before a 'nomadic' political thought that 
follows from Deleuze's ontological claims can be explicated, it will be necessary to 
consider the philosophical tradition of 'state thought' and show how it produces place. 
Deleuze does not use the term 'state thought' himself, although in his introduction to A 
Thousand Plateaus Brian Massumi states that the book can be read as being against 'state 
philosophy': the tradition of Western metaphysics revolving around representation 
(Massumi in Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: xii-xiii). I have chosen to modify this to 'state 
thought' in order to make it clear that it is not merely abstract philosophising that 
generates a representationalist ontology, but rather that they are reproduced in everyday 
life and through 'common sense'. The term 'state', meanwhile, draws attention to 
Deleuze's resonances with anarchist thought (cf. May: 1991, 1994, Newman: 2007, 2010; 
Day, 2005; Jun: 2007; Kuhn: 2009), which I weave into the following two sections. The 
term should not, however, be understood as referring solely to the geopolitical state; and 
nor is it sufficient to expanded it to include institutional hierarchies that adopt 'statist' 
modes of operation (the school, the military, and so on). These are undoubtedly statist 
forms, but for Deleuze the state functions as a mode rf thought: a 'concrete assemblage 
which realises the machine of overcoding of a society' (Deleuze and Parnet, 1987: 97), 
and may be produced wherever bodies interact. Thus, Deleuze does not see the state as 
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something that can be 'smashed' (or even dismantled) solely through tackling hierarchica 
institutions, but recognises it also as a mode of thinking t and living that is hostile to thl 
immanent flow of life. In this, he is close to the position of the anarchist Gustav Landauel 
who stated that: 
[o]ne can throwaway a chair and destroy a pane of glass, but those are idle 
talkers and credulous idolaters of words who regard the state as such a thing 
or as a fetish that one can smash in order to destroy ... The state is a condition, a 
certain relationship between human beings, a mode of behavior; we destroy it by 
contracting other relationships, by behaving differently toward one another ... We 
are the State and we shall continue to be the State until we have created the 
institutions that form a real community' (1994: 1). 
Yet Deleuze is more pessimistic than this: there can be no 'real community' that frees u 
from the dangers of statism once-and-for-all. An anarchist society cannot simply be aJ 
end of history, for even that will not be free of the state form in thought (Newman, 2001). 
As a representationalist mode of thought, statism posits identity prior to difference ani 
denies difference its role in the creation of the new. It does this via two seemingi' 
contradictory stances. The first of these is by deeming unregulated life as the creator of , 
dangerous disorder - 'chaos' or 'anarchy' in their everyday, pejorative senses: matter i 
something that must be 'subjugated' and 'organized' (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 37:: 
and so requires 'ordering' in accordance with an essential essence. Despite drawing il 
power from the play of difference that characterises life (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004t 
400), state thought fails to comprehend difference-in-itself, privileging the essences c 
identity and sameness - 'goals, paths, conduits, channels, organs' (Deleuze and G u a t t a ~ ~
2004b: 413), which posit the 'submission of the line to the point' (Deleuze and Guattari 
2004b: 323); rendering all difference a difference from a fixed, knowable identity. Th 
second claim that state thought makes is that matter is not alive at all, but inert - and thu 
incapable of creating any thing. 12 Thus, it follows Aristotle in adopting 'hylomorphism 
12 Welchman discusses the (apparent) contradiction between these two positions in greater depth, arguin 
that because 'Chaos is matter as threat ... the neutralization of this threatening conception of matter is 
conception of the installation of inert or dead matter' (1997: 214-215). See also Protevi's comments i 
Protevi, DeLanda and Thanem (2005a: 66). 
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tnrough which 'acttve torms are lmposea whOlly ana totally upon passive mater, and voila, 
the thing is produced' (fhanem, 2001: 33, c( Protevi, 2001), As John Protevi's Political 
Physics: Deleuze, Derrida and the Body Politic notes, this results in the homogenisation of 
difference (2001: 38, 79) through the installation and perpetuation of hierarchical forms 
(123). It 'resonates with fascist desire [in which] the leader comes from on high to rescue 
the chaos of the people by his imposition of order' (9). (It is crucial to remember that this 
is still a property of desire, however: an immanence that fails to stay true to the conditions 
of its own becoming.) 
Such a mode of thought is 'arborescent' (tree-like): it seeks to 'root man' (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2004b: 27) to a 'General' governing principle from which all laws are dictated. 
Trees serve 'not a[s] metaphor[s] at all but an image of thought, a functioning, a whole 
apparatus that is planted in thought to make it go in a straight line and produce famous 
correct ideas' (Deleuze and Parnet, 2007: 25). These 'famous correct ideas' deny the free 
play of difference and 'organize, stabilize [and] neutralize' life- injecting it with 
'redundancies' (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 15). Quoting Clement Rosset, Deleuze and 
Guattari argue, in words that are - again - of obvious itftportance to students of 
utopianism, that through these 'redundancies' 'the world acquires as its double some other 
sort of world ... there exists some other place that contains the key to desire missing in this 
world' (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 28). The arborescent form of thought is hostile to 
life - it subordinates desire to lack and when that happens 'it's all over. no desire 
' , 
stirs ... Whenever desire climbs a tree, internal repercussions trip it up and it falls to its 
death' (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 15). 
Morality is key to arborescent thought. In Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze notes that it 
portrays itself as 'divine, transcendent, superior to life' (Deleuze, 1986: 122), making 
judgements on differentiations and becomings in the name of transcendent principle or 
lack held over and above the world of forces and matter. In presenting itself as a necessary 
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'control' on the flows of life, morality betrays 'an extraordinary hatred, a hatred for life, I 
hatred for all that is active and affirmative in life' (ibid.). It'is a dialectical mode of though 
rooted in what Nietzsche called ressentiment: the jealousy of a 'reactive' subject towards tht 
active subject leading the reactive subject to label the active subject 'evil' (1986, 44; 121) 
Deleuze thus approves of Nietzsche's rejection of Hegel's master-slave dialectic, in whicl 
the reactive slave comes to resent the master's ability to act and argues that the master is 
therefore, 'evil'. In passing this judgement the slave notes that they are not like the maste 
and thus must be 'good'. Such thought brings the concept of 'good' into the world only a 
the opposite of evil, meaning the 'negative becomes "the original act, the beginning, thl 
act par excellence'" (Deleuze, 1986: 120-121). The moral good is thus predicate upon evil 
and the striving force of life is something to be denied. In such a system there is no roon 
for the becoming of difference: '[r]evolution never proceeds by way of the negative 
(Deleuze, 1994: 208), a claim expanded upon by Simon Tormey, who argues that statl 
thought 'subordinates that which exists or that which mqy come to exist to a system a 
formal knowledge, in turn denying the possibility of contingency, creativity, innovatiOl 
and of difference' (2006: 141: emphasis in original). 
State thought thus seeks to organise space in accordance with abstract principles - a belie 
in the moral good - rather allow life to regulate itself and produce the new througl 
differentiation. Deleuze and Guattari refer to the resulting space as 'striated s p a c ~ ~
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 425). In a striated space relationships are defined an< 
arranged in a fixed order: the flow of life is defined 'goals and paths, conduits, channels 
organs, an entire organon' (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 413). Governance of such l 
space is similar to Euclidean geometry, in which a large number of theorems are premise( 
on a set number of axioms and in which a line is formed only between two point 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 233).13 Law and order operate in the name of 'rationalit) 
13 There is something of a tension between Dcleuze and Guattari's rejection of Euclidean geometry and thl 
influence Dcleuze draws from Spinoza, whose Etllics is written in an axiomatic manner derived froll 
Euclid. 
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L4"u, UUILILULIC I;) ;)UUVIUUl<l.LLU LV <l.U;)U<l.LUUU, lClUd.UUUg caprurea, annexed, trapped in a 
space or territory over which it has ... minimal control.' (Tormey and Townshend, 2006: 
50) Striation thus provides a space for 'the art of governing people or operating the State 
apparatus' (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 525): the 'excess' of life, difference and desire is 
repressed in favour of 'order'. 
Deleuze argues that the striated space is a space of hierarchical arrangements, but it must 
be understood that he is not referring merely (or primarily) to the formal, pyramidal 
hierarchy in which increasing power-over rests with a decreasing number of people, as 
described by Colin Ward, who argues that: 
authoritarian institutions are organised as pyramids: the state, the private or 
public corporation, the army, the police, the church, the university, the hospital: 
they are pyramidal structures with a small group of decision-makers at the top 
and a broad base of people whose decisions are made for them at the bottom. 
(1973: 22). 
Though such hierarchies clearly exist - and will be engaged with throughout this thesis _ 
Deleuze is keen to highlight that the hierarchy of striated thought does not necessarily 
take this classic pyramidal form. Rather, it can also be utilised to refer to the way in which 
prevailing power relations prevent difference-in-itself from creating the new, allowing the 
reactive forces of identity and representation to dominate over the active force of life and 
imposing a 'something' to which immanence is considered to be immanent. This 
hierarchy manifests itself through 'the reign of law and of virtue' and so 'morality and 
religion are ... theories of hierarchy' (Deleuze, 1986: 60-61). The law of value in capitalist 
society can also be added to this list, and hierarchy can be extended to cover 'bourgeois' 
forms of organisation in which power is produced immanently,14 creating: 
an unrivalled slavery, an unprecedented subjugation: there are no longer even 
any masters, but only slaves commanding other slaves; there is no longer any 
need to burden the animal from the outside, it shoulders its own burden. Not 
that man [sic] is ever the slave of technical machines; he is rather the slave of 
the social machine.(Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 276) 
14 There are similarities with Foucault here. He notes that power relates to the 'multiplicity of forGe relations 
immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization' (1990: 92). 
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Striation and hierarchy also works through the body of the (supposed) self-identic: 
subject: the 'universal thinking subject' (herself a creation oCstate thought), who enable 
an appearance of 'universality' to come into being (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 411 
through the striation of mental space, which posits the individual subject's consciousnei 
as the locus for the creation of order (Deleuze and Guattari, 200b: 415). Indeed, Delem 
and Guattari go so far as to say that 'the unity of the faculties at the center constituted b 
the Cogito, is the State consensus raised to the absolute' (2004b: 415). This consenSl 
results from the 'striating of mental space', and posits the individual subject 
consciousness as the locus for the creation of new forms of order (ibid.; Deleuze an 
Guattari, 1994: 46). It fails to acknowledge that difference creates active forces whic 
escape consciousness (Deleuze, 1986: 38), and that consciousness is the expression ( 
reactive force: the way a 'self-identical' individual responds to the given order (Deleuzi 
1986: 39). 
Nomadic Thought 
Opposing state thought, Deleuze and Guattari point the way towards what I am calling 
'nomadic thought'.J; This works in harness with the inorganic force of life in order to g 
beyond that which exists, encouraging virtual singularities to actualise themselves. This: 
not done with reference to a transcendent, lacking 'beyond', and cannot be discerned b 
the rational subject. Rather, it is built on the belief that the body politic can - by creatin 
'smooth space' - call into being the necessary forces to bring around genuine change. It : 
an 'artisanal' politics of 'working with' this body rather than an 'architectural' (c 
hylomorphic) politics of 'working on' matter (Protevi, 2001: 122-123); and has significar 
resonances with anarchist and autonomist forms of organisation. It draws a distinctio 
15 FredricJameson provides some useful commentary on the relationship between the nomadic and the stal 
in an essay entitled 'Dualism and Deleuze', published in HI/enCeJ of the Dialectic (2009: 181-201). For hill 
this emerges as a 'very late theme' in A Thousand Plateaus and is frequently utilised in order to 'recontain. 
all the complex and heterogenous material: something like a narrative ... [or] even ideological frame th: 
allows us to reorder it into simpler patterns.' (2009: 199) This should be kept in mind during this thesi 
there is a great deal of complexity and heterogeneity to the concepts of - and opposition between - stal 
utopia(nism) and nomadic utopia(nism). 
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ideal whilst promoting the latter as a method of evaluating in the name of life. 
Deleuze and Guattari refer to the nomadic subject as a 'schizophrenic', or 'schizo-
revolutionary' (sometimes plainly 'schizo') - a subject traversed by a multiplicity of active 
forces. The schizo is constituted by difference; not self-identity - a plurality of forces, 
affects and becomings combine to determine their reality. Following Nietzsche's claim that 
active force escapes consciousness, they do not 'think' change in an abstract or idealistic 
manner, but instead 'feel' it (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 21). This is not an easy position 
to be in - the experience is at times 'harrowing, emotionally overwhelming ... which brings 
the schizo as close as possible to matter, to a burning, living centre of matter ... that 
unbearable point where the mind touches matter and lives its every intensity, consumes it' 
(ibid.), yet such a life may lead to 'a feeling of violent, almost vertiginous, happiness' 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 33). In a dazzling piece of prose, Deleuze and Guattari 
write that schizos: 
know incredible sufferings, vertigos, and sicknesses. They have their specters. 
They must reinvent each gesture. But such a man [sic] produces himself as a 
free man, irresponsible, solitary, and joyous, finall)i. able to say and do 
something in his own name, without asking permission; a desire lacking nothing, 
a flux that overcomes barriers and codes, a name that no longer designates any 
ego whatever. He has simply ceased being afraid of becoming mad. He 
experiences and lives himself as the sublime sickness that will no longer affect 
him. (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 142) 
Through these intense feelings the new is brought into the world, for the schizo is 'the 
universal producer' (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a:7). However, unlike the rational subject 
of State Thought, schizos '[do] not speak of another world' to create this new (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 2004a: 142): rather, they are 'propelled' by forces immanent to the present _ 
they 'know how to leave', having 'made departure into something as simple as being born 
or dying' (ibid.). Their product is that which is created when they flee: the aformentioned 
'residue'; an (actual) order created out of (virtual) chaos, in a manner analogous to the 
operations of complex systems. In this - again - Deleuze and Guattari can be seen as 
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close to particular strands of anarchist thought, which also acknowledge that chaos an 
order are not simply opposites, but rather that chaos has a tendency to self-organise int 
order (and continue to disrupt this order) (Bey, 1994: 2; 2003: 21, 36; Crimethinc: onlin 
at thecloud.crimethinc.com). 
Given my misgivings around the term 'schizo', which I feel risks romanticising (and thu 
trivialising) mental illness (though this is clearly not Deleuze and Guattari's intention), all! 
which downplays the relationship between the subject and the spatial realm; I will dra, 
on another of Deleuze and Guattari's figures here: the nomad. In A Thousand Plateaus the 
write that: 
the nomad is not at all the same as the migrant; for the migrant goes 
principally from one point to another, even if the second point is uncertain, 
unforeseen, or not well localized. But the nomad goes from point to point 
only as a consequence and as a factual necessity; in principle, points for him 
[sic] are always relays along a trajectory. (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 419) 
The nomad's continual departure is 'life answer[ing] the call of death, not by fleeing but ~ ~
making flight create' (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 122, emphasis added) - they draw 'lim 
of flight' (ibid): movements going beyond the present and fleeing striated organisatior 
With this constant departure to an unknown destination, they embody the version ( 
anarchism offered by George \Voodcock, which sees it: 
not [as] a swelling stream flowing on to its sea of destiny. .. but rather of water 
percolating through porous ground - here forming for a time a strong 
underground current, there gathering into a swirling pool, trickling through 
crevices, disappearing from sight, and then re-emerging where the cracks in 
the social structure may offer it a course to run. As a doctrine it changes 
constantly; as a movement it grows and disintegrates, in constant fluctuation 
(1975: 15). 
The nomad thus remains animated by desire even after the fulfilment of a particular lac 
- an aspect of Deleuze's philosophy which Eugene \V, Holland links to Jacques Lacan 
'metonymy of desire', in which a desired object (which serves to give the subject a 
identity) loses its desirable qualities as soon as it is realized (2005a: 61). Thus, the nomad 
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As Karen Houle writes, Deleuze's philosophy 'shifts the fulcrum of action and 
evaluation .. .from the outcomes of an action to the nature of the grounds upon which an 
action was enabled ... the worthiness of a thing or a state of affairs lies in the conditions of 
its becoming' (2005: 95) - these conditions of becoming, of course, being ongoing (they 
defined the action and are allowed to continue after the action 'has taken place). 
Important to note is that space is central to the nomad: it is space that they traverse and 
that they affect as they traverse, producing what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as 'smooth 
space', in which state thought'S hylomorphism is abandoned and life is given power to self-
regulate non-hierarchically (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 389). Nomads group together 
and form 'pack' or 'band' like groups which are defined immanently without a pre-
determined structure, organisation or an ordering moral principle (Deleuze and Guattari, 
2004b: 395), creating multiplicities which seek to increase their ability to affect and be 
affected, and in which there is no opposition between the individual and the collective. 
Their connections take the form of the 'rhizome' - a network of connections that are 
non-hierarchical in the traditional sense (it lacks a vertical structwe) and in the Deleuzean 
sense (it lacks an ordering point) (Deleuze and Guattari: 2004b: 3-28). 
Deleuze and Guattari refer to these rhizomatic connections between bodies as a 'nomadic 
war machine'. This is not related to 'war' in the everyday meaning of the term, but rather 
recalls Hobbes' claim that 'war is against the State, and makes it impossible' (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2004b: 394, cf. 2004b: 253). The 'nomadic war machine', then, 'is the mode of a 
social state that wards off and prevents the State' (ibid.) - a multiplicity that seeks to 
perpetuate immanent relationships in a smooth space. In the nomadic war machine, 
difference cannot be incorporated into identity or represented according to some 
operation of the 'similar' (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 395). Deleuze refers to the 
regulation of space in this way as 'crowned anarchy' (1994: 55), recalling George 
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Woodcock's claim that anarchism universalises aristocracy (1975: 30), creating a group ( 
masters combining with other masters. In this, the 'nomadic war machine' can be seen t 
offer a vision of anarchist organisation that answers Nietzsche's criticism of anarchism fc 
forming an alliance of reactive subjects: the triumph of the 'weak' who are scared ( 
power and too timid to forge the conditions for becoming (1994: 52).16 
The nomadic war machine, then, seeks power; but it seeks the power of production ratht 
than the power of hierarchy. Deleuze identifies this with the Nietzschean 'will-to-powe 
(1986: 49-51; 61-64) and Spinoza's potentia (1988a: 97-99); and uses the French ten 
puissance to refer to it. Such a concept of power is distinct from hierarchical operations ( 
power (Spinoza's potestas, which Deleuze often renders as pouvoir) - referring instead to 
body's capacity to affect and be affected, and to the 'capacity to multiply connections tho 
may be realized by a given "body'" (Massumi in Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: xviii). Th 
understanding of power does not see it as a 'zero-sum' game in which the power of 011 
body necessarily decreases the power of another, and does not posit the power of one < 
hostile to the freedom of another (freedom in this sense becoming bound up with th 
power-to (May, 2011). Indeed, the increase in power of one body may result in th 
increase in the power of another. 
In order to get around the fact that the English term 'power' does not distinguish betwee 
potentia/puissance and potestas/pouvoir (cf. Hardt in Negri, 1991: xi-xii), it is useful to explOJ 
the difference between the concepts 'power-to', 'power-over' and 'power-with,.17 M 
reading of these concepts is indebted to Uri Gordon (who notes their importance fc 
contemporary anarchist practice), and for him, 'power-over' refers to acts of dominatiOl 
behaviours which prevent others from acting; 'power-to' refers to empowerment - th 
16 For more on the relationship between Nietzsche and anarchism, see Call, 2002: 40-42; Newman, 2007: 
48; and the John Moore edited collection I Am Not A Man, I Am Dynamite: Nittvehe and Anarchism (2004). 
17 These terms are used frequently in anarchist literature, but my use of them here is indebted to U 
Gordon's (2008) reading of Starhawk (1987) - although Gordon takes a more analytical approach, and 
more cautious about embracing 'power-with' than I (though as I note below, the creation of 'smooth spac 
cannot be seen as a once-and-for-all utopian moment). 
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enhanced by combining with others (2008: 48-55). Nomads, then, express 'power-to' and 
form nomadic war machines in order to enhance this through 'power-with'. I will use 
these three forms of power throughout this thesis - using 'power-over' to delineate the 
Deleuzean understanding of hierarchy, pouvoir and potestas; power-to' to express the 
striving of desire, life, puissance and potentia; and 'power-with' to refer to the way that 
'power-to' can be increased by bringing nomadic bodies into contact with other nomadic 
bodies to form a multiplicity. 
It should be clear, then, that the nomadic war machine privileges neither the individual 
nor the collective. Instead, it rejects the (necessity of this) opposition itself, designating it 
the product of state thought (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 308).19 The nomad is 'fully a 
part of the crowd and at the same time completely outside it, removed from it ... on the 
edge' (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 33) - there is no 'self organising life on their behalf. 
Lewis Hyde's re-imagining of the concept of the 'dividual' is also useful here: unlike the 
'individual' (who views herself as entirely autonomous and operating in a world of 
metaphysical freedom), the 'dividual' acknowledges that 'we ~ \ e e always simultaneously 
individuals and sunk in our communities', and 'is constituted by the complexity of the 
world' around her (2010: online at bombsite.powweb.com). The more dividual nomadic 
bodies join with other dividual nomadic bodies (and acknowledge their own internal 
difference), the greater the power-with and the greater the chances of creating the new 
and ensuring that occupied space remains smooth, and remains open to new formations 
and modes of life. 20 
18 Their capacity to affect and be affected, p e ~ h a p s . . . 
19 Again, there are significant resonances WIth anarchism he.re. See, for example Kropotkin (2009), Bey 
(1994: 3) and Goldman (1998: 7 ~ - 8 6 ) ) - although K r o ~ o t k i n n and. Goldman see a division between the 
individual and the collective, even If not a necessary tenSIon (the pomt of Deleuze - and, to a lesser extent 
Bey, is that the ontological status of the individual is disrupted). 
20 It should be noted that D e l e . u ~ e e hims?lf . u ~ e d d t ~ e e concept of ~ e . . 'dividual' to refer to the ability of 




This, then, is the Deleuzean realisation of 'the good life': a space in which the future: 
always 'open and never pre-given; a space in which a multiplicitous assemblage ( 
dividuals (a 'nomadic war machine') utilise its power-with to create the new. But given t h ~ ~
- as I have shown - Deleuze rejects morality, on what grounds is it possible to speak ( 
'the good'? The answer comes in Deleuze's concept of the ethical, which he distinguish( 
from the moral. Again, the assemblage of Spinoza-Nietzsche is important here, as the titl 
of Chapter Two of Spinoza: A Practical Philosophy - 'On the Difference Between The Ethi( 
and a Morality' (Deleuze, 1988a: 17-29) makes clear. Deleuze identifies an ethicl 
framework in Spinoza's Ethics, in which: 
Good and bad ... are the two senses of the variation of the power of acting: 
the decrease of this power (sadness) is bad; its increase Goy) is 
good ... Objectively, then, everything that increases or enhances our power of 
acting is good, and that which diminishes or restrains it is bad; and we only 
know good and bad through the feeling of joy or sadness of which we are 
conscious ... Since the power of acting is what opens the capacity for being 
affected to the greatest number of things, a thing is good "which so dispose! 
the body that it can be affected in a greater number of ways" ... or which preserve 
the relation of motion and rest that characterizes the body. (Deleuze, 1988a: 71) 
The ethical, then, allows us to evaluate (rather than judge) actions in the name of lift 
giving us the ethically 'good' (that which allows life to transform itself immanently) an 
the ethically 'bad' (that which seeks to impose an external order on life) in favour of th 
morally good (that which conforms to an external ordering principle) and the morally ev 
(that which does not conform to an external ordering principle). In Nietzsche and P h i l o s o p ~ ~
Deleuze even goes so far as to suggest that '[t]he good of ethics has become the evil ( 
morality, the bad has become the good of morality. Good and evil are not the good an 
the bad but, on the contrary, the exchange, the inversion, the reversal of the 
determination.' (1986: 122) 
Ethics are thus materialist and operate independently of our consciousness. We experien, 
them through the passions: they are material forces that act on our bodies: '[i]t is not 
matter of judging life in the name of a higher authority which would be the good, th 
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even every value, in relation to the life which they involve.' (2005b: 136) Foucault is 
therefore right when he claims in his introduction to Anti-Oedipus that the text in question 
constitutes a 'book of ethics' that offers 'a way of thinking and living' (in Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2004a: xv), and I would argue that this could be extended to Deleuze's entire 
output. 
The 'No' 
Given Deleuze's hostility to the dialectic (see in particular 1986: 175-194), it may seem 
unusual to argue that there is a 'Deleuzean no'. What I want to insist on here, however, is 
not the 'no' as a constitutive element of productivity in Deleuzean thought - as the section 
on difference-in-itself, above, makes clear, ,[rJevolution never proceeds by way of the 
negative' (Deleuze, 1994: 208). Rather, I want to suggest that the 'no' is important to this 
project for drawing attention to the fact that Deleuze's affirmative thought renders finality 
impossible: there can be no end of history; no colloquial 'utopia' of perfection is possible. 
This 'no' is, therefore, integrally bound up with the affirmation of life and difference-in_ 
itself discussed previously. Indeed, Deleuze himself makes tm.. point in his reading of 
Nietzsche's Overman, writing that ,[tJhere is no affirmation which is not immediate[y 
followed by a negation no less tremendous and unbounded than itsel( Zarathustra rises to 
this "supreme degree of negation". Destruction as the active destructitm qf all known values is the 
trail of the creator.' (1986: 1 77). To say 'no', then, is to reject the present: and indeed any 
future that might be created from affirmation, for ,[tJhere is no affirmation which is not 
preceded by an immense negation' (.ibid), save the affirmation of the subject who simply 
accepts the present as it is - the affirmation of 'the ass' (a figure of Nietzsche's) who does 
not know how to say 'no' as well as 'yes' (1986: 181). Thus, 'affirmation would never be 
real or complete if it were not preceded and followed by the negative' (179). 
This can be illustrated with reference to the concept of smooth space. Despite offering 
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this as a terrain that is constituted by (and constitutes) ethically good forms a 
organisation, Deleuze and Guattari warn us that we should '[ n] ever believe a smootl 
space will suffice to save us' (2004b: 551). Rather, what is at stake is 'operations of striatiol 
1 
and smoothing ... the passages or combinations: how the forces at work within spao 
continually striate it, and how in the course of its striation it develops other forces an< 
emits new smooth spaces' (ibid.). Simply to affirm smooth space as the answer to problem 
of political and social organisation is colloquially utopian in the sense of being impossible 
Smooth space should not be seen as a euphoric moment bringing about the final triumpl 
of the good; a once-and-for-all emancipation that creates an eternal state of becominj 
free from hierarchical forms and artificial limits on life. To believe in this would be to have 
faith in the impossible, for - as I have noted - the state is not only an institutional forn 
but a mode of thought that can be reproduced immanently. Smooth space in its pun 
form cannot exist (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b: 524) and to believe that it has bee) 
realised (as in, for example, the 'true community' of Landauer) fails to acknowledge the 
tyrannies of habit that will emerge - established patterns of thought and behaviour tha 
insidiously work to reinstall power-over. The 'no', then, draws ~ t t e n t i o n n to thl 
aforementioned 'radical pessimism', which cannot be separated from Deleuze's affirmativi 
thought and might be summarised by Foucault's claim that history unfolds as an ' e n d l e s s l ~ ~
repeated play of domination' (1977: 51). 
A Final Word of Warning: Deleuze and postfordist organisation 
In recent years a number of commentators have noted how contemporary forms 0 
capitalist organisation (which might broadly be dubbed 'postfordism') have a number 0 
resonances with the work of Deleuze (and Guattari) (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007 
Vandenberghe, 2008; MacLellan, 20 I 0), with Slavoj Zizek even going so far as to sugges 
that '[t]here are, effectively, features that justify calling Deleuze the ideologist of late 
capitalism' (2004: 184-185). Others note that broadly Deleuzean forms of organisatiOl 
have been utilised in contemporary military strategies (Weizman, 2007; Monk, 2007) 
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Whilst it is true that on occaSIOn such organisational forms adopt broadly non-
hierarchical principles and utilise a loosely Deleuzean language of flux and flow, Deleuze 
himself was well aware of this danger. Reinforcing his and Guattari's claim that simply 
creating smooth space is not sufficient, they note that 'the smooth itself can be drawn and 
occupied by diabolical powers of organization' (2004b: 530, emphasis in original), including 
those of multinational capital (2004b: 543; c( Deleuze, 1992; Deleuze and Negri, 1990). 
Thus, it is important to note that whilst there is an ethical 'good' within smooth space, it 
can also be utilised for the establishment of 'power-over' (inequality in wealth being 
understood as a hierarchical form), which is to say that it can be put to ethically bad ends: 
it can be made immanent to something other than immanence itsel( In other words, it is 
not enough simply to create ethically good forms of organisation internal to that 
organisation: the external uses to which it is put must also be considered. 
Conclusion 
Deleuze's thought, then, has offered two conflicting visions of political organisation: the 
statist and the nomadic. The former has obvious resonances with colloquially pejorative 
concepts of utopia; whilst the latter - with its ethical 'good', its 'no' to permanence and its 
sense of space and place as something constantly being reproduced suggests a very 
.. 
different form of utopianism, but a utopianism that retains an etymological fidelity to the 
concept. As I have noted, however, there are no easy answers regarding what might 
constitute a utopia in Deleueze's approach, but there are certainly plenty of 'tools' that 
might be used in thinking through how the concept can be rethought for an age that has 





In this chapter I directly address the primary aim of this thesis: utilising the the too 
offered by Deleuze's theoretical framework to develop two differing forms of utopianism 
one aligned with state thought, and the other with nomadic thought; as well as theorisin 
the relationship between these forms. The chapter begins by developing my concept ( 
state utopianism. This begins with a reading of the work of the utopian literary historiar 
].c. Davis and Krishan Kumar. From them, I show how utopia can be understood as 
place in which statist philosophy holds sway: a 'perfect' form of organisation wheJ 
difference is not tolerated and the individual is seen as a threat to the stability of th 
collective. I argue that this approach splits utopianism into three dimensions: the desigt 
realisation and reproduction of the utopia (though I note that these may not b 
temporally discrete). I note that in the first two of these dimensions utopia functions as 
transcendent lack and that the final of these dimensions is simultaneously utopian an 
anti-utopian (as well as being dystopian, from the perspective of nomadic thought). I als 
note that it is possible to unintentionally be a state utopian. From this, I consider th 
phenomenon of anti-utopianism, where I invert my earlier argument to claim that ant 
utopianism is, in fact a form of state utopianism. I link this to the contemporary glob: 
order and 'capitalist realism'. 
I then turn to consider ways out of this seeming double-bind. Firstly, I consider what Rut 
Levitas refers to as the 'function based approach' to utopia, associated with Fredri 
Jameson, Tom Moylan and Levitas herself (though I am careful to acknowledg 
differences between these thinkers). Here, the emphasis shifts from the content of u t o p i ~ ~
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to their function. I note that this approach assumes that utopias are text based and show 
how it sees utopian texts not as blueprints (as in state utopianism), but as heuristic devices 
that unpick our certainty in the present whilst turning towards the future as a space of 
potential. Noting that intent is again an important issue here, I offer a reading of Tom 
Moylan's concept of the 'critical utopia' - a text intended by its author to have this 
function - and argue that here content is also important, for critical utopian texts are not 
only designed such that the subject who encounters them will subject their present to 
critique but depict utopias that themselves are constituted by critique (though these two 
points cannot be separated). I note that 'critical' also refers to the 'critical mass' necessary 
to enact any utopian change. I am (sympathetically) critical of this approach, however. I 
argue that it either emphasises the negative, critical power of utopian texts, or lapses back 
towards state utopianism, with political action guided by a transcendent lack that serves 
what Levitas calls 'the education of desire'. I also argue that objects other than utopian 
texts can have a utopian function, and that by focussing on utopian texts the function 
based approach runs the risk of failing to mobilise the 'critical mass' that Moylan speaks 
of, as utopian texts are likely to be encountered by individuals. 
From this, I move on to consider process based approaches to utopia, focussing on the 
work of Ernst Bloch and Deleuze and Guattari's brief mentitJn of utopia in What is 
Philosop1!J? I' note that the former's thought contains a number of resonances with statist 
thought, but argue that the process approach performs the crucial function of giving 
utopia a temporal as well as a spatial dimension. I then argue that in so doing, however, it 
conflates utopianism (as a force) with utopia (the place). In this, I suggest, it is guilty of the 
hysteria that Newman associates with Deleuze. 
I then return to the content of utopia. Drawing in particular on anarchist approaches to 
utopia, I show that the term utopianism is often used to refer to forms that resonate with 
nomadic thought, but that such approaches are reluctant to commit to spatially grounding 
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this utopianism. This, I suggest, results in a utopianism without utopia. I then analy: 
three approaches that do (to an extent) seek to ground nomadic organisation in space 
Hakim Bey's 'Temporary Autonomous Zone', John Holloway's 'crack', and Anc 
Robinson and Simon Tormey's 'propulsive utopias', which I note come close to envisagir 
what a 'nomadic utopia' may look like, but which do not theorise how such spaces m ~ ~
produce striation; nor account for the importance of 'antiproduction'. 
I then offer my concept of the nomadic utopia: a place of ethically good organisation th: 
is immanently bound up with the utopianism that creates it. I argue that this is a materi 
rather than ideal place constituted by non-hierarchy and difference-in-itself. I note th: 
experiencing life within a nomadic utopia may also have a utopian function, making 
uncomfortable for the subject to return to a state utopia and 'educating their desire' abol 
how the world might be otherwise. I note that the nomadic utopia also pays heed to tl 
'no' in utopia's etymology by rejecting the idea that it constitutes an end of history. Tl 
'no' thus introduces a temporal element to the nomadic utopia, structuring it as a place I 
permanent prefiguration that acknowledges the dangers of the tyranny of habit. I no 
that a nomadic utopia may at times need to embrace 'strategic hierarchy' or 'strateg 
identity' in order to escape the dangers of hysterical flux. I also develop the term 'devial 
nomadic utopias' to acknowledge the dangers of nomadic utopias being put to stati 
ends. 
My concept of the nomadic utopia having been developed, I briefly consider i 
relationship to the state utopia. Here, I argue that nomadic utopias may ossify into a sta 
utopian form if the 'no' is not heeded and tyrannies of habit emerge. I argue that i 
naming a place as either a nomadic or state utopia attention must also be given to i 
spatial and temporal dimensions. I also argue that nomadic utopias may function I 
(relatively) autonomous spaces within (but distinct from) a state utopia. 
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State Utopianism 
Utopia and Perfection 
In 'The Three Faces of Utopianism Revisited', Lyman Tower Sargent argues that 
'[pJerfict, perfiction, and their variants are freely used by scholars in defining utopias. They 
should not be' (1996: 9 - emphasis in original). Normatively, I would agree, yet here I 
want to argue that a holistic approach to utopia must include understandings that see it as 
a place of perfect' social arrangement ('a perfect place') because - whether or not they are 
intended by their authors, founders or members to be understood as perfect places - the 
history of utopia contains a number of places that claim perfection for themselves (which 
is to say that the occupants of the communities believe them to be places that cannot be 
improved upon). Furthermore, I will argue, this understanding of utopia can be extended 
to include the contemporary global order organised by capital and state power. 
In articulating this argument, I draw heavily on the works of ].C. Davis' Utopia and the Ideal 
Sociery: A Study of English Writing 1516-1700 (1981) and Krishan Kumar's Utopia and Anti-
Utopia in Modern TImes (1987) (and, to a lesser extent, his Utopianism [1991]). As the titles of 
these two main texts suggest, they are limited in scope (both geographically and 
temporally), but they claim to represent the concept of 'utopia' as a whole (Sargent, 1982: 
-. 
683 makes this point in relation to Davis). As Sargent notes, Da,vis 'has to discuss works 
that don't fit his definition because, even though they violate his definition, he recognizes 
that they are utopias' (1982: 683-684). Thus, whilst he may have identified tropes common 
to some English literary utopias of this period, his claims should not be taken to fix the 
meaning of utopia for all of time and space. Kumar is guilty on this front as well: whilst 
he covers utopian works from a greater time span (believing utopia to have begun in the 
sixteenth century, he continues from there until the twentieth century) and a wider 
geographical region (though it remains anglocentric), he believes utopia to be a western, 
Christian construct and excludes 'modern' works that do not conform to his definition of 
utopia: there is little on, for example, the 'new wave' of utopias from the 1970s by writers 
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such as Ursula K. Le Guin and Samuel Delany. I Yet despite Davis and Kumar being 
wrong to extrapolate from their narrow temporal and geographical focus to fix the 
meaning of 'utopia' once and for all, it would also be mistaken to state that utopia must 
never be equated with claims to perfection. Indeed, the value of Davis and Kumar's work 
is that they are both defenders of the concept of utopia and offer detailed analyses of 
utopias that can be associated with perfection, something that is usually associated with an 
anti-utopian stance. 
SODle notes on CorDl 
My approach here, then, is to analyse the content of utopian places in order that certain 
characteristics internal to the utopian place can be utilised in order to build a definition of 
the state utopia. However, it is important to briefly consider the 'form' based approach to 
defining utopia (cf. Levitas, 1990: 6-7). Although I am using Kumar and Davis here to 
help me create an analysis of the content of utopian spaces, utopia is also a form for 
them. Specifically, it is a literary form (Davis, 1981: 4; Kumar 1991: 20),2 and one of five 
varieties of literarily conceived perfected 'ideal society', which differs from the others in 
primarily through the human agency required to realise it. 3 It is clear from my 
Whilst it is plausible that these are excluded for being responses to a period of postmodern times rather 
than 'modern times', Kumar docs not state what he means by modern, and the book is marketed as 
dealing with 'the latest phase of utopia'S history: the period since the 1880's [sic)' (publisher's blurb in 
Kumar, 1987). . 
2 Utopia as a literary form has been widely discussed (sec, for example: Sargent, 1967, 1975, 1994,2010; 
Morton, 1978; Berneri, 1982; Moylan, 1986, 2000; Suvin,1979, 2003; 1996; Sargisson, 1996; 2010; 
Jameson, 2007; and Burns, 2008). but it is important to note a difference between four categories of 
thinker here. Firstly, there are those who accept that it is one utopian form among many and treat it as 
such (Sargisson, 2010; Suvin, 2003; Sargent, 2010). Secondly, there are those who explicitly define utopia 
as a literary genre (Kumar, Da\;s, Morton, Suvin, 1979 and Berneri). Thirdly, there are those who 
explicitly state that utopia is not solely a literary genre, but frequently conflate the two by using the term 
'utopia' to refer to 'literary utopias', or write solely or primarily about works of literature (Sargent, 1967, 
1994; Moylan, and Jameson). FinaIly, Burns uses literary theory (alongside political theory) and writes 
exclusively about literary utopias, but is careful to consistently usc the term 'literary utopias', suggesting 
that he believes there are other forms of utopia that are not literary, but that they fall outside the scope of 
his work. This is a rough guide only and thinkers are often not consistent across works. 
3 For Davis and Kumar, the other types of ideal society are Cockaygne, Arcadia, Millennium and the 
'Perfect Moral Commonwealth' (Kumar replaces the latter with 'The Ideal City') (Davis, 1981: 22-36; 
Kumar, 1987: 3-19). For Davis, Utopia is unique in that it is brought around through human agency, and 
specifically the creation of laws (differentiating it from Cockaygnes, which contain no account of their 
creation; Millenniums, which arise through an act of God; and Arcadia, which results from a bountiful 
nature and an unexplained radical break with the present); and docs not assume a perfect human nature 
(unlike Arcadia, where desires are only 'moderate'; the Perfect Moral Commonwealth, where they have 
been perfected through a process of moral reformation; the Millennium, where mankind is without sin; 
and Cockaygne, where the elimination of scarcity solves problems related to human nature. Sec pages 20-
22 for Cockaygne, 22-26 for Arcadia, 26-31 for the Perfect Moral Commonwealth, 31-36 for the 
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introduction that I do not agree with the view that utopia should be confined to the 
literary. Not only is the term used to describe existing forms of organisation, confiating 
utopian literature with utopia does not leave a term for the societies that these texts depict. 
Literary utopias should, to my mind, properly be thought of as works set in and about a 
fictional utopia, rather than clearly and simply as utopias." 
Furthermore, there is nothing unique!J literary about the features of the societies that 
Kumar and Davis describe. It is perfectly plausible to perceive of them being depicted 
through a series of paintings, for example; or as plays, films, musical works, and so on - or 
even as the dreams of a single individual that are never publicly depicted through any 
form. 5 These visions would, I believe, still be visions of a utopia (though the visions 
themselves would not be the utopia: a dream or a film is not a utopia, it is a dream or a 
film set in and about a utopia), and for this reason I use the term 'utopian texts' rather than 
'utopian literature' (the former including, but not being limited to the latter) when 
referring to fictional utopias. Yet even this expansion of the category from utopian 
literature to utopian texts is not sufficient as it is c o n c e i v a b l ~ . . - if not plausible - to 
Millennium, and 36-40 for Utopia). Kumar differs slightly, arguing that human nature is perfectible 
(though not perfect) in Utopia, and that Utopias can be differentiated from other forms of ideal society in 
that they result from developments in science and technology: the other varieties of ideal society constitute 
the 'pre-history' of utopia but are not, strictly speaking, utopias (1987: 20). He is inconsistent in this 
regard, however, and makes reference to 'ancient' utopias later on in the text (31), though he makes it clear 
that these are not 'utopia proper' (1987: 32). I follow Sargisson (1994) in suggesting that all these forms are 
in fact, utopian - although I do not engage with any of them in depth in this thesis. ' 
One further thing to note is that the differences between these forms are discussed by Davis and Kumar as 
differences of content, though visions thl,lt they would classifY as Cockaygnes can be found in the visual 
arts - Pieter Breugcl the Elder's 'An Interpretation of the Land of Cockaigne' - for example (Frank 
IGGI), music - Harry McClintock's 'Big Rock Candy Mountain' (Rammel, 1990), and oral traditions (Dei 
Guidice, 2001); Millennial societies in religious oral traditions (Thompson, 1968: 48-50; and Arcadias in 
the visual arts - particularly in renaissance era paintings and music (see Gerbino, 2009, for an aCCOunt of 
Italian arcadian music of the renaissance). 
4 I recognise the futility of such a claim: ~ h ~ n n r ~ f e r r i n ~ ~ to l i t e r ~ . . utopias it ~ ~ o ~ y . .natural that this be 
shortened to 'utopia'; and where a theonst s pnmary mterest IS literary utOpIas It IS perhaps unfair to 
expect them to preface the term 'utopia' with the term 'literary'. Nonetheless, the point is - at least for my 
argument - an important one. 
5 To illustrate the danger in limiting utopia to the I ! t e r ~ y y form it is interesting to consider the city of 
Magnasanti, constructed on the c ? m u p t ~ r r game S I ~ ~ l t y y ~ O O O O by a ~ 2 2 year old architecture student 
named Vincent Ocasla. Magnasantl con tams over 9 million SImulated reSIdents and has 'existed' stably for 
thousands of game ~ e a r s . . The city !s governed by ' m i c r o m ~ ~ m ~ n t t :or absolute ~ e c ~ o n ' , , and in the 
context of the game It works: there IS ~ e a r r full e m p l ~ e n t , , all Slm reSIdents are 100 Yo satisfied; there are 
no abandoned buildings; water pollution and congestion levels are at zero (overall pollution levels are at 
10% _ astonishingly low for any city in t h ~ ~ !ame) and utilities are p r o v i d e ~ ~ t h r ~ u g h h community 
programmes (http://www.youtube.com/watch. v-NTJQTc-TqpU). For a fuller discUSSIon of computer 
gaming and utopia, see Sargisson (2012: 189-207). 
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imagine a 'real' (rather than fictional) place that attempts to 'meet the criteria for utopia as 
laid out by Kumar or Davis. As I note below, people have tried to create communities 
based on perfected literary utopias, and the contemporary world of 'capitalist realism' 
(Fisher, 2009a) can be seen as claiming perfection for itself, and so as a utopia.6 
Thus, in working through Kumar and Davis' analyses of the content of utopias, I will utilise 
their thought as if they were referring to utopian places, rather than utopian texts. This is, 
I believe, less problematic than might first appear: whilst there are a number of features of 
utopian texts that lend themselves particularly well to the techniques of literary and 
textual analysis, these are generally associated with the function based approach to utopia 
(see, for example, the use of s e m i o ~ i c c squares7 by Jameson [2007] and Wegner [2002]) 
and are barely considered in the works of Davis and Kumar. There is litde - if anything -
in their analysis of literary utopias that could not be applied to utopia understood as a 
form of spatial organisation or theory of place. 
The content approach: utopia as a perfect space 
A form based approach to defining utopia can never be sufficient. Whether one follows 
Davis and Kumar and argues that utopia is a literary genre, expands on this to argue that 
it is a broader textual form (and so might include music, art, film, etc.) or follows my claim 
that utopia is needs to be seen as a spatially grounded sociological phenomena, attention 
needs to be paid to the content of these forms (cf. Levtias, 1990: 4-5). Simply saying that 
utopia is a place tells us nothing: we need to know what it is about a place that makes it a 
utopia. This is my concern here. 
For Davis and Kumar, the key feature of utopias is that they are perfect (Davis, 1981: 14; 
Kumar, 1987: 28), although they differ in two key ways regarding the nature of this 
6 Levitas makes a similar point, asking 'is it then to be assumed that when these conditions do not exist, 
there are no utopias?' (1990: 5). 
7 These are not, of course, unique to literary analysis: but are of particular use in going beyond the limits of 
narrative in fictional works. 
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perfection - Davis argues that it is absolute and on the societal level, whilst Kumar argues 
that 'perfect' relates instead to perfoctihili!J and occurs on an individual level.8 I will deal 
with Davis' approach first. For him, utopia's absolute perfection (1981: 38, 40) means that 
its realisation results in 'the end of uncertainty, confusion [and] change [s] of heart' (1981: 
381). He maintains that the 'dynamic utopia' - a utopia in which there is scientific 
progress - 'is a myth', for science 'has a potential to produce limitless innovation and 
restless change' and so is 'incompatible with a perfect society unless perfection can become 
dynamic' (1984: 34): perfection 'is not relative' (1984: 10). However, 'total' perfection for 
Davis does not mean that utopias are 'unrealistic', for they do not deny human nature (as 
he sees it): crime, poverty, war, exploitation and vice remain, but are successfully l i ~ t e d d
by 'restraint or punishment of recalcitrant individuals' (1981: 37). 
For Davis, then, utopia's perfection is at the level of societal organisation and comes at 
considerable cost to the individual, whose appetite 'imperils' 'social cohesion' and 'the 
common good' and must be repressed (Davis, 1981: 19). Freedom is antithetical to utopia, 
carrying with it 'the possibility of disorder [because] [i]n o f f e r i n ~ ~choice, it enables one to 
choose wrongly, foolishly and wastefully, and not only well, wisely and to good effect. In 
removing the threat of disorder, one removes freedom' (1981: 374). The only form of 
freedom utopia allows is negative - 'freedomfiom disorder and moral chaos, freedom from 
moral choice altogether' (1981: 384), meaning that people living in a utopia 'have 
accepted a discipline which is totalitarian in its scope and denial of human 
individuality. .. the Utopian's area of choice is so limited that he is almost incapable of 
moral behaviour. In utopia the bad alternative is, as far as possible, unavailable' (1980: 54) 
- pluralism is the 'greatest enemy' of utopia (1981: 382). Davis also makes further 
references to totalitarianism, arguing that utopia is organised through 'discipline of a 
totalitarian kind' (1981: 40), and approvingly quoting Nikolai Berdyaev's claim that 'utopia 
is always totalitarian, and totalitarianism in the conditions of our world is always utopian' 
8 This difference in opinion partly s t e ~ s s from different readings of texts, and partly from the fact that 
Kumar casts his net wider than DaVls. 
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(1981: 374). Davis suggests that this totalitarianism isjustifit;d as it prevents the 'anti-social' 
activity of 'all anti-utopianism': 
All anti-utopias to date - Nineteen Eighry-Four, Brave New World, He and the others-
have been written from the point of view of the miscreant, the criminal. He [sic] 
represents our relativism, our desire for self-affirmation, the pressure to 
pluralism ... the unorthodoxy of the rebel is what gives them their critical capacity 
but it also gives them their underlying weakness, their general sense of being 
unsatisfactory. For the utopian'S answer to the miscreant's action is to point to his 
ignorance, ignorance of the conditions of pre-utopian life. The rebel's criticism 
can only be understood in terms of a selfish ignorance which stems from its anti· 
social nature. All anti-utopianism hitherto is profoundly anti-social (1981: 374· 
375). 
Utopia, then, is a place that has realised the absolute triumph of a 'perfect' sociality ove] 
the imperfect individual. 
Despite claiming that 'it seems best not to insist on some "essentialist" definition of utopi. 
but to let a definition emerge: by use and context we shall know our utopias', and tha 
'nothing is to be gained by attempting to be too precise or exclusive' ( 1 9 ~ 7 : : 26), Kumar' 
definition of utopia is both precise and exclusive - albeit to a lesser degree than Davis 
(this is to be expected, given the greater time period that his book engages with). Again 
utopia is presented as something 'perfect', with Kumar claiming (incorrectly) that 'if therl 
is one thing that students of utopia agree on' it is that utopias are perfect (1991: 48). Ye 
'perfect' here is linked not to perfection in the absolute, Davisian sense, but rather to i 
process of perfectibiliry. This stems from the Enlightenment's faith in progress - Kuma 
cites as foundational Kant's claim that: 
[w]e can regard the history of the human species as a whole, as the unravelling a 
a hidden plan of nature for accomplishing a perfect state of civil constitution for 
society. .. as the sole state of society in which the tendency of human nature can b 
all and fully developed.' (1987: 43) 
This belief in progress is founded not only in Enlightenment philosophy, however, fo 
'[t]he introduction of science and technology into utopia also brought into it the idea c 
progress ... There could be no resting point for scientific and technical development ... s, 
utopia too cannot achieve any final state of rest' (1987: 31).9 Through science, a belit 
9 Kumar is a little inconsistent regarding the relationship between science and utopia. In Utopianism, h 
argues that utopia should be considered a 'species' of science-fiction (1991: 20), yet the wording hel1 
suggests that there are utopias to which science and technology have not been introduced. In Utopia alU 
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that scarcity can be overcome emerges, to the extent that 'there seemed no limit to human 
progress and perfection' in utopias (1987: 32). Thus, for Kumar, '[t]he modern Utopia 
makes not the philosopher, but scientific philosophy, king' (1987: 223). This requires 
'scientific, experimental, tentative reason' (ibid.); the dynamic utopia is not a myth -
'proper' utopias are dynamic (1987: 32). Crucially, however, this is not a dynamism that 
threatens the political order: rather, it reinforces it. The liberal sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf 
makes this point in relation to the utopian society depicted in H.G. Wells' A Modern Utopia, 
noting that the change embraced there is limited solely to reform and so presents no 
threat to the status quo: 'strikes and revolutions are conspicuously absent from utopian 
societies' (1958: 116). The techniques of science utilised, meanwhile, are the techniques of 
what Deleuze and Guattari would term royal science - an application of statist principles 
to the field of science, and the use of this science to reinforce statist organisation (2004b: 
402,405). 
Kumar's claim that there is no limit to human perfection also differs from Davis' concept 
of the perfect. He follows Judith Shklar and H.G. Wells in belie'ing that utopian societies 
are not founded upon a belief in original sin (1987: 28, 100), although he does not agree 
(with Wells) that human nature is inherently good in utopia. 10 Rather, he sees the utopian 
human as 'infinitely malleable ... a tabula rasa' (1987: 28), which means that when placed in 
the context of correct (utopian) social structures, humans are capable of perfection (1987: 
28). Thus, whilst Davis equates anti-utopianism with individualism, Kumar suggests it lies 
in conservatism's belief in mankind's selfish human nature. For him, the anti-utopian: 
sees weak human creatures constandy succumbing to the sins of pride, avarice 
and ambition, however favourable the circumstances. The anti-utopian need not 
believe in original sin, but his [sic] pessimistic and determinist view of human 
nature leads him to the conviction that all attempts to create the good society on 
earth are bound to be futile. (1987: 100)11 
Anti-Utopia in Modern Times, he argues that Campanella's Ci9' of the Sun was the first utopian text 'to make 
science and scientific research central to its vision' (this was published in 1602, 86 years after More's 
Utopia, which Kumar believes gave birth to utopia), but that 'it was undoubtedly [Bacon's] .New Atlantis 
[1624] which was most influential in fixing the association between science and utopia' (1987: 30). 
10 He compares utopianism to Pelagianism, a Christian doctrine which rejects original sin, believing instead 
that humans can choose good or evil (1987: 100). 
11 Sargent refutes the equating of anti-utopianism with conservatism, noting that conservatives have 
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· Nonetheless, this process of perfection will not be one of absolute harmony between th 
collective and the individual. Drawing on H.C. Wells' A Modern Utopia, he notes that 
utopia will be marked by an 'unceasing oscillation' between 'the private concerns ( 
individual life and the public concerns of society ... a utopia therefore must show somethin 
of the imperfection of the fit between the individual and society' (1987: 211). Thi 
'imperfect fit' is not enough to produce political change, however. As humans becom 
increasingly 'perfected', difference is subordinated to the inexorable logic of progress an 
the 'new' is prevented from actual ising itself. 
The state utopia 
If utopias are places that deny difference and make claims to perfection/perfectibilit 
then they can be linked not only to the nation state, but also to Deleuze's concept of stat 
thought. Their anti-vitalism is identified by Lucy Sargisson, who argues t h ~ ~
'[p]erfection ... symbolizes death: the death of movement, the death of progress an 
process, development and change; the death, in other words, of politics (1994: 37). Thes 
utopias, then, are hostile to life: they are transcendent forms that deny the inorgani 
vitalism central to nomadic thought. They are governed in accordance with a moral goo 
that places power with 'the murderous appetites of men, the rules of good and evil, of th 
just and the unjust' (Deleuze, 1988a: 13). The individual is seen as a threat to the totalit 
of vision and so must be subsumed into the collective, denying the possibility of mutuall 
affective relations. 
Though their focus is primarily on the content of utopia, Davis and Kumar also engag 
with the social function utopian texts perform. For Davis, utopian texts are worthy ( 
study because of their importance in prefiguring the birth of the modern, 'total' stat 
(1981: 9). It was in utopian texts, he argues, that the first fully formed visions of ' 
formulated utopian visions (1982: 566). 
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'centralised, bureaucratic, sovereign state with its impersonal, institutional apparatus' were 
apparent. They portrayed: 
[t]he comprehensive, collective state with its assumption of obligations in every 
area of human life, from health to employment, education to transport, defence 
to entertainment and leisure, is a feature of every advanced state ... both 
revolutionaries and reactionaries ... have furthered the growth of the Leviathan ... 
And the utopian's significance is that he prefigured this development and, in a 
sense, prepared the language and conceptual tools to accompany its emergence ... 
[by] inject[ing] images of a total and rational social order, of uniformity instead 
of diversity, of impersonal, neutrally functioning bureaucracy and of the 
comprehensive, the total state. (8-9) 
This is an important point, and one that I will expand to include utopian practices in 
Chapters Four and Five. For Kumar, meanwhile, there is a simple choice between 
believing in utopia (as he understands it), and being anti-utopian; between being guided 
by visions of a better future and wallowing in the present. Utopian visions are necessary 
for the belief in (and realisation oD progress, which has been central to 'Western 
civilization', perhaps constituting its 'greatest achievement' (1987: 423). Noting that the 
west 'now controls, to all intents and purposes, world development', he argues that 'this is 
no longer a matter which concerns it alone' (ibid.): if we want progress to continue, we 
, 
need utopian visions to inspire it. 
Not only is this argument remarkable for histories of colonialism and continuing 
imperialism, it also fails to grasp what Dahrendorf (1958) understood of 'VeUs' 'dynamic' 
utopia: that progress does not equate to qualitative political change. Rather, it is often 
marked by a multiplication and intensification of systems of control (Berardi, 2011; 
Gordon, 200B). The 'new' which is produced by progress is not really a 'new' at all (SU\;n, 
1997: 37;.Jameson, 2007: 281-295) and the utopia of progress is a 'remarkably dynamic 
society that goes nowhere' (Noble, quoted in Suvin, 1997: 37). 
65 
The three diInensions of state utopianisln 
As Kumar and Davis are dealing with literary utopias, they give no account of hm 
utopias arise, beyond saying that they are created through human agency. Here, I want tl 
suggest on how such agency would necessarily function: what 'state utopianism' means, il 
other words .. The argument I present here is both a simplification and something of ; 
straw position (I expand on this below), but is extremely useful as a heuristic device (that i 
to say as a mode of operation against which other utopian operations can be measured). 
State utopianism IS, at its 'purest' level, a hylomorphic philosophy that has thre 
dimensions: the design, realisation and reproduction of a state utopia. It might be sai, 
that the first two dimensions have a radical function (which is to say that they seek to gl 
beyond the status quo), whilst the final dimension has a conservative function (which is tl 
say that it seeks to reproduce the status quo). The dimensions are complimentary and rna: 
be contemporaneous, but do not all have to occur for state utopianism to be taking place 
below, I argue that the second and third dimensions may arise immanently, (re)producini 
a state utopia without reference to a transcendent blueprint. 
The first of state utopianism's dimensions is the designing of a blueprint. This may b 
carried out by an architect, author, town planner or filmmaker - anyone, in fact wh 
presents a vision that (seeks) to hylomorphically rearrange life in accordance with a mora 
vision of the good (which is not to say that any of these professions is inherently statl 
utopian). This blueprint functions as a lack: the 'key to desire missing in this world', anc 
orients political activity to its realisation. It is important to consider intent here, howevel 
This is usually considered to be essential for utopianism (Sargisson, 2009), which is to sa: 
that you cannot be involved in the creation of a utopia without intending to be. Howevel 
one of the claims I will make in this thesis is that utopias - of both the state and nomadil 
varieties - are (re)produced by people who have no intention of doing so. This is' not t; 
say that the issue should be discarded completely, however, and with regards to the firs 
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dimension of state utopianism it IS important to differentiate between someone who 
articulates a vision of a non-existent state utopia intending it to be realised (however likely 
that is); and someone who articulates such a vision as a heuristic device (which is to say 
they do not intend for it to be realised) - although this should not be seen as a binary 
opposition. I return to this second 'function' of articulating a utopian vision in the section 
entitled 'Function Based Approaches: Utopia and Critique', below. Here, however, I want 
to briefly use the example of Thomas More's Utopia to illustrate my point. 
The first thing to say here is that Utopia illustrates the problems with relying solely on 
intent for ascertaining whether someone is a state utopian or not: we cannot know for 
certain what More had in mind when he wrote the text (Sargent, 1984). However, as 
Stephen Duncombe (in More, 2011: xxxix) and Edward Surtz (in More, 1964: xxvi) have 
argued, it is entirely possible to read Utopia in a heuristic manner - and to attribute this in 
part to an intention of More's; others, meanwhile, have argued that More may in fact 
have intended Utopia to be read as a work satirising utopian aspirations so as to make 
them seem ludicrous (Wooden, 1977). Yet whilst More may not ~ a v e e interuled for Utopia to 
, 
be taken as a blueprint (and may even have been an anti-utopian), it was utilised as a 
blueprint by Vasco de Quiroga, a Spanish bishop in sixteenth century Mexico. He sought 
to impose a societal form based on More's Utopia upon the indigenous population in the 
state of Michoacan '2 (Mumford, 2002). Thus, whether or not Utopia was intended to have 
what I would call a state utopian function, it did; whether or not More saw himself as 
being possessed by a state utopianism, he ultimately produced a state utopianism. 
The second dimension of state utopianism, then, is the action required to realise a lack. 
The unrealised utopia acts as a blueprint for political action (Sargent, 1982: 568-574),13 
brought into being through human agency with as little deviation from this blueprint as 
12 He thought this would help convert the locals to Christianity and restore their own 'lost heritage', 
believing that More had been inspired by Native American societies in writing Utopia (and overlooking the 
fact that the Utopians were not Christian). 
13 Sargent himself does not subscribe to this view, but provides a neat summary of those who believe this is 
how utopianism operates. 
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possible, for the blueprinted utopia 'is perfect, and any a l t ~ r a t i o n n would lower its qualit 
(Sargent, 1982: 568). Here, utopianism becomes a hylomorphic process that necessitatl 
the implementation of hierarchy in order to subordinate difference-in-itself and brir 
chaotic and! or inert matter to organisation. It was this dimension of utopianism that Wi 
exhibited by de Quiroga (though he must also have exhibited the first variety, modifyir 
More's blueprints to the particularities of the situation 14). Like the utopia it seeks to creat 
this aspect of utopianism will be hierarchically structured, with 'specialists' familiar wit 
the workings of the plan and possessing technical knowledge regarding its implementatic 
in positions of power-over. Again, intent is not necessary here: those seeking to realise tl 
utopia but further down the hierarchy might include builders, engineers and so on; an 
they may be unaware of the political element of the task at hand. They may even t 
opposed to it, and only be partaking because of coercion or the promise of financi 
reward. To the extent that their actions are oriented to the production of a state utop 
(self-consciously or not), however, they can be said to be exhibiting this second dimensia 
of state utopianism. As their organisational form will be structured in accordance wit 
statist principles, it is likely that the state utopia will be prefigured in this dimension I 
state utopianism. 
Once a state utopian form has been realised, state utopianism ceases to be 'radical' (whic 
is to say it ceases to be oriented to a lack heyond the present), and instead performs tl 
conservative function of reproducing a realised state utopia. IS This force mayor may nl 
be intentionally utopian (one does not have to believe capitalism to be utopian 1 
reproduce it, for example). It can still legitimately be called 'state utopianism' when thel 
is no utopian intent, however, because it reproduces the state utopia. 
14 Of course in trying to impose a European form of organisation on indigenous people, de Qliroga did pI 
a great deal of attention to particularity. 
15 For Mannhcim (1936), this is the difference between 'ideology' and 'utopia'. For him, both are fictions ~ ~
abstractions of a more complicated truth, at least) that help us to understand the world - but 'utopia' 
that which enables us to go beyond the present whilst 'ideology' stabilises the present around existil 
formations of power. My claim here is that - as a sociological form, rather than a 'fiction' - utopias can I 
realised, and that when they are realised in the form of a state utopia they will become conservative ar 
seck to stabilise existing power relations. 
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When intentional, this conservative state utopianism is also an anti-utopianism, which is 
to say that it rejects the possibility of other ways of organising space. This means that 
there is a paradox at the heart of state utopianism: its moment of triumph results in the 
death of utopia. There is no needfor utopianism in the state utopia, for the state utopia is believed 
to be perfect. This means that the state utopia also seeks to abolish difference-in-itself (as 
difference-from perfection), and so from a nomadic perspective it must be thought of as a 
dystopia. The realised state utopia, then, is simultaneous(y a utopia, an anti-utopian and a t!JStopia. 16 
As I noted at the start of this section, these three dimensions of state utopianism may well 
be inter-related. As Z ~ z e k k notes (in relation to contemporary neoliberalism), a common 
trick of 'extremism' is to claim that a goal has not yet been reached and call for ever more 
drastic measures to ensure that it is (Zizek, 2009: 19): thus, 'victorious' state utopians may 
in fact deny that their state utopia has been achieved, even while claiming that 'there is no 
alternative'. In this, they would be mobilising both the second and third dimensions of 
state utopianism simultaneously. Stalin's claim that socialism had been achieved in the 
• 
USSR in 1932, meanwhile, shows how arbitrary the distinction' between the second and 
third dimensions is. Furthermore, the second and third dimensions of state utopianism 
will undoubtedly occur through a combination of different state utopian projects which 
share a set of principles but are not identical in form or content (in Chapters Four and 
Five, for example, I suggest that the symphony orchestra and compulsory education 
played an important role in creating the modern nation state). 
Anti-Utopianism, 'capitalist realism' and the state utopia 
The majority of what is commonly understood as 'anti-utopianism' comes from the 
dominant ideology's mixture of conservatism and liberalism, which sees the world of 
16 Nomadic thought is not alone in labelling such places dystopias, of course: t h o ~ ~ ideologically o p p o ~ d d to 
the form of organisation would also see it as a dystopia, although these judgements may well be premised 
on the claim that a different form of state utopia would be better, rather than from a nomadic perspective 
(notwistanding that, following Gordon's [2008] argument, nomadism could i ~ l f f be ~ e n n as an ideology, 
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liberal democracy and capitalism as the only possible way of avoiding the perils associate 
• I 
with utopia and its establishment: the 'capitalist realism' of which Fisher (2009a) speaks. 1 
is this anti-utopian view that is largely responsible for the conflation of utopianism wit 
what I have called 'state utopianism' (Sargent, 1982) - although as I hope to show in thi 
thesis, there are forms and practices that resonate strongly with state utopianisr 
(including, as I will shortly argue, capitalist realism). As Sargisson (2012: 22) notes, th 
ideological position finds both popular and intellectual expression. The former is 
powerful 'tool for ridicule' that is utilised to castigate those whose politics are (eve 
marginally) left-of-centre (22-24).17 The latter is a form of critique which does n< 
automatically assume that to be 'utopian' is bad, but purports to show why it is, and it j 
on this that I want to briefly focus. My contention here is that it would be better cast <I 
anti state utopianism, and that by conflating utopia with state utopianism it falls into th 
reverse side of the double-bind experienced the realised state utopia: here it is the ant 
utopianism that is shown to constitute the third dimension of state utopianism. 
One of the most influential texts in the anti-utopian tradition is Karl Popper's two volum 
The Open Sociery and its Enemies. This suggests that what I have called state utopianisr 
applies to utopianism tout court. He sees it as a philosophy premised on the belief that: 
we must determine our ultimate political aim, cr the Ideal State, before taking an 
practical action. Only when ... we are in possession of something like a blueprint ( 
the society at which we aim, only then can we begin to consider the best ways an 
means for its realization, and to draw up a plan for practical action. (1957: 157) 
For Popper, this is a dangerous approach as there could be no agreement regarding th 
nature of 'the society at which we aim'. As such, the implementation of any blueprir 
would necessitate the use of centralized hierarchical power and - very possibly - violenc 
(1957: 161, cf. Gray, 2003, 2007). This would not end once the utopia had been realisec 
however, and anti-utopianism typically draws attention to the totalitarian contra 
17 Sargisson provides a table of the top ten google search results for 'Obama' and 'utopian' (on 26/05/2011 
These are all negative, and utilise the term 'utopian' to ridicule Obama. The top two were a Richal 
Epstein forbes.com article 'Obama's Doomed Utopia' and a Linda Chavez article from The Tuscan Citi;:4 
titled 'Obama's utopian plans will ruin us' (2012: 23). 
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required to prevent change, which I noted in my discussion of Davis (Beauchamp, 1974; 
Dahrendorf, 1958). 
As I noted, this is the reverse side of the double-bind of the realised state utopia, however: 
this anti-utopianism is a form of state utopianism. Sargent makes the point forcefully, noting 
that: 
[t]he conservative opponent of reform is in the same sense a utopian. In arguing 
that we cannot or should not attempt to improve on the present, he or she is 
saying either that we live in the best possible world, or that any change is likely to 
make our imperfect world even more imperfect' (1982: 580; 1994: 27) 
Indeed, given that - as I noted in my introduction - 'perfect' refers to that which cannot 
be improved upon, the conservative opponent of reform is, paradoxically, claiming that 
this 'imperfect' world is perfect. Tom Moylan acknowledges this, noting that 'the anti-
utopian standpoint also appropriates perfection for itself, as it argues that the "best of all 
possible worlds" already exists in the status quo' (2000: 75). Thus, 'realism' (of this form)-
so often opposed to 'utopianism', by thinkers on both the left (Fisher, 2009) and the right 
(Carr, 2001) - reveals itself as a particular kind of state utopian thought itself. 
• 
Following this line of thought, the contemporary global order comes to be seen as 
utopian. The (apparent) 'end of history' realised by the spread of neoliberal capitalism 
and liberal democracy following the end of the Cold War has created a belief that liberal 
democracy 'remains the only coherent political aspiration that spans different regions and 
cultures around the globe' and thus 'the end point of mankind's ideological evolution' as 
'the final form of human government' (Fukuyama, 1992: xiii). From the perspective of 
those who celebrate this triumph, it is a triumph over utopia - as Mark Fisher has noted, 
'[n]eoliberalism presented itself as supremely realistic - as the only possible realism. It told 
us that utopia is impossible because there is no such thing as society, only individuals 
pursuing their own interests.' (2009b: 95) Yet is this realism not precisely the third 
dimension of state utopianism? The claim that 'there is no alternative' functions similarly 
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.. 
to Davis' claim that in utopia the individual is not permitted to choose wrongly, for the] 
1 
simply is no choice to be made, whilst claims that scientific progress will serve to eradica 
the horrors perpetuated by capitalism can be compared to the 'perfectibility' that Kum: 
identifies with 'dynamic utopias'. Zizek puts it well: 
Mter denouncing all the "usual suspects" for utopianism, then, perhaps the tim 
has come to focus on the liberal utopia itself. This is how one should answer thos 
who dismiss any attempt to question the fundamentals of the liberal-democrad 
capitalist order as being themselves dangerously utopian: what we are confronting i 
today's crisis are the consequences of the utopian core of this order itself. Whil4 
liberalism presents itself as anti-utopianism embodied, and the triumph oj 
neoliberalism as a sign that we have left behind the utopian projects responsible fo 
the totalitarian horrors of the t w ~ n t i e t h h century, it is not becoming clear that th4 
true utopian epoch was that of the happy Clintonite '90s, with its belief that we hel 
reached "the end of history", that humanity had finally found the formula for th 
optimal socio-economic order' (2009: 79, c.f. 3, 5). 
John P. Clark makes a similar point - noting that the totalitarianism the triumphant glob 
order sought to associate with utopianism is a feature of its own society. In a commel 
that resonates with Jameson's claim that it is easier to imagine the end of the world tha 
the end of capitalism, he writes that: 
[tJotalitarianism today is not on the deepest level a matter of sovereignty. Nor doe 
it depend on the state's formal abolition of all competing forms of SOCii 
organisation (though the evils embodied in this political totalisation process and it 
system of oppression and terror cannot be overemphasised). The ultimate 
totalitarian achievement is the capture of the imagination, and the reinforcemen 
of that conquest as the dominant order is legitimated through processes oj 
sublimation and banalisation. (2009: 13) 
Arguments along the same line are also made by Levitas (1990: 34; 2005: 16), Newma 
(2009: 209), Moylan (2000: 183-187), Jameson (2009: 412), Harvey (2000: 194-195) an 
Geoghegan (1987: 3). 
It is not merely those opposed to the status quo who make the comparison, howeve 
David Steele (an advocate of the free market), notes that '[t]he attempt to abstain froJ 
utopianism merely leads to unexamined utopias' (1992: 375), whilst Geoffrey M. Hodgso 
puts it beautifully when he states that 'such a stance typically admits utopianism throug 
the back door while keeping all eyes to the front' (1999: 8). It is also worth noting t h ~ ~
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before neoliberalism had established itself (which is to say, before it had reached the third 
dimension of state utopianism), its proponents - including Hayek - argued that it needed 
utopian visions of its own (Hayek, 1949; Harper, 1979). 
This is a difficult situation. The victorious utopian embraces anti-utopianism while the 
anti-utopian has been shown to embrace utopia. This is, I realise, a radical claim. Shortly, 
I will suggest that nomadic utopianism might offer a way of escaping this bind. Yet this 
seems to suggest that utopianism - and utopia - is inescapable. To some, this will seem a 
ridiculous statement that diminishes the power of the term, which should be reserved only 
for a genuinely 'other' and radically 'better' society. Yet I believe there is both conceptual 
and rhetorical value in such a position. It can perhaps be seen as doing for utopia what 
Zizek has done for ideology (indeed, Zizek sometimes conflates the two concepts in First as 
Farce Then As Tragedy, 2009), saying to those who claim to deny utopia that such a claim is 
'utopian, stupid!' ( cf. Zizek, 'It's Ideology, Stupid': 2009: 9-85) 
Escaping the Double-Bind • 
Function Based Approaches: Utopia and Critique 
It is not only liberals and conservatives who have positioned themselves as anti-utopians. 
In The Communist Manifisto, Marx and Engels critique the hylomorphism inherent to the 
'utopian socialism' of Fourier, Saint-Simon and Robert Owen, stating that 'the proletariat 
[(ie. those who will inhabit the utopia)] ... offers to [the utopian planner] the spectacle of a 
class without any historical initiative or any independent movement' (2004: 46): it is seen 
merely as inert/chaotic matter that must be given form. 18 State utopian planners reduce 
'historical action' to 'their personal inventive action', and the 'spontaneous class 
organization of the proletariat' gives way to 'an organization of society specially contrived 
18 For a iongc.-r discussion of this argument, sec Engels' Socialism: Utopian and Scimtific (2008). As Levitas (1990: 
41-42) notes, this critique of utopian socialism (and Marx and EIlgc.'Is' critique of the 'utopian 
communism' of Cabet and Weidig) should not be extrapolated from to claim that marxism (or cvcn Marx 
and Engc.-Is) werC opposed to utopia per St. And as I shortly notc, Marx and Engels also acknowledged the 
positive function of utopian socialism. 
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by these inventors. Future history resolves itself, in their eyes, into the propaganda and d 
. 
practical carrying out of their social plans' (ibid.). At first glance, this seems close to d 
position of Popper, yet despite their scathing critique of utopian socialisrr 
hylomorphism, Marx and Engels are not simply anti-utopian, for they note that the 
visions 'also [contain] a critical element. They attack every principle of existing sociel 
Hence they are full of the most valuable materials for the enlightenment of the workir 
class' (2007: 47). 
In this, they move away from the view that utopian visions should be read as positi, 
blueprints, and towards an understanding of them as a source of critique; a heurist 
device that can be utilised to open up the present to the possibility of becoming othc 
(through, in their case, historical materialism). Implicit in this view is that utopia is 
textual form (I use the category broadly here to include literature, visual art, film 
architectural plans, etc., though there is a bias towards literature in much of the criticisl 
that takes this approach). It is such an approach that Ruth Levitas (1990: 7) refers to as d 
'function based' approach to utopia - and here the emphasis shifts (although not entirel 
from the content of a utopian text to its the way in which it interacts with the present t 
introducing an 'estrangement' to our relationship with the contemporary world (SUVil 
1972; 1979).19 For Sargisson, this means that '[r]ather than read [utopias] "straight", I 
depictions of the desired future or as blueprints for perfection', we should 'introduc 
greater subtlety to our reading and see them as critical artefacts.' (1996: 40) 
To follow this line of thought is to state that utopia functions not by providing a bluepril 
that should be enacted, but rather by giving us an alternative that estranges our senses! 
that we cannot return safely to the present; showing us the contingency of the world v. 
live in and unpicking our belief in 'the end of history'. The utopia: 
19 Suvin takes the term estrangement from Bertolt Brecht, for whom it refers to a 'rcpresentation ... which 
allows us to recognize its subject, but at the same time makes it seem unfamiliar.' (quoted in Suvin, 1972: 
374) 
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anticipates and criticises. Its alternative fundamentally interrogates the present, 
piercing through societies' defensive mechanism - common sense realism, 
positivism, and scientism. Its unabashed and flagrant otherness gives it a power 
which is lacking in other analytical devices. By playing fast and loose with time 
and space, logic and morality, and by thinking the unthinkable, a utopia asks the 
most awkward, most embarrassing questions. (Geoghegan, 1987: 1-2) 
The claim here is that having 'lived' in a utopia by reading a novel; contemplating or 
participating in a work of art; going to the theatre; or so on,20 our 'structures of feeling' 
(Williams, 1977: 132) are altered such that we ask awkward questions of the present, 
interrogating relationships of power, 'common sense'; and - perhaps - coming to 
understand that the 'realism' of our state utopian situation is, in fact, a historical 
contingency and not simply an always already given. At their most radical, such texts may 
even serve to 'make ... the present impossible' (Blanchot, 2006: 378). Utopias 
'break ... epistemological ground', presenting 'dangerous knowledge' in a 'minor key'21 
(Moylan, 2000: 6), offering 'disruption' as a discursive strategy. As Sargisson notes, this 
allows the field of utopia to escape the double-bind I observed in state utopia, creating a: 
[c]ritical opposition, [which operates] not in the classical binary tradition but 
opposes the existing space of opposition; its fonction is not to provide an alternative but 
to deny that existing options are the onry ones. Opposition is thus understood as a bigger 
concept than the either/or position; it is comprised of rttultiple critiques of a(n) 
(omni)present structure of exploitation, hierarchy and alienation (1996: 55, 
emphasis added). 22 
Implicit in this critique is a turn towards the future. Whilst we might not believe in the 
particular utopian future we have been presented with but - to quote the slogan of the 
World Social Forum - we do begin to believe that 'another world is possible' (Moylan, 
1986; 2000;Jameson, 2007; Duncombe in More, 2011, 2011; 1997; Noble, 2011). It is not 
20 For the ways in which art may have a utopian function see Bloch (1986,1989); Bell (WIlc), Weiss (2011), 
Noble, (2009, cds.; 2011), Duncombe (2011), Bourriaud (1995), Adorno (2004). For theatre, see Dolan 
(2005), Adiseshiah (2012). 
21 Perhaps a little pedantically, I would suggest that the concept of dissonance would work better than that of 
the minor key here. This process of cognitive estrangement suggests that something is not right; that 
something does not fit, and this is the dominant understanding of 'dissonance' in musicology (minor keys 
or chords are not necessarily dissonant and are often experienced as beautiful). For a discussion of the 
relationship between harmony, dissonance and utopia, see Bell (20 II) and Marshall (2012). 
22 This, then, is far more radical than the function that Kumar ascribes to utopias. For him, utopia's primary 
value is that they are the motor for progress - but this is progress that fails to disturb the status quo. Russell 
Jacoby (1999) at times comes close to this attitude. 
75 
• 
so much that utopia helps us to imagine an alternative, but that it helps us to imagir 
1 
imagining an alternative. 23 
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Figure One: Utopia's Function? 
There is, of course, another issue regarding authorial intent here. It is undoubtedly tn 
that many utopian texts are designed to be read in this way by their authors (I hm 
already suggested that this may include Thomas More's Utopia); but just as this has bee 
(mis?)read as a blueprint to guide political action, there is no reason that a utopia whic 
was intended to function as a blueprint could not be used as a heuristic device in th 
way. 24 Tom Moylan's concept of the 'critical utopia' can - in part - be seen as an attem] 
to answer this issue, and gently shifts the focus towards the content of utopian visioI 
rather than their function (though does not do so fully). As Moylan put it in his 2008 e s s ~ ~
23 Jameson (2007: 281-295) argues that historicising the present is the function of science fiction, whilst 
utopia moves us into the domain of the future. 
24 For example, Edward Bellamy certainly intended the future Boston of his novel Looking Backward: 2001 
1887 (2009) to be fairly close to a world he believed desirable and obtainable - and was taken as one by 
number of intentional communities that were inspired by it - yet its heuristic function had a wid 
utopian impulse, encouraging William Morris to write his literary utopia News From Nowhere as a critic 
response. Thus, the value of Looking Backward is not just (and I would suggest not primarily) that it provid 
a glimpse of how life could be otherwise, but that it fed into a process of reflection on how the wor 
could be otherwise amongst its readership, including William Morris, who then produced another te: 
which fulfils the same function, and so the utopian function proceeds ad infinitum. I remain sympathetic 
- and have advocated this understanding of utopia'S operation in previous work (Walls and Bell, 2010). 
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'Making the Present Impossible' (named for the aforementioned Blanchot quote), 'the 
subject matter has always mattered' (2008: 83). 
First outlined in his 1986 book Demand the Impossible: Science Fiction and the Utopian Imaginary 
and revisited in 2000's Scraps rif the Untainted Sky: Science Fiction, Utopia, 0stopia (which 
develops the concept of the 'critical dystopia', something I consider in relation to Yevgeny 
Zamyatin's We in Chapter Three, below), the term 'critical' has three functions: the first of 
which is to designate utopias that intend to convey the 'Enlightenment sense of critique -
that is expressions of oppositional thought, unveiling, debunking, of both the genre itself 
and the historical situation' (1986: 10). Secondly, it is utilised 'in the nuclear sense of the 
critical mass required to make the necessary explosive reaction' (1986: 10). Finally, it refers 
to the content as well as the function of the utopian texts, which are set in imperfect 
places marked by difference, conflict and change - they contain the 'Enlightenment sense 
of critique' internally (1986: 10-11). For example, Moylan analyses Joanna Russ' short story 
'When it Changed' by pointing to the fact that, at its conclusion, an inhabitant of the 
utopian community 'Whileaway' called Janet remembers that the initial name of the 
• 
colony was 'For-a-While', and that the message she must talre with her to move the 
community forwards is to: 
[r]emember to be historically vigilant, do not lock in the utopian achievements, 
do not remove the social utopia from the processes of time. Don't cut a deal with 
the false utopian devil of your own collective imagination as it dreams of the end 
of history; and don't cover up the deal by changing the colony from that of a 
place-in-process to one of eternal delight, literally allowing time to while away 
(2000: 15). 
Moylan'S primary concern, however is not how Russ' story points to a different 
configuration of utopian organisation (that is, to a different, critical utopian content), but 
in the relationship between the reader and the text. This warning is not designed for Janet 
- but for the reader. Moylan follows the above quote by noting that Janet (and Russ in her 
own political moment) cautions the reader not to let the process of learning and change 
end, not to risk a situation - brought about by either internal or external forces - that 
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might "take away the meaning" of life' (ibid.). Nonetheless, this is a crucial developmel 
• 
and one I return to below. 
Critiquing the Function Based Approach 
Whilst I believe the function based approach to utopia is important in revealing tt 
relationship between utopian texts and the subject who encounters them, I believe that 
either overemphasises the negative aspect of utopianism, privileging the 'no' in utopia 
etymology, at the expense of the 'good' and 'place'; or runs the risk of lapsing back in1 
the philosophy of state utopia. Furthermore, it operates primarily on the individu 
subject and can function without a utopian vision at all. These are both dange 
associated with seeing utopian as a textual form. Here, I want to explore these critiques. 
In relation to the first of these criticisms I ofTer Sargisson's claim that - for those wn 
ascribe to the function based approach - the purpose of utopia 'is not to provide , 
alternative'. This can be seen in Jameson's claim that rather than embrace utopia, 'd 
slogan of anti-anti-Utopianism might well ofTer the best working strategy' (2007: xvi). ] 
this, he furthers an argument developed in his 1982 essay 'Progress Versus Utopia; or, Ca 
We Imagine the Future?'2s, where he makes the seemingly paradoxical statement tho 
utopian fiction succeeds by failure to escape the conditions that produced the text (200 
289) and that 'the true vocation of the utopian narrative ... [is] to confront us with 0\ 
incapacity to imagine Utopia' (2007: 293, cf. 1988: 101) as a result of the 'systemi 
cultural and ideological closure of which we are all in one way or another prisoneI 
(2007: 289). Utopia allows us to 'rattl[e] on the bars' of necessity that keep us prisoner 1 
'intense spiritual concentration and preparation for another stage which has not y' 
arrived' Gameson, 2007: 231-232), but ultimately we are still prisoners - just prisonel 
ever more dissatisfied with our prison. Tom Moylan puts it well (although still locates it 
25 The version of this I am referencing is published in Archaeologies of the Future (2007). The first half of this 
an original, book-length work entitled 'The Desire Called Utopia'; the second constitutes a number· 
essays Jameson has written on utopia since the 1970s. The first two references from 2007 here are fro 
'Progress Versus Utopia .. .', the final one is from 'The Desire Called Utopia'. 
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constitutive element of change in utopia's negative power) when he says that it is 
important to 'move from this core negative moment to its positive penumbra' (2008: 82). If 
Brecht's concept of estrangement can serve as an departure point for this approach to 
utopia, I want to paraphrase a different quote of his here and state that the utopian 
should not just hold up a mirror to reality, but should seek to hammer it into shape.26 The 
negativity present in some function based approaches seems to have been emphasised 
over the 'good' and 'place'. Is this all utopia can do? 
Furthermore, is it on!y utopia that can do this? By which I mean: is it only a utopia that 
has this utopian function? This may seem a strange question, but I believe the answer to 
be negative: texts or objects other than those that depict a realised utopia can have a 
utopian function, yet it would clearly be ludicrous to refer to them as utopias. Indeed, 
perhaps this function is better considered simply as critique. The architect David Garcia's 
(2012) plan to transform the abandoned Duda-3 radio mast near Chernobyl into a giant 
feeder for migratory birds might, for example, prompt us to ask questions about about 
nuclear power; about state cover-ups; about how climate change is affecting migratory 
, 
birds; about why we cannot realise such fantastic projects under Ute present conditions - it 
might even move us to wonder in what kind of world we could follow through on the plan, 
and how that world might be realised. Similarly, Ben Anderson (2002) has shown that 
listening to music with no obvious utopian content (the songs of The Clash and David 
Gray) may move people to - however fleetingly - imagine a different, better world; and it 
is not too much of a stretch of the imagination to think that they might consider how this 
could be achieved as well. Yet neither Garcia's bird feeder nor a song of David Gray's can 
be called a utopia. Rather, I suggest that a better concept would be the 'imaginal 
machine', developed by Stevphen Shukaitis (2009a) and summarised by Duncombe as 'a 
technology for freeing our thinking from the prison house of the possible and for 
imagining alternatives ourselves' (2011: Ii). Indeed, Duncombe has already suggested that 
26 The quote I am paraphrasing here is 'art is not a mirror held up to reality, but a hammer with which to 
shape it' (quoted in Turpin, 1993: 139). 
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when a utopian text operates in the manner ascribed to it by the function based approach 
it can be considered a form of imaginal machine (ibid.).27 
Ruth Levitas' approach perhaps offers a way out of these two problems (the first of which 
is a central concern for her), yet it does so at the cost of returning towards state 
utopianism. She argues that when '[w]hat becomes central is the process of imagining 
utopia, rather than the substance of any vision' (2003: 144) there follows a 'weakening of 
the transformative potential of utopia: Utopia survives, but at a cost, and that cost is the 
retreat of the utopian function from transformation to critique' (2001: 25). For her, then, 
'utopia[nism] requires the representation, the objectification, of desire' (Levitas, 2001: 33); 
a future oriented object upon which we can hang our utopianism (2003: 14). A 
phantasmic bird feeder will not do: utopianism requires a far fuller vision of the good 
place to orient us. This vision functions not as a blueprint, but in the manner of 
Habermas' (1992) regulative ideal. Utopia does not only feed into our desire to escape the 
present, but pulls through from the other side of the prison bars by educating our desire 
to break free. Levitas writes: 'if the function of utopia is the education of desire', she 
writes, 'the function of the education of desire is the realisation of utopia' (1990: 124, c.£ 
1990: 78; 1997: 75-79; 2001: 34). This also involves theorising the agency required to 
achieve a utopian future: a utopian text is merely escapist if it depicts a good place with 
no reference to how it was obtained (1990: 200). This is a useful concept that I will 
frequently return to and can, I suggest, be vital in avoiding the hysteria Newman 
associates with Deleuzean thought. 
Whilst Levitas' approach escapes the negativity of Jameson's approach - and cannot be 
applied to texts that could not conceivably be called utopias - there is a move back 
27 I am currently working on a project that is in part concerned with how urban wastelands function as a site 
stimulating the utopian imagination, for example (http://wastcland-twinning.net). It would be ludicrous 
to call a wasteland a utopia, however, though not to say that it might function as an imaginal machine (cf. 
Doron, 2009, on the imaginal function of wastelands). 
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towards the system of state utopianism, with political change oriented to a lack. She states 
that: 
All this openness is a bit much for me. We could do with a bit of closure. 
Abensour's commentary on Morris suggests that it does not matter whether you 
agree or disagree with the institutional arrangements. What matters is that the 
utopian experiment disrupts the taken-for-granted nature of the present and 
proffers an alternative set of values.' (2007: 57) 
She adds that utopianism does not exist without a pre-existing utopian VISIon and 
identifies this with lack: it 'cannot be articulated other than through imagining the means 
of its fulfillment. You cannot identify what it is that is lacking without projecting what 
would meet that lack, without describing what is missing.' (2007: 53). 
Finally, I want to address one final concern with the function based approach, which is 
that it may well fail to mobilise the 'critical mass' Moylan speaks of. I have noted that it 
can be utilised for utopian texts other than literary works, but by and large these take 
forms whose primary subject is the individual. We read books alone, for example, and 
unless we know someone else who has read the same work, are a member of a reading 
group, or are studying it for educational purposes it is unlikely we will talk to anyone 
• 
about its (potential) meanings. Any transformation of consciousness is thus likely to occur 
on an individual level, as Duncombe makes clear in the introduction to his online 'Open 
Utopia,28 edition of More's Utopia, where he notes that '[b]y posing the question of "What 
if?" to the individual reader, it could well be argued that Utopia [(he refers to More's book, 
but could be referring to the textual genre of utopia)] engenders an individualized 
response' (2012: Iii). 
28 Open Utopia is an online project centred around Thomas More's Utopia, and Duncombe in part positions 
it as an attempt to address this problem. In the 'About' section of the website it states 'This digital edition 
of Utopia is open: open to read, open to copying, open to modification. On this site Utopia is presented in 
different formats in order to enhance this openness. If the "isitor wishes to read Utopia online they can find 
a copy. If they want to download and copy a version, I've pro"ided links to do so in different formats for 
different de,,;ces. In partnership with The Institute for the Future of the Book I pro,,;de an annotatable 
and "social" text available for visitors to comment upon what More -_. or I -- have written, and then share 
their commcnts with others. Those who like to listen will find a reading of Utopia on audio files, and those 
who want to watch and look can browse the user-generated galleries of Utopia-themI'd art and \ideas. For 
people interested in creating their own plan of an alternative societ}; I've created Wikitopia. a \\-iki \\-ith 
which to collaborate with others in drafting a new Utopia [sic]. More versions for more platforms arc likely 
to be introduced in thc future.' (opl'nulopia.orgl 
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Process based approaches: utopia as utopianism. 
In the years between 1954 and 1959 the German philosopher Ernst Bloch published tl 
three volumes of his magnum opus The Principle of Hope (1986), a text which performs tl 
crucial function of moving utopia away from an idealism of representation 
transcendence and into the realm of immanent materialism by placing practices I 
everyday life and the temporal at the heart of utopia. Seeking to correct what he saw : 
marxism's overly determinist economism, much of The Principle of Hope identifies 
number of practices, occurrences and forms as having a utopian orientation; a list th 
includes art, sport, medicine, religion, architecture, advertising and daydreaming. The: 
varied features of everyday life, Bloch maintains, contain a latency or intent towar( 
something beyond that which exists.29 He privileges those that are more than mere wishe 
however - and names them 'concrete utopias' (against wishful 'abstract utopias' - sc 
Levitas, 1997 for a critical summary of the distinction). These concrete utopias, whic 
Bloch states should be understood 'in carefully considered and carefully applied contra 
to utopianism' (1986; 157) show that show the world as existing in a permanent state I 
becoming-other and constitute 'a methodical organ for the New; an objective aggrega: 
form of what is coming up' (ibid.).30 This is an important step: utopia here is locate 
immanently rather than transcendentally, and has a concrete effect (and, indeed affect) a 
those who experience it: new 'structures of feeling' arise from 'real life' rather than textu: 
engagement. Furthermore, it is entirely plausible for the subjects of this utopian affect 1 
be collective rather than individual. Yet the concrete utopia - for Bloch - is not spatial 
grounded, but exists temporally: it transcends the operation of linear time and reachl 
forwards into a time yet to come (McManus, 2003). His philosophy, therefore, 
29 Anderson's analysis of the utopianism of David Gray's music - discussed above - draws on Bloch's work. 
30 It is worth noting that the past plays a similar role to the utopian space in function based approaches 
utopia. For Bloch, confronting our past (with its unrealised hopes and potentials) may serve to estrange' 
from our present, meaning that the past functions similarly to the utopian spaces in function baSI 
approaches (Bloch, 1986: 8-9; cf. Geoghegan, 1997 for a discussion of the role of the past and memory 
Bloch). There are resonances here with Derrida's notion of 'hauntology', in which our present is 'hauntc 
(and thus partly constituted) by past visions of a promised future that never actualised themsclv 
(Derrida, 1994). Stripped of its more formally marxist content (for it is communism that we we 
promised but that never materialised), hauntology has recently had a great deal of influence in Briti: 
music criticism, where it is applied to a movement in music that seeks to sonically (re)create the Ie 
utopian visions of social democracy and ubran modernism (see Reynolds, 2006). 
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'transcendent without transcendence' (1986: 146) - it always goes beyond what exists, not 
in reference to a specific representation of the good place, but through actualising a 
becoming immanent in the present. 
Yet despite this move towards immanence, Bloch has something of the state utopian in 
him. Firstly, his utopianism is not only driven by saying 'No to the bad situation which 
exists', but also 'Yes to the better life that hovers ahead' (1986: 75), for '[a]ll being is still 
built around the Not which induces hunger. There does not yet exist a food which could 
calm and fill up the lack entirely' (1976: 3, emphasis added): the implication being that 
one day there may be. Thus, his immanence is 'immanent to something', and 'this 
something reintroduces the transcendent' (Deleuze, 1995: 45) - or, as Bloch puts it - it is 
'full of disposition to something, tendency to, latency of something' (1986: 76). Bloch's 
utopia then, remains oriented to a lack: which it 'drives toward' (Bloch, quoted in O'Hara 
and Kellner, 1976: 23). As Ze'ev Levy notes, 'Bloch asserts that life and existence cannot 
be understood by the question "where from?"; it is incumbent upon us to understand 
them by asking "where to?" and "what for?'" (1997: 176). 
, 
The answer to these questions comes in the form what Bloch calls the 'Ultimum', which 
'represents the last, i.e. the highest newness, the repetition (the unremitting 
representedness of the tendency-goal in all progressively New) intensifies to the last, 
highest, most fundamental repetition: of identity.' (Bloch, 1986: 203). It is the 'ultimate 
reality' (1986: 435) and is linked to Marx's classless society, coming at the end of class 
based prehistory and serving as a glorious new dawn when mankind arrives at a home 
(,Heima!) at which it has never before been. In a beautiful passage, Bloch writes that 
[t]he true genesis is not at the beginning, but at the end, and it starts to begin only 
when society and existence become radical: that is, comprehend their own roots. 
But the root of history is the working, creating man [sic], who rebuilds and 
transforms the given circumstances of the world. Once man has comprehended 
himself and has established his own domain in real democracy, without 
depersonalization and alienation, something arises in the world which all men 
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have glimpsed in childhood: a place and a state in which no one has yet beel 
And the name of this something is home or homel\lnd. (1986: 1375-1376) 
Whilst this does not function as the 'end of history' per se, it must still be seen as a lack: 
'teleological unfolding of what we have all "really" wanted since time immemori 
(Levitas, 1997: 79). Though Bloch acknowledges the presence of concrete utopias in tl 
present, the potential they embody can only be universalised once this homeland has bee 
reached: there is thus a separation ('a total leap') between the ends and means; tl 
immanence of concrete utopia is immanent to something. Utopia (which, for Bloc 
remember, is a process) is not enough in itself: its goal is to return us to a homeland \' 
have never experienced. 
In this, Bloch comes close to the first dimension of state utopianism: blueprinting an ide 
society that will orient political action. He names it 'Heimat' rather than utopia, howevc 
and - confusingly - names the utopianism that will lead to it 'utopia'. 'Yet Bloch's flirtiI 
with lack and his semantic idiosyncracies are not the only issues with which I take issu 
he also comes close to the second dimension of state utopianism in utilising the militarisl 
language of Leninist vanguardism to theorise the agency of the concrete utopia. In tl 
regard, Moylan criticises him for shunning a pluralist approach in favour of a 'singul: 
site of historical movement [that] betrays what the actually existing Left has come I 
know: namely, that the social spaces and movements of contestation are multiple ar 
shifting.' (2001: 58) 
Perhaps unaware of these concessions to state thought, Deleuze and Guattari approving 
reference Bloch in an endnote linked to the section of What Is Philosophy? in which the 
discuss utopia (1994: 224, n.12), which - for them as for Bloch - is a force immanent 1 
the present that destroys the status quo: 
utopia is what links philosophy with its own epoch .. .it is with utopia that philosoph 
becomes political and takes the criticism of its own time to its highest point 
Utopia does not split off from infinite movement: etymologically it stands fOI 
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absolute deterritorialization but always at the critical point at which it is 
connected with the present relative milieu, and especially with the forces stifled by 
this milieu ... What matters is not the supposed distinction between utopian and 
scientific socialism but the different types of utopia, one of them being revolution. 
In utopia ... there is always the risk of a restoration, and sometimes a proud 
affirmation, of transcendence, so that we need to distinguish between 
authoritarian utopias, or utopias of transcendence ([the 'state utopia,] ), and 
immanent, revolutionary, libertarian utopias. But to say that revolution is itself 
utopia of immanence is not to say that it is a dream, something that is not 
rcalized or that is only r alized by betraying itself. On the contrary, it is to posit 
revolution as a plane of immanence, infinite movement and absolute survey, but 
to the extent that these features connect up with what is real here and now in the 
struggle against capitalism, relaunching new struggles whenever the earlier one is 
betrayed. The word utopia therefore designates that conjunction if philosophy, or if the 
concept, with the present milieu - political philosophy (1994: 99-100, emphasis in 
original). 
Here, utopia is understood as a process of deterritorialization: the absolute unpicking of 
any certainty. Yet this also proves unsatisfactory as an explanation for utopia. For while the 
conflation of the system of utopian function with utopia deprives us of a term to name 
utopia-a -pia e, Bloch and Deleuz and Guattari's utopia know no place; this i not the 
conftation of utopia with the system it calls into being, but if utopia with utopianism. As Lisa 
Garforth notes, '[wJhat is utopian' in Dc1cuzc and Guattari' work 'are indrtcrminate 
"lines of flight" , not where they might lead' (2009: 20), a vicw echoed by the arti t lcve 










Figure Two:' Tlopia', tew Lambert 
source: r iJitslel' t'.com 
.. 
There are clear resonances with nomadism in Bloch, and in Dcleuze and Guattari's c ~ ~
for an 'immanent, revolutionary, libertarian utopia' as opposed to a 'utopia I 
transcendence' (what I would call the 'state utopia'). Following Deleuze and : M a s s e ~ ~
understandings that space and place is made by forces across time, the stress on t1 
temporal dimension of utopia is key. Important also is to acknowledge that utopia ca 
take a plurality of concrete forms rather than merely be a textual genre and - related 1 
this - the understanding the utopia is something that might be collectively experienn 
rather than something that affects an isolated reader. Nonetheless, I want to contend th 
positing utopia as process or 'absolute deterritorialization' risks privileging flux ar 
becoming to the extent that utopia becomes a dizzying, disorientating and potential 
dystopian process, taking on the 'hysteria' that Newman associates with Deleuze's thougr. 
Lambert is only half right when he states that utopia is 'no place' - an aspect of u t o p i ~ ~
etymology also emphasised by Deleuze and Guattari's reference - it is also a 'good place 
and thinking of utopia as process overlooks this crucial aspect such that ,it becomes pure 
a temporal form rather than one that stresses the dynamic interplay between time ar 
space, a problem foregrounded by David Harvey, who notes that: 
Free-flowing processes become instantiated in structures, in institutional, social 
cultural, and physical realities that acquire a relative permanence, fixity anc 
immovability. Materialized Utopias of process cannot escape the question 0 
closure or the encrusted accumulations of traditions, institutional intertias, ane 
the like, which they themselves produce. (2000: 185) 
Thus, whilst utopia should not be thought of as the goal (or end) of utopianism in the w ~ ~
that the relationship between means and ends is traditionally understood, some way c 
theorising utopia as place in time is necessary, but without discarding becoming. To c 
this, I argue, means to return to the content of the utopian place; to draw on Deleuzc 
nomadic thought to think what it might mean for a place to be 'good', for a place to 'Sl 
no'; and to reconsider the relationship between utopia and utopianism. 
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A return to content: utopia, freedoD1 and becoD1ing 
The difference between the nomadic and the state utopia is not one of form or function, 
but a difference in content. In starting this section, then, I begin by focussing on theorists 
who have looked at the content of utopias and identified a strain of utopia which 
resonates with nomadic thought. Whilst these approaches are diverse, I want to suggest 
some commonalities that may point the way to a nomadic understanding of utopia, but 
one that still grounds it in space rather than seeing it solely as a process. 
The first of these approaches is concerned primarily with literature, and thus tends to 
conflate utopia with utopian literature. Nonetheless, as for Davis and Kumar above, I 
believe it is possible to consider these approaches as taking a content based approach to 
utopia, for the features of utopia they identify have no qualities which limit them to the 
literary, or even fictional. These approaches often identify two trends in utopia: one 
oriented around perfection, hierarchy and order (which I have suggested might be called 
the 'state utopia'); the other around qualities that resonate more positively with nomadic 
thought. 
• 
I have already mentioned Moylan's concept of the critical utopia, and to the extent that 
this should be defined as a utopia that is constituted by critique, it can be considered in 
this category. It is not alone, however. Marie Louise Berneri's Journey Through Utopia (first 
published in 1950 and largely a critique of utopianism's authoritarianism) identifies a 
strain of 'libertarian utopias', (though the only one which receives extensive focus is 
William Morris' News From Nowhere). These: 
oppose to the conception of the centralized state that of a federation of free 
communities, where the individual can express his [or her] personality without 
being submitted to the censure of an artificial code, where freedom is not an 
abstract word, but manifests itself concretely in work (1971: 8). 
In these utopias, 'happiness is the result of the free expression of man's [sic] personality 
and must not be sacrificed to an arbitrary moral code or to the interests of the state' 
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(1971: 2). More recently, and also from an anarchist perspective, John P. Clark has made 
similar observation - tracing two lineages of utopia: one of domination descending fro 
Plato's Republic, which he refers to as 'the original utopia of state power' (2009: II), al 
one descending from the Daodrrjing (a point of relevance for the discussion of Le Guin 
Chapter Three), which: 
is not achieved through domination in any of its forms, whether political 
economic, patriarchal, technological, or even epistemological. Rather, throug 
an ontology of unity-in-difference, the other is given authentic recognition 
Knowledge becomes sympathetic understanding and participato 
consciousness, as opposed to conquest and subjugation. The hierarchies of th 
utopia of domination (reason over desire, form over matter, soul over bod; 
. male over female, adult over child, civilised man over the primitive, consciousne 
over the unconscious, and so on.) are thus rejected. Apparent opposites are sho\l 
to interpenetrate, to complement one another, and to be necessary elements of 
larger whole (that is, of course, also a non-whole). (ibid.). 
A number of feminist critiques have made a similar division, separating 'masculir 
utopias from 'feminine' utopias. The former are notable for the emphasis they place ( 
rationality, hierarchy and order; the latter for privileging non-hierarchy, becoming al 
embodied intelligence. Of particular note here is the role that author"s of utopian te, 
themselves have played - Ursula K. Le Guin (1989), Joanna Russ (1995) and Marl 
Piercy (2003) have all drawn this distinction, whilst the theorists Lucy Sargisson (199 
and Qi.nyung Wu (1995) have made similar observations. 
Similar claims have also been made for non-textual forms, however - and a number 
these theorists also identify utopia with concrete practices in the 'real world'. John P. CIa 
notes that 'it would be a mistake to look at utopia primarily as a literary genre, as is Oftl 
done today', for there is an 'abundant legacy of utopian practice in the real world and 
actual history' (2009: 23), although he stops short of explicitly saying that there have bel 
spatially grounded utopias in 'the real world and in actual history' and should, perhaps, 1 
seen as being closer to Bloch here. In this, he occupies a similar position to a group 
thinkers whose thought can in some way be said to resonate with nomadic thought, ar 
who refer to utopianism or 'the utopian', but are (implicitly) hostile to the concept of 
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spatially grounded utopia: the anarchist inspired approaches of Judith Suissa (2009), 
Carissa Honeywell (2007), Uri Gordon (2009) and Nicholas Spencer (2009) can all be 
seen in this light. 31 
Anarchism does not abandon the idea of spatially locating its utopian politics, however, 
and one of the theoretical understandings of place closest to the nomadic utopia arises 
from the anarchist tradition: Hakim Bey's 'temporary autonomous zone' (and the related 
'permanent autonomous zone'). Key here is Bey's 1990 lecture and essay 'Temporary 
Autonomous Zone'. Drawing heavily on the work of Deleuze and Guattari, as well as 
anarchist theory and the then emerging cyberculture theories, it creates the concept of the 
temporary autonomous zone (TAZ) to refer to spaces of open insurrection created by 
'psychic nomadism' (2003: 104) that 'unfold ... within the fractal dimensions invisible to the 
cartography of Control' (2003: 101). These are 'made real' through 'the moments and 
spaces in which freedom is not only possible but actual (2003: 130, emphasis in original). 
The TAZ is thus unknowable in advance and is continually recreated by those who 
inhabit it - it avoids hierarchy or a transcendent ordering principle. It is not 'a harbringer 
of some pie-in-the-sky Social Utopia to which we must sacrifice our lives that our 
children's children may breathe a bit of free air' (2003: 131). Bey initially believed that 
such places could only exist for a short period of time before being co-opted back into -
or destroyed by - the dominant systems of control (indeed, it might be argued that the 
very concept of the TAZ - applied as it is with great ubiquity - has itself been 
recuperated by cultural capital), but updated the concept in his essay 1994 essay 
'Permanent TAZs', in which he suggested that it was possible to conceive of the TAZ's 
social relations surviving indefinitely. Interestingly, although Bey states that the permanent 
TAZ is not the product of 'pure utopianism' (it is unclear what he means by this), he 
31 Judith Suissa is of particular interest here - she explicitly talks about an anarchist utopianism being 
grounded in an educational space, but does not call this space utopia. Uri Gordon, meanwhile, opens his 
essay 'Utopia in contemporary anarchism' by arguing that 'anarchist utopias are perforce places created by 
the actions of individuals and communities taking history into their own hands' (2009: 260) - a claim that 
resonates strongly with nomadic utopianism, but he then goes on to reject the concept of utopia for 
anarchism, associating it with perfection (2009: 267). 
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makes six further references to utopia, utopianism or the utopian in the essay, which clos 
with the claim that 'the intensification of the PAZ will be .... Utopia Now' (1994: online 
hermetic. com), and (writing as Peter Lamborn Wilson), he refers to the autonomous zon 
created by Barbary Corsairs as 'pirate utopias' (2003). Sargent (2010: 48); Anderson (200 
212); and Robinson and Tormey (2009: 156-176) have explicidy linked the 'tempora 
autonomous zone' to utopia, and I return to the latter below. 
A further understanding of place that eschews the term utopia and resonates wi! 
nomadic thought is John Holloway's concept of the crack, as developed m Cra 
Capitalism. Holloway seeks to explicitly differentiate the crack from the utopia, arguil 
that the latter has a tendency to be· authoritarian (2010: 38) and is concerned wi' 
controlling space, whilst the crack operates temporally (20 I 0: 236). Yet the first of the 
points is answered by the anarchist concepts of utopianism addressed above and the latt' 
point is something of a false binary, for utopia is has a temporal dimensi?n, and Hollowl 
does refers to cracks in spatial terms (2010: 25, 29, 49). Thus, they can perhaps be be 
understood as spatiotemporal phenomena which ground Bloch's prefigurative no 
synchronicity in space (in the Deleuzean sense of the word). Their power comes from tn 
spatiotemporal dimension - they prefigure the 'not-yet' (a term also used by Bloch). Tt 
is clear in Holloway'S analysis of the 200 I argentina:;:,o uprising in Argentina, which: 
was not just a spatial crack, it was also a temporal crack [(note, however, that i 
retains its spatial dimension - the 'crack' is not pure process)] ... A social energ 
was released, different ways of relating were created. This was a temporary crac 
in the patterns of domination ... Often such explosions are seen as failures becau 
they do not lead to permanent change, but this is wrong: they have a validity ( 
their own, independent of their long-term consequences. Like a flash of lightnin 
they illuminate a different world, a world created perhaps for a few short houri 
but the impression which remains on our brain and in our senses is that of aI 
image of the world we can (and did) create. The world that does not yet exis 
displays itself as a world that exists not-yet (2010: 29-30). 
The crack thus fulfils the education of desire - although in line with Holloway'S belief 
the plurality of struggle this should be called 'the education of desires' - bringing to Ii 
new structures of feeling. Although this crack - like many others - is temporary, Hollow. 
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argues it might nonetheless contribute to permanent changes in social order in a manner 
consistent with nomadic thought's immanent operation: 
While each rebellion has its own validity and requires no justification in terms of 
its contribution to the future Revolution, it remains true that the existence of 
capitalism is a constant attack on the possibility of determining our own lives ... A 
crack is not a step on the path to Revolution, but it is an opening outwards ... It is 
never entirely closed, even when it is violently suppressed. The Paris Commune 
lives on, despite the slaughter of so many of its participants ... There is a drive 
outwards from ... cracks. They are centres of transgression, radiating waves of 
rebellion, not according to some pre-determined model (for these do not work) 
but always experimentally, creatively. Our cracks are not self-contained spaces but 
rebellions that recognise one another, feel affinities [and] reach out for each other. 
(2010: 29-30) 
As an immanently ordered space of becoming that proliferates rhizomatically, Holloway's 
crack bares a number of similarities to Andy Robinson and Simon Tormey's 'propulsive 
utopia' (2009). Drawing on Alfredo M. Bonano's essay 'Propulsive Utopia', and an 
anonymous essay entitled 'Desire is Speaking: Utopian Rhizomes', as well as the work of 
Holloway and post-left anarchism, they argue against transcendent 'utopias of deferral', 
and for a utopianism premised on the Delezuean concept of desire and active force, 
which spreads according to the logic of the rhizome, expanding the utopian space it does 
so. Thus, their final claim positions utopia 'not [as] a prefiguration of something-to-come, 
but [as] an instantiation of something-else, a not yet full/ formed space/place, a 
becoming-different that shows that other worlds are not merely possible, they are in-
formation'. (2009: 175)32 Here, then, seems to be a concept of utopia that is spatially 
grounded, but is subject to an ongoing nomadic process of becoming. Yet elsewhere in 
their essay Robinson and Tormey seemingly downplay the idea of utopia functioning as a 
space positioning it instead as a processual force. 'At the most basic level', they write, 
'utopia is not a particular space or place but movement or flow which in turn may create 
new spatial possibilities' (2009: 164). This again conflates utopia with utopianism, and 
leaves no word for those new spatial possibilities. 




The concepts of Bey, Holloway and Robinson and T o r ~ e y y are also' open to the charge 
believing that a smooth space will suffice to save us (indeed, if they have a utopia it cou 
perhaps be said to be a 'smooth space') - no account is given of the inevitable and (to i 
extent) desirable forces of antiproduction and reterritorialization that Deleuze insists a 
essential for the formation of new orders (though in Holloway's case it might be that th 
simply do not achieve the permanence that makes this a potential danger), and so there 
the potential for such places to breed only chaos and not a self-organisation from cha( 
they run the risk of becoming atopian rather than utopian. Nor do they acknowledge tl 
danger in such places becoming excessively reterritorialized to the extent that they are I 
longer open to the future and lapse into the status of state utopia. 
The Nomadic Utopia 
It is my contention, then, that the approaches to utopia I have considered so far do n 
meet the conditions of nomadic thought and/or do not (consistently) acknowledge tl 
spatial dimension of utopia. When utopia is understood as a perfect place (whether th 
perfection is absolute or pertains to an infinite perfectibility) it is a statist, striated space 
which life is hierarchically arranged in accordance with an order of representation, al 
governed according to a moral good. Approaches that focus on the function of utopi 
meanwhile, have a tendency to stress its negative, critical dimensions over its positi' 
creative potential, separating utopia from what it can do. They also focus primarily ( 
how utopian texts operate on the individual subject, meaning there is no collective age 
of transformation. Process oriented approaches, meanwhile, fail to acknowledge th 
utopia is a place and conflate it with utopianism. They thus run the risk of failing 
spatially realise the desire that embodies them. 
I have, however, highlighted three approaches to space - one that implicitly embraces tl 
concept of utopia (Bey's TAZ), one that explicitly rejects it (Holloway's crack) and one th 
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explicitly embraces it (Robinson and Tormey's propulsive utopia) that are consistent with 
nomadic thought and - occasional inconsistencies notwithstanding - are spatially 
grounded. Yet even these, I suggest, are insufficient for the creation of a fully nomadic 
utopia, as they do not engage with the importance of striation, 'death' and 
'antiproduction' in the creation of new forms; and the dangers that the utopia may face 
from these forces. 
In order to address these concerns, I offer the nomadic utopia. To theorists of utopia I 
suggest that its value lies primarily in three areas. Firstly, it provides a model of utopia that 
more closely matches the features of many places commonly referred to as utopias than 
pre-existing understandings of the term, but which can also be utilised to analyse utopian 
texts (and can supplement - rather than replace - the function based approach to utopia) . 
Secondly, it insists on situating the more 'hysteric' tendencies of Deleuzean political 
thought - and understandings of utopia that see it as a process - in place, forcing them to 
'slow down' and reterritorialize so that advantage can be taken of gains made. Finally, it 
enables the theorization of the dangers associated with reterritorialization; providing a 
way to think through the relationship of the nomadic utopia to s ~ t e e utopia. 
The good place 
Nomadic utopia is created by the ethical good in the sense outlined in Chapter One. 
Notwithstanding the points I make in the following section entitled 'The place that says 
no', it is a place of non-hierarchical social relations in which there is no opposition 
between the individual and the collective and in which 'difference-in-itself flourishes. It is 
thus a material (rather than an ideal) place that is continually being reproduced (though 
this is not to say that fictional nomadic utopias cannot be depicted, as will become clear in 
the following chapter on literary utopias). This means that the nomadic utopia is not the aim qf 
nomadic utopianism, but rather the result: nomadic utopianism (re)produces the utopia, and it 
does so without being oriented towards a lack. Nomadic utopianism, then, is not an 
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operation of rational thought that escapes the present, but is the' force of rhizomat 
connections between affective bodies (and so includes the 'active thoughts that esca] 
consciousness'). Comparisons can be made between the relationship to the virtual and tl 
actual in Deleuzean philosophy - the nomadic utopia constitutes an 'actual', but its no 
hierarchical organisation means that the virtual realm remains capable of producing tl 
new; it continually 'reactualises' itself through differentiation. The nomadic utopia is th 
not made by what is possible - but neither (contra critiques of utopianism) by tl 
impossible: it is the product of the virtual. 
As for the state utopia, intent is not necessary for nomadic utopianism: the (re)producti( 
of a utopia need not be the (primary) aim of those operating in the space. Those studyil 
sociological utopianism have often spoken of 'intentional communities', but the nomac 
utopia may actually function as what Damon Miller (2009) calls an 'unintentior. 
community'. The nomadic utopias I consider in chapters four and five,for example, ha 
the performance of music and the production of knowledge as their primary purpos 
(though in both cases - and particularly in popular education/critical pedagogy - they a 
likely to acknowledge that this cannot be 'abstracted from the form of organisation th 
take), and even where the primary purpose of an organisation is 'political' (that is, it 
seeking to create a better form of political organisation), it may reject the term 'utopi 
These organisations are, however, constituted by a sense that the structures they ado 
(and so the places they create) are, in some sense, 'good'. There may not be the intent 
produce a utopia, but there is - at least on some level - an intent to produce a good pta 
even if this good is secondary to (or cannot be separated from) what is ostensibly th( 
primary purpose. My argument, however, is that if a place is perceived to be 'good',33 al 
also pays heed to the 'no' such that it does not perceive of itself as 'finished', or 'the b( 
possible world' (which I consider shortly) it makes sense to call it a utopia. To paraphra 
33 There is a danger here of falling into an individualised judgement - of saying nothing more than 'if (l 
person thinks it is a utopia then it is a utopia for them'. This clearly plays into an individualised polil 
that denies any collective subject. This is why it is so important to follow Dcleuze and argue tI 
increasing the capacity of a collective body to act will increase the capacity of the individual body to ; 
(though, of course, Dcleuze problematizes the ontological primacy of the individual body). 
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the Marx Brothers: if it looks like a utopia, and feels like a utopia, then it's a utopia. 34 
Thus, if part of the purpose of this thesis is argue that liberals and conservatives who 
claim to be anti-utopian are in fact state utopian, it also argues that those whose politics 
chime with nomadism are also utopians. 
Whilst the ultimate aim of nomadic utopianism - which is utopian in the colloquially 
'impossible' sense is the establishment of a global (or, in light of my reading of The 
Dispossessed in Chapter Three, galactic!) nomadic utopia; a crucial point to note is that 
nomadic utopias are not just interesting in and of themselves, which is to say that - like 
Holloway's 'crack' - they produce becomings that go beyond their temporal and spatial 
boundaries. Those who have experienced life in a nomadic utopia - however briefly - mqy 
experience affectively productive 'structures of feeling' that estrange their sensibilities such 
that they cannot safely return to 'capitalist realism"s dystopia of drudgery. In this sense, 
nomadic utopias have the utopian function of critique, educating the desires of those who 
experience them. Recalling Deleuze's insistence that affirmation and negativity cannot 
completely be separated from one another, Kati Weeks writes that: 
[A]lthough [utopias] are presented here as two s ~ p a r a t e e functions, one 
deconstructive and the other reconstructive, their simultaneous presence t 
ransforms each of them ... the "no" to the present not only opens up the possibility 
of a "yes" to a different future, it is altered by its relationship to that "yes"; the 
affective distancing from the status quo that might be enabled is different when it 
is paired with an affective attachment either to potential alternative or to the 
potential of an alternative' (2011: 207). 
34 One further factor should be taken into consideration here. Firstly, there is, of course, something of a 
problem with coming from 'outside' a group and imposing the label 'utopian' on it (or even deciding if its 
organisational space is 'good' and pays heed to the 'no'), particularly if it is hostile to the concept and/or 
are coming from a tradition where the concept of utopia is not widely known. This may apply to fictional 
spaces too, although there is clearly less theoretical violence enacted in labelling a fictional space a utopia 
than one that exists in the real world or actual history. The theorist interested in applying the concept of 
nomadic utopia (as I am) must, therefore, deal sensitively with this issue, and accept that the labelling of a 
space as 'utopia' (or not) does not establish a universal truth. Rather, they help to expand the concept of 
utopia to include new forms, and (as noted in the previous footnote), this understanding of utopia may -




The place that says no 
Deleuze's ethical good does not allow for finality, and so the nomadic utopia is never 
settled place: it says 'no' to the permanence so often associated with utopia. Thus, the '11 
brings a temporality to the nomadic utopia, counteracting naIve claims that tl 
establishment of smooth space constitutes a once-and-for-all establishment of 'the gO( 
life', a move that would see nomadism's ethical good move towards statism's moral goo 
and which would - ultimately - transform the place into a state utopia (I consider tl 
relationship between the nomadic and state utopia shortly). Whilst the Weeks' que 
offered above focuses on the function of utopia in the dystopia of the current global ord 
her theorising of the relationship between the yes and the no is important for thinkil 
through the function of a nomadic utopia, in which a process of affirming difference-i 
itself and rejecting the finality of the present is eternally ongoing. 
The 'no', then, does not mean that the nomadic utopia does not exist, l;>Ut rather that it 
never in a state of completion: the 'good' and the 'no' acquire a consistency in the mann 
that Heraclitus' river 'is not the same and is'. Thus, the nomadic utopia can never 1 
isolated from the forces of production that (re)produce it: its prefiguration is not to a fill 
figuration, but to further prefiguration, ad infinitum. This means that in assessing whethel 
place is a nomadic utopia it is not sufficient simply to look at its form of organisation a1 
single instant in time: attention must be paid to its becomings through time. This h 
obvious resonances with Doreen Massey's understanding of place, but I want to brieJ 
highlight to two further points of comparison here. The first is with the manner in whi, 
E.P. Thompson defines class in The Making oj the English Working Class. 'Like any oth 
relationship', he writes, it 'is a fluency which evades analysis if we attempt to stop it del 
at any given moment and anatomize its structure' (1968: 9); and - closer to home (so 
speak) - with Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the 'schizophrenic object'. TI 
schizophrenic object exists, but cannot be distinguished from the forces that (re)produce, 
and the 'nontermination' of which 'is a necessary consequence of its mode of productie 
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(2004a: 7).35 Both of these claims are important to bare in mind when determining the 
nature of a utopian space. 
Strategic hierarchy and strategic identity 
The nomadic utopia, then, contains its system internally: it is constandy produced and 
reproduced by utopianism, and cannot be conceived of separately from this utopianism. 
It is powered by an affirmation of difference-in-itself, which results in saying 'no' t() 
finality. It is not simply in a chaotic state of permanent flux, however, but alternates 
between speeds and slownesses - at times rapidly smoothing and hastening away from 
ossification, at others slowing down to take stock of gains made, and striating. Not onlY are 
such forces inescapable, they are also necessary. In this, the nomadic utopia follows Deleuze and 
Guattari's insistence that death and moments of 'antiproduction' must be inserted into 
circuits of life (and indeed are necessary for the reproduction for such circuits). Hierarchy 
and identity must not be allowed to govern in a nomadic utopia, but they may be useful 
strategic tools to loosen tyrannies of habit. I give concrete examples of this in Chapters 
Four and Five. 
• 
These may also be utilised to enable the nomadic utopia to escape the second danger of 
smooth space - that of becoming an atopian site of pure chaos, which is experienced as a 
dizzying, dystopian affect in which the processes of reterritorialization fail to capitalise on 
gains made by deterritorialisation, resulting in undifferentiated chaos. Here, self-
organisation fails: chaos does not lead to order, but to further chaos. In such moments, the 
extremes of statist thought may seem particularly appealing, although - as Solnit (2010) 
has noted - forms of organisation that resonate with nomadism may also (temporarily) 
emerge. 
35 There is a key difference here, however: Deleuze and Guattari state that ,[t]here is no need to distinguish 
here between producing and its product' (2004a: 7). Yet it is precisely such a distinction that I am arguing 
for (between utopianism as producer and utopia as product, even if these two things cannot be fully 
separated). I argue that following Deleuze and Guattari on this point leads to the fallacy of the hysteric 
that Newman identifies, and to an understanding of utopia(nism) that fails to capitalise on its gains. 
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The 'deviant nOlIladic utopia' 
1 
Above, I noted that Deleuze's thought has been utilised for the benefit of militaries al 
capital. Just as it is entirely possible to utilise broadly nomadic principles to advance t 
state form, a place organised in the manner I have described here so far could also be p 
to statist ends. Here, I would return to my claim above and argue that attention needs 
be paid to the wider social forces that a space forms part of: a place that functions 
further a wider programme of state utopianism should be understood as a 'devia 
nomadic utopia', though a binary opposition between 'pure nomadic utopias' and 'devia 
nomadic utopias' should not be posited - any nomadic utopia operating within capitalisl 
for example, is bound to reproduce certain structures from the dominant system; and al 
risks reinforcing the dominant system. I discuss this further in my analysis of homophot 
and patriarchy in improvisation in Chapter Four; and in the manner in which nomac 
utopian education risks reproducing capital in Chapter Five. In ?rder to escape the 
dangers, a coming together of means and ends is required: just as a nomadic utopia mt 
remain constituted by nomadic utopianism, so must it feed back into that nomac 
utopianism. Under capitalism, however, this may not be entirely possible, and this 
something that needs to be considered by those seeking to create nomadic utopias. 
The relationship between the nOlIladic utopia and the state utopia 
When these hierarchies ossify, the place ceases to be a nomadic utopia and takes on tl 
characteristics of the state utopia. Eventually, if becoming ceases, difference-in-itself 
repressed, and the inorganic power of life is prevented from creating the new it may ful 
adopt that form. It is, of course, impossible to identify the exact moment at which 
nomadic utopia ossifies into a state utopia: it is not the presence of hierarchy, identity 
representation per se, but their ossification - the sense that they have acquired son 
permanence - and it is equally difficult to identify the freeing of a state utopia into 
nomadic utopia. Thus, care must be taken to examine the workings of the place o ~ ~
time, or as they are likely to unfold over time: it is the becomings that a place engende 
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and is made by that determine whether its good is moral or ethical, and making an 
evaluation (which can often only be tentative, and which must be open to continued re-
evaluation) on whether a place is a nomadic or statist utopia must take into account the 
likely nature of the place's future. 
The difficulty of noting whether a place is nomadic, statist or simply a place becomes 
more difficult as it increases in size due to the greater number of relations of power, many 
of which will not be easily observable and many of which may not be known about. As 
the section on musical improvisation in Chapter Four, below, shows - even the smallest 
communities will likely be marked by both statist and nomadic features, and thus places 
should always be thought of as a mixture of utopian forms: they \I{ill be simultaneously 
nomadic and statist. Yet taking into account the temporal and the spatial dimensions of a 
place, it is possible to make a tentative judgement on whether it is a nomadic or state 
utopia. 
NOD1adic utopias and autonoD1Y 
It should also be noted that nomadic utopias may exist spatially and temporally within a 
state utopia (an anarchist cell inside a fascist state, for example; or the forms I consider in 
Chapters Four and Five within capitalism), but that they ward off the organisational form 
of the state utopia: they make it impossible within their own sphere of relations (that is, in 
the places they create). Thus, nomadic utopias contained temporally or geographically 
(and - at least by the dominant statist logic of the social contract - legally) within a state 
utopia must be subtracted from that state utopia. A city governed by strict hierarchy, but 
which houses a nomadically utopian resistance movement should not be seen as a mix of 
utopian forms, but as a state utopia: the resistance movement exists autonomously from 
wider society, although this autonomy can - of course - never be absolute, as I note in 
Chapter Four. 
99 
Conclusion: time for a turn to life 
This chapter has drawn on utopian studies philosophy in order to think through t\l 
concepts of utopianism: the state and the nomadic; and has noted that they are not simF 
opposite forms, but that they merge into one another at an indeterminable point. So fi 
the concepts of the state utopia and the nomadic utopia have no life: they are merely in! 
theoretical frameworks. It is, then, necessary to take the step into life; to consider practic 
and experiments that might constitute state utopias, and - in particular - those that mig 
constitute nomadic utopias, as well examining how these nomadic utopias may ossify in 
state utopias. This turn to life will help illuminate the theoretical framework I ha: 
outlined here - bringing it to life and adding nuance. To do this, I want to look at bo 





Given that I have argued for a sociological, rather than literary, understanding of utopia, 
it may seem surprising that I should first turn to utopian literature in order to give life to 
the theoretical framework developed so far. Yet the aim of this chapter is not to engage in 
literary analysis per se, at least not in the commonly understood sense of the term - issues 
such as form, fictionality, authorial intent and the nature of the literary work are not my 
primary concern here; although this is not to say they are entirely irrelevant, and I do 
engage with them where appropriate. Nor is my primary concern to engage with the 
utopian function of these texts, which is to say that my focus is on the make-up of the 
utopian spaces they depict rather than the relationship between the texts and the reader -
although this is an important secondary task of this chapter (and so this chapter shows 
how the approach to utopia I have developed can be utilised alongside a function based 
approach). First and foremost, this chapter is an attempt to utilise my theory of utopia in 
order to provide readings of both utopianism (the social forces ~ r i v i n g g to [re]create some 
form of 'good' place - whether statist or nomadic) and utopia (the places that result from 
- and perpetuate - utopia) in works of what might broadly be called 'utopian fiction'. 
The three texts I consider in this chapter are Yevgeny Zamyatin's m, Albert Meister's the 
so-called utopia qf the centre Beaubourg. and Ursula K. Le Guin's The Dispossessed: An Ambiguous 
Utopia. Zamyatin and Le Guin's works are among those most commonly written about in 
utopian studies (and have been considered together [Wegner, 2002; Burns, 2008]), but I 
hope to show how the approach to utopianism I have developed provides a particular (and 
useful) theoretical framework to read these texts; whilst Meister's work is litde known in 
the field, but asks a number of interesting questions about what might constitute a utopia 
or a utopianism. 
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This chapter should be read as the first application of my t h ~ o r y , , but one in which there i! 
rhizomatic relationship between the theory and the fiction: the texts not only provic 
some 'fictive' flesh for the theoretical bones I have outlined so far, but force nuance at 
particularity onto the framework. They also provide space for me to reflect on the conce. 
of dystopia. It is important to stress, however, that the analyses of J1'e, TIe so-called utopia 
the centre heaubourg and The Dispossessed I offer in this chapter should not be seen as definiti' 
- there are many aspects to the texts I do not consider here. I 
The first text I consider is Zamyatin's J1'e. I note that this is often read as a dystopian wo 
that has an anti-utopian function. I undertake an analysis of OneState - the state utopi. 
society in which J1'e is largely set and argue that this is indeed a dystopia, but I then arg'l 
that it is a mistake to read J1'e simply as having an anti-utopian function, contending th 
it is better understood as having an anti state utopian function. Indeed, I suggest that J 
also details a utopianism in the shape of the Mephi - a resistance movement seekit 
revolution in OneState. Their utopianism, I suggest, can be understood as a prot 
nomadic utopianism, and I argue that this resonates with Zamyatin's own politic 
philosophy, which - like Deleuze and Guattari's - utilised the concept of nomadism. I ar 
however critical of the Mephi for exhibiting a rather hysterical desire that fails to grour 
its utopianism spatially - they seem to offer a utopianism without a utopia. 
I then turn to Albert Meister's TIe so-called utopia of the centre heaubourg,a work set in a 7 
storey deep structure hollowed out underneath the newly built Pompidou Centre in Par 
I show how this is organised in accordance with a number of principles of nomadism: it 
non-hierarchical and allows difference-in-itself to flourish. Yet I contend that it cann 
properly be read as a nomadic utopia because it fails to account .for the 'no' in utopil 
Other issues that commenta;ors have drawn attention to include the role of sexual desire and romance 
We (Horan, 2007; Self, 2007); the fact that the texts all feature white, Oargely) heterosexual ml 
protagonists and are largely written from their point of view (Attwood, 2004; Moylan, 1986: 91-120); t 
role of science and technology in TIu Dispossessed (Burns, 2008); post modernism and Hie (Burns, 2008) ~ ~
architecture in The so-called uropia of 1M cmtre heauhourg (Crinson, 2007). 
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etymology: there is no detailing of conflict or critique immanent to the space, which 
seems to function purely as a smooth space. As such, I contend that its depiction is 
unrealistic and that the book's main function is likely to be heuristic rather than 
representational. 
Ursula K. Le Guin's novel The Dispossessed is then considered. I situate this within the 'new 
wave' of utopian fiction developed in the early 1970s and relate it to Moylan's concept of 
the 'critical utopia'. I argue that it can be read as depicting a nomadic utopia in the form 
of Anarres - the planet in which much of the novel is set. I relate this to Le Guin's 
concept of the 'yin utopia'; a dynamic space open to forces of becoming (opposed -
initially at least - to the static 'yang utopia'). I show how it is (broadly speaking) non-
hierarchically structured but note that to simply embrace it as such would be to ignore the 
'no' so central to nomadic utopianism. Indeed, I argue that this is a flaw of Anarres, and I 
show how it is succumbing to tyrannies of habit and operations of power-over which 
means that it risks ossifying into a state utopia. Here, I briefly consider Le Guin's Taoism 
and argue that instead of reading Anarres simply as a 'yin utopia', it must be seen as a 
place where the 'yang' is immanent; always threatening to oss!fy social relations into a 
state utopian form. I argue, however, that this ossification does not reach sufficient levels 
to label Anarres a state utopia, and that the novel's open ending shows that Anarres is still 
producing nomadic be comings. 
We: nomads against the state 
Yevgeny Zamyatin's 1921 work WI is often taken to be an - if not the - archetypal 'classic' 
2 We was written in 1920-21. It was banned by the Soviet authorities and was first published in English in 
1924 by the New York publisher E.P. Dutton, although black market copies were circulated in Russia. A 
legal publication appeared in the U S S R . f o l l o ~ n g g ~ l a s n o s t t in 1988 (Brown in Zamyatin, ~ ~993: xi-xiv). 
All references with only a page number In thIS secUon are to the Clarence Brown translauon of ~ ~ (1993), 
and I adopt the vocabulary and formatting as he has translated it ('OneState' rather than 'One State' or 
'United State'; 'The Benefactor' as opposed to 'Do-Gooder'). Translations have also been done by Mirra 
Ginsburg (1983), Bernard Guerney (1970) and Natasha Randall (2006, 2010). The original 1924 
translation was by Gregory Zilboorg (1954), although Brown claims this contains errors (in Zamyatin, 
1993: xii). The Zilboorg translation was original published in English as MY, whilst there are variations of 
spelling of both Yevgeny (Evgeny, Evgenii, Eugene) and Zamyatin (Zamiatin). 
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dystopia (Moylan, 2000: xi, 133; Baccolini and Moylan, 2003: 1; Malak, 1987: 9). 
probable influence on Aldous Huxley's Brave New World and its definite influence ~ ~
George Orwell's Nineteen Eighty Four are oft-noted (Orwell, 1946; Burns, 2008; Owe 
2009; Smith, 1976; Meckier, 1984; Parrinder, 1973? Andrew Barratt (1985) and Will S 
(in Zamyatin, 2007: xii), meanwhile, have suggested that all works of dystopian fiction a 
derivative of H ~ , , and it is certainly true that it contains many well-worn signifiers 
dystopian literature, including a totalitarian state, the privileging of happiness ov 
freedom, the destruction of the individual, the absolute mechanisation of daily life, t: 
spread of the city and the denigration of the 'natural' environment. It is often m o b i l i s ~ ~
by liberal and conservative commentators as a warning against utopianism (which th 
conflate), and in this light functions as a text seeking to reinforce (and indeed enhance) tl 
power of capitalist realism's state utopia (Saint-Andre, 2003; Riggenbach, 2010).4 Thus, 
embodies the 'anti-utopian utopianism' of the established state utopia (of capital) and 
often referred to - by thinkers on both the right and the left - as an anti-utopia (Bam 
1985; Brown, 1976; Weber, 1958; Kumar, 1987; Davis, 1981; Huntington, 1982; Carde 
1987; Woodcock, 1956). 
My contention here is two-fold. Firstly, I argue that the giant city state of OneState . 
which most of We is set is indeed a dystopia, and that is is a dystopia because it is a sta 
utopia. Secondly, I argue that there are significant - and frequently overlooked - elemer 
of nomadic utopianism in the plot, although it stops short of depicting a nomadic utopi 
Thus, utilising my approach to utopia means that H ~ ~ can be read as a critique of sta 
utopianism from the perspective of nomadic utopia. This means that the text can 1 
3 It has also been acknowledged or suggested as an influence on Ayn Rand's Anthem (Riggenbach, 20 I 0; 
Saint-Andre, 2003) and Kurt Vonnegut's Plqyer Piano (Vonnegut, 1973). 
4 Whilst Bolshevism is clearly one of the targets of Zamyatin's satire, there is good evidence to suggest tt 
HI was intended as an attack on modernity's hyper-rationality more generally (indeed, Zamyatin wal 
supporter of the Bolshevik revolution). Clarence Brown argues that it was written as a warning agail 
'the fate towards which a thoughtless humanity is hurtling' (in Zamyatin, 1993: xix), and OneS tate 
inspired not only by his time in Soviet Russia but also on his experiences working as a naval engineer. 
Newcastle, where he experienced a highly Taylorised working system in the shipyards of the Tyne. Ma 
of the features of OneState (including rigid timetabling of 'private' life) were also explored in his earU 
novel/slanders, a satire on middle-class England (c.r Brown in Zamyatin, 1993 and Myers, 1993). 
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thought of as 'critical dystopia' (a term I take from Tom Moylan), as although it is a 
depiction of a 'bad place', it pushes the reader to imagine alternatives: it has a utopian 
function. It is thus an error to refer to it as an anti-utopia per se; it is an 'anti state utopia', 
but this is by no means the same thing. 
State Utopia in We: OneState 
ue takes the form of the diary of D-503, a twenty-sixty century inhabitant of OneState: a 
giant city state in which almost all of the world's drastically reduced population lives. 
Bringing to mind Popper's claim that the establishment of a utopia will have unacceptable 
costs, this population has been reduced by over 99 percent as a result of the '200-Years 
War between the City and the Country' (21): something that D-503 believes to have been 
necessary for the establishment of 'earthly bliss in the granaries of OneS tate' (22). D-503 
works as the chief engineer of the INTEGRAL, a rocket powered spaceship that 
OneState will utilise to colonise nearby planets that have not adopted its social system (a 
metaphor, presumably, for Comintern, and designed to represent the spreading of state 
utopianism to new territories). He writes his diary in the hope that it will one day be read 
by the 'unknown people' on these planets. Through these e n t ~ s s we get a sense of the 
political and social organisation of OneState, which - as soon becomes clear - is a society 
in which difference is brutally repressed. For D-503 (initially in the novel's narrative, at 
least) it is a good place - the 'Benefactor' (who rules OneState), his instruments of torture 
and the Guardians (the secret police force named, presumably, after the governors of 
Plato's ideal city state in Republic) 'represent good, all that is sublime, noble, elevated, 
crystal pure. Because that is what protects our nonfreedom, which is to say, our happiness.' 
(61) 
In a clear pre-echo of Davis' claims about utopia, Zamyatin has D-503 write that 
'[n]othing need happen' because of the 'mathematically perfect life' that OneState has 
almost achieved (it is not quite there, D-503 observes, because there remain people who 
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are not convinced of its absolute superiority) (4) - a 'system of scientific ethics ... based I 
subtraction, addition, division and multiplication' (14), In which 'the mighty power 
logic cleanses whatever it touches' (23). This 'ethical' system (which, following t 
distinction between ethics and morality I made in Chapter One should - perhaps ratb 
confusingly - be thought of as a moral system) has the aim of 'hardening and crystallizi 
life' and seeks an 'ideal ... state of affairs where nothing ever happens anymore.' (Zamyat 
1993: 25) 
OneState, then, functions as the 'end of history'. In a passage notable for its utilisation 
the figure of the 'nomad' (which I return to below), D-503 writes that 'all human histo 
as far back as we know it, is the history of moving from nomadic life to a more settled w 
of life. So, doesn't it follow that the most settled form of life (ours) is by the same token t: 
most perfect form of life (ours)?' (11-12), whilst S - one of the Guardians of OneSta 
states that 'we have nowhere to fly to, we've already flown there, we've found it' (88). 1 
503 also states that the perfect morality of OneState ensures that no progression beyol 
its logic will be possible, for: 
only the four rules of arithmetic are unalterable and everlasting. And only thl 
moral system built on the four rules will prevail as great, unalterable, ani 
everlasting ... that is the summit of the pyramid up which people, red and sweatin 
kicking and panting, have scrambled for centuries' (111: emphasis added). 
In an entry that brings to mind Deleuze and Guattari's association of state thought wi 
Euclidean geometry, D-503 also notes that OneState 'is a straight line. The great, d i v i ~ ~
precise, wise straight line - the wisest of all lines' (4). Everything is timetabled 
perfection and OneS tate's residents function as a single entity - the (seemingly) titular 'v 
that functions as a triumph of the collective over difference: 
We get up, millions of us, as though we were one. At the very same hou: 
millions of us as one, we start work. Later, millions as one, we stop. And then, Ii 
one body with a million hands, at one and the same second according to th 
Table, we lift the spoon to our lips. And at one and the same second we leave fc 
a stroll and go to the auditorium, to the hall for the Taylor exercises, and then 1 
bed. (13) . 
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This 'we' completely dominates and subjugates the individual's capacity to manage their 
daily lives, and - as D-503's reflections make clear - also affects their capacity to imagine 
how the world might be otherwise. State utopianism'S claim that 'there is no alternative' is 
central to his mindset: 
I've read and heard a lot of unbelievable stuff about those times when people 
lived in freedom ... of all things the very hardest for me to believe was how the 
governmental power of that time ... could have permitted people to live without 
even a semblance of our Table, without obligatory walks, without precisely 
established mealtimes, getting up and going to bed whenever it pleased them ... 
Now, that's something I simply cannot get through my head.(63, ellipsis in 
original) 
Here, then, D-503 is the state utopian par excellence - he revels in his 'unfreedom' and is 
incapable of imagining any other world. In a passage whose wording is remarkably 
similar to J.C. Davis' claims about the anti-utopian, he writes that those who do not 
conform to the utopian system are 'criminals': 
"Liberation?" Astonishing how the criminal instincts do survive in the human 
species. I choose the word criminal advisedly. Freedom and criminality are ... 
indissolubly linked ... when a man's freedom is reduced to zero, he commits no 
crimes. That's clear. The only means to rid man of crime is to rid him of 
freedom.' (36, ellipsis in original) 
This 'criminality', he fears, could result in 'chaos' (225) - an overwhelming of the unity of 
the 'one' by difference. Thus, the one is to be opposed to the fnultiple; and in order to 
keep out the latter OneS tate must resort to classically hierarchical forms of power: D-503 
writes approvingly of the Guardians, whilst a compulsory 'Great Operation' removes the 
capacities for citizens to imagine, preventing them from considering how the world might 
be otherwise. 
OneState, then, is a state utopia par excellence - an enormous striated space of control in 
which life has 'slowed' to a standstill. Chaos and difference have been eradicated through 
moral laws which are 'rationally' internalised by citizens - and reinforced through 
hierarchical systems of control should they be swept away by the 'irrational'. The 
individual is considered a threat to the totality of the system and must entirely subjugated. 
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Anti-Utopia or Dystopia? 
Given its horrific portrayal of a (state) utopia, ~ t e e is - as I have noted - frequently read 
an anti-utopia: a text cautioning against collective organisation and utopianism (with t: 
two conflated to a considerable extent). This is the approach taken by those on t 
libertarian right who seek to link Zamyatin to the work of Ayn Rand (Saint-Andre, 200 
Riggenbach, 2010). Moreover, Zamyatin himself can be mobilised in support of such 
view (to support the claim that he is an anti-utopia, that is - anyone who engages with 1 
political thought can clearly see that he was no proto-Randian). In an essay on H.I 
Wells, he writes that works of utopian literature are 'sugary', 'pinkish' works that a 
characterised by two 'generic and invariable features': 
One is the content: the authors of utopias paint what they consider to be ide: 
societies; translating this into the language of mathematics, we might say t h ~ ~
utopias bear a + sign. The other feature, organically growing out of content, is 1 
be found in the form: a utopia is always static; it is always descriptive, and has n 
or almost no, plot dynamics (1991: 286). 
He then proceeds to describe- Wells' The Time A4achine, The First Alen in the Moon, The Hlar 
the Air, and The ~ # J r l d d Set Free, noting that these 'differ from utopias as much as +A dim 
from -A. They are not utopias' (1991: 287). Zamyatin's rather rigid, algebraic thinking 
useful here - the constant is 'A', and this - we can assume - refers to the places in whi, 
the texts are set, and whose static nature results in the literary utopia having little by w 
of plot dynamic. So while literary utopias depict places deemed by their author to 1 
good, these texts of 'V ells' are the opposite: they detail a place their author presumed 
be bad, and so can be called 'anti-utopias', They denounce the 'ideal' societies they are! 
in and plot interest is introduced by way of a heroic struggle against dominant morality. 
On this reading, the literary anti-utopia is conflated with the literary dystopia, al 
dystopias are believed to warn against utopianism. Yet as many have pointed out (Sargel 
1982, 1986; Moylan, 2000: 122-132; Donawerth, 2003; Suvin, 2003) this is a mistake: 
literary dystopia may present a 'bad place', but - whether this place is judged bad by t 
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reader or is intended to be bad by the author - it does not necessari[y flllow.from this that the text 
cautions against all possible maniftstations qf utopia; rather, it is against one particular utopia, or one 
particular form qf utopia. The failure of a particular utopia does not mean that the concept is 
discredited. Indeed, the anti-utopian text 'celebrates and protects the status quo and the 
satisfactions that it delivers to its beneficiaries' (Moylan, 2000: 131) and so has the state 
utopian function of preserving existing society. Its message can be compared to the views 
of D-503 - the world we live in is perfect (remembering here the etymology of perfect as 
a place that cannot be improved upon) and it would be foolish to imagine one beyond it. 
There is no need for utopianism in the state utopia. 
This is not a necessary feature of the dystopian text, however. As many have noted, 
dystopian literature often has a utopian function. For Fitting (1995), Moylan (2000) and 
Sargent (2010: 28-29), this distinguishes it from the anti-utopia, 5 whilst Moylan - drawing 
on RafTaella Baccolini's claim that many dystopias 'negate static ideals, preserve radical 
action, and create a space in which opposition can be articulated and received' (Baccolini, 
2000: 17) - suggests that dystopian texts that are 'strongly, and ... self-reftexively "critical'" -
which is to say that they contain utopian elements - shoultl be considered 'critical 
dystopias' (Moylan, 2000: 188).6 Here, however, I want to argue that - like the utopia -
the dystopia should be thought of as a form of spatial organisation. It is, simply, a 'bad 
place', and so literary dystopias are texts set in bad places, and where a considerable 
narrative focus is placed on the organisation and operation of that 'bad place'. 
5 Whilst Fitting stresses the importance of a utopian element within the text (a resistance movement fighting 
against the state utopia in which the work is set) to be the defining feature of a dystopia as opposed to an 
anti-utopia, Sargent argues that dystopias are extrapolations from the present (and thus function as 
Jeremiads, warning humanity that this is our fate unless we change our ways), whilst anti-utopias present a 
vision of a bad future (and thus warn humanity not to change its ways). This, of course, means that texts 
might take on different functions in d i ~ e r e n t t times o.r locations. rtf, of course, was extrapolated from 
Zamyatin's present and warned humamty to change Its ways (see n.3, above), but to the contemporary 
reader in a liberal democracy it could be read as a warning against the need for change (though as I will 
argue, I believe this misses a crucial element to the work). 
6 Baccolini suggests that critical dystopias have existed since the 1930s and came to the fore in the 80s, but 
Moylan reserves the term 'for works that arise out of the emerging socioipolitical circumstances of the late 
1980s and 199Os' (the so-called 'end of history') (Moylan, 2000: 188). 
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This thesis has suggested there are two conflicting versions of 'bad': the ethical 'bad' al 
the moral 'evil'. Thus, in judging a place a dystopia, one' can speak from the position 
nomadism and say that it is 'bad' because it ascribes to a moral good; or one can spe 
from the position of a statist ideology and claim that a dystopia is 'bad' because it does 11 
conform to the (morally good) tenets of that ideology. It is my belief that these two a 
often conflated in popular usage of the term, where 'dystopias' fail to conform to politi( 
and economic liberalism, but are also seen to limit the capacity to affect and be affected. 
Given this definition, I do not follow Fitting, Sargent and Moylan in distinguishing t 
literary anti-utopia from the literary dystopia; rather, I would argue that certain litera 
dystopias have" an anti-utopian function (and so reinforce an existing state utopia), whi 
others have a utopian function - which may be of the 'radical' stateS or nomadic vari( 
(in this, I am closer to the position of Suvin, 2003). I suggest that the former 
considered as anti-utopian dystopias and the latter as critical dystopias. Deciding I 
which category a text falls in is a matter for each reader (and the fact that books a 
usually engaged by individuals divorced from sociality is, I suggest, a limit to th 
transformative potential) and will vary according to the time and place in which it is rea 
It may be influenced by the intentions of the author (where known), but is not (and shot; 
not be) limited by them, and it may also be influenced by popular and critical opinion (5 
Fish, 1989 for an account of the influence of critical interpretations). Thus, the views i 
author holds about their work should be considered as theoretical readings just as t 
views of other theorists should. They are of relevance, but do not fix the meaning Of t 
work once-and-for-all. Furthermore, the distinction between anti-utopias and critic 
dystopias - while useful- cannot tell us whether the utopian aspect of a critical dystopia 
nomadic or statist. For Baccollini, it is affirmatively the former - she argues that they Ci 
7 This, I suggest, speaks volumes about the success of liberalism (and in particular neoliberalism) in co-
opting nomadic concepts (non-hierarchy, flux) and putting them to statist ends. Those sympathetic to 
nomadism must, therefore, be careful when promoting these aspects of nomadic thought. 
8 Which is to say that they may point to an unrealised, rather than a realised, state utopia. Where JVe is 
utilised in support of the free market and liberal democracy it might be said to function in this way. 
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be linked to poststructuralism's 'attack [on] universalist assumptions, fixity and singularity, 
and pure, neutral and objective knowledge in favor of the recognition of differences, 
multiplicity, and complexity; partial and situated knowledges; as well as hybridity and 
fluidity' (2000: 18), but it is possible to imagine a work set in a dystopia, but which can be 
read as advocating the establishment of an alternative form of state utopia. 
We as a nomadic critical dystopia 
Against readings of We which place it as what I would call an anti-utopian dystopia, I 
want to contend here that it can be read as a nomadic critical dystopia. In other words, it 
is a literary work set in an ethically 'bad place' but which - through its portrayal of a 
nomadically oriented resistance movement - can be read as a text embracing nomadic 
utopianism, and prefiguring the poststructuralist variety of critical thought Baccolini 
associates with the critical dystopia. In this, I follow Jameson (2007: 177, 202), Wegner 
(2002: 147-172)9 and Suvin (1973: 15), who detect utopian aspects to We. It is my 
contention here that Zamyatin can be added to this list, and that the utopian impulse 
depicted in We - which is inspired by his Nietzschean thought - can be read as a nomadic 
utopianism. • 
Indeed, as I noted above - and have commented on at length elsewhere (Bell, 2010), there 
are remarkable resonances between Deleuze's nomadic thought and Zamyatin's political 
beliefs, which he laid out most clearly in two essays - 'Scythians' (written in 1918) and 'On 
Literature, Revolution, Entropy and Other Matters' (1923), collected in revgeny Zamyatin: A 
Soviet Heretic (1991). In each of these essays, Zamyatin argues for a permanent revolution 
of becoming, using the concept of 'revolution' in a manner similar to Deleuze and 
Guattari's inorganic life. In 'On Literature ... ', he claims that it is 'everywhere, in 
everything. It is infinite. There is no final revolution, no final number' (1991: 107), positing 
9 Wegner actually goes so far as to claim Ul 'for utopia'. This i ~ ~ not to say, however, that he thinks that it 
explicitly depicts a utopia - rather that through textual analysts the reader can uncover potential utopias 
beyond the narrative. It is 'for' a .utopia ~ a t t the . r e ~ d e r r has to work t o w a r d ~ . . In other words, it produces a 
utopianism. My suggestion here IS that thIS utoplarusm may well be nomadic. 
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it as a prefigurative, immanent force which does not answer to a lack. He uses the figure 
the Scythian lO to embody this revolution. The Scythian: t 
gallops across the green steppe, hair streaming in the wind. Where is he [si 
galloping? Nowhere. What for? For no reason. He simply gallops because he is 
Scythian ... an eternal nomad. Today he is here, tomorrow, there. Being attache 
to one place is unbearable to him. And if in his wild gallop he should chane 
upon a fenced town, he will give it a wide detour. The very odor of a dwellin 
of settled existence ... is intolerable to the Scythian. He is alive only in the win 
free gallop, only in the open steppe (Zamyatin, 1991 b: 21). 
Thus, the nomad 'can never rest on laurels, he [sic] will never be with the practical victc 
with those who rejoice and sing "Glory be'" (1991: 23); whenever the movement of 1 
infinite is stopped, the nomad will 'hasten away. .. to freedom' (1991: 22). They will do 
'under any regime, any external order (1991: 32) and exist ol;ltside the state, because 'at 
times, under the laws of all the monarchies and republics ... [they] have been reward 
only by a lodging at government expense - prison' (1991: 23). In resisting laws, Zamya 
states that the space of the Scythian/revolutionary is is non-Euclidean (1991: 10 
suggesting that their becoming is spatially grounded. Literature, Zamyatin believed, cot 
help further this revolutionary nomadism against forces of 'entropy', which sought 
preserve the status quo and - when it does so - it is 'utopian', although utopian is not 01 
to be applied to literature - Zamyatin states that in being utopian, literature is 'absurd 
like Babeuf in 1797. It is right 150 years later' (1991: 109). Such a utopianism, I sugge 
can be seen as a precursor to nomadic utopianism. 
It should not, however, be seen as identical to nomadic utopianism as I have developed 
Whilst my reading of Deleuze emphasises the interplay of being and becoming, al 
10 'Scythian' is something of a vague term, referring to an ethnolinguistic group of nomads on the Monl 
steppe for around a thousand years from 600 BC. In later periods it tends to refer more vaguely 
inhabitants of the Pontic-Caspian steppe (Rolle, 1980). What is known of the social structure during t 
. earlier periods suggests that it was hierarchical, and that Scythians were considered to be 'close to natll 
by the 'civilised' power of Greece (Rolle, 1980: 123-131). It seems likely that Zamyatin uses the concept 
the Scythian in a similar way to Deleuze and Guattari use the nomad: to name those who refuse fixity a 
embrace non-hierarchical organisation (though Zamyatin never develops an account of this as Delel 
and Guattari do with the nomadic war machine). 
One interesting resonance (though probably no more than a happy co-incidence) is that the Grc 
philosopher Anarcharsis was a Scythian. Though none of his works have survived, he is considereC 
forerunner to Greek cynicism, and one of its central claims - that suffering is the result of fa 
judgements (Long, 1996: 29) - bare a similarity to Dc1euze's appropriation of Spinoza and Nietzsch 
ethical thought. 
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utilises place in order to 'slow down' the more ecstatic, hysterical tendencies in Deleuzean 
thought, Zamyatin is less nuanced, and gives no account of how gains made by the 
'scythian' revolutionary might be held; his thought is one of speeds, not speeds and 
slownesses. He should, perhaps, best be thought of as a proto-nomadic utopian, liable to 
fall victim to the hysteria that Newman associates with Deleuze's thought. I I 
This 'proto-nomadic' utopianism is represented in the plot of Jte through the Mephi - a 
collective movement seeking liberation from OneState; a fictive embodiment of 
Zamyatin's Scythians. Against those who appropriate Jte as a proto-Randian work 
celebrating the heroic individual, I want to suggest that they can be read as a 'nomadic 
war machine'. As I noted in Chapter One, the nomadic war machine destroys the 
opposition between the opposition and the individual, and wards off the state form. 
Zamyatin portrays the Mephi's autonomy from state forms quite literally by locating them 
beyond the Green Wall that divides OneState from the natural world, and the reader gets 
access to them through the female character (and Mephi member) 1-330, who D-503 
enters into a relationship with. In an exchange with D-503, she makes clear the Mephi's 
hostility to OneS tate's statist logic, noting that: • 
there are two forces in the world, entropy and energy. One of them leads to 
blissful tranquility, to happy equilibrium. The other leads to the disruption of 
equilibrium, to the torment of perpetual movement. Our - or rather, your -
ancestors, the Christians, worshipped entropy as they worshipped God. But 
we anti-Christians, we ... (159, ellipsis in original)12 
In contrast to OneState's statism, the Mephi's philosophy seeks to open up spaces for the 
flow of life; it insists that another world is possible, and that another world will alwqys be 
possible. There can be no final resting point for life; no 'once-and-for-all' utopia serving as 
the end of history. This is made clear in what is perhaps the book's pivotal exchange, 
where 1-330 lays bare the fallacy of hoping for a final state of being to D-503: 
II In this I differ from my earlier work on Zamyatin and Deleuze and Guattari (2010), where I did not 
consider this point of divergence. 
12 The influence of Nietzsche's thought is clear here, and must be taken into account when considering the 
similarities between Zamyatin and Deleuze (for Nietzsche, what I have called 'morality' here is Christian -
so to be 'anti-Christian' means to embrace what I have called ethics rather than morality). See Rooney 
(1986) and Burns (2008: 87-88) for more on Nietzsche's influence on Zamyatin. 
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.. 
"Yes - revolution! Why is that stupid?" 
"Stupid- because there can't be a revolution. Becallse ... our revolution was the 
final one. And there cannot be any further revolutions of any kind. 
Everybody knows that." 
... "Tell me the final number." 
"The what? I. . .I don't understand. What final number?" 
"You know- the last one, the top, the absolute biggest." 
"But, 1-330, that's stupid. Since the number of numbers is infinite, how can 
there be a final one?" 
"Then how can there be a final revolution? There is no final one. The number 
of revolutions is infinite." (168, ellipses in original) 
Across a number of such encounters, D-503 finds that his certainty in OneState's mOl 
code is eroded, although even prior to meeting 1-330 he has been developing a nomac 
subjectivity, having developed a fascination with ..J-l: an 'irrational' number which troubl 
him greatly: 
For every equation, every formula in the superficial world, there is ~ ~
corresponding curve or solid. For irrational formulas, for my ..J-l, we know ( 
no corresponding solids, we've never seen them. . . .But that's just the whol 
horror - that these solids, invisible, exist. They absolutely inescapably mllS 
exist. Because in mathematics their eccentric prickly shadows, the irratioml 
formulas, parade in front of our eyes as if they were on a screen. An( 
mathematics and death never make a mistake. And if we don't see these solids i 
our surface world, there is for them, there inevitably must be, a whole immens 
world there, beneath the surface ... My mathematics, up to now the only lastin 
and immovable island in my entire dislocated life, had also broken loose an 
floated whirling o£f.' (98, ellipses in original) 
As this uncertainty increases through further encounters with 1-330,13 D-503 finds ~ h a t t : 
moves increasingly away from the rationalism of the cogito, and closer to the 'schiz 
revolutionary' nature of nomadic subjectivity. At one point he describes himself 
suffering from a 'strange condition ... [where] you wake up at night, open your eyes on tl 
darkness, and suddenly feel- you're lost, and you start groping around as fast as you ca 
looking for something familiar and solid .. .' (143, ellipsis in original). He comes to see: 
'other' in himself - finding that he is often not alone but 'with "him", the other me' (6: 
This 'other' D-503 is an irrational being whose 'shell burst open, and ... [whose] pie( 
13 There are certainly some problematic gender politics at play here. Referring to 1-330's position al 
'temptress', Horan refers to her as a 'stock femme-fatale' (2007: 134): yet 1 would argue that she is freci 
D-503 from a politics of 'mathematics and death' and leading him into a politics of Dcleuzian life: 
'femme-vital', if you will, but the fact that she remains undeveloped as a character is a shame, and ever 
Zamyatin is not embracing misgoynst stereotypes he is certainly not rejecting them entirely. Nonethelc 
there is something attractively subversive about the way Zamyatin transforms the female temptress" 
figure as old as Eve to D-503's Adam (and it is possible to read OneS tate as a play on the Garden of Edl 
- into a figure of revolution; and 1-330 is herself an active revolutionary - her function is not solely 
'tempt' men (c£ Wegner, 2002: 168). 
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were just about to fly in all directions ... and then what?' (56): the unity of his individuality 
disrupted by difference-in-itself. As the book progresses, D-503 comes to embrace this 
internal difference; even going so far as to declare that 'everybody has to go mad ... 
absolutely mad, and as soon as possible! This is crucial! I know it is!' (152). The loss of his 
rational, self-identical subjectivity and his seeming embrace of what Deleuze and Guattari 
might call a 'schizo-revolutionary' subjectivity coincides with his losing faith in OneState 
and a growing belief that the future must be different from the present. His certainty in 
OneState's moral code shattered, he becomes a 'schizo-revolutionary' and joins the 
Mephi. 
For George Orwell, the Mephi's 'utopianism' can be likened to what might be called an 
anarcho-primitivism. He states that they represent 'the rebellion of the primitive human 
spirit against a rationalised, mechanised, painless world' (1946: online at 
theorwellprize.co.uk). Alexandra Aldridge (1977) and Gordan Beauchamp (1983) develop 
a similar view: the latter arguing that 'hope .. .lies with the primitives, with the savages 
beyond the Wall who have escaped the yoke of Reason' (65). Yet I cannot agree with this 
judgement: as the book reaches its climax, D-503, 1-330 anJ fellow members of the 
Mephi seize control of the INTEGRAL, which, as I noted above, originally represented 
OneState's state utopian ambitions. Rather than destroy this technological marvel, as 
primitivists surely would, they hijack it such that it becomes a vehicle of immanent, 
prefigurative nomadic utopianism. Responding to D-503 asking 'What do we do now?', 1-
330 states 'I don't know. Do you have any idea how marvellous this is - just to fly, not 
knowing, no matter where.. . And soon it'll be 12:00 and no one knows what?' (193, 
ellipsis in original). Here, the utopianism is nomadic - both space and time promising the 
unknown and the contingent. What will come will be 'new, never before seen, or 
imagined' (141); it will be created by the play of life and not in accordance with a 
transcendent ideal. 
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Yet there is a worry here that the Mephi may fall victim to the hysteria Newm 
associates with Deleuze's thought - theirs is a philosophy entirely of speeds; it lac 
slowness, lacks an 'element of antiproduction' that will enable the creation of genuine 
new ways of life. It privileges becoming over being and so the reader rather feels that th 
will remain forever trapped in process; unable to make any spatial gains. T 
INTEGRAL, it seems, is doomed never to land in a new world: a utopianism withou1 
utopia. 
There is no way of assessing how true this accusation is, however: by the end of the n01 
1-330 has been executed by OneS tate and D-503 has undergone the 'operation' to remo 
his powers of imagination and is denouncing his former revolutionary allies Oeading to 
330's execution). Yet as he notes in the final diary entry that the reader sees, OneStat 
battle against the Mephi has not truly be won for, 'in the western quarters [of OneSta1 
there is still chaos, roaring, corpses, animals, and, unfortunately, quite.a lot of Numbe 
who have betrayed r e a s o n . ' l ~ ~ (225) The text itself is thus resists closure, encouraging i 
reader to imagine a world yet to come (Wegner, 2002: 171-172). It may be a dystopia, b 
it is a critical dystopia that represents nomadic utopianism and - in so doing - has 
nomadic utopian function, albeit one that lacks the heuristic pull of a fictionally realis: 
nomadic utopia. ls 
The ecstatic naivety of The so-called utopia of the centre beaubourg 
ue, then, leaves the reader to imagine what kind of place the Mephi might create (or, 
put it another way, what a nomadic utopia might look like). Here, I want to turn to ate 
that might be read as a literary nomadic utopia: that is, a work set in a utopian space th 
14 Although 1-330 is never identified as the 'leader' of the Mephi (and the reader gets the impression that t 
Mephi would not have a leader), it is interesting that the Mephi's utopianism seems to continue even af 
her execution. This suggests a rhizomatic organisation that cannot be stopped merely by attacki 
particular nodes, and brings to mind the claims of occupy movements that 'you cannot kill an idl 
(Smucker et al, 20 II). 
15 It is worth noting here the claims made by Peter Fitting, who states that the new 'utopian texts' of t 
1970s 'break out of the passivity and illusionism of the traditional reading experience in an effort to pu 
the reader to work for change' (1987: 26). This, I would argue, applies also to m. 
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conforms to a number of nomadism's tenets - Albert Meister's largely ignored The so-
called utopia oj the Ccntre beaubourg, first published in French in 1976. This text has not been 
written about (to my knowledge) in the field of utopian studies (it is better known in the 
art world due to translator Luca Frei's relative fame there) and I have only come across 
one other utopian theorist who had previously been aware of its existence (and they 
lecture in an art school). 
The work's history is rather complicated. Its author Albert Meister was a Swiss sociologist, 
and the book was first published under the psuedonym Gustave Affeulpin (who functions 
as the text's narrator/hero). It was first published in French as La soi-disant utopie du Centre 
beaubourg (1976), and an Italian translation (Sotto it Beaubourg, which translates as 'Under 
the Beaubourg') followed under Meister's own name (1988). The first English translation 
was made in 2007 by the artist Luca Frei, and is credited to Frei as an 'interpretation', to 
which he has added visuals. This was a limited edition of a thousand, and now fetches a 
great deal of money online, although a scanned .pdf has circulated online. For a while I 
suspected it may have been a hoax created by Frei. 16 This suspicion was enhanced further 
as it was published as part of a book series entitled ' F a b r i c a t ~ o n s ' , , and because Albert 
Meister was the birth name of 'Grandpa' Al Lewis (the actor best known for his role in 
The Munsters, who had anarchist sympathies) - but original copies of the Italian and 
French versions can be found on books.google.com; and Sotto it Beaubourg is also available 
on amazon. com and in a 2008 reprint from the publishers website 
(http://www.eleuthera.it). The French edition is also quoted in Furter (1995: 132), and 
has been reissued under Meister's own name (2010). 
The so-called utopia oj the centre beaubourg is an unusual work, and sits oddly alongside 
(broadly) contemporary critical utopian literature from the USA (discussed in the section 
16 In the manner, perhaps, of the work of the British artist Jamie Shovlin, best known for two 'fake' projects: 
'Lustfaust: A Folk Anthology 1976-81' (2003-2006), which sought to mythologise a krautrock band called 
Lustfaust (who had never existed) through a p p a r e ~ t t archival materials; and 'Naomi Y.Jelish' (2001-2004) -
another fictional archive, this time of drawings made by a disappeared schoolgirl Naomi Y. Jelish (see 
Bracewell and Tufnell, 2007). 
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on Le Guin, below). Although it has significant political resonances with these works (it 
, 
very noticeably, a product of the events of May '68), The so-called utopia of the cen 
beaubourg's lack of plot or character development means - in form at least - it has more 
common with the 'classic' utopias of More, Bacon and Campanella, and - as Ow 
Hatherley (2009) has noted, it is something of a boring read - an accusation often levell 
at classic utopias. Like J1-e, The so-called utopia of the centre beaubourg. takes the form of t 
diary - in this case of 'Gustave Affeulpin' (under whose name it was first published) -
mysterious man who creates a 76-storey structure underneath the newly open 
Pompidou Centre in Paris. He opens it up as a space for spontaneous, self-organis 
'culture' and as the narrative progresses it becomes the titular (so called-) utopia. 
The so-called utopia of the centre beaubourg opens with Affeulpin utilising his 'moleucul 
matter contraction' technology in order to hollow out a giant space (the 'beaubourg', 
'good p l a c e ~ ~ in the foundations of what will soon be the Pompidou C ~ n t r e e in Paris (1 
This ludicrous, fantastic method of creating the utopia can be read as a comment on t 
creation of classic utopias, which have often been criticised for failing to account for t 
processes of historical change required to realise them (Marx and Engels, 2004: ~ ~
Engels, 2008; Levitas, 200 I). Yet unlike the classic utopia, which is invariably a stat 
space built according to a blueprint, Affeulpin has no idea (in either the colloquial or t 
philosophical sense) what will fill the space. He calls a meeting for people interested 
using the space and says only that '[a]ll these levels are designed for culture, for the cultt 
that you will be doing, because I don't have a preconceived idea of culture' (18). Althou 
he is the 'architect' of the space in a structural sense, he does not wish to be an architect 
life within the space, something clear in Affeulpin's reflections on architects who: 
didn't understand why we [- in creating the beaubourg -] left so much spac 
without precise attributes. They do it in urbanism, in housing, in cultura 
buildings; they pretended to come and help us to define the different functior 
of the rooms architecturally: here we'll dance, there we'll rest, and there we' 
run etc. In other words, an exact replica of what they impose in the cit i e s 
and complexes they build, where the people that will live there know in advanc 
where they will and, especially, where they will not sleep, or run, or eat, etc. (29) 
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Against this architectural striation, the beaubourg functions as a smooth space that harks 
back to 'ancient cities [that] were lively precisely because they weren't planned'. It is an 
space of 'anti-planning, anti-urbanism, n o n ~ a r c h i t e c t u r e ' ' (.ibid). Affeulpin acknowledges 
that this will 'unavoidably' create 'wavering, indecision, discussion and tension', but states 
that such discussions should be held 'because we also know that we could never have these 
discussions [before], ... since the planners never speak with the planned, the modellers with 
the modelled' (30). The empty shell of the beaubourg is not the utopia, then - it is only 
when a sense oj place is created through the activity of those who fill it that it will become 
one. 
The discussion on what should be done with the space is mediated on a non-hierarchical 
basis. At the opening of the space, Affeulpin calls a meeting. Around 4,000 people attend, 
expecting him to make a speech or to determine what the space is for. To their (initial) 
disappointment, he refuses to do such a thing, stating only that the space is owned by the 
public and is to be used by the public for 'culture' - however they define that term. He 
remains adamant that all those who use the space must 'decide together' what it must be 
used for, but rejects the idea that this can be done by a n a l y s i n g ~ ~ those in the space on an 
individual basis, pouring scorn on a man who posits a 'study of [everyone's] motivations, 
in other words a cultural marketing' (20). Hierarchy is rejected by those at the meeting 
because, Affeulpin reflects, it would mean the beaubourg becoming: 
stuck in the dead end of democracy. The elected leaders would become the 
true master, more or less immovable because of their taste for power and, 
above all, because of the habit that we'll fall into, relying on them and confiding 
in them, transferring onto them the task of thinking the future of the centre, and 
the worries and the responsibilities of the everyday functions. We have been 
persuaded that by following the usual direction the centre would fail its mission of 
transforming the conditions of cultural creation and allow everybody to create. 
(32) 
It is acknowledged that such a task is 'far from being easy' and Affeulpin writes that he can 
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'unaersrana me angmsn OJ mose who haven't got bosses any more, the constant wOIT] 
for ... confirmation' (Hoy).17 
The beaubourgians (as they come to be known), put their trust in 'chaos': the ability of thl 
'rabble' to self-organise into something productive without an external ordering principle 
and so reject hylomorphism. They form what Affeulpin calls a 'non-organisation' (54) ( b ~ ~
which is meant 'non-hylomorphic organisation'); and their confidence that 'in the end, a 
always when the conditions for freedom have been put in place, things will sort themselve 
out without recurring to the schemes of doctrines' (ibid.) is well-founded, for they SOOI 
have a burgeoning culture: a form of o r g ~ n i s a t i o n n so successful that it is replicated il 
London, Milan and a number of French cities. At the entrance, they paint words fraIl 
Victor Hugo'sl8 Notre Dame de Pam, in large capital letters: 
AND BY THE BLOOD OF GOD, 
I HAVE NEITHER FAITH NOR LAW, 
NOR FIRE NOR DWELLING-PLACE 
NOR KING 
NOR GOD! (Gas) 
There are clear resonances with Zamyatin's nomadism here in the resistance to th 
metaphor of the 'dwelling' which, of course, refers to any final state of fulfilment. Thul 
the beaubourg remains constituted by the play of life. 'To change society', Affeulpin write! 
'we should begin by liberating within us all the forces of freedom that we would like to se 
succeed in the society of the future' (75). Beaubourgians recognise that the process ( 
becoming must continue permanently, and Affeulpin states that the predominant attitud 
is that 'the established fossilises and ossifies itself. We must never stop experimenting' (32 
In order to remain a nomadic utopia, forces of nomadic utopianism need to remair 
traversing the space and pushing it beyond any hint of the static. Time thus ceases t 
17 After page 122 of the book there are no more page numbers: instead, pages are labelled with words or 
phrases. I give these in itallics to avoid them being confused with an author citation, or bracketed text. ' 
18 These are referred to as 'verses of Balzac' in the text - whether the mistake here is Meister's or Affeulpin 
is not clear (if the latter, it is perhaps intended to satirise reverence for old masters). Frei provides 
reference to Notre Dame de Paris, the novel from which it is taken, but does not correct the error in th 
author's name. 
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operate as a mechanism of control, as it does with OneS tate's strict timetabling, Affeulpin 
telling of a Chilean beaubourgian called Paco, who: 
one day. .. started to talk, not in a meeting, but to individuals, one at a time, 
especially to busy ones, to those who continue to go down to their studios at 
fixed hours and regularly come up some hours later, reproducing down here 
the routine rhythms of the industrial schedule. Without wearing a watch, they 
have internalised their schedule to such an extent that they don't need to ask 
anyone for the time to know when to start and when to finish. (the end) 
Perfection is therefore wholly antithetical to the beaubourg. An enormously diverse range of 
activities and spaces spring up on the various floors: a park (complete with birds); libraries; 
practice rooms and recording studios for musicians; a floor covered in non-identical 
squares painted by a group of schizophrenics; and a motorcycling club are among the 
'cultures' that use the space. Amidst such a plethora of activity it would clearly be 
ludicrous to talk of any kind of 'perfection', and so 'if it bothers you that when you put 
your hand on the railing of the escalator you touch some bird shit, too bad. That doesn't 
bother us, we even think it should be like that' (Everything). 
Attempts to co-opt the beaubourg to ends beyond itself are resisted: Affeulpin writes 
disparagingly of 'pre-conditionsists', who 'pretended that it\ impossible to create a 
counter-culture, or to create anything else that could be called different than current 
society, before having realised the Revolution' and who argue that 'the centre had to 
become the tool in the formation of the masses for the Revolution' (52-53). He notes that 
'our goal wasn't, and isn't, to compete with bourgeois culture, nor to weaken its power and 
its domination. Entirely to the contrary, our goal is to escape from the influence of 
bourgeois culture' (53). Similarly, he later states that '[t]he only way to refuse the system is 
to negate it, to ignore it. Not against, but alongside, to create a parallel universe, science-
fiction's parallel spatio-temporal continuum' (286). 
Rather than change the present by reference to the future, then, the beaubourg seeks to 
change the future by changing the present. There is no clue as to what it will look in the 
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future, but realising the future that exists in the virtual realm of the present. This m o d ~ ~
proves remarkably successful, and it is worth quoting at length Affuelpin's final r e f l e c t i o n s ~ ~
By refusing to structure and organise ourselves, our beaubourg has avoided. 
any possibility for a leading minority to emerge that, under the guise of a 
benevolent non-directivity, could have easily governed every affair and, 
inevitably, would have reaffirmed the division between the hand and the mind, 
between the inferiors and the Superiors. Without a power to take, without a 
budget to control, without subscribers and right to entry, we are a happy mini 
people, with a beautiful history but without stories. And the arts that have 
been developed here, indisputably reflect the transformation of our life. 
Because, more than the arts, the originality and quality of which you can 
discuss forever, what we have produced is an art of living. For us, the old art has 
died with the death of the old man. It's life itself that has been remodelled and Wi 
realise very well that our studios, our floors, our workshops and our shaggers, hav 
only been the pretext to transform the pale and dreary life of the pretentious 
civilisation called modern. Instead of being a screen that separates from life, just 
like the homes that enclose it, culture has become a research on life itself; and the 
arts, which prevent you from living while sometimes helping you to exist (if riot ta 
subsist), have become the rehearsals, the practising of the art of. living, the only 
big Art. Culture stops being the substitute of the art of living, and History begins 
As to finding out if our very happiness isn't favourable enough to push the 
boundaries, if creation isn't fundamentally tied to tensions and suffering, born olJ 
of mismatch and the acute perception of the ephemeral: in short, if we don't fall 
asleep in our new art of living, we can leave answering all those questions to thos 
who by looking for reasons to live tomorrow forget to live today (Murlofa) 
1-330 and the Mephi, one suspects, would approve. 
NODladic utopia, deviant nODladic utopia or sDlooth space? 
The so-called utopia oj the centre beaubourg might be read, therefore, as a literary nomadi 
utopia: a text set in (and about) a nomadic utopian place. Yet its relentless optimism an 
the lack of criticality within the text place it close to the naivety often ascribed to classl 
utopias: Meister's text seems to be 'impossibly utopian' in the colloquial sense, guilty of tll 
charge of escapism that Marx and Engels; and Levitas level at utopias. Furthermorl 
whilst I do not share Levitas' belief that utopia must be located in the future in order t 
avoid escapism, utopias in the here-and-now must engage with wider societal POWf 
structures, and consider how their modes of operation may have an impact beyond the 
immediate space, and it is not clear that the beaubourg does this. 19 As a result, it runs tll 
19 The exchange of letters between Levitas and Sargisson published as 'Utopia in Dark Time 
Optimism/Pessimism and Utopia/Dystopia' (2003) develops this debate further. Sargisson maintains th 
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risk of functioning as a deviant nomadic utopia, providing novel forms of organisation 
that can productively be put to use by capital. Two examples are illustrative here. Firstly, 
the recently squatted Friern Barnet library, ~ h i c h h has been re-opened by those squatting 
in it ('Squatters Reopen Library After Council Closes Local Services', The Guardian, 11th 
September 2012: online at http://guardian.co.uk) - a move welcomed by local residents 
and the local council. Whilst there is something wonderfully utopian about this (and I 
think it is fair to assume that this is a utopianism that would have more in common with 
nomadism than statism), without reflecting on how this relates to the neoliberal project of 
spending cuts (responsible for the closure of the library in the first place) - and acting 
accordingly - it risks entrenching that neoliberalism, with those behind the cuts using it as a 
reason to close further libraries ('because someone else in the community will volunteer to 
run them'). Secondly, the World Bank's utilisation of the anarchist architect and urban 
theorist John Turner's work, with his belief that squatters were capable of non-
hierarchically self-organising communities (a claim that resonates with the beaubourgians' 
'anti-planning-anti-urbanism, non-architecture') mobilized in service of policies that 
limited the ability of governments to provide support for those without adequate housing 
• or access to services (Davis, 2007: 72). In such situations, nomapjc organisation must be 
careful not to confuse the state form with the geopolitical state. Whilst the latter is -
ultimately - a site of power to be overcome, its ability to protect the community against 
market forces can be an important ally in nomadic struggle. 
There are also problems internal to the beaubourg. It is hard to imagine a spontaneous 
organisation lasting for so long with no real organisational structures to sustain it, and 
without an element of 'antiproduction' inserted to capitalise on gains made: the 'strategic 
hierarchies' or 'moments of strategic representation' I spoke of in Chapter One, above. 20 
utopias in the here-and-now perform an important transformative function for those who experience 
them; Levitas remains wedded to the more orthodox Marxian position that a rupture in property relations 
is required before any utopian relations can be established. The dangers I progress to outline here - and 
my remarks on property relations in the conclusion, below - notwithstanding, I am closer to Sargisson on 
this. 
20 Quite apart from the manner in which 'anti-planning, anti-urbanism, non-architecture' as well as 'non-
organisation' might resonate with neoliberalism, it would be dangerous to abandon the idea of planning 
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In this, there is something of the impossibility colloquially associated with the form d 
utopia, and the beaubourg veers towards being a smooth space rather than a, nomadi, 
utopia: it lacks the fragility of the nomadic utopia which comes from the danger 0 
ossification into state utopia. Whilst i,t keeps the ethical 'good' from nomadic utopia': 
etymology, and embodies it in a place (the beaubourg, or 'good place'): it forgets the 'no'. 
The lack of criticality may - in part - come from the fact that the only voice encounterec 
in the text is Affeulpin's (or at least when we do hear the views of others they are filterec 
through Affeulpin). This leaves the reader wondering whether his fellow beaubourgian 
experience it as positively as he does. And does his power as its creator not lead tl 
informal hierarchy of the kind Deleuze warns against? What is done when peopl 
disagree in the beaubourg? What happens when someone says they don't want to b 
surrounded by bird shit? The reader simply is not told: like classic utopias, we ar 
presented with only one uncritical perspective on the space. With this text, then, th 
approach to utopia that I developed in the previous chapters is not fully applicable. 
This does not mean that The so-called utopia if the centre beaubourg does not have heuristic (c 
even satirical) value for nomadic utopianism (whether intended so by Meister or not). I 
offering an overly optimistic (impossible) vision of a nomadic utopia it suggests what sue 
a philosophy would be able to do in an 'ideal world' - a positive vision that lenc 
encouragement to nomadic organisation, even as it fails to engage with the difficulties thl 
are likely to be faced. In this, it can perhaps be seen as an 'optimistic' counterpart t 
Meister's own sociological work, which was largely concerned with processes ( 
ossification, or 'organisational degeneration' in self-organised and voluntarii 
and architecture entirely in a nomadic utopia (though this is not quite what Affeulpin means by the pre6 
'non-'; he uses it to mean 'atypical' or 'not what is normally meant by,). Rather, the challenge would be I 
create an 'artisanal' approach to these forms: one that does not hylomorphically impose a form on bodie 
but seeks to create new possibilities for life: new ways of combining bodies and forces. In architecture, tl 
work of Friedensriech Hundertwasser might be interesting in this regard - Harries suggests that this c ~ ~
be seen as an 'anti architecture' (1998: 240-242; see also Hundertwasser's 'Mould Manifesto Again 
Rationalism in Architecture', 1959 and Restany, 2001). Comparisons might also fruitfully be made wil 
'Freetowns' such as Copenhagen'S Christiania. See also Andrew Ballantyne's Deleuze and Guattari J 
Architects (2007). 
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communities, such that power becomes concentrated in the hands of an informal elite 
(Meister, 1984). 
The utopian pessimism of The Dispossessed 
Ursula K. Le Guin's The Dispossessed (sometimes published with the subtitle 'An 
Ambiguous Utopia'21) was first published in 1974, and - along with works by writers such 
as Marge Piercy, Joanna Russ and Samuel Delany - formed part of what might called a 
'new wave' of utopian literature inspired by the proliferation of new leftisms offered by 
critical theory, feminism, critical race theory, queer theory and - in particular - their 
seeming explosion in the 'event' of '68 (Moylan, 1986: 10; Cavalcanti, 2003: 48; Somay, 
1984; Wegner, 2002: 172-173). As Somay notes, these works were typically open-ended, 
featured multiple viewpoints and portrayed their utopian societies as flawed: they are 
Moylan's 'critical utopias' (1986).22 The narrative interest, meanwhile, often comes from 
the tension between stasis and change, with a protagonist (or protagonists) finding the 
supposed utopia increasingly closed and so increasingly dystopian. The Dispossessed is 
perhaps the best known of these texts - it won both the Hugo and Nebula Awards and 
• 
continues to generate a great deal of commentary in the field of utopian studies, having 
recently been the subject of an edited collection (Davis and Stillman, 2005) and a 
monograph (Burns, 2008). Here, I want to suggest that it can be read as detailing the 
struggle between forces of nomadism and statism, and that the society in which it is 
largely set - Anarres - is a nomadic utopia in danger of ossifying into a state utopia. 
The plot centres around the physicist Shevek, who is on the verge of inventing a device 
called the 'ansible', which - utilising t4e 'simultaneity theory of time', in which all of time 
21 The Dispossessed was first published with the subtitle 'An Ambiguous Utopia', but has variously been called 
The Dispossessed: A Novel (1974,2003), The Dispossessed: The Magnificent New Epic of an Ambiguous Utopia (1975) 
and simply The Dispossessed (2006) (cf. the editorial note in Davis and Stillman's The New Utopian Politics of 
Ursula K U Guin's The Dispossessed. The edition I use here is the 2006 Gollancz publication, which is simply 
titled The Dispossessed. 
22 Moylan devotes a chapter to The Dispossessed in Demand the Impossible (1986: 91-120), but refers to it as a 
'flawed' critical utopia. Rightly, he points out its heteronormativity, the passivity of female characters and 
its reliance on a stereo typically masculine hero to drive the plot (1986: 91-120). 
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exists simultaneously - will make instant galactic communication possible. Shevek lives i1 
the anarchist society Anarres, where he finds the ansible's development hampered by hi 
university supervisor Sabul, who has worked his way into a position of power-over; and b 
prevailing opinion, which functions as an informal hierarchy that prevents change an 
becoming. Having found Anarres increasingly dystopian in the manner it limits hi 
capacity to affect change, Shevek is - extraordinarily - allowed to leave for the country ( 
A-Io on the planet Urras (Urrasti consider Anarres to be its moon, and vice-versa). A-Io 1 
a fictional representation of the Vietnam War era USA (and Urras represents Eaith), an 
although initially finding it 'utopian', Shevek soon discovers its more dystopian/stal 
utopian elements, and comes to see the good in Anarresti life. He joins a resistan( 
movement on Urras and returns to Anarres as part of the 'Syndicate of Initiative',' 
movement seeking to unsetde Anarresti life by returning it to its anarchist origins an 
allowing it to go beyond itself. 
This basic plot summary covers only a fraction of the The Dispossessecls many themes an 
sub-plots, but those not covered here relate back to the conflict between forces of statisr 
and nomadism in Anarres. The message Shevek wants to impart to its inhabitants can b 
compared to that which Moylan states is the central message for the reader of Joann 
Russ' 'When it Changed': he is cautioning them to remain 'historically vigilant' and not t 
'lock in' utopian achievements so that the utopia is removed 'from the processes of timf 
coming to believe it has achieved the 'end of history' in the process (cf. Moylan, 2000: 15 
Thus, The Dispossessed is often said to belong to the critical utopian genre (Moylan, 198{ 
10; 91_120;23 Jorgensen, 2009; Seyferth, 2009: 286-287). I would agree with this readinl 
but add that as Anarres is depicted as fluctuating between nomadism and statism: it ca 
be read both as a critical utopia and a critical dystopiaY My intention here is to exploI 
23 Against these readings of The Dispossessed as a utopia, Tony Burns argues that it 'is best thought of I 
being, not a literary utopia at all, of any kind, and therefore not a utopian novel, but rather a novel PU] 
and simple - a novel dealing with the theme of utopianism in politics' (Burns, 2008: 20). This rests upc 
his claim that literary utopias detail ideal societies and contain little by way of plot or charactc 
development, central to the literary genre of the novel. As will be clear by now, this is not a distinction 
draw, but Burns is right to state that The Dispossessed is a novel dealing with utopianism. 
24 As I am utilising The Dispossessed here to flesh out the concept of the nomadic utopia and the constat 
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the tensions between nomadism and statism on Anarres, and show how - by embracing a 
degree of realism not found in The so-called utopia oj the centre beaubourg - Le Guin's novel 
details many of the problems a nomadic utopia may face. 
Anarres as a nomadic utopia 
In her 1982 lecture 'A Non-Euclidean View of California as a Cold Place to Be'25 
(published in a collection of her essays in 1989), Le Guin argues that 'Utopia has been 
euclidean, it has been European, and it has been masculine' (1989: 88). It has been a 'big 
yang motorcycle trip. Bright, dry, clear, strong firm, active, aggressive, lineal progressive, 
creative, expanding, advancing, and hot' (1989: 90); its places static, 'perfect' and - as such 
- uninhabitable26 (1989: 89). She argues, however, for the creation of a 'yin' utopia: 'Non-
European, non-euclidean, non-masculinist' (1989: 90), in which '[t]here are songs [and] 
one of the songs is called "Dancing at the Edge of the World''', suggesting that the space 
is always 'on the edge' - and always becoming other through creative, communal activity 
(the metaphorical 'dancing') (1989: 99). 
• 
Though Le Guin makes no reference to The Dispossessed in 'A Non-Euclidean View. .. ', 
Donna Williams has suggested that Anarres functions as precisely such a 'yin' utopia 
(1994: 165), and a number of commentators have argued that it embodies the non-
euclidean - and indeed anarchist - qualities of the yin utopia. Laurence Davis notes that 
it answers '[o]ne of the most powerful and persistent criticisms of utopian thinking ... that it 
threat it faces from ossifYing into a state utopia I do not consider the nature of Urras, but as a state 
utopian/ dystopian place to do so would lend further weight to the claim that The Dispossessed is 
simultaneously a critical dystopia Oike OneState, Urras contains a resistance movement) and a critical 
utopia. 
25 The title of this lecture is one of many instances where Zamyatin's influence on Le Guin is apparent, 
something Burns analyses at length. In addition to this essay, he notes that Le Guin labelled We 'the best 
single work of science fiction written yet', calling it 'a subtle, brilliant and powerful book; emotionally 
stunning' (quoted in Burns, 2008: 82). He also points to her referring to Zamyatin as an 'internal emigre' 
and her subsequent use of the same phrase to refer to herself (.ibid), and the fact there is a (female) 
character named 'Zayin' in Le Guin's 1969 short story 'Nine Lives' (2008: 83). As indirect evidence of 
Zamyatin's influence, meanwhile, Burns points to similarities in plot, theme and vocabulary between the 
two authors (2008: 83-85). 
26 This claim indicates that - like me - Le Guin at times sees utopia in terms of place, rather than as a 
literary genre (though it is clear she thinks the latter too - this is evident not least in the original subtitle of 
The Dispossessed). 
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does not, and perhaps cannot, recognize the unending ~ o w w of the historical process 
(2005: 3), and states that in creating it, Le Guin 'breaks radically from [the] static utopial 
tradition ... by imagining a genuinely dynamic and revolutionary utopia in which the p a ~ ~
never assumes a final shape and the future never shuts its doors' (Davis, 2005: 4, cf. 18 
Moylan, 1986: 101). In this sense, I would agree that Anarres can be seen as a 'yin' utopia 
Yet the embrace of the 'yin' is its weakness as well as its strength, and the Anarresi 
sometimes seem blind to the statist operations of power that they themselves are c r e a t i n ~ ~
Thus, in keeping with Le Guin's Taoism27 (and contra the claims she makes in 'A Non 
Euclidean View ... ') it seems that creating a utopia does not simply mean creating aJ 
ethically 'good place' that eradicates the 'yang', for the yang is a form of thought that an 
way of being that cannot be banished once-and-for-all: to believe it has been is to fa 
victim to it. Nomadic utopianism's relationship to state utopianism is - I contend -I 
useful way to think through these problems. 
There is much of the yin about Anarres, however. It is a (geopolitically) stateless society i 
which the distribution of labour integral to the functioning of a large society is organise 
non-hierarchically. Property is held in common, which - as Sabia (2005) notes - providl 
the basis for mutual relations of power-with between individuals and the community: 0 
Anarres it is understood that 'the strongest, in the existence of any social species, are t h o ~ ~
who are most social. In human terms, most ethical' (177). This is reinforced by 'Pravic' 
the language spoken, which has been designed so as to reduce linguistic operations I 
power-over: so successfully, in fact, that the very concept of hierarchy cannot be ful 
understood by the Anarresti (on his first trip to Urras, Shevek struggles to comprehend tl 
'curious matter of superiority and inferiority' he knows is central to relationships the] 
[13]). In theory, this means that Anarres exists in a state of permanent becoming: 
[W]ith the myth of the State out of the way, the real mutuality and r e c i p r o c i ~ ~
of society and individual became clear. Sacrifice may be demanded of tht 
individual, but never compromise: for though only the society could give 
27 Call (2007), Burns (2008) and Bain (1981) discuss the importance of Taoism in The Dispossesesd. Le Guin 
herself has translated the Tao Te Ching (1997). 
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security and stability, only the individual, the person, has the power of moral 
choice28 - the power of change, the essential function of life. The Odonian 
society was conceived as a permanent revolution, and revolution begins in the 
thinking mind. (289) 
Anarres' statist becomings 
This quote, however, shows that Anarresalso contains features that are neither yin nor 
nomadic. 'Odonian' refers to Odo - a woman who died 200 years before the narrative of 
The Dispossessed begins, and whose writings provided the inspiration for Anarresti society. 
In this, there are clear elements of statism in the founding of Anarres, with a blueprint for 
'the good life' followed. Though this Kroptkin-esque blueprint stresses the importance of 
non-hierarchy and becoming, it also has a starkly utilitarian rationale that prevents them 
from flourishing (though it stresses a mutualism of interests between the individual and 
the community, it argues that this will be a harmonic, permanent mutualism rather than 
one constituted by struggle and becoming). The claim that 'revolution begins in the 
thinking mind' is also troubling from a nomadic perspective, displaying a privileging of 
the ideal over the material; and the mind over the body. These features create problems 
for Anarres, which - the reader rapidly learns - is not as idyllic as had been hoped. The 
, 
state as a geopolitical entity may have been abandoned, but'the state form survives. 
Indeed, it survives so strongly that - contra Williams' claim that it Anarres is a 'yin' utopia, 
Donna R. White sees it as precisely the kind of euclidean, 'yang' utopia that Le Guin 
rejects (1998: 98). 
It is certainly true that Le Guin gives a number of examples of statist operations of power 
in Anarres - often through the figure of Bedap, Shevek's friend and lover. He plays a role 
similar to 1-330 in u-e, unpicking Shevek's certainty in Anarres' goodness. 29 In a long 
exchange with Shevek, he argues that informal hierarchies have been established through 
28 Confusingly for the perspective I have developed, Le Guin argues that 'morality' is flexible and adaptive to 
situations in hand whilst 'ethics' are rigid and fixed in accordance with pre-determined principles (1989: 
18-19). Burns compares Le Guin's morality to Macintyrean 'virtue ethics' (2008: 192-196). 
29 The character of Bedap is one of the most problematic for Moylan, who notes that his role seems to be to 
have sex with the (otherwise heterosexual and heteronormative) Shevek, unpick his certainty in Anarres, 
and then disappear again: he has no political agency of his own, merely contributing to Shevek's heroism 
(1986: 110-111). 
129 
bureaucracy and an ossified division-of-labour, which leads to 'people seeing their talent, 
their work, their lives wasted ... good minds submitting to stupid ones ... strength and 
courage strangled by envy, greed for power, fear of change' (144). This occurs in the name 
of utility (Reynolds, 2008: 86) and means that peoples' capacities to affect and be affected 
are severely limited. Bedap believes that simply abolishing the state has not been sufficient 
to abolish the state form: 'on Urras', he reflects, 'they have government by minority. Here 
we have government by the majority. But it is government! The social conscience isn't a 
living thing any more, but a machine, a power-machine, controlled by bureaucrats!' (145). 
He argues that this arises from the need for stability, which 'gives scope to the 
authoritarian impulse' (145). In the early days of Anarres, he claims, people were aware of 
this, but they were so successful that this has been forgotten: 'Education, the most 
important activity of the social organism, has got rigid, moralistic, authoritarian. Kids 
learn to parrot Odo's words as if they were laws - the ultimate blasphemy!' (146) The 
'tyranny of habit' has allowed power-over to emerge immanently such that - as Bedap 
states - '[i]t's always easier not to think for oneself. Find a nice safe hierarchy, and settle in. 
Don't make changes - don't risk disapproval - don't upset your syndics. It's always easiest 
to let yourself be governed.' (146) 
Shevek has a similarly disarming conversation with a character named Yea whilst visiting 
A-Io, who makes clear that eradicating formal operations of power over (sovereign power, 
in this instance) is not sufficient to eradicate potentially more insidious forms of power-
over: 
"I know you've got a - a Queen Teaea inside you, right inside that hairy head 
of yours. And she orders you around just like the old tyrant did her serfs. 
She says 'Do this!' and you do, and 'Don't!', and you don't" 
"That is where she belongs," he said, smiling. "Inside my head." 
"No. Better to have her in a palace. Then you could rebel against her" (219). 
Like many literary dystopias works (which is not to say that The Dispossessed is a literary 
dystopia, but that it has features of the critical dystopia due in part to the way in which 
Anarres becomes state utopian), Shevek comes to realise how pernicious these forms of 
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hierarchy are, and toward the novel's end he claims that 'We've made laws, laws of 
conventional behaviour, built walls all around ourselves, and we can't see them, because 
they're part of our thinking' (286). Here is perhaps the novel's key point (at least as far as 
this thesis is concerned): abolishing formal hierarchies and creating a 'good place' is not 
enough: statism is a mode of thought that arises immanently. Anarres is becoming a state 
utopia riddled with informal hierarchies. 
Sabul - Shevek's supervisor at the Central Institute of Sciences (where he is developing 
the ansible) - seeks to take advantage of these informal hierarchies and the ossification of 
the division of labour. He has worked his way into a position of authority (power-over) at 
the Institute by plagirising works from Urras and - when Shevek discovers this - he 
blackmails Shevek by threatening to end his career as a physicist if anyone is told. Sabul is 
also consulted as an 'expert' on physics by the Syndicalist Organisation of which Shevek is 
a member, and uses this position of power to try and prevent Shevek from developing the 
ansibile, claiming that it will upset the 'organic function' of the society (295), and that it is , 
of no use to the society 'because it doesn't get bread into people's mouths' (296). Sabul, 
then, is a reactive character: he says 'no' to life and seeks to maintain a status quo from 
which he (in his position of authority) benefits. But his ways of operating spread: Shevek 
finds that instead of being able to use Sabul in an affective, rhizomatic manner (to 
increase each other's capacity to affect and be affected), the best he can do is utilise him as 
a means to an end in the manner of a 'profiteer' (103); ,[n]ot in a relationship of mutual 
aid and solidarity, but [in] an exploitative relationship' (ibid.) in which each man is trying 
to get the better of the other. 
By depicting these operations of power-over, Le Guin imbues The Dispossessed with a 
nomadic utopian function. For Lewis Call, they show Le Guin's postanarchist sensibilities 
(which I see as nomadic) - she recognises that classical anarchism is 'not enough' (2002: 
87) and so promotes a version of anarchism that is 'more flexible, more fluid, more 
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" '1 
adaptable' in order to combat different forms of power-over - particularly those forms 1 
. . . I 
that emerge immanently (2007: 88). Thus, The Dispossessed's 'truly radical legacy' is that ttl 
. I 
1 
'transgresses the boundaries of conventional anarchist thinking to create new forms of I 
anarchism that are entirely relevant to life in the postmodern condition' (2007: 88-89). i 
I 
Brennan and Downs, meanwhile, argue that The Dispossessed offers 'a penetrating critique I 




It is worth considering the influence of Taoism on Le Guin a little more here. Despite her i 
I 
seeming embrace of the 'yin' utopia over the 'yang' in 'A Non-Euclidean View of j 
j 
California as a Cold Place to Be', Tony Burns notes that, at times, Le Guin views the yin 1 
I 
~ ~ ~ ~ I 
not simply [as] "opposites" which might exist independently of one another. It is 1 
not possible, she maintains, for us simply to "compromise" between them. Nor 
can we produce a harmony by reconciling the tension which exists between them. 
We cannot synthesize them in a manner which achieves a third way of thinking 





For Le Guin, then, the Taoist answers a 'most peculiar' kind of 'harmony or resolution' I 
1 
that 'does not preclude the possibility of tension, contradiction, and therefore, conflict, I 
I 
between the component principles which create and sustain it', for there is a 'balancing i 
1 
act' that 'results in neither stasis nor synthesis' (Burns, 2008: 58). The yang is always j 
immanent to the yin, and it is only by acknowledging this that a utopia will avoidi 
~ ~
ossification into state utopia/dystopia. Whilst the The so-called utopia of the centre beaubourg's 1 
, 
1 
'good place' failed to acknowledge the productive elements that this yang might bring, 1 
I 
i 
Anarres (at times) fails to acknowledge its dangers. 
I 
i 
It is clear that for much of The Dispossessed's narrative, the yang has ossified to such an I 
l , 
extent that Anarres might be called a state utopia (and so - as Williams claims - a) 
! 
dystopia). Yet by the end of the novel there is a sense that Anarres is generating nomadic i 
~ ~
~ ~
utopianism again, and that it might be possible to call it a nomadic utopia (it is, after all, .i 








this optimism but crucially he is no longer an isolated individual struggling against an 
oppressive society: .he has joined the revolutionary 'Syndicate of Initiative'. At the end of 
the novel he is returning to Anarres having completed the invention of the ansible. 
Travelling with him is Ketho - an ambassador from the planet Hain. Explaining the 
political situation on Anarres to him, Shevek states that: 
"Things are a little broken loose, on Anarres. That's what my friends on the 
radio have been telling me about. It was our purpose all along - our 
Syndicate, this journey of mine - to shake up things, to stir up, to break some 
habits, to make people ask questions. To behave like anarchists! All this has 
been going on while I was gone. So, you see, nobody is quite sure what happens 
next..." (333) 
Shevek's own nomadic utopianism is clear here - for him, Anarres is a utopia, but it can 
only remain so if it is acknowledged that there can be no resting place, and that the time 
to come is always unknowable: a reversal of Massey's claims that for the future to be open, 
space must be open to, and that place is made through returns. Anarres, then, must again 
become prefigurative: collapsing the time yet to come into the present (the ansible making 
this possible not only in a theoretical but in a literal sense). ~ o m m e n t i n g g on this in 
relation to the ansible, Davis notes that Le Guin was inspired by Friedrich Kiimmel's essay 
'Time as Succession and the Problem of Duration', which he summarises as stating that 
'the coexistence of past and future is no longer in contradiction with the present. All 
periods may be conceived of as existing at one and the same time' (2005: 5). This creates 
'an incessant interweaving of the "times"', though this 'does not .. .imply their fusion ... only 
the past as past and the future as future are able to make the present, entering into it and 
giving it foundation' (ibid.). Davis then goes on to note the nomadic potential of such an 
understanding, for: 
in the open circle of future and past there exists no possibility which is not made 
concrete by real conditions, nor any realization which does not bring with it 
new possibilities. This interrelation of reciprocal conditions is a historical process 
in which the past never assumes a final shape nor the future ever shuts its doors. 
(2005: 6) 
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Thus, whilst the landing on Anarres is a homecoming for Shevek, it represents the 
beginning of a journey for him, for Ketho and for those they will encounter; the start of a 
new adventure, of something unknown: the reader gets the feeling that Shevek's 'home' 
(the utopia) will not remain as he knew it - it is, like Heraclitus' river or Deleuze and 
Guattari's schizophrenic object - a place continually being reproduced; a site of being 
that is subject to becoming. It is a home that is also not a home. A no place as well as a 
good place: a nomadic utopia. "You're sure you want to walk through this wall with me, 
Ketho?", asks Shevek - as the narrative comes to a close - "You know, for me, it's easy. 
\'Vhatever happens, I am coming home. But you are leaving home. 'True journey is 
return .. .''' (335: ellipsis in original).30 \Ve must remain nomadic, in other words, if we 
want our utopia to survive. 
The Dispossesserls ending, then, is also' a beginning: a new beginning for Anarres and, 
possibly - for the universe. For when The Dispossessed is read alongside the other works in 
Le Guin's 'Hainish cycle'/l its closing events can be read as vital for the creation of the 
'Ekumen' - an intergalactic federation of planets founded by the Hainish. Although never 
explicitly stated, it is possible that Ketho's engagement with the anarchism of Anarres 
inspired the Ekumen, whilst the instant communication made possible by Shevek's ansible 
allows it to function. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has considered three works of fiction. Each of these depicts places that relate 
to the concept of utopia, and I have attempted to show how my concepts of the state and 
nomadic utopia can be utilised to read these places (although in the case of The so-called 
utopia oj the centre beaubourg I suggested that this is not an entirely successful operation). In 
30 The interplay of supposed opposites central to Le Guin's Taoism is again apparent here. 
31 The novels Rocannon's World (1977), Planet oj Exile (1979), City oj Illusions (1989b), The Left Hand oj Darkness 
(1974), The Wordfor HiJrld is Forest (2010), The Telling (2001); and a number of short stories in The Wind!" Twelve 
Quarters (1975), A Fisherman oj the Inland Sea (2005), Four Wqys to Forgiveness (1996) and The Birthdqy oj the TtOrid 
(2003). 
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not, however, ignored the potential utopian function of these works: I have also sought to 
stress the way they may impact on the subject who reads them. In this, I hope to have 
demonstrated how the approach to utopia I have developed can be utilised alongside a 
function based approach. 
It is my contention that the three works considered in this chapter can be said to offer an 
'education of desires', albeit one that functions slightly differently from the manner in 
which Levitas utilises this concept. The 'desires' that are being educated here are of the 
Deleuzo-Guattarian variety, and the 'education' they receive by encountering these 
utopian texts is a 'nomadic education' (a concept I return to in Chapter Five, below) - one 
that is not concerned with realising a pre-determined lack, but with expanding 
opportunities for life to actualise its productive force. In these three texts, I suggest that 
this is done by giving the reader a sense of the affective power of non-hierarchical 
organisation whilst warning of the pitfalls that come with an uncritical celebration of the 
ethical good. These are important lessons, and I will return to them in the discussion of 





In an essay on the manner in which music might have a utopian function, Ruth Levitas 
notes that 'the particular function of music can usefully go beyond analyses analogous to 
textual methods' (2010: 229). In this chapter, I take this claim seriously, utilising the 
approach to utopia developed so far in this thesis alongside the musicologist Christopher 
Small's concept of 'musicking' in order to consider the relationship between music and 
utopia. Specifically, I am interested in how the practice of musical performance might 
create utopias. My claim is, therefore, not that music might have a utopian function for 
the listening subject (I do not deny that this is true, but that is not my interest here), but 
that musical performance creates utopias, and that these utopias themselves have a 
utopian function. In order to develop this analysis, I draw heavily on the musicologist . 
Christopher Small's concept of musicking, and the chapter opens by expanding upon this. 
I note that he sees music as a practice rather than an abstract 'thing', and that he offers 
'musicking' as a gerund to describe participation (in any form) in this process. I also show 
how Small sees this as an inherently political practice of relevance for the organisation of 
society, and note that this resonates with a wider societal sense that musicking can be a 
force for social good. 
As I have noted, however, there is a moral good and an ethical good; and at this point I 
make the claim that the performance of what is commonly known as composed music is a 
morally good practice (and so can be linked to state utopianism), whilst the performance 
of what is commonly known as improvised music is an ethically good practice (and so can 
be linked to nomadic utopianism). I note, however, that this opposition is too simplistic, 
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and I suggest that it is better - initially at least - to oppose improvised musicking with 
what I call 'concrete musicking' (a term I take from Adam Harper) - though even this 
opposition is deconstructed later on. I argue when engaging in improvised musicking 
musicians have the power to create sounds immanently; whilst during concrete musicking 
the sounds they must make are 'set in stone'. This concretisation does not only result from 
the imposition of a score, however, but may arise immanently. 
I then bring the concept of utopia into consideration. I suggest that the symphony 
orchestra constitutes a form of organisation devoted to an extremely concrete form of 
musicking, and that as a result it can be seen as a state utopia. I show how it functions as 
an arborescently ordered place oriented around a transcendent lack (the score), in which 
the individual is placed in opposition to the collective and difference-in-itself is 
subordinated. I also argue that the symphony orchestra has - historically - played a state 
utopian role in the promotion of the nation state and the capitalist economic order. I then 
draw on the (negative) experiences of musicians in symphony orchestras and make 
comparisons between the language they use to describe their experiences and the 
language of characters in dystopian fiction. From this, I suggest, the symphony orchestra 
can be seen as a dystopia. 
I then turn to consider the practice of collective musical improvisation. I note that a 
number of theorists and musicians have argued that musical improvisation is a utopian 
practice, and that others have spoken of it a manner that resonates with nomadic 
utopianism. I then analyse the social relations that are produced during collective musical 
improvisation, arguing that to the extent the musicking is improvised these will be non-
hierarchical and constituted by difference-in-itself. Thus, I argue that the improvising 
assemblage functions as a multiplicity: an affective body that expresses power-with in 
which an increase in the power-to of one performer results in an increase in the power-to 
of other performers. I also show how the improvising musician is herself constituted by 
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difference, and is subject to processes of becoming. 
I argue, however, that these social relations cannot be taken for granted - and that 
improvisation is always at risk of ossification into concretised musicking and statist 
utopianism. This, I note, can happen through the tyranny of habit or from musicians 
exhibiting forms of power-over, both of which may prevent musicians from musicking 
immanently. In order to ward off these dangers, I argue that improvising musicians may 
sometimes need to utilise forms of strategic identity and/or strategic hierarchy in the form 
of generic identities and musical scores (although not in the traditional sense) in order to 
keep the space open. This, I show, means that the relationship between the concrete 
musicking and improvised musicking cannot simply be though of as one of simple 
opposition. The chapter closes by noting two dangers of uncritically applying the concept 
of nomadic utopianism to improvised musicking, arguing that an uncritical celebration of 
improvisation is likely to reproduce forms of power-over from the wider society. 
Musicking 
This chapter is not about 'music' as the term is commonly understood. It is not about the 
intentional combination of sounds and what these might mean, or what effects and affects 
they may have on a listener. Rather, I utilise the musicologist Christopher Small's concept 
of 'musicking', which he developed in his 1998 book Musicking: The Meanings oj Performing 
and Listening and utilise this to analyse the social relations between those making music. 
Following Small's work, this chapter is built on the premise that the relationships between 
musicians in the moment of performance - and in certain moments outside of 
performance - constitute political forms of organisation, and so create utopian space. 
Small's concept of musicking has significant resonances with both Deleuze's philosophical 
project and nomadic utopianism, although should not be thought of simply as a musical 
application of such claims. Arguing against traditional musicological perspectives in 
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which 'the subject matter of music is made up, primarily, of significant works of music 
that have outlived the culture of their age' (Dalhaus quoted in Small, 1998: 4), Small's 
theory rests on his claim that 'there is no such thing as music' (1998: 2). This is not to say 
that music does not exist, rather that it 'is not a thing at all, but an activity, something that 
people do. The apparent "thing" music is a figment, an abstraction of the action, whose 
reality vanishes as soon as we examine it at all closely.' (ibid.) To focus on the 'thing', Small 
suggests, is dangerous, as the concept of music comes to be thought of as 'more real than 
the reality it represents', which is to say - the process of music (ibid.). Drawing on Small's 
work, the musicologist Adam Harper made a similar point in a talk at the 2010 Oxford 
Radical Forum, in which he noted that: 
there are many languages throughout the world that don't actually have a word 
for music. This is usually because a culture has no concept of music as an abstract 
noun that needs to be signified. These aren't the languages of societies and 
civilisations that don't have any practices we in the West might interpret as 
musical ... far from it. For centuries, Westerners have grown up with the idea that 
music is an abstract thing. This handling of musical activity gives rise to the belief 
that music is separate from, and floats above, everyday life- at best reflecting it, 
reminding us of it, rather than residing in the real world and embodying it. 
(online at rougesfoam.blogspot.com). 
Small links this point to a wider critique of philosophies of the transcendent, arguing that 
the concepts of 'love, hate, good and evil' have no existence aside from the activities we 
perceive as loving, hateful, good or evil: there is no 'universal or ideal lying behind and 
suffusing the actions.' (ibid.) (In this, he is close to Deleuze's rejection of morality in favour 
of a Spinozan ethics.) 
For Small, then, music is a verb, with musicking its gerund (though I would contend that 
music is both a noun and a verb, and that the two cannot fully be separated from one 
another'). Musicking can be defined as 'tak[ing] part, in any capacity, in a musical 
performance, whether by performing, by listening, by rehearsing or practicing, by 
In his insistence that there is no such thing as music, Small's views on music can be seen as analogous to the 
process approach to utopia, in which utopia is not a thing (a noun) but an activity (a verb). Here, however, 
I would suggest it is more appropriate to think of music - like place - as both a noun and a verb. It is like 
a schizophrenic object whose existence should not be thought without attention to the relations of 
production that brought it into being such and not shortened to 'music', as they often are. They are 
instructions for musicking: they are not music. 
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providing material for performance (what is called composing), or by dancing' (Small, 
1998: 9, emphasis removed). In this sense, to focus on the utopian function of a particular 
musical work would be to music, but my intention here is to focus on performance, which, 
Small states, 'is the primary process if musicking, from which all other processes follow' (1998: 
113, emphasis in original). In looking at performance, I draw on Small's insight that '[t] he 
act of musicking establishes in the place where it is happening a set of relationships, and it 
is in those relationships that the meaning of the act lies' (1998: 13, c( 1998: 183; 1996: 
218; Davidson, 2010: 234, 237). In creating these relationships, my contention is that the 
musicking of performance creates utopias. 
For me, as for Small (1998: 13), musical performance is thus a political act, and it is cited 
by Levitas (2010) as one of the ways in which music may have a distinct utopian function 
(although my argument here is very different to hers). As Small notes, 'in every musical 
performance, at any time, everywhere', we 'may be sure that somebody's values are being 
explored, affirmed and celebrated' (1998: 77). In performance, desired relationships are 
brought into virtual existence so that those taking part are enabled to experience them as 
if they really did exist' (1998: 183). It is worth quoting him at length on this matter: 
By bringing into existence relationships that are thought of as desirable, a 
musical performance not only reflects those relationships but also shapes 
them. It teaches and inculates the concept of those ideal relationships, or 
values, and allows those taking part to try them on, to see how they fit, to 
experience them without having to commit themselves to them, at least for 
more than the duration of the performance. It is thus an instrument of 
exploration. 
In articulating those values it allows those taking part to say, to themselves, to 
one another and to anyone else who may be paying attention: these are our 
values, these are our concepts of ideal relationships, and consequently, this is 
who we are. It is thus an instrument of q/firmation. 
And third, in empowering those taking part to explore and to affirm their 
values, it leaves them with a feeling of being more completely themselves, 
more in tune with the world and with their fellows. After taking part in a good 
and satisfying musical performance, one is able to feel that this is how the 
world reallY is, and this is how I really relate to it. In short, it leaves the 
participants feeling good about themselves and about their values. It is thus an 
instrument of celebration. (1998: 183-184) 
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These three dimensions (exploration, affirmation, celebration) can be seen as analogous to 
(though not absolutely conforming to) the three dimensions of the state utopian system: 
'exploration' as the dimension of state utopian design, 'affirmation' as the creation of the 
utopia and 'celebration' as the reproduction of the utopia. Below, I move beyond Small to 
suggest ways in which these three stages are disrupted during/in the nomadic utopia of 
improvisation. 
The claim that music can feed into a wider societal sense of the good - and that these 
relationships are related to visions of the good - is frequently made in relation to the 
importance of music education (see, for example, Department for Education and 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2011) and was recognised by Robert Owen, 
who utilised musicking (both performance based and otherwise) to foster community at 
his utopian community in New Lanark, stating that: 
dancing, music and the military discipline, will always be prominent 
surroundings in a rational system for forming characters. They give health, 
unaffected grace to the body, teach obedience and order in the most 
imperceptible and pleasant manner and create peace and happiness in the 
mind. (1857: 147)2 
Yet as I have noted, there are different visions of the good, and in this chapter I explore 
this further, by considering the difference between morally good musical performance 
(state utopianism) and ethically good musical performance (nomadic utopianism). 
Improvisation and concretisation 
It is the basic claim of this chapter that it is improvisation that constitutes ethically good 
musical performance (and so is a form of nomadic utopianism), whilst the performance of 
what is commonly referred to as composed music is a morally good practice (and is thus a 
form of state utopianism). This argument is, however, deepened and problematised as the 
chapter progresses - a process that begins here, where the opposition between 
2 See Lorna Davidson (2010) for a fascinating account of how what I would recognise as musicking was 
utilised to shape society at New Lanark. 
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improvisation and composition is replaced by a relationship between 'improvisation' and 
'concretisation'. These are only preliminary notes, however, and the relationship is 
complicated as the chapter progresses. 
In order to develop these terms, I begin with the widely used concepts of composed music 
and improvised music. My basic definitional starting point here is the approach taken by 
the improvising musician and music theorist Eddie Prevost, who distinguishes between 
music that has been composed and music that has been improvised by arguing that in 
composed music 'most of the technical problems of preparing for a performance are 
solved and refined before the presentation', with 'relationships between the musicians ... 
mediated through the manuscript which normally represents the score'; whilst in 
improvisation the musicians 'are searching for sounds and their context within the 
moments of performance' and 'the relations between musicians are directly dialogical: i.e. 
their music is not mediated through any external mechanism e.g. a score' (2009a: 43). 
\-Vhen dealing with what Prevost terms composed music, then, musical performance is 
oriented to a transcendent lack (the score); whilst improvisation proceeds immanently. 
Yet contrasting composed with improvised mUSIC IS, I contend, unhelpful for three 
reasons. Firstly, improvisation can be understood as a form of composition. Some 
improvisers refer to their practice as 'instant composition' or 'spontaneous composition',3 
drawing on the sense in which composition refers to 'the action of putting together or 
combining', or 'the forming (if anything) by combination of various elements, parts, or 
ingredients' (Oxford English Dictionary Online: online at oed. com). Secondly - even 
where improvisation is not understood as a form of composition, a number of 'external 
mechanisms' not colloquially associated with composition may be utilised. Many of these 
will be consciously decided upon by musicians prior to playing: examples might include 
deciding to play in the Dorian mode, agreeing to follow the the saxophonist's lead or 
3 Sec, for example, the Instant Composition Orchestra (http://www.icporchestra.com/). 
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playing around a particular riff. Though these constitute external limits (albeit self-
imposed ones),4 they cannot (with the possible exception of the riff) be considered 
'composition' in any commonly understood sense of the term. 5 Other limits will apply that 
have not been consciously imposed by musicians. If they are familiar only with standard 
western tuning, for example, they are likely to be limited by that tuning (and the scales it 
makes possible) in that performance; and musicians may also repeat gestures or 
techniques they have utilised before and feel comfortable with.6 Finally, limits may emerge 
during an improvised performance as hierarchies emerge or the group hits a particular 
mode of musicking that becomes established as the 'norm' for the duration of their 
playing. Once established, these limit the level of improvisation in the Prevostian sense, 
but as they are internal rather than external limits, they do not increase the level of 
composition. 
I discuss the relevance of these issues for nomadic utopianism below. For now, however, I 
want to suggest that the simple binary opposition between improvisation and composition 
no longer holds. Rather, the issues I have dealt with here suggest instead a spectrum - the 
approach taken by Harper (2011: 48-49) and Hamilton (2007: 197) - upon which 
musicking is improvised to the extent that these limits do not affect the musician's capacity 
to create immanendy, and not to the extent that they do. A term to replace 'composition' 
(or, more accurately, 'the performance of composed music') is also needed - which covers 
the fact that limits on improvisation are not necessarily external to the musicking (ruling 
4 A 'self-imposed external limit' may sound contradictory. I use it to refer to particular structures that limit 
the capacity of the musicians during performance, but that the musicians have consciously imposed upon 
themselves before (and therefore external to) that performance. This is a fairly broad category, and could 
even be used to cover instances of musicking where a group had decided to follow a particular score. It 
perhaps cannot be used where musicians are coerced into following a particular score through an external 
power (schoolchildren singing hymns in an assembly, for example); or where musicians are contractually 
obliged to perform particular scores (a professional orchestra, for example). 
5 I have previously (2012) attempted to stretch the definition of composition to include these clements. 
6 The instruments used may also be a factor here - though for reasons of space I do not consider this here. 
A piano, for example, can only make discrete tuned sounds and so is limited in terms of harmonic 
possibility (it is also hard to retune during performance. In order to get around the limitations of 
instruments, improvising musicians often play instruments 'incorrectly' (hitting the body of a guitar to get 
percussive sounds and make the strings resonate, for example), or 'prepare' their instruments by, for 
example, placing metal objects on the strings of a piano so they will resonate and move around the piano 
body (preparation is sometimes prior to performance, sometimes during) in order to get them to react in 
unpredictable ways. Adam Harper's Infinite Music (2011) discusses this in greater depth. 
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out terms such as 'predetermination', for example) and here I draw on (and adapt) Adam 
Harper's term 'concrete'. For him, this term refers to musicking that is 'set in stone' (2011: 
47) and - though he utilises it in a broader sense than I am interested in (to include 
musicking beyond the immediate space of performance7) - it can be used to refer to 
musicking that meets arry limit: whether enshrined in a score; arising through a conscious 
democratic decision by performers; or that arises immanently during performance.8 
Although it may read a little oddly, I utilise the gerund 'concreting' to refer to this process 
in places, as I believe it is important for stressing how it may emerge in action rather than 
being predetermined prior to action. I also use 'concretised' as an adjective to describe 
performances that are ?ave been predetermined to be concrete. 
Concretised performance as state utopianism: the symphony orchestra 
In Chapter Two, I developed my concept of state utopianism to refer to hierarchically 
ordered activity producing and sustaining a transcendent vision of a moral good. It is 
either oriented to a lack or to the perpetuation of perfection (though this may not be 
conscious), and divides the individual and the collective into discrete, conflicting bodies 
whereby an increase in the power of one necessarily results in a decrease in the power of 
the other. This, I argue, characterises the relationships of performers involved in the 
performance of what can perhaps be seen as the most extreme form of musical 
organisation where concretetised performance is found: the symphony orchestra. To 
develop this analysis, it is necessary to analyse the social relationships between performers 
In a 'typical' symphony orchestra,9 in which a large number of musicians collectively 
7 He shows how 'variations in playback equipment and acoustics will cause the sonic attributes of 
[recorded) music to differ' at each moment of playback, for example (2011: 47). Though interesting, this is 
beyond my scope. 
8 Harper contrasts 'concrete' musicking to 'flexible' musicking. Here, however, I do not feci the need to 
replace the term 'improvisation' with 'flexible performance', as the two are more or less identical (which is 
to say that improvisation is the name given to flexible musical performance); the issues I introduce to 
problematise improvisation do not call into question the efficacy of the term to the extent that those 
introduced to the term composition do. 
9 There is no standard definition of what constitutes a 'symphony orchestra', though they evolved in the 
nineteenth century as composers wrote ever grander works requiring ever larger orchestras to play them. 
As such, they tend to be large ensembles of 80 or more musicians, a number which would be excessive for 
many concertos (though symphony orchestras do play concertos). 
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perform musical works by following a score notated using the five-line staff system of 
notation. These musicians are overseen by a conductor, with further hierarchical ranking 
within the orchestra, and - despite Harper's (correct) assertion that there is a degree of 
flexibility to their performance (inasmuch as performers can immanently regulate certain 
values within loosely defined parameters) (2011: 44), the musicking undertaken in a 
symphony orchestra comes as close as any in the western tradition to the pole of 
concretisation. It thus serves to illustrate how an 'extreme' state utopianism operates. 
Other forms of musical organisation (the chamber orchestra, the rock band, the folk 
group I ~ ~ will conform to some of these tenets, but to a lesser extent - and so they are 
further from the concrete pole. 
I do not want to deny that the music made by symphony orchestras can lead to joyous experiences for 
both performers and listeners, and may well produce rhizomatic becomings of its own: moments that 
exceed its statist form. While I argue here that it engenders ethically bad relationships among performers 
- and it should also be noted that much of the music is born of (and perpetuates) colonialist, nationalist, 
patriarchal and bourgeois values, with their attendant statist logics (see Bell, 2011a; Small, 1998; McClary, 
1991) - this does not mean it should never be enjoyed. We should, perhaps, reflect on our complicity in 
these processes if we enjoy it - but it does not mean that we should not enjoy playing or listening to it. I, 
for one, enjoy both of these - the sounds of Beethoven's symphonies have accompanied the writing of this 
thesis more frequently than, say, Ornette Coleman's free jazz, and I can still remember the intense joy and 
empowerment I felt as an eight year old when my school choir sang in a series of concerts with the Royal 
Liverpool Philharmonic Orchestra. 
10 Two further forms of musicking that can be seen to constitute a form of state utopianism can be found in 
the 'guitar orchestra' of Glenn Branca and in Sun Ra's Arkestra. Both of these draw on tropes from the 
symphony orchestra, and the former is particularly similar - albeit without such a complexity of 
hierarchies between musicians or sections of the orchestra - but neither form of organisation should be 
understood as identical to the symphony orchestra. In an interview with the musicologist, musician and 
composer Wim Mertens in 1982, the composer John Cage speaks of his unease attending a Branca 
concert, stating that he 'felt negative about the political implications [of the music)" before continuing to 
say that he 'wouldn't want to live in a society like that, in which someone would be requiring other people 
to do ... to do such an intense thing together ... [it is] an example of sheer determination of one person 
[(Branca)) to be followed by the others ... even if you couldn't hear you could see the situation, that [it] is 
not a shepherd taking care of the sheep, but of a leader insisting that people agree with him, giving them 
no freedom whatsoever ... when the amplifier broke that was the one moment free of intention .. .if it was 
something political it would resemble fascism'. The audio of this interview is contained as a track rSo 
That Each Person Is In Charge of Himself) on Glenn Branca's album Indeterminate Activi!JI oj Resultant 
Masses (2006). 
Whilst their music often sounds similar to freely improvised jazz, Sun Ra's Arkestra were also strictly 
hierarchical and their playing was guided by what Sun Ra believed was 'natural' for black musicians, 
whilst musicians individual egos were to be subordinate to the collective identity fostered by Sun Ra as 
bandleader (Iyer, 1996: online at http://archive.cnmat.berkeley.edu/). Sun Ra's authoritarianism was 
lauded by Arkestra member Pat Patrick, who described him as 'the type of musician that inspires you 
towards improvement and a better output' and from whom ,(t]here is always something to be learned 
from' (quoted in Wilmer 1977:85), whilst another member of the Arkestra -John Sinclair - noted that 'we 
knew he was a dictator, but at least he was a benign dictator.' (quoted in Szwed, 1998: 245) An analysis of 
Sun Ra's Arkestra, then, reveals that there may be a disparity between the perceived freedom of a music 
and the conditions of those producing it: my focus here is firmly on the latter. 
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The structure of the symphony orchestra 
In his essay 'Generating and Organising Variety in the Arts', the musician, music producer 
and music theorist Brian Eno stresses the hierarchical organisation of a symphony 
orchestra, writing that it: 
is a ranked pyramidal hierarchy of the same kind as the armies that existed 
contemporary to it. The hierarchy of rank is in this pattern: conductor, leader of 
the orchestra; section principals; section subprincipals; and, finally, rank-and-file 
members. Occasionally a soloist will join the upper echelons of this system; and it 
is implied, of course, that the composer with his intentions and aspirations has 
absolute, albeit temporary, control over the whole structure and its behavior. This 
ranking, as does military ranking, reflects varying degrees of responsibility; 
conversely, it reflects varying degrees of constraint on behavior (1981: 130). 
Small makes a similar point, noting that it is 'almost without question that these 
relationships should be authoritarian and hierarchical' (1998: 68), with the 'rank and file 
[players] rarely consulted about the nature of the product to be made' (1998: 69). He 
draws attention in particular to the power-over of the conductor, who 'represents the 
image of what all of us dream at times of doing and of what many in our time have tried 
to do in the field of social and political action: to resolve conflicts once and for all through· 
the exercise of unlimited power' (Small, 1998: 86, cf. Levine and Levine, 1996: 18-20). 
This is a necessary operation to prevent 'chaos' (Attali, 1985: 66-67), and the conductor's 
power-over is so great that, in a startling example of hylomorphism, she is sometimes 
spoken of as 'playing' the orchestra is if it were her instrument (Galkin, 1988: 568). 
Small and Eno both note that this hierarchy is necessary in order to follow the score, 
which functions 'as a statement about organisation ... a set of devices for organising 
behaviour toward producing sounds' (Eno, 1981: 129); a 'lack' towards which the 
orchestra organises itself. In it is embodied the Platonic 'ideal form' of each piece of 
music, which the orchestra strives to realise in each performance (Small, 1998: 113):11 
The score that lies on the conductor's desk tonight is the ultimate center of 
power in this big space, the symbol of the composer's authority over what is 
played here and the means by which that authority is exercised. The authority 
II For Brahms, the orchestra was always doomed to fail. 'No one can do [M:ozart's] Don Giovanni right for 
me', he noted. 'I enjoy it much better from the score' (quoted in Hamilton, 2007: 113). 
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of the conductor, supreme as it appears, is contingent on his obeying, like 
everyone else on the platform, the coded instructions that the score contains. 
He [sic] can make no gesture that is not inspired by these instructions, make 
no demands on the players that is not sanctioned by them. He may extend the 
implications of the instructions to the utmost, but he has, finally, to be able to 
justify his extension by reference to the authority of the score. (1998: 115)12 
As Hamilton notes, the score constitutes a vision of perfection (in making this argument 
he references the etymology of perfection I discussed in Chapter Two, above) (2007: 196). 
It functions as a lack in a manner comparable to a utopian blueprint in the system of state 
utopia, even if the organisation of people is not its primary purpose. 
(Re)producing the lack inscribed in the score reqwres the total domination of the 
individual by the collective: any expression of 'difference' would constitute deviance from 
the form established by the score and so the individual performer must submit absolutely 
to the totality, governed by the score (Hamilton, 2007: 113, 197; Small, 1998: 66). Like 
the capitalist worker under Adam Smith's division of labour, the individual musician's 
contribution is also valueless on its own (Attali, 1985: 64). Thus, the individual is to be 
opposed to - and subsumed under - the collective and difference is considered to be 
difference from perfection. The symphony orchestra thus constitutes a state utopia. 
The utopian function of the symphony orchestra 
Although my focus here is primarily on the inner relations of musicking collectives, the 
orchestra also has an outward-facing state utopian function, projecting its vision of the 
good life to the wider world (Beckles-Willson, 2009: 4), and it is important to acknowledge 
this (after all, few of us will ever play in a symphony orchestra - though we may well 
perform in a musical group that shares many of its organisation forms). As Small notes, 
the relationships created in musical performance 'model, or stand as a metaphor for, ideal 
relationships as the participants in the performance imagine them to be: relationships 
between person and person, between individual and society' (1998: 13). This can be 
12 Small notes, however, how the conductors themselves are at the mercy of market forces - and also that 
orchestras are subject to processes of managerialism (1998: 85). 
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witnessed in the claim of the orchestral clarinetist and music educator Basil Tschaikov, 
who claims that the symphony orchestra represents a ~ e w e l l in the crown of civilization, a 
microcosm of society at its best' (quoted in Fischer, 1994: 24). Mark Evan Bonds, 
meanwhile, traces how the symphony orchestra's playing was understood by German 
critics of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to embody a cosmopolitan 'we' that was 
integral to the development of the modern German state (2006: 63-70)13 (resonating with 
J,e. Davis' claims about the state-forming function of the literary utopia), whilst Jacques 
Attali shows how the rise of the symphony orchestra was bound up with the development 
of capitalist economic order (1985: 67). 
There may, however, be an 'estranging' function to experiencing life within the symphony 
orchestra. Given that - as Fisher notes - capitalist realism denies that there is any such 
thing as society, experiencing something collective that is as undeniably powerful as 
performing in a symphony orchestra (or similarly organised musical group) may function 
as a 'shock' to the system, which prevents the performer from being able to comfortably 
embrace the status quo's ideology of individualism. The youth orchestras created in 
impoverished areas of Britain as part of the 'In Harmony' programme (http://ihse.org.uk) 
may fulfil this function (and is tentatively cited as an example of utopian practice in 
musical performance by Levitas, [2010: 227-228]). To consider what might be called 
'authorial intent' complicates this picture somewhat, however, and I would maintain that 
in seeking to 'improve 'concentration, commitment, creativity, teamwork, [whilst] raising 
aspirations and self-esteem' ('In Harmony' funding announcement, quoted in Levitas, 
20 I 0: 228) it is intended not to challenge but to reinforce the dominant ideology (though 
this does not necessarily mean that it will be s u c c e ~ s f u l ) ) - functioning primarily as a 
culturally imperialist and hylomorphic shaping of the underprivileged in order to create 
13 This vision of cosmopolitanism is less explicitly authoritarian than the operations of power that Small 
ascribes to the orchestra, resting as it does on a belief that there is a balance between the individual 
players' differences (manifested through the different sounds that their instruments make) and the whole. 
Yet, as Dennis Mischke (2010) points out, cosmopolitanism privileges identity above difference and rests 
on an essentialist belief in universal moral codes: its 'we' thus denies difference and so has more in 
common with statist modes of thought than nomadism. 
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'social inclusion'H and maintain the status quo - a 'repression of desire' rather than an 
'education of desire'.15 It may well be that a 'nomadic excess' escapes this intent, however 
Gust as utopian texts may be constructed by readers in ways other than their authors 
intended), and may suggest ways in which a state utopianism other than that of the 
dominant order can be useful in prompting a transition beyond the present. 16 Venezuela's 
El Sistema programme of youth orchestras may well be instructive in this regard (see 
http://festnojv.gob.ve), and suggests that institutions closely related to the geopolitical 
state may functions as important sites of struggle for nomadic utopianism. I reflect more 
14 For a critique of the way social art practices have been used to boost 'social inclusion', see Bishop (2012) 
and Kester (20 11). See Allen (20 I 0) for a critically nuanced application of similar debates to El Sistema's 
programme in Scotland. 
15 Pervly Simfonicheskiy AnsambI' bez Dirizhyora (usually known as 'Persimfans') is perhaps worth 
commenting on here. A conductorless orchestra founded shortly after the Bolshevik revolution in Moscow, 
this was inspired by the ideal of 'collective endeavour'. According to the Grove Dictionary 0/ Music, it 'was a 
first-class symphony orchestra, which aimed to revitalize the methods of symphonic performance by 
relying on the creative initiative of each of its members, employing the rehearsal methods of chamber 
ensembles, and by resolving questions of interpretation through consensus. Based on the principle of full 
artistic and material equality for all of its members, its players comprised the finest artists of the Bol' shoy 
Theatre orchestra, and professors and talented students from the Moscow Conservatory. Persimfans 
acquired a reputation for expressive, virtuoso playing and brightness of sound, and played an important 
role in the development of concert life in post-Revolutionary Moscow. It also strongly influenced the 
formation of other leading Moscow schools of instrumental performance, and helped generally to raise 
standards of orchestral playing in the USSR. Following the example of Persimfans, conductorless 
orchestras were organized in Leningrad, Kiev, Voronezh, and also in several cities in other countries (such 
as Leipzig andNew York). The weekly Persimfans subscription concerts held at the Great Hall of the 
Moscow Conservatory over the tenyears of its existence (1922-32) enjoyed a huge success, as did those 
organized in factories and other unorthodox venues. Programmes were thought through carefully, and 
were wide-ranging and adventurous. A music journal was also published by Persimfans from 1926 to 
1929.' (online at oxfordmusiconline.com). Despite this, the orchestra had difficult changing tempos, 
suggesting perhaps that the music written for symphony orchestras necessitates some form of hierarchy 
among players. 
16 In a similar manner, the communal aspect of playing together in an orchestra may create a relatively 
autonomous space that allows for social relations - if not to be made anew - to be reconfigured in a 
manner that might make a utopian politics more plausible. In this sense, the West-Eastern Divan 
Orchestra - founded by Edward Said and Daniel Barenboim - is worth considering. Described by the 
latter as a 'utopian republic' (2006), it is composed of young Palestinian and Israeli musicians who 
democratically decide on the orchestra's programme. Acknowledging the complexity of its situation, it 
transcends crass generalities about 'uniting people through music' and deliberately avoids grand claims 
such as, for example, arguing that material inequalities between the lives of Israelis and Palestinians 
disappear within the orchestral space; it has nonetheless created a temporality of hope that disrupts that of 
ongoing conflict (Cheah, 2009). As such, it is perhaps to be tentatively welcomed, although my arguments 
that the inequalities of organisation during the moment of musical performance within a symphony 
orchestra would, I contend, still apply here (Barenboim's charisma, for example, cannot be overlooked in 
considering the success of the project - something that perhaps resonates with debates about the function 
of charistmatic authority in fashioning nomadic utopias [see Bell, 201Ib]). Furthermore - although the 
rhetoric used by the orchestra is careful not to overstate its political efficacy - I cannot help but feel that by 
presenting Israeli and Palestinian musicians as equal runs the risk of masking (or even erasing) the very 
unequal power structures that perpetuate that conflict. To this end, the discussion of strategic hierarchy in 
Chapter Five, below, would be of relevance in considering the utopian (or simply political) efficacy of the 
orchestra. Claims about western classical music's universal ability to overcome cultural and political 
divisions must also be subject to scrutiny, not least for their foreclosing of difference and neo-colonialist 
assumptions. For a detailed critical account of the orchestra that acknowledges these complexities against 
the background of Edward Said's thought and (Beckles-Willson, 2009). 
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on this latter point in my discussion of education in Chapter Five, below. 
The sym.phony orchestra as dystopia 
As I showed in my analysis of OneS tate in Zamyatin's J11e and Anarres in Le Guin's The 
Dispossessed, the state utopia is - from a nomadic utopian perspective - a dystopia (an 
ethically bad place), and is often felt as such by those who experience it. Here I want to 
briefly focus on the manner in which the orchestra may be felt to be dystopian by its 
members, or is perceived to be dystopian by observers. Although I have not found 
reference to a symphony orchestra musician using the term 'dystopia' (or 'dystopian,) to 
describe the orchestra, the similarities in the way the symphony orchestra is sometimes 
described with the language used by characters in in literary dystopias is worth 
commenting on. 
In a quote with remarkable resonances to some of the language used by D-503 in J11e, the 
Boston Symphony Orchestra violinist Marylou Speaker Churchill uses the term 
'scrubbers' to refer to the string section of a symphony orchestra, stating '[w]e who are so 
many individuals, have to play together. If we don't it doesn't sound good. That's the 
orchestra routine for violinists' (quoted in Fischer, 1994: 24), whilst the Dayton 
Philharmonic Orchestra violinist Marilyn Fischer states that there is 'a tension between 
the sublimity of our task and the conditions under which we work' (1994: 254), which are 
'highly formal, almost ritualized' (1994: 257). Such experiences lead the musicologist Rose 
Rosengard Subotnik to state that 'when efforts to preserve the autonomy of the 
composer's vision are unbounded, the performer is turned into a kind of automaton' 
(1991: 256). 
Despite his belief that the symphony orchestra constitutes a utopia, Basil Tshiakov can 
also be utilised here: his claims regarding the importance of tyranny resonating withJ.C. 
Davis' claim that the state utopia is a totalitarian space that cannot tolerate difference and 
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with the experiences of 0-503 in ue and - to an extent - Shevek in The Dispossesed: 
the more successful we are as instrumentalists, the more we have to sublimate 
our individuality ... to the tyranny of the conductor. .. players in an orchestra 
have to submit, instant by instant, to the dictates of a single individual ... every 
movement you make, in the music that is the substance of your being, is dictated 
to you by others (quoted in Fischer, 1994: 28). 
The music made by symphony orchestras may sound wonderful, but the social forms that 
lead to its creation - and that it helps to perpetuate - are less so. 
Collectively improvising music as a nomadic utopian pradice 
As noted above, there are a number of forms of collective musical performance that are 
less concrete than the symphony orchestra (almost all in western musical traditions, in 
fact). Here, I want to focus on the practice of collective improvisation, by which I mean 
musicking undertaken by groups of musicians that comes close to the pole of 
'improvisation' on the spectrum running from improvisation to concretisation that I 
proposed above. For reasons that will become obvious as this discussion progresses, these 
forms of musicking are not absolute{y improvised, however. 
Despite the prevalence of the term in discourses about improvisation, I do not utilise the 
term 'free improvisation'. This is in part because it is often associated with a particular 
sound: 'the sound of free improvisation', and so signifies a set of generic conventions which 
reify the content of the musical work over and above the practices of musicking which 
produced it. It is also because I believe the emphasis on 'freedom' is unhelpful, and ignores 
the power-relations that will always shape the process of musicking. I discuss these below. 
Improvisation and the 'good place' 
My broad claim is that improvisation is a nomadic utopian practice, and so creates 
nomadic utopias. In this, I draw on the work of a number of improvisers and 
musicologists who have noted its relevance for political and social organisation in ways 
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that resonate with nomadic thought. For Eddie Prevost, improvisation can foster 
communitarianism: groups of people uniting in a sense around a common purpose, but 
who may have very different experiences, desires and abilities (2004: 4). For David Borgo, 
it has a 'resoundingly social nature' (2005: xiii), by which he means that it brings people 
together to create music and reflect on how that music is and could be made. The singer 
Maggie Nicols states that 'improvisation reaches out, breaks down barriers, challenges 
frontiers' (in McKay, 2005: 1), stressing its constant becoming. These factors are often 
used to promote the music, too: the annual improv festival 'Freedom of the City' 
advertised its 2011 programme with a flyer stating that 'London's improvised and 
experimental music community has been revolutionising music for over forty years, 
refusing pre-determined structures and inherited hierarchies', and made no reference to 
what the music actually sounded like. The musician and theorist Paul Hegarty, 
meanwhile, notes that the improvisation collective can be seen as 'a community of the 
fellow free; a community that is rethinking the idea of itself continually, hopefully. Its key 
hope is the potential for interaction, an intcrsubjcctive entity forming from the purest kind 
of democracy, continually reforming' (2012: I). He also notes that this 'seems a 
paradigmatic anarchistic social model: no hierarchy, no rules that cannot be altered, 
removed, bent' (2012: 3).17 Eugene ,v. Holland (2004,2008) and Jeremy Gilbert (2004), 
meanwhile have utilised Deleuzean concepts to explore improvisation; and l8 Deleuze and 
Guattari themselves write that 'to improvise is to join with the world' (2004b: 344). 
There is a nomadic utopianism implicit in these pronouncements, and on occasions the 
concept of utopia has been explicitly utilised in relation to improvised mUSIC. Paul 
Hegarty notes that m a capitalist world, improvisation is continually striving 'to be 
17 The improvising musicians Woody Sullender and Daniel Carter; and the musicologist Adam Harper have 
also noted that improvisation has much in common with practice of anarchism (Sullender, 2005; Carter in 
Jacobson, online at 577records.com; Harper, 2010). This claim is also made by Christopher Small, who 
notes that 'improvisation celebrates a set of informal, even loving relationships which can be experienced 
by everyone present, and brings into existence, at least for the duration of the performance, a society 
whose closest political analogy is with anarchism [with] each individual [contributing] to the wellbeing of 
the commullity.' (1987: 307) 
18 I make reference to Gilbert's work above and below, but find Holland's unsatisfactory for its lack of 
engagement with the practice of improvisation itself. 
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something else, the somewhere else of utopia' (2012: 4), whilst - speaking to the comedian 
Stewart l..<'e in an interview with The Guardian newspaper - the saxophonist Evan Parker 
espoused a naive but appealing vision of improvisation as utopia, stating that '[w]hen I 
close my eyes and I am just playing with other people in a free situation, where we can all 
do what we want, I am in a utopian space. And I have been very lucky to spend a huge 
amount of my life in that utopian space' (2010: online at guardian.co.uk). Further 
examples come from the pianist tred Van Hove (in Brennan, 2006); the trombonist, 
composer and jazz historian George E. Lewis (2008: xii); the musicologist; and the jazz 
historian Eric Porter (2002: 24). 
A more theoretically rich passage - which resonates closely with the concept of nomadic 
utopia ~ ~ comes from the theorists Christoph Cox and Daniel Warner, who note that: 
(f]or many [improvising musicians], the improvised musical performance 
serves to create -- in the midst of hierarchical social relations - a utopian 
space, a genuinely democratic realm full of cooperation, coexistence, and 
intersubjective exchange. Without established musical or social props, 
everything is held together by these intersubjective relationships that are as 
strong and as fragile as a spider's web, and, as such, constantly under 
construction and repair' (Cox and Warner, 2002: 251-252). 
It is important to note that these broadly utopian and communal views of collective 
improvisation are not universally shared, however. The novelist Ralph Ellison - a keen fan 
of jazz - saw improvisation as a site of individual struggle. tie believed that 
[t]he health of jazz and the unceasing attraction which it holds for the musicians 
themselves lies in the ceaseless warfare for mastery and recognition - not among 
the general public, though commercial success is not spurned, but among their 
artistic peers. And even the greatest can never rest on past accomplishments, for, 
as with the fast guns of the Old West, there is always someone waiting in a jam 
session to blow him literally, not only down, but into shame and discouragement.' 
(2008: 555-556)19 
19 For a critique of this view, see A Power SlTrJnger Than Itself, George Lewis' history of the Association for the 
Advancement of Creative Musicians (2008). Whilst the whole book works as a critique of such a view, 
presenting improvisation as an altogether more cooperative form of social organisation, early on in the 
book Lewis takes particular aim at Ellison's claims (as well as those of jazz historian Eric Porter, who felt 
that jazz made during and since the Second World War is 'macho'), noting that '[i]n talking with the 
musicians, however, 0l\e also realizes that bebop-based jam sessions on the South Side went far beyond the 
romantically macho "cutting session" model so attractive to American literature and folklore. While the 
jam session was indeed a competitively based system of authority and virtuosity, Ellison's protocapitalist, 
social Darwinist framing of the jam session system seems undercut by accounts that speak of communal 
generosity rather than shaming. Jodie Christian remembers the atmosphere of gruff, laconic learning that 
permeated the late-night sessions: "Now and then you might ask a question, or they might tell you some-
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Ben Watson, meanwhile, attacks the idea of 'improv-as-community', claiming that it 
espouses 'one world moralism' and is a form of 'liberal face-saving and fcelgood ideology' 
(2004: 254). Drawing on Adorno (despite his well-known hatred of much jazz music), 
Watson claims that the best improvisation (typified, for him, in the work of the guitarist 
Derek Bailey) does not seek to create 'community' (Bailey is best known for his' solo work, 
though he did regularly collaborate with a wide-range of improvisers), but is an e x ~ p l e e
of an 'authentic Modern Art [that] speaks a moment of truth: controversial, nerve-
wracking and critical' (2004: 254).20 This is an important criticism - and one that I will 
return to below. 
It is clear, however, that it is possible to talk of improvisation as a utopian practice, and it 
is also clear that for those who make such a claim it is not at all like the state utopia of the 
symphony orchestra (which is also a dystopia): it rejects the hylomorphic belief that bodies 
need hierarchical organising in order to escape chaos or inertia. Indeed, hierarchy is 
hostile to improvisation: where one musician leads and the others follow, the musicking of 
those following is concretised to a degree (by what the leader plays). In fact, even the 
musicking of the leader is less improvised that it would be if they were not leading. 21 
Hierarchy increases concretisation for all but the musician at the top of the hierarchy 
(and, as will hopefully become clear, potentially even for them too). 
In denying the need for a score to bring order to matter, improvisation adopts nomadism's 
belief that difference can self-organise to produce the new. This is clear in the written 
thing without you asking a question: 'Go home and practice, man, because you need to know your scales, 
you need to know your chord changes.' So you went home and worked on it. Next time you'd come out, 
you'd be halfo'f!J ready. ... I don't think that they thought in terms of teaching or imparting knowledge, 
the ones who were advanced in playing. Of course they were, but I don't think you can think in terms of 
that. When you are in a community, you do. (21, ellipsis and emphasis in original) 
20 Ironically, Eddie Prevost suggests that Derek Bailey himself is complicit in what might be called 'cosy 
liberalism', attacking his 'preference for musical co-existence rather than conscious processive interactivity' 
(2004: 15). 
21 I explain this further below, but the basic argument is that the leader will have to rely ~ a r g e l y ) ) on their 
own experiences and abilities to make musical sounds, whereas if they were involved in a non-hierarchical 
improvisation they be responding to the sounds made by their fellow musicians: an operation that would 
enable them to go beyond their habits and create new ways of playing. Of course a leader will respond to 
the playing of those subordinate - no matter how hard they try not to - but it can be said that to the 
extent they do this, they are not leading and there is no hierarchy. 
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introduction that Eddie Prevost offers to players who partake in his weekly improvisation 
workshops (which are open to all): 
Each musician should look at the materials they use for making music, as an 
infinite resource for sound production [ ... ] the relationship between musician 
and sound source is fluid and capable of far more responses that can be 
imagined. Imagination itself is stimulated - ignited- only by practice. The 
musician is urged to try and search without specific objectives and even without 
hope or expectation of finding anything. Paradoxically this can lead to 
undreamt of results. These findings become part of the musician. They are 
part of self-invention. 
[Simultaneously, it is suggested] that the mUSlClan refers to and extends the 
openness of enquiry, to the other participating musicians and what they are 
doing. For here, I contend, there is an infinitude greater than that encountered 
in our relationship with mere static material. 
Playing then, becomes a way of experiencing and accessing constandy 
renewable energy - that is consequendy free of expectation and formula. It is 
full flowing cognition. (2009b: online at workshopseries.wordpress.com) 
As players come together with their different instruments, different techniques, different 
styles, different histories and different moods they bring these differences together and 
produce a powerful way of creating new forms (of relation, of sonic expression, etc.). In 
an article in The Wire magazine, Philip Clark describes how listening to other players at 
Prevost's workshops enabled him to find new ways to play. '[T]he way forward', he states, 
'was to listen, respond, listen, respond. Use the ears to move the fingers - stop using the 
fingers to prejudge sound. There was nothing to fear no need to stew in my pit of 
embarrassed fear about producing the "wrong" sound' (2012: 36). I would share this 
reflection - my experience of improvisation is that playing with new musicians enables me 
to produce or configure sounds in a new way as I respond to the challenges that their 
playing offers. 
This response in no way implies a hierarchy, however: it is not merely that Clark will 
follow his fellow improvisers, but rather enter an endlessly shifting dialogue with them in 
which they respond to his response and so on, ad infinitum. Thus, improvisation rebuffs 
Nietzsche's suggestion that anarchism displays a hatred towards life (1994: 58) and creates 
155 
an inversion of Deleuze and Guattari's bourgeois organisation in which there are only 
'slaves commanding other slaves' (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 276) by creating a space 
in which there are only masters - those who can 'say yes' to Deleuze's inorganic life. This 
can likened to what Deleuze calls 'crowned anarchy' (1994: 37, 264; Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2004b: 175), George Woodcock's claim that anarchism constitutes a 
'universalised aristocracy' (1975: 30) and - in musicology - to George Lewis' concept of 
'multidominance' (2000). 
Lewis uses this latter term to describe musical and visual arts traditions developing from 
the black Mrican diaspora.22 When applied to improvisation it refers to the manner in 
which the social relations of musicking are not characterised by a fear of power but rather 
a lack of power-over that enables each performer to maximise their power-to through 
power-with. The oft-cited phrase 'nobody solos, everybody solos' also nicely illustrates the 
rhizomatic23 distribution of active force in collective improvisation, and Lewis makes clear 
how such an arrangement is conducive to the production of the new in performances by 
the Association for the Advancement of Creative Musicians (of which he has been a 
member for over forty years). In their performances, he notes: 
the extreme multiplicity of voices, embedded within in an already highly 
collective ensemble orientation, permitted the timbral diversity of a given 
situation to exceed the sum of its instrumental parts, affording a wider palette 
of potential orchestrations to explore. (Lewis, 2000: 36r 
22 Interestingly given my discussion of Deleuze anarchism and chaos in Chapter One, above, Lewis notes 
that both visual arts and music from the African Diaspora have been frequently dismissed by white critics 
as 'chaotic' (2000: 36). 
23 The music critic Simon Reynolds associates this origin of the phrase 'nobody solos, everybody solos' with 
the group Weather Report (2007: 270). He has also utilised the concept of the rhizome to theorise the 
improvisatory performances of Miles Davis and Can (2007: 270), and Jeremy Gilbert talks of collective 
musical improvsiation as a 'realised experience of a sociality which is truly rhizomatic in its transversality 
and undecidable complexity', suggesting that it is here 'that the power of such improvised music lies' 
(2004: 125). 
24 Multidominance extendcd to rhythm sections as well as instruments that had traditionally soloed and been 
privileged in performance. George Lewis charts the development of a 'non-hierarchical approach to time' 
in jazz, noting that '[t]he notion of drummers as primary timekeepers had already broken down with the 
work of Kenny Clarke, who pithily suggested to a colleague in the 1940s that rather than relying on the 
drummer, each musician should be personally responsible for the articulation of tempo and meter. Then, 
with the advent of Sunny Murray, Milford Graves, Andrew Cyrille, and Beaver Harris, the implications of 
the non-hierarchical approach to time became evident, as tempos were irregular, constantly changing, or 
even completely absent - challenging the centrality of "swing" to the identity of jazz, or (on some views) 
redefining the nature of swing itself. Gradually, relationships between ensemble players became more 
fluid, and as collective free improvisations advanced mutable notions of foreground and background, 
distinctions between soloists and "rhythm sections" began to blur. Instruments that formerly assumed 
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In this, improvisation is testament to the fact that a lack of hierarchy can potentially lead 
to neither inertia nor chaos, but instead to an immanently generated and constantly 
shifting order and the production of the new. In his book ~ n c c or Swarm: Improvising Music 
in a Complex Age, David Borgo draws on this to link improvisation to the science of 
complexity. For him, improvising music collectives constitute a 'complex, emergent 
system[s], (2005: xvii) that immanently regulate themselves to take account of difference. 
Perhaps the clearest explication of this claim can be found in the following passage, which 
has startling echoes to the language of Yevgeny Zamyatin's essay 'Scythians' whose titular 
figures never rest on a victory and 'hasten away' to freedom 'whenever the movement of 
infinity is stopped (1991: 22-23): 
[fhe complexity scientist Michael M.] Waldrop's descriptions of the science 
of complexity spoke of systems poised on "the edge of chaos", never quite 
locking into place nor dissolving into complete turbulence; systems that could 
self-organize and adapt to a constantly shifting environment. "The edge of 
chaos," he writes, is where new ideas ... are forever nibbling away at the edges of 
the status quo, and where even the most entrenched old guard will eventually be 
overthrown ... The edge of chaos is the constantly shifting battle zone between 
stagnation and anarchy, the one place where a complex system can be 
spontaneous, adaptive and alive." I can think of no better definition of 
improvised music.' (2005: xvii) 
As I noted above, the science of complexity has been linked to the work of Deleuze by a 
number of contemporary theorists, including Manuel DeLanda, John Protevi and 
Thorklid Thanem (the first of whom is linked to improvisation by Simon Reynolds and 
Joy Press [1995: 199-200]), and this description of 'the edge of chaos' nicely captures the 
interplay and interconnection of chaos (difference) and order (place) in the nomadic 
utopia. 
Philip Clark's claim that the way forward is to listen and respond; and not worry about 
producing the 'wrong' sound is not only interesting as a springboard for an exploration of 
how difference-in-itself is brought together immanently and non-hierarchically to produce 
the new in improvisation, however, but for three further reasons. Firstly, it shows how that 
background roles, such as the bass, came to the front' (2008: 38, cf. Corbett, 1994: 78). 
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which is created cannot be 'prejudged', which makes clear the fallacy of trying to 'plan' 
ahead in improvisation as in nomadic utopianism (at least to the extent of imagining the 
finished product): the 'new' is created as a result of activity rather than calling the activity 
into being. The saxophonist Ornette Coleman makes a similar point in the liner notes to 
his collectively improvised album Change of the Century, 25 in which he notes that: 
[w]hen our group plays, before we start out to play, we do not have any idea 
what the end result will be. Each player is free to contribute what he feels in 
the music at any given moment. We do not begin with a preconceived notion 
as to what kind of effect we will achieve' (2004: 254). 
In language that resonates with Borgo's referencing of complexity theory, Coleman's 
fellow saxophonist Steve Lacy states that there 'is a freshness, a certain quality that can 
only be obtained by improvisation .. .It is something to do with the "edge". Always being 
on the brink of the unknown and being prepared for the leap ... a leap into the unknown' 
(quoted in Cox and Warner, 2004: 249). The jazz critic John Litweiler, meanwhile, states 
that Ornette Coleman's music: 
makes clear that uncertainty is the content of life, and even things that we take 
for certainties (such as cell motives) are ever altering [in] shape and character. 
By turns he fears or embraces this ambiguity; but he constandy faces it, and by 
his example, he condemns those who seek resolution or finality as timid. (1984: 
39) 
These claims are resonant with both Small's claim that it is musicking that produces 
music, and with my claim that it is nomadic utopianism that produces the nomadic utopia 
- although I should be clear that the 'new' I am interested in here is the social form 
created by the 'multidominant' relations between the musicians, rather than the music 
itself (though the music may well be expressive of these relations). An exploration of the 
further points thrown up by Clark's quote will, I suggest, show that the social form - the 
25 There is a troubling contradiction between the collective nature of much free improvisation and the 
crediting of albums to solo artists - often to satisfy the demands of record companies keen to create 
recognisable 'products' to sell to the market. This also plays into hagiographic 'great man' (and it 
invariably is men) narrative of jazz/improvisation's history (see DeVeaux, 2001 and Pekar, 2001 for 
criticisms of the 'great man' narratives in jazz history, and the remarks made by Maggie Nicholls and 
Georgina Born in McKay, 2005 for the erasing of women from narrative accounts of the rise of what 
became known as 'second wave' improvisation in Europe. I speak more about the erasing of women and 
queers in improvisation below). 
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space created by improvisation - is a nomadic utopia. It gains identity and creates a sense 
qf place through a particular form of musicking based upon the repetition of difference. 
The second of these further points of interest in the Clark's quote is that he talks of 'using 
the ears to move the fingers', implying a circuit of embodied intelligence that illustrates 
nomadic utopianism's disruption of a simple mind/body dualism. As in Deleuze's reading 
of Nietzsche, 'active thought' (that which creates the new) here escapes full consciousness, 
finding itself also flowing throughout the body. David Borgo further develops this idea, 
reflecting that 'my favorite ... times spent improvising seem neither entirely mental, nor 
entirely physical, but rather [occur] when these binary divisions seem to dissolve and 
disappear' (2005: 36), whilst Ornette Coleman claimed that 'sometimes I can hardly 
believe that what I hear when the tape is played back to me is the playing of my group. I 
am so busy and absorbed when I play that I am not aware of what I'm doing at the time I'm 
doing it' (2004: 254, emphasis added). As Coleman's quote suggests - and as the following 
interview quote from Evan Parker makes clear - this use of embodied intelligence further 
increases the unknowability of the music created through improvisation: 
Sometimes it's as predictable as addition, you get exactly what you expect, 
other times it's entirely unpredictable. For example, iLyou have two basic 
rhythm patterns happening across the two hands - and then superimpose a 
related but different pattern of articulation from the tongue, you get a final 
result that is very hard to predict - because there's a three-layer process 0 f 
filtering that might throw up patterns of accented notes which you couldn't 
think up (in Corbett, 1994: 83) 
This leads nicely on to the third point of interest in Clark's quote: that improvisation 
breaks the unity of the individual. If, in improvisation, the mind and the body are no 
longer subject to Cartesian duality, Deleuze's claim that the unity of the individual can no 
longer be the starting point of political organisation also holds: the improvising 
'individual' is - like Deleuze and Guattari's schizorevolutionary - constituted of 
difference-in-itself. For David Borgo: 
the dynamic complexity that informs, and can be generated by, an individual 
improviser is immense. Mind and body, moment and place, emotion and 
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intellect, preparation, experience, and spontaneity all collide, collude, and (in 
the best of moments) cooperate to create a compelling performance' (2005: 
62). 
Meanwhile, the improvising guitarist and musicologist John Corbett - in an essay entitled 
'Ex Uno Plura: Milford Graves, Evan Parker, and the Schizoanalysis of Musical 
Performance' - details how the limbs of an improvising percussionist (Milford Graves, in 
this instance, although he is utilised as an example rather than an exception) operate as 
bodies of individuated difference, challenging the unity of the subject (1994: 78-80), 
before going on to note that similar processes are at work in the improvising saxophonist 
(represented by Evan Parker). Utilising the De1euzean vocabulary hinted at in his title, he 
notes that the saxophone: 
may be played in such a way that it allows it to be fragmented as well, likewise 
at the level of the body of the performer. Fingers, mouth, tongue, teeth, lungs: 
these are distinct members of the solo-saxophone ensemble. Joined together 
as the Evan Parker solo assemblage, they are constellated in such a way as to 
break the seeming unity of melodic expression. (1994: 82) 
Thus, he notes, 'there is no longer a single player per se', but rather an assemblage 
(Corbett, 1994: 84). Similar arguments, I would argue, can be made for a number of 
instruments utilised in improvisation: not least the human body itsel( 
With the individual replaced with a schizorevolutionary, nomadic dividual constituted of 
difference, p ~ r f o r m a n c e s s of collective improvisation will contain considerable complexity, 
allowing ever greater opportunities for the creation of the new and unforseen (Borgo, 
2005: 62). What is clear here is that in this collective assemblage the supposed opposition 
between the interests of the individual and the collective that proceeds from a liberal 
understanding of the subject does not apply. Terry Eagleton puts this well, stating that: 
[t]he complex harmony26 [Improvising musicians] fashion comes not from 
playing a collective score, but from the free musical expression of each member 
acting as the basis for the free expression of the others. As each player grows 
more musically eloquent, the others draw inspiration from this and are spurred to 
. 26 I would question the use of the metaphor of harmony here: improvised music is frequently dissonant, and 
the concept of harmony has essentialist connotations. See Tenney (1988) for a discussion of 'harmony'; 
and Bell (2011a) and Marshall (2012) for an argument in favour of a dissonant form of political 
organisation rather than a harmonic one. 
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greater heights. There is no conflict here between freedom and the "good of the 
whole". (2008: 100) 
It is possible to speak, then, of an 'affective body' of improvisation: an assemblage 
reproduced by conatus or desire. This is related to the rhizomatic multidominance 
engendered by improvisation that I discussed above, and is illustrated - on a simple level -
in Clark's statement. His claim that he felt as if he was in a 'straitjacket' is, in essence, a 
statement of powerlessness: an inability to act. Yet by listening to another musician and 
engaging with what they were playing (their expression of difference), Clark found a way 
out of this and was empowered to act: an increase in the power-to of one resulting in an 
increase in the power-to of another musician, creating power-with that comes to 
constitute the entire assemblage. It is as a result of moments like this that Eddie Prevost 
states that '[i]f the musician ... remains trapped in a perception of himself [sic], then he no 
longer improvises' (1995: 81).27 
This process may not always function as smoothly as I have presented it here, however -
and at times the space of improvisation may be constituted by conflict as musicians 
struggle to be heard or, perhaps, move the music away from a settled groove or a sound 
they are not keen on. In this they may struggle with each other or with the music itself: the 
self-organisation of difference-in-itself is not always an easy task, and can be marked by 
conflict. Though there is always a danger that this will restore state utopianism's split 
between the individual and the collective and break the mutually affective power relations 
I have just discussed (I consider this danger - and ways to potentially avoid it - below), 
this struggle should not be identified as an Ellisonian struggle for domination, but rather 
as an integral part of non-hierarchical organisation and the creation of new forms. 28 
27 This is, perhaps, a litde extreme, and another example of the fallacy of the improvisation -
composition/improvisation - not-improvisation opposition. Rather, I would state that when the musician 
fails to abandon their self the flexibility of their performance decreases and the concreteness of their 
performance increases. 
28 Maeckelbergh (2012) identifies conflict as a source of creativity in the 'alterglobalization movement' and 
the Spanish 15th May movement. It is also central to the agonistic political thought of William Connolly, 
inspired (in part) by Deleuze's thought (2002). 
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This, I would suggest, is far from the cosy liberalism that' Vatson associates with accounts 
of improvisation that stress its communality, with the Adornian 'moment of truth' (or 
rather a succession of moments of truth) embedded immanently within the very 
structures of difference that constitute improvised music king. Here, Small's stages of 
exploration and affirmation are simultaneously explored resulting in a turbulent, creative 
process of becoming that says yes to life and produces new forms. 
1II1provisation and the 'no place' 
From this, it can said seen that the place of improvisation is ethically good, and that it 
increases the capacity of performers to affect and be affected. But the nomadic utopia is 
not simply a 'good place', it is also constituted by the 'no', which is to say that it must not 
be separated from the forces of becoming that traverse and produce it. In other words, 
improvisation must avoid the dangers of becoming settled and producing tyrannies of 
habit: it should not fall into the trap of the third of Small's stages of musicking as creator 
of cultural meaning: celebration, for that would be to claim improvisation as an 'end-of-
history'. As Hegarty notes: 
at every point, improvising implies a breaking-free, a move outside of stifling 
structures, instruction, precision, correctness, moral goodness and upright 
participation. Machines and bodies would be exceedl·d, driven outside of 
normal tolerances and functions, and creativity would be rethought as. the 
mobilisation of truly inventive chance. (Ilegarty, 2012: 1) 
This is a process that must never end. 'Vhere it does, the place of the nomadic utopia risks 
moving towards the state utopian form - a danger I will now turn to discuss. 
Like all nomadic utopias, those created through improvisation are constantly in danger of 
lapsing into state utopianism - particularly when this danger is forgotten. A full aCCOUnt 
of improvisation's nomadic utopianism thus needs to include nomadic utopianism's 
'radical pessimism'. Here, that means accepting that the 'good place' I have described 
above is not a pre-given in improvisation, and that even if reached it is always at risk of 
concretising into a more statist form. At times, improvisation results in informal 
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hierarchies, represses difference in favour of identity and results in the emergence of a 
state utopia (which may be felt to be dystopian by the musicians). This danger may 
emerge within a single performance or across performances by different groups. 
Within a single performance, there are two main dangers to nomadic utopianism. The 
first comes in the form of the improviser who fails to behave in a nomadic manner, 
retaining their individuality over any sense of collectivity identity, reproducing the 
opposition between the individual and the collective. This may be done deliberately, but is 
a frequent problem of inexperienced improvisers unaccustomed to the intense processes 
of listening to others that successful collective improvisation requires (Clark, 2012). After 
warning against readings of improvisation that come 'perilously close to utopianism'29, 
Scott Thomson captures the dynamic well, noting that: 
[t]he model of group interaction I have been developing [(one of 
multidominance)] verges, admittedly, on an idealized, best-case-scenario 
model for collaborative music-making that is quite rare indeed in actual 
performance. A more thorough (and realistic) analysis of improvisation must 
acknowledge how "authoritarian" gestures [(gestures imbued with a will to 
power-over)] threaten the musical and social well-being of a performance. 
Such an analysis points to the real possibility of failure in any group 
improvisation. The fluidity of authority within a group can be easily 
circumscribed by gestures that fix social power in a domineering or negligent 
way; the good faith that a group works to establish as a foundation for 
responsible and responsive play is under constant threat of being demolished 
in this way. Authoritarianism, from my own experience as a performer and 
listener, is commonly exemplified by a player's inability or unwillingness to 
listen to the other members of an ensemble, often coinciding with his or her 
unresponsive, soloistic musical contributions. This type of musical activity 
constitutes a very basic authoritarianism in which the player effectively suggests 
that "I have nothing to learn from you, but you have something to learn from 
me." Ironically, this attitude duplicates the social and aesthetic dynamic that, as I 
have suggested, improvisation can serve to question-the fixity of evaluative 
criteria and authority that pervades "mastery/exclusion" pedagogical models. 
(2007: 5-6) 
When a player behaves in such a way in improvisation (and I would suggest that 
inexperience or a lack of confidence may be reasons for doing so: such behaviour does not 
always stem from a desire for authority), a hierarchy frequently emerges as other 
29 Thompson is using the concept of the utopian in the sense of 'unrealistic', h ~ r e . . Thus, I would argue that 
he is warning against readings that forget the 'no' of utopia's etymology. 
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performers have little choice but to follow in their lead (or if their authority is challenged 
there may be an Ellisonian power struggle'. Thus, the level of improvisation decreases 
and the playing of the 'authoritarian' performer functions as a lack that the others must 
strive to follow. Whilst this may be musically interesting, the place created by the 
improvisation becomes (to an extent) concretised and becoming slows down, meaning that 
the reciprocally affective relations is replaced by a hierarchy of power-over in which all 
players bar the 'authoritarian' find their capacity to affect and be affected limited (and as I 
have noted, the authoritarian may have a decreased capacity too): they are destined 
merely to fulfil the role assigned for them by the performer who (consciously or not) has 
taken it upon herself to lead. 
The second way in which an improvising space may move towards state utopia is through 
the emergence of tyrannies of habit. Comparisons can be made the way in which 
Anarres ossifies in The Dispossessed - not through deliberate authoritarianism (such as that 
of Sabul) - but through the tyrannies of habit into which so many of its inhabitants have 
settled: 'laws of conventional behaviour', as Shevek might put it. In improvisation, this can 
occur when players settle into a self-organised pattern that comes to regulate the 
performance (the music dominates the musicking), the result being a consensual and 
immanent concretisation that limits the capacity of players to express their difference in 
order to create new ways of playing and interacting. This, however, should not be 
confused with what might be called 'slow improvisation' in which a particular phrase or 
pattern is repeated,31 or with the establishment of a 'groove'. It is not the fact that an 
improvisation is (relatively) static, but that the possibility for deterritorialising this pattern 
30 In Philip Clark's article, the improviser Ross Lambert describes tactics he uses when playing alongside 
improvisers who are determined to follow the generic conventions associated with Reductionism (defined 
by Christopher '\'illiams as a genre 'characterized by quiet unstahle sounds, subducd group interaction, 
renunciation of gesture, and structural uscs of silcnce adopted by younger imprmiscrs in the mid-1990s' 
[2011: I]). "'It depends on my mood''', Lambert states, '''but dealing with some Reductionist-minded 
player - I either disengage or challenge, and I mainly challenge. I try to psychoanalyse the miscreant and 
come up with the best mode of attack to unsettle them, then shut the fucker up. That's a reasonable 
version of what I do.'" (in Clark, 2012: 39) 
31 To be clear, the 'slow' here docs not refer to the tempo or meter of the music, but the speed at which it 
changes. The music of the Australian trio The Necks is perhaps instructive here. 
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is no longer present.32 
In this light, Tom Moylan's warning to the citizens of 'Whileaway' (2000: 15) can be 
adapted as a warning to those engaging in collective improvisation. They must remember 
to be vigilant and not lock in their achievements' (interestingly, the phrase 'locked-in' is 
often used by musicians to describe emerging grooves)'. They should 'not cut a deal with 
the false utopian devil of their own collective imagination as it dreams of the end of 
history, and not cover up the deal by changing the improvisation from a flexible, nomadic 
musicking experience to a concrete, statist musicking experience'. 
Concretisation does not only occur in single performances, however, but may emerge over 
time in the form of generic conventions, akin to the way in which Odonianism's flexible 
ethics ossify into 'laws' on Anarres. Whilst this chapter has focussed on improvisation as a 
practice rather than a genre, in truth it may not be possible to separate generic 
conventions from the practice itself, which is at risk from becoming 'clogged up' with 
particular stylistic norms derived from a dominant generic trend. Philip Clark describes 
such a problem in his essay on Prevost's improvising workshops, in relation to the genre of 
reductionism:33 
The guitarist Michael Rodgers, a onetime enthusiastic supporter, critiqued the 
workshop as part of a letter voicing wider concerns about the UK Improv 
scene in The Wire 318. "The workshop in its early years was diverse, lively and 
full of risk and debate. By about 2004/2005 it started feeling more like church, 
where one must avoid offence and observe ritual. A hegemony was replacing a 
much more vibrant state of being," he claimed. As someone present almost from 
the beginning, does [workshop participant Ross] Lambert recognise any truth in 
Rodgers's words? "It's true that the workshop's gone in peaks and troughs in 
terms of creativity," he thinks. "The initial peak tailed off as people left London 
or became a bit lazy, or started thinking about a generic, product-type sound. 
This was around the time Reductionism started coming in, and I took badly to 
32 Possibility in this sense refers not only to players who want to change the pattern and do not know how 
because the other players appear to be so invested in it, but also to players who fail to consider the 
possibility of embracing new ways of musicking, and to players whose bodies become incapable of 
responding to desire. There is, then, clearly an issue of consciousness here: just as Shevek is not aware that 
there is anything wrong with the way of life on Anarres until his conversations with Bedap, improvising 
musicians may too be comfortable once they have settled into an established pattern (hence my claim that 
conflict may be productive). 
33 I use reductionism because Clark's essay provides a useful springboard for the diseussion, not because it is 
any more or less 'statist' than other stylistic conventions within improvisation. I have improvised with 
reductionist inspired improvisers and - whilst their playing has been recognisable as such - I have not 
found them to be overly dominant or inflexible (though whether they could say the same for me I cannot 
be sure!). 
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people displaying that in the workshop." (Clark, 2012: 38) 
Here, the nomadic utopianism of improvisation is faced with a different type of problem 
to that of concretisation emerging within a single performance: it may also emerge over 
time as players become familiar with each other and themselves, and settle into 
comfortable modes of playing. This danger is hinted at by Hegarty, who states that: 
[o]nce the vista opens up of playing any notes, incorporating any sound, taking any 
musical approach, then this infinite expanse itself becomes a limit, a pre-prepared 
instruction to "explore" this musical universe, that can lead to the ossification of the 
exploration as simple style (2004: 54-55). 
Similarly, the composer Pierre Boulez notes that the improviser 'can only turn to 
information that he [sic] has been given on some earlier occasion, in fact to what he has 
already played' (1985: 461).34 This, again, prevents the new from being realised 
immanently and sees the space move away from the pole of nomadic utopia. 
In order to enable the improviser to avoid repeating what she has already played, it is 
worth following Deleuze and Guattari's claim that elements of 'antiproduction' are 
sometimes necessary. In order to avoid any of the dangers outlined above, then - and in 
order to keep the space of improvisation nomadic - improvisers may predetermine 
certain aspects of their musicking. This disrupts the operation of the spectrum running 
from the improvised to the concretised that I suggested above, as certain forms of 
concretisation are utilised to decrease the overall concreteness of a performance (and so 
increase levels of improvisation). As Steve Lacy has noted: 
the more pinned down you are [when you play], the more free you are in a 
way ... the freedom can come out within limits. Then you are really free. Whereas 
when you are completely free, after a while it dries up, it turns into the same thing 
all the time.' (1974: online at hup:/ /emanemdisc.com) 
It is unlikely that Lacy means that 'the more pinned down you are, the more free you are' 
in the absolute sense, but rather that predetermining certain structures increases the 
freedom - or power-to - of musicians. Thus, if it is possible to talk of 'free improvisation', 
34 This results in the practice of improvisation ossif}ing into agmrt, or sct of gl'lIrcs. This is what Rodgers is 
protcsting against in the quote above whcn hc lamcnts the influl'nce of reductionism. 
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it should not just be in understood in the sense of negative freedom (,freedom-from'), but 
must sometimes be enabled by certain structures that provide positive freedom (the 
'freedom-to'). 
This 'freedom to' can, I suggest, be gained by implementing what might be referred to as 
'strategic concretisation': strategies utilised to prevent concretisation entering 'via the back 
door', so to speak. Here, I would point to improvising musician's use of gameplay or 
scores (though these are rarely written using the five-line staff format common to the 
western classical tradition). These are be used to present concretisation from arising 
through either domination by a particular musician (or group of musicians), or tyrannies 
of habit (either those that emerge in a single performance or have emerged over a 
number of performances). Gameplay is also often (though by no means exclusively) 
utilised to develop improvisational ability35 in inexperienced improvisers (see the exercises 
in Higgins and Campbell, 20 10, for example36). 
Unlike the score that a symphony orchestra follows, the purpose of these games or scores 
is to break down established habits and/or hierarchies and generate new modes of 
interacting. They seek to expand the terrain of the performer rather than restrict it. To 
illustrate this I want to draw on the composer and improviser Helen Papaioannou's 
graphic score Cogs (figure three). This is designed 'pressurize players' interpersonal 
negotiations of rhythmic relationships during improvisation' (online at 
helenpapaioannou.com). Here, 
35 This should be judged ethically rather than in accordance with the standards of musical technique. In 
other words, desired skills are those which enable the musician - and the musicians she is playing with - to 
immanendy create new ways of performing See Borgo (2007) for a fuller discussion of the problem of 
evaluating improvised music. 
36 In this text, the authors develop a series of improvisational workshops that powerfully with nomadic 
utopianism. These events 'look towards ... a future that is unknown and unpredictable', generating 
'something new and different from what has come before' (2010: 5) by promoting 'ethical actions' that 
function as invitations to further action (20 I 0: 12). They function as process and a way of being' (20 I 0: 5); 
and 'invite ... new ways of thinking and doing music that challenge both teacher and student with the 
potential to transform in various ways' (2010: 6). To put this another way, it might be said that they create 
nomadic utopias and generate a nomadic utopian function. Given the subject of the following chapter, it is 
interesting to note that the authors draw inspiration from the work of Paulo Freire (2010: 3). 
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the emphasis is very much on th type of interaction that the visual 
information may engender, rather than encouraging an ethos which values a 
'perfect', reproducible representation of a scar. Th aim i to heighten the 
different intensities involved in these relati nship , the beating back-and-forth, 
and the shifting dynamics between i ndividuall ollective focuses in 
achieving/ dissolving the synchronisation of parts. In a sense, this type of 
hyperactive, frenzied exchange is aim d towards ollapsing the distinction 
between individual/collective (Papaioannou, in mail conversation with author: 
2011 ). 
The purpose of such scores, then, is to coax impr vi ing bodies to self-organisation 
meaning that rather than act hylomorphically the compo er takes on an 'artisanal' role. 
} 
Figure Thr : Extra t from ogs, Helen Papaioannou 
ource: helenpapaioannou. com 
ID1provisation and the 'education of desire' 
Thus far I have claimed that improvi ation cr at n madi ut pias. In thi , I beli ve it 
has an ethically good value in and of itself. Yet thi an be expand d by modifying Levitas' 
concept of the 'education of d sire'. In hapt r Two, I not d how this function by 
providing the reader of a utopian t xt with an altcrnativ to th tatu quo and by 
showing the steps that might b taken to r a1is u h a pa . ' his I sugge t d, ran the 
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risk of being a state utopian operation, with political action oriented to the realisation of a 
lack, although I noted that it fulfilled an important function in my readings of utopian 
literature in the previous chapter. 
Here I want to contend that an important utopian function of contemporary nomadic 
utopian practices (such as musical improvisation) is the 'education of desires'. My claim in 
this regard is that by experiencing musical improvisation, performers develop new 
structures of feeling that may lead them to believe that nomadic utopias can work. 
Furthermore, they are likely to experience many of the frustrations and failures that 
disrupt nomadic utopianism and may develop strategies that help to alleviate these (such 
as the scores I discuss immediately above). As the form of improvisation I have discussed 
here is a collective practice, these experiences will not only be the property of the 
individual subject: there will be others to discuss them with (which is not to say that 
everyone will have the same experience: indeed, different experiences may well be 
valuable). Furthermore, whilst the experiences of organising nomadically in improvisation 
may not be directly transferable to other situations, through analogy and the confidence 
that comes with experience they may inspire solutions to problems in other forms of 
nomadic organisation. 
Some problems with this approach 
In Chapter Two, I noted that evaluations of a place's position as either nomadic or statist 
are necessarily contingent and partial. Whilst the relatively 'omnipotent' perspective 
afforded by literature (unreliable narrators, shifting perspectives and other 'postmodern' 
techniques notwithstanding) sometimes affords an opportunity to minimise this, when 
engaging with 'real world' spaces no once-and-for-all judgement can be made. This is a 
particular problem in improvisation: I have partaken in numerous performances (public 
and private) where performers have disagreed about the power relations, and I 
particularly want to flag up situations where the majority of an improvising assemblage 
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felt that th.e affective power relations of a performance were evrnly distributed, but one or 
two performers did not. Wbilst such performances are likely to have been more nomadic 
than those where none of the performers felt the affective power relations were evenly 
distributed, this is not necessarily the case - it could be the result of the kind of cosy 
consensus that has dragged Anarres towards state utopianism. Nomadic utopia may at 
times be discomforting, and it cannot simply be said that an enjoyable experience is a 
utopian one. The problem here, then, is similar to the problem that Shevek is faced with 
when he is told that it is better to have your rulers in a castle than in your head, because 
then you can rebel against them. Affective power relations are not necessarily visible (or 
audible), and they may not always be fclt, either. 
The problem is furthered for the student of utopianism in that the primary purpose of 
improvising musicians is likely to be the production of music rather than the creation of 
utopian space. Whilst many believe that the two are inseparable (that good music comes 
from good musicking relationships), this is not necessarily the case (indeed, I am not sure I 
would follow this argument, even within impro\isation). I would suggest that further work 
on the power relations immanent to improvisation would thus be infi)rmative, but for the 
reasons outlined in the previous paragraph this could only ever be contingent and partial. 
The best way around this problem is, perhaps, to encourage improvising musicians to 
reflect on how they felt power relations played out in an open and honest way after 
performances. This would constitute a 'slowness' in contrast the 'speed' of improvisation, 
but is almost certainly a necessary process in order that future performances (assuming the 
musicians will play together again37) can be as nomadically utopian as possible. 
Improvisation as a 'degenerate nomadic utopia' 
As a relentlessly inventive form that pri\ileges the crration of the new and enables 
37 Even where they won't, lessons learned here can be applil'd by pc-rforml'n ill future collective 
improvisations. 
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collective solutions to difficult problems, improvisation has - understandably - had a great 
deal of appeal to businesses seeking to find new markets to exploit and new ways to cut 
operating costs, something that many improvising musicians and theorists are acutely 
aware of (Hegarty, 2012; Mattin, 2009; Saladin, 2009; Brassier et al. 20 I 0). As such, 
management journals (and other publications on the ever blurring boundaries between 
academia and b u s i n e s s 3 ~ ~ have published a number of articles extolling the potentials of 
improvisation in a business context, and make use of examples from musical practice. A 
sample of such works includes 'Improvisation as "real time foresight'" (Cunha et al.: 2011); 
'Improvisation in service recovery' (Cunha et al.: 2009); 'Improvisation and Knowledge: 
The Challenge of Appropriation' (Kamoche and Cunha, 2008) and :Jazz Musicians: 
Creating Service Experience in Live Performance' (Kubacki, 2008). Meanwhile, the 
website 10OOventures.com - which describes itself as offering 'Broader knowledge, better 
ideas!' for entrepreneurs, corporate leaders, innovators and consultants/trainers' hosts an 
online 'mini-course' by Vadim Kotelnikov for 'creative achievers' entided 'The Jazz of 
Innovation' (some of Kotelnikov's other courses include 'Strategic Management', 'SMART 
Innovation', 'Winning Customers', 'Your People Skills', '12 Leadership Roles' and 
'Inspiring Corporate Culture'). 
There is, of course, a contradiction in capitalism adopting improvisation's non-
hierarchical form, for in perpetuating inequalities of wealth it perpetuates what is perhaps 
the most insidious form of power-over in the contemporary world, whilst its attendant 
political form Oiberal democracy) speaks the language of difference, but always as 
secondary to a melting pot identity.39 Thus, to utilise improvisation for the end of 
capitalism is to take a nomadic form and turn it against itself by putting it to statist ends. 
If an improvising nomadic utopia is created for such ends it is, clearly, a degenerate 
38 Tht"rt' is, of course, some excellent critical work coming out of Business and Management schools, but the 
essays I citt" hert' art' seeking to utilise improvisation to expand market opportunities. 
39 For a critique ?f jazz narratives that sec it as expressing the 'melting pot' theory of cultural assimilation, 
sec Ht"nch, 2001. 
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nomadic utopia (although this does not preclude the possibility that it might prompt 
reflection on how the social arrangements of that space might be extended across society, 
rather than utilised in the pursuit of profit). 
These degenerate nomadic utopias should not spell the end for improvisation as a form of 
nomadic utopianism, however: as Harry Cleaver has noted, selective readings of Marx 
have provided the impetus for capitalism to deepen its exploitative practices (2000: 27). 
They should, however, force improvisers to reflect ever harder on their practice and 
consider how it may be complicit in certain ideological narratives that seek to present 
liberal democracy and capitalism as progressive, non-hierarchical economic and political 
systems. To this end, I would suggest that an engagement with the forms of popular 
education I address in the following chapter may prove productive. 
Improvisation and the problem of autonomyo 
Above, I noted that improvisation does not operate entirely unconnectedly from social 
norms and identities. Thus, although spaces created by improvisation can function as 
prefigurative nomadic utopias, they can never do so ahsolulery: their 'autonomy' is never 
complete, and dominations and exclusions perpetuated in today's statist utopia will 
inevitably reproduce themselves within both improvised performances and in the culture 
of improvisation more broadly (here I echo the sympathetic critique of narratives of 
'autonomy' by Bohm et al, 2010). By dominations I mean that those who have been 
socialised such that they are not confident in expressing themselves may well feel unable to 
express any power-to within an improvised setting and end up following fellow 
performers; by exclusions I mean that certain groups of people are simply less likely to 
partake in improvisation. The latter may not take place actively, but unless it is recognised 
and challenged it is likely to continue. These practices may also be interlinked: those who 
40 Marie Thompson forced me to think far harder about the issues I address in this section, for which I am 
extremely grateful. I should also acknowledge the importance of discussions with Ben Trott on the issue. 
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find themselves dominated in an improvising setting may find it an unsatisfactory process 
and decide that it is not for them, perpetuating the exclusion. In this, improvisation is 
confronted with many of the problems faced by today's social movements (X, 2000; Trott, 
2012). Whilst these operations of power are not directly concerned with the operations of 
a nomadic utopia, they are important in understanding the relationship between 
prefigurative nomadic utopias and wider society, and inject my call for strategic hierarchy 
and strategic identity politics with an added urgency. 
In particular, improvisation faces problems of exclusion and domination around gender 
and sexuality. Race is a more complicated issue, although improvisation in Europe tends 
to be mainly the domain of white males.41 I would tentatively suggest that class is also an 
issue here, although there is little research on this ( it must be noted that many of the most 
celebrated musicians are from working-class or blue-collar backgrounds, but I would 
suggest that - in the UK at least - improvisation is becoming an increasingly middle class 
practice). These dominations and exclusions are not fixed though, and operate in different 
ways in different geographic and temporal locations. This section, then, can only offer the 
broadest overview of trends, but it should absolutely not be seen as an afterthought. 
Whilst some may read it as an unnecessary diversion from the main argument of this 
chapter, I believe that it articulates the single biggest problemfor utopian narratives of improvisation 
and, perhaps, for autonomist practice more broadly. It also addresses a problem that is 
self-defeating for improvisation: in limiting the practice to certain kinds of people, it 
41 George Lewis charts two histories of improvisation in his important essay 'Improvised Music after 1950: 
Afrological and Eurological P e r s ~ c t i v e s ' ' (2002), noting that European (and white American) improvisers 
sought to distance their music from issues concerning race (and to a lesser extent class) that predominated 
in Afrological forms (which, he notes, should not be based on racial essentialism, but on the ways in which 
the musicians in question construct their identities and their practices). In his book A Power Stronger than 
ftug; meanwhile, he details the expulsion of the white vibraphonist Emmanuel Cranshaw (though he did 
not think of himself as white) from the Association for the Advancement of Creative Musicians. Although 
stating that she has since changed her mind, MCM member Amina Claudine Myers states that 'I was 
one of the ones that was against having somebody white in the organization [and voted for Cranshaw's 
expulsion1. Whites were always having something. They always run everything, come in and take over our 
stuff. but this was something black that we had created, something of our own, and we should keep it 
black' (in Lewis. 2008: 2(0). This, however, should not be seen as comparable to the exclusion of women 
or queers: as members of an oppressed minority, the exclusion of white musicians by black musicians is of 
an entirely different order, and may well have been necessary for the development of black self-expression. 
This is one of the ways in which prefiguration can never be absolute: sometimes it is necessary to create 
spaces in which those with dominant identities are excluded. 
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becomes less open to difference and ends up reproducing techniques and practices far 
more readily than if it were more open to different ways of being. Accordingly, I make no 
apology for the length of this section. 
Sadly (and perhaps surprisingly), there is little literature on the domination of certain 
identity groups within improvisation - where domination is spoken of, it is usually 
disconnected from broader sociological factors and societal structures, and often focuses 
on the individual actions of the dominant musician (as in Thomson's account quoted 
above). This is not to say that it is not a problem, however - and I have spoken to 
improvising musicians (including those I have played with) who felt that societal structures 
of inequality had, at times, prevented them from participating as fully as they would have 
liked in improvised performances, and were sometimes reproduced within the place of 
improvisation. In order to address - and perhaps overcome these issues - I would suggest 
that improvisers might learn from certain social movement practices, which account for 
the fact that certain groups have been marginalised from social discourse and so may be 
less confident in speaking by creating structures through which they are e n ~ o u r a g e d d to 
make contributions free from the interference of dominant social groups, such as allowing 
women and members of ethnic minorities to speak first at public meetings - a tactic 
utilised by many Occupy movement occupations (Trott, 2012). This would function as 
another necessary insertion of death into the improvising system: a form of strategic 
hierarchy that is necessary in order to overcome hierarchical residues from the world 
beyond the autonomist space of improvisation. It is not the only (nor indeed a wholly 
satisfactory) solution, of course, and a broader awareness of these issues within the 
improvising community is certainly needed - regardless of tactics adopted in any 
particular performance. 
Exclusion is more broadly spoken about within discourses on improvisation: particularly 
in relation to gender. In her PhD thesis, the improvising pianist Dana Reason Myers notes 
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that '[ilt is often a challenge even to find a recording of a women improviser, and naming 
more than a few women improvisers might prove difficult even for an improvised music 
enthusiast·2, since the overall support of their work has been inadequate.' (2002: 1; cf. 
Papaioannou and Thompson, 2012; Lewis, 2008: 459-460; Oliveros, 2004; Tucker, 2000, 
2004; Smith, 2004.)H This leads to a 'myth of absence' (Myers, 2002: 2) and a 'vicious 
circle' effect in which 1) there are fewer female improvisers; 2) those who do improvise are 
treated with less importance than men; 3) improvisation is seen as masculine activity; 4) 
fewer women take up improvisation. 
Sherri Tucker makes a similar argument about queer improvisers (in the sense of 
improvisers who 'take nothing to be natural or normal', but with an emphasis on 
sexuality), asking a series of questions that challenge the heteronormative discourses of 
many representations of improvisation: 
What's going on in 2006 ... when a popular cable TV lesbian soap opera series 
animates hip young white lesbians rescuing the Planet (night club) from a jazz 
quartet (by convincing the African American heterosexual woman who owns 
the establishment to "give the girlies what they want ... ?" Or in 1984 when a 
jazz historian publishes his claim that "the incidence of homosexuality in 
jazz" is "not only below that in other kinds of music and all the other arts," 
but "far below population norms cited in studies such as the Kinsey 
Report" ... ? Or in 1965, when an eclectic music magazine solicits responses of 
ten jazz musicians to the validity of the claim that "HOMOSEXUALITY IS 
ALMOST NON-EXISTENT AMONG JAZZ MUSICIANS AS 
COMPARED TOOTHER LIMBS IN THE TREE OF SHOW 
BUSINESS" ... ? How does a term like "effeminacy" come to operate as the 
critical language deployed by jazz writers, audiences, and musicians of the 
1950s to denigrate some emergent jazz styles while advocating for others that 
are heard explicitly as black-hetero-masculine ... ? (2008: 1, emphasis in original). 
The improvising pianist Steve Beresford also acknowledges that contemporary British 
improvisation is a practice undertaken largely by straight males. For him, however, there is 
little that can be done to correct this as it is merely a reflection of broader social 
42 Sadly. this rang true with me until I made a conscious, concerted effort to address this problem. 
43 Myers cites a whole host of evidence for this claim, noting that jazz and improvisation magazines rarely 
feature profiles or reviews of female improvisers (and use gendered language when they do), and that 
prominent improvising festivals rarely book female artists to appear: of the major festivals she surveyed (up 
to 2000), the Tatklos Festival had the highest proportion of female improvisers, with 18.48% of 
impro\ising musicians booked in its then sixteen year history female. The worst was the Du Maurier Jazz 
Festival, with just 2.8% over six years. Even the flyer for politically positioned Freedom in the City 2011 
that I referenced a b o l . ~ ~ only advertises seven female performers out of a total of thirty-nine named. 
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structures. In an interview with George McKay he asked 'is it entirely fair to talk about 
these, what you're calling "limitations on the assumptions or inscriptions of liberty" in 
improvised music? H'e're not in utopia! It's just a music scene in a problem society!' (2005: 
24, emphasis in original). 
It strikes me that it is perfectly fair to talk about them, and indeed it would be unfair not 
to. Defeatism should not be an option here and - to combat this - the improvisation 
community must actively seek to recognise the contributions of female and queer 
improvisers. The former of these practices would operate against the writing out of 
female contributions that Maggie Nichols and Georgina Born (both members of the 
Feminist Improvising Group) have identified in interviews (Nichols in McKay, 2005: 20; 
Born in Myers, 2002: 72). As Nichols noted in an interview with Myers, 'there was a time 
when somebody at LMC (London Musicians' Collective) said there just aren't the women, 
and a couple of us sat down and wrote this huge list of women that we knew improvised, 
it was massive ... There's lots of women, there is enough to program festivals.' (2002: 107). 
This task, however, should be accompanied by a critique of the assumption that female 
and queer improvisers constitute an exception to the norm: whilst highlighting their 
contributions is important, it threatens to leave the 'norm' of improvisation as a straight, 
male practice unchallenged (Tucker, 2008). Critical questions must therefore also be 
asked, but sadly this is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
At times, the practice of excluding those whose identity is other than straight and male 
has functioned through active misogyny and homophobia rather than what can probably 
(if a little charitably) be understood as an unthinking reproduction of patriarchal, 
heteronormative structures.44 This is a particular problem in jazz improvisation (as it is in 
the jazz scene more broadly - see Gavin, 2001), which at times displays an unpleasantly 
44 As Myers notes, the exclusion of women is frequently perpetuated by comfort and habit. '[A]n individual', 
she writes, 'may choose to stay with familiar people, materials and patterns, but this in turn can limit the 
degree to which improvisation allows for an opportunity to take chances and move into new territories' 
(2002: 133). 
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ht'tt'ronormatiwly misogynist character. Although free jazz Gazz at its most improvisatory) 
was oftt'n pt'rct'iw'd as a challenge to this (Ake, 1998; 2004: 438), homophobia and sexism 
remain. ~ I a g g i e e l'\ichols recalls the pianist Alexander von Schlippenbach complaining 
about 'tht'st' wonwn who can't play their instruments' (in McKay, 2002: 22) after a 
Feminist Improvising Group performance, whilst Valerie Wilmer quotes an unnamed 
(malt» improvising saxophonist, who recalled that: 
[w]hen the word got out that I was playing with a woman, the cats really came 
down on me. They said, "What the hell are you doing playing with a woman ... ?" 
When tht'y ht'ard the actual music, though, several of the musicians changed their 
minds and actually wanted to play with her;. (1992: 205) 
Tht' improvising saxophonist Charles Gayle, meanwhile, has denounced homosexuality as 
an 'abomination' (quott'd in Heble, 2000: 210). Whilst there are a number of nuances to 
bt' considered ht'rt' before an absolute denunciation is made (Heble, 2000: 211-227t\ his 
daims show that improvisation is not, de facto, a tolerant practice, and may well be 
t'xdusionary. 
Ot'spitt' (or pt'rhaps, in part, because oD the problems associated with improvisation as a 
practice (although not because of its practices of domination and exclusion), I remain 
firmly wt'ddt'd to tht' belief that improvisation offers an example of nomadic utopianism 
in practict' (or, pt'rhaps, praxis). The improvising musician and theorist Mattin expresses 
this de-arty: 
The relationship between the instrument,46 the other players, the space and 
audit'nct' (if thert' is one) becomes intensified through a mutual understanding 
that e-\"crything is at stake at every moment. Power structures can be changed 
at any point because the future of this practice is unwritten. The social relations 
be-ing produccd are questioned as the music develops. If successful, improvisation 
runs against its own dogmatism. This is done through developing agency and 
-l5 As an African-:\merican who was homeless for twenty years, Gayle is clearly a structurally disadvantaged 
mrmber of :\merican society. and ethical judgements by privileged members of society (such as myself) 
maltr me uncomfortable. though equally this should not be seen as legitimising his pronouncements. 
Hrblr's handling of this. ,;a a reading of postcolonial theory and African-American history is excellent, 
and I would rrfrr interested readers there for a fuller discussion of the issues. 
46 I ha\'t' 1I0t considerrd the rolt' of instruments (nor the audience) in improvisation for reasons of space. 
Thry should IX' considt'red part of the impro\ising assemblage, however, and a fuller account would think 
through how thry might contribute to - or hinder - the nomadic utopianism of imprO\isation. Nor have I 
considerrd the relationship between the social relations of musicking and the particular qualiites of the 
music prodll('rd. For considerations of these issues. see Bell (201Ia), Marshall (2012) and Heble (2000). 
177 
responsibility towards the present among the people involved by questioning 
established norms of behaviour. (2009: 169) 
Two pages later, he notes that these practices are 'wider than just the moment in which 
the musicians are playing with each other.' (171) In this, he echoes a claim made by the 
improviser and music writer David Toop, who states that if there is a utopianism inherent 
to improvising music, it is not one realised in a particular performance 'of unfettered 
spontaneity' but one which must be realised over a long period of time and across 
performances (2005: 239; cf. Borgo, 2005: 194). What this points to is a careful, 
considered practice that alternates between ecstatic, rhizomatic creation and careful, 
considered reflection. Like Anarres, it does not offer an easy ride: there are no simple 
solutions in its utopia. It is not simply a case of abandoning all hierarchies and playing 
freely forever, but of continually watching out for new ways of interacting and the 
dangers that they bring with them, and of searching for solutions to these dangers in a 
dialogic, non-hierarchical manner. 
Conclusion 
. This chapter has suggested that music has an important utopian function, and that the 
forms of organisation that structure 'musicking' produce the musical collective as a utopia. 
I have argued that the symphony orchestra functions as a state utopia (and has a state 
utopian function both internally and externally), and that i m p r o \ ~ s i n g g assemblages can 
(but do not always) function as nomadic utopias. I showed how these nomadic utopias are 
always under threat from statist forces and suggested a number of strategies that may be 
utilised in order to help ward off statism. I also argued that improvisation may selVe to 
'educate the desires' of those who experience it, providing nomadic utopianism with 
confidence and experience that they may be able to carry Over into other forms of 
organisation. 
A word of warning needs to be sounded, however. In a sense, the two case studies this 
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chapter is structured around - the symphony orchestra and the improvising assemblage -
can bt' set'n as 't'xtremes' of state utopia and nomadic utopia. Unlike most communal 
spaces, they tend to be absolutely united around a purpose that - presumably on some 
level most of the performers find enjoyable (performing music). Furthermore, in 
impro\·isation 'difference' expresses itself as a musical quality, something far easier to 
immanently organise than the potentially incompossible differences that may arise in 
trying to structure a society. Thus, whilst I suggest that improvisation can 'educate the 
desire' of those improvising, there are dangers in thinking that improvisation provides 'the 
answers' to forms of social organisation - to make such a case would be to fallaciously 
assume that the macrocosm is a perfect replication of the microcosm. 
It is, then-fore, important not to overstate the case for the political relevance of musicking: 
it is clear that improvisation is never - on its own - going to produce nomadic utopias 
outside the immediate space-time of performance, and nor would I advocate the cessation 





'Whilst I believe that musical improvisation allows the subject to experience the dizzying 
power-to generated in a nomadic utopia, it is clearly only ever going to playa marginal 
role in any broader transformation of social structures. \ \'hilst I belicve it is of vital 
importance to consider the utopian ramifications of the manner in which seemingly non-
political spaces are organised (the musical collective among them), focussing solely on such 
cultural activity risks leaving larger cultural structures untouchcd. \Vhilst the musician 
may experience an education of desire in the improvising group, there is no guarantee it 
will prompt them to push for a nomadic utopia on a broader scale. And there is, of 
course, the risk that improvisation provides only a compensatory function: a temporary 
space of autonomy that offers relief from the negative affects of capitalism's state 
utopia/ dystopia. 
In this chapter, then, I want to turn to a practice that is less insular: education. There can 
be no guarantees here either, but I contend that it is more likely that a nomadic utopian 
education will produce becomings that resonate beyond the nomadic utopias it creates. 
Furthermore, given education's ubiquity I would argue that it constitutes a vital terrain of 
struggle: state utopians certainly have no qualms about utilising education to reproduce 
the status quo (whilst denying that they are doing so, of course). Roughly following the 
structure of the previous chapter, then, this chapter considers what a state utopian 
education might look like: how it utilises 'education' as a form of state utopianism, and 
how this produces classrooms and schools as state utopias (which themselves have a state 
utopian function). It then proceeds to do the same for nomadic utopianism. 
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Before this can be undertaken some clarification of terms used is required. The first part 
of the chapter is dedicated to briefly explicating what I mean by 'education' (which is 
linked to utopianism); and 'school' (which is linked to utopia), and to the relationship 
betwct'n tht'm. I also further the case for education and schools being vital terrains for 
struggle. Following this, I move on to show how education can function as a form of state 
utopianism. I show that compulsory education was developed as a project to strengthen 
the powt'r of tht' nation state and the emerging bourgeoisie (playing a role in the second 
dimension of statt' utopianism), and that it continues to function as a force preserving 
their interests (thus functioning as the third dimension of state utopianism). I briefly show 
how t'ducation has a state utopian function in a number of literary dystopias, with 
particular attention paid to the function of education in Aldous Huxley'S Brave New World. 
Utilising the work of the Brazilian philosopher of education (and teacher) Paulo Freire, I 
argue that what is common to these forms of education is an epistemological approach in 
that \;rws knowledge as a 'thing' located in a transcendent place beyond the individualised 
subject of education. I show how that this approach leads to curricula being designed 
around knowledge that has been chosen by those in formally sanctioned positions of 
power-over, mraning that 'other' forms of knowledge (including those that are embodied 
and affectiw), as well as the social complexities of the knowledge taught - are excluded 
from the classroom. I show how the examination system reinforces this and argue that it 
also limits the capacity of teachers to explore forms of knowledge not on the curriculum, 
a<; well as reducing students' enthusiasm for exploring the social aspects of knowledge. I 
argue that when it is structured in this manner, education functions as a force of state 
utopianism that reproduces the status quo. I also show that it produces the classroom as a 
state utopia. This, I contend will have produce the state utopian function of repressing 
desires. 
My attention then turns to how education can function as a form of nomadic utopianism. 
I argue that this must be predicated upon a different epistemological approach that sees 
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knowledge not as a 'thing' to be obtained, but as something always under construction (I 
refute the claim that this is an epistemological relativism). I then show how this approach 
is taken by a number of educators and theorists of education who see themselves as 
utopian, and I explore how they utilise the concept of utopia - finding it to be similar to 
process approaches of utopia. I then turn to explore precisely how education might 
function as nomadic utopianism, suggesting that this occurs when difTt'rence-in-itself is 
allowed to present itself within the educational space such that knowledge can be non-
hierarchically and collectively constructed. I note that it is a mistake to associate difference 
with the individual learner, as their subjectivity will be constructed through interacting 
with other learners, and will herself be constituted by difference. I then consider 
approaches that have utilised this approach to education (within and outside of formal 
educational institutions) to argue that through it the school and the classroom can be 
constructed as nomadic utopias: (broadly) non-hierarchically organised places in which 
difference-in-itself is encouraged, but which never see themselves as finished. I also note 
the importance of adopting a pragmatic approach that pays attention to the 
particularities, desires and experiences of those in the space, and argue that doing so may 
require the use of strategic hierarchies and temporary divisions of labour. I note the 
potential dangers of constructing classrooms as nomadic utopias within formal 
educational institutions that play an important role in the reproduction of state 
utopianism, though I argue that this may well be a risk worth taking, not least because -
as I conclude by saying - nomadic utopias in education may have a utopian function 
beyond their space, 'educating the desires' of those who inhabit them such that they are 
able to comprehend the wider world being organised in a nomadic form. 
DeRning Terms: Education, School and the Classroom 
Untangling the meanings of 'education' and 'school' is an important task. Thinkers who 
engage critically in the field often fail to define their terms, and there is little consistency in 
the way they are used - even by individual thinkers (and sometimes within the same text). 
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It is perhaps tt'mpting to follow the implication of Mark Twain's oft-repeated witticism 
that 'I haw newr let my schooling interfere with my education' (quoted in Hawkey, 2001: 
IB+) which-- in the context of this thesis - would mean positing education as a nomadic 
utopian process and 'school' as a state utopian institution working to prevent the unfolding 
of 'true' education (with 'schooling' thus being the variety of 'education' delivered in 
schools); an institution capable of offering only Compulsory Miseducation, as the title of Paul 
Goodman's (1968) book has it. Such an argument is made explicitly by Everett Reimer in 
Against School ( 1971), in which he argues that: 
True education is a basic social force. Present social structures could not survive 
an educated population, even if only a substantial minority were educated. 
Something more than schooling is obviously in question here; indeed, almost the 
opposite of schooling is meant. People are schooled to accept a society. They are 
educated to create or re-create one. (1972: 121) 
This distinction between 'education' as a force seeking to go beyond the present (and it is 
dear from Rt'imer's writings that he believes this would be true for a1!)l present, and thus 
that education has a nomadic utopian function) and 'school' (or 'schooling') as a means to 
protect the status quo (and thus with a state utopian function) initially seems to be 
rt'fleeted by a number of those critical of contemporary practices. 1 Stanley Aronowitz's 
essay 'Against Schooling: Education and Social Change' (2004), for example, argues that 
schools have 'failed', transmitting only 'conformity to the social, cultural, and occupational 
hit'rarchy' (16), whilst maintaining that education has at least the potential to bring around 
political change. Ivan Illich's Deschooling Sociery (1973), meanwhile, argues that that 'equal 
educational opportunity is ... both a desirable and a feasible goal, but to equate this with 
obligatory schooling is to confuse salvation with the Church' (18), and that school is 'not 
liberating or t'ducational because [it] reserves instruction to those whose every step in 
If"arning fits p r e \ ~ o u s l y y approved measures of social control' (19). These arguments are not 
new, t'ither: the t'ighteenth century English radical William Cobbett argued that schools 
offen'd not 'education' but rather 'heddekashun', a poor facsimile for the transmission of 
Rrimer's distinction between 'accepting' and 're-creating' is - from a nomadic perspective - problematic. 
As I ha\T shown- and \\ill argue further in this chapter - perpetuating the status quo requires that status 
quo to be reproduced. 
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'really useful knowledge' which would help learners transform their social world (quoted in 
Johnson, 1981: 6). Similar arguments have been made (in a variety of forms and from a 
variety of perspectives) by Freire (2000), Giroux (2009), Johnson (1981), Hem (1998, 
2003), Mickey D (1993), McLaren (2009), Morris (2004: 65-67), Bakunin (no date) and 
Brighton Free Uni (2006). 
A deeper reading of these thinkers complicates the picture, however. Many reveal 
themselves to be against what might be called 'actually existing schools' - and sometimes 
compulsory schooling - rather than the concept of school itsel( Thus, whilst Aronowitz's 
article signals in its title that it is 'Against Schooling', the focus of its critique is on state 
controlled schools in the US (although many of its arguments could be applied to state 
schools in other countries) and not the concept of the school per St. Indeed, it displays a 
commitment to the concept of 'the school': firstly by pointing to the non-state run Rand 
and Jefferson Schools as' utopian alternatives to mainstream schooling, and secondly by 
(briefly) attempting to answer the question 'what are the requisite changes that would 
transform schools ... [in] to sites of education that prepare young people to see themselves 
as active participants in the world?' (120). Hem (1998), meanwhile, expresses his 
admiration for the 'Esceula Moderna' (Modern Schools) founded by the Spanish anarchist 
Francisco Ferrer, whilst Giroux and McLaren have both argued for the transformation -
rather than the destruction - of schools, and expressed their admiration for the radical 
pedagogical practice of Paulo Freire, which took place within mainstream schools in 
Brazil (McLaren, 1994; 1997; Freire and Horton, 1990).2 
2 Illich's position, mcanwhilc, is a little more complicated. Following thc publication of Deschooling Society, he 
remained hostile to the cone cpt of thc school but dcveloped his argument to include a rejection of the 
concept of education itself, prcferring instead the tcrm 'learning'. In 1995 - twenty-two years after the 
publication of Deschooling Society, hc wrote that: 'I [now] understand education as learning when it takes 
place under the assumption of scarcity in the means which produce it. The "need for education" from this 
perspective appears as a result of societal beliefs and arrangements which make the means for so-called 
socialization scarce ... educational rituals reflected, reinforced, and actually created belief in the value of 
learning pursued under conditions of scarcity ... [which] could easily survive and thrive under the rubrics 
of deschooling, free schooling or homeschooling .. .' 
'What does scarcity have to do with education? If the means of learning ... are abundant. .. then education 
never arises - one does not need to make special arrangl'ments for "learning". If, on the other hand, the 
means for learning arc in scarce supply, or are assumed to be scarce, then educational arrangements crop 
up to "ensure" that certain, important knowledgc, ideas, skills, attitudes, etc. are "transmitted". Education 
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It is dear, then, that critical approaches to education and the school are walking 
something of a semantic tightrope.:l In order that this might be traversed safely, I propose 
to proceed from the etymology of the terms in question (taking note of both their origins 
and their contemporary, colloquial uses). The origins of the word education (which is 
commonly considered as a noun) lie in the Latin verb educo, meaning 'to lead forth' or 'to 
raise up' (OVord English Dictionary: oed. com; Online Etymology Dictionary: etymonline.com). 
This suggests a hylomorphic form of organisation in which there is someone in a position 
of hierarchical power-over who does the 'leading forth' or 'raising up' in accordance with 
values already set. It implies that the subjects of education (the students or pupils) are 
passive, inert indi\iduals incapable of determining the direction they wish to take in life, 
and suggests that education is a form of state utopianism. To a degree, this is reflected in 
colloquial uses of the term, with education commonly understood as the formal 
transmission of knowledge which occurs at schools (OJifOrd English Dictionary: oed. com) 
which' as I will show - are largely state utopian institutions. This understanding is not 
absolute, howewr, and 'education' is also used for other forms of knowledge acquisition 
which do not necessitate a statist form. It would not be unusual, for example, to hear 
someone r('fer to a discussion with a friend as 'educational', and the broad traditions of 
'popular education' - which I draw heavily on below - show that it is possible to have an 
education that is not structured in accordance with statist principles. 
Ihl"n bl"coml"s an I"conomic commodity, which onc consumes, or, to usc common language, which onc 
"gl"ts": ,2008: v'. 
A numbl"r of Ihinkl"rs of an anarchist pcrsuasion takc a similar position and rcjcct both cducation and 
schooling ,Mallhl'ws. 2009; Morris, 2004: 65-67), whilst Leo Tolstoy adopted the unusual position of 
founding a school yet rl"jecting 'education', seeing it as the 'compulsory, forcible action of one person upon 
anolhl"r for Ihl' purpose of forming a man such as will appear to us to bc good' (2008: 5). Echoing Illich, 
hI" argul"d thaI ('ducalion 'is culturc undcr restraint. Culturc is free' (.ibid). 
Ddl'uzl' discuSS<'d Ihl' difference betwcen a 'school' and 'movement' in L'Abicbiaire de Gilles Dt/euze (Thc 
Alphabl't of Gilil's Ddeuze') - an intervicw with Clairc Parnet, broadcast on Frcnch television in 1988. 
Th('fl'. hl' argul'd Ihal a 'school' implied a hierarchical ordering around a charismatic figure (he cites 
Lill·an. \\,illgrnsldn and Brl'ton as examples); and stated that he preferred instead the idea of a 
'mO\"t'ml'nt' in which thl'rl' were no guarantees, no leaders and no disciples. \'\'hilst this has obvious 
rl'll'\-aJlCl" for thl' task at hand here, Deleuzc is rcfcrring to 'schools of thought', rather than the school as a 
sight for/of Il'arning (as L'Abectdairt is in French, I am rdying hcre on Charles Stivale's English oven;ew, 
onlinl' athttp://www.langlab.wayne.edu/ cstivalel d-gl abc l.html). 
3 This. of collrse. is intensifil'd when issues concerning translation are taken into account. A number of 
languagrs do not distinguish between 'to teach' and 'to learn', whilst in Hindi the word for 'education' is 
Ihl' saml' as Ihl' word for 'chastisement' (Matthcws, 2009: online at theanarchistlibrary.org). 
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The word 'school', meanwhile, comes from the Greek skhole, meaning 'a time or place for 
discussion' (Online Etymology Dicitionary: etymonline.com) and the Latin schola, which refers 
to a 'place or establishment in which a teacher expounds his or ht'r vit'ws' (O:iford English 
Dictionary: oed. com). The former contains no explicit hierarchy, but the latter suggests that 
the school is teacher-driven: it is the place where the 'leading forth' is carried out. 
Colloquial usage of the term school tends to reflect the hierarchical understanding but 
again this is not absolute, and founders of numerous nomadic experiments in education 
have used the word school for their projects (although some prefer the spelling 'skool' in 
order to emphasise their difference, or using a suffix such as 'Frt'e'). It is also important to 
note that common usage of the term 'school' goes beyond the physical place in which 
learning takes place and refers also to the institution, with its attendant power structures. 
In this light, I utilise the term 'classroom' to refer to the immediate place of discussion 
(with the understanding that this exists in time and so will never have fixed power 
relations) and 'school' to refer to broader institutional structures (which would include, but 
not be limited to, the classroom). School in this sense might also refer to a university or 
college: I am not concerned here solely with education of the young. 
From these definitions and contemporary uses of the terms 'education' and 'school', I 
would argue that neither concept should be understood as inherently statist or nomadic. 
In this, education can be compared to musicking in that it refers to an activity (the 
acquisition of knowledge) that unfolds over time, and so is a form of utopianism, whilst 
'school' is the space in which education takes place and so can be understood as a form of 
utopia. Yet I would also retain the sense of time that accompanies the Greek skhole, and 
insist that a school also exists in time as well as space, and so is itself subject to forces of 
smoothing and striation4• It will thus always have something of the nomadic in it, even 
4 Schools are often understood as institutions, and here it may be fruitful to consider a comparison between 
the institution as understood by the 'new institutionalist' turn and utopia. For Viven Lowndes, new 
institutionalism 'differs from its older sister [classical institutionalism] in at least three important respects. 
First, it is concerned not only with formal rules and structures but also "ith the informal conventions and 
coalitions that shape political behaviour. Secondly, it docs not take political institutions at face value; 
instead, it takes a critical look at the way in which they embody values and power relationships. Thirdly, 
new institutionalism rejects the determinism of earlier approaches. While institutions constrain individual 
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where it is primarily governed by statist principles, and vice-versa. 
In asserting that education and school/the classroom can be either nomadic or statist, my 
position echoes the approach implicitly taken by those thinkers who criticise 'actually 
existing schools' whilst holding out hope for education as an emancipatory force, and 
bdie\'ing that such an education can be delivered through a school, when that concept is 
understood in the broadest sense as an 'institution' seeking to deliver an education. 
Furthermore, I share the belief of these thinkers that education constitutes a particularly 
important - and potentially fertile - terrain for nomadic utopianism. I would argue that 
there is a greater likelihood of someone who has experienced a nomadic utopia(nism) 
during their education will engage in nomadic forms of political organisation in their life. 
Education is also an important force in reproducing the status quo. This can be seen in 
light of Foucault's work on how power-over does not solely come from 'above' but is 
reproduced by lower-level institutions and smaller communities of belonging and works its 
way up to formal levels of government' (the nation-state thus being parasitic upon these 
forms of organisation, rather than creating them from top-down). Schools can clearly be 
seen as span's of social reproduction - 'miniature prefigurative utopias' (after Dewey's 
be:ha\;ollr. the:y are: also (paradoxically [- though not to the dividual of a nomadic persuasion - ]) human 
('fC'atiolls. which c h a n ~ ~ and evolve through the agency of actors.' (Lowndes, 2009: 92) Thus, the 
institution is nol somC'lhing simply impose:d from above, but is remade by the activity of those who form a 
part of it. ThC'rt' arc: ob\;ous comparisons with Massey's approach to place, here. 
This unde:rsl:lnding should not limited to institutions officially sanctioned by the state, and any institution 
that is aiming to o(fC'r an C'ducation (any 'school', in other words) can be seen as an institution (here I 
would go he:yond LO\\11de:s' definition of new institutionalism to include those that have no formal rules or 
stnlC"lllre:SJ, whilst the classroom refers to any place in which education takes place, and should, therefore, 
takt' inlo account the relationships (between students; between teachers; and between teachers and 
stlldC'nts' that in part constitutC' it. As such, a geographical region such as a city might function as a 
d a s . ~ r o o m . . Colin Ward and Anthony Fyson's Streetwork: The Exploding School (1973), for example, considers 
utilising the city as a school; whilst the artist and educator Nils Norman has attempted to put some of 
the:sc idC'as into practice: with his School of Walls and Space at the Danish Royal Academy of the Visual 
Arts in Cope:nhagcn lse:e: http://wallsandspace.wordpress.com/). Paul Goodman's novel The Grand Piano 
,1942'. me:anwhilc:, depicts New York City utilised as a school. 
5 FOlll'allh's conce:pt of go\'crnmentality (1991) is of particular relevance here. Recalling Deleuze and 
GlIallari's claim that the: 'state form' goes beyond (and pre-exists) the geopolitical state - refers to 
tnhnique:s of gu\,e:rnance: bc:yond the institutions that arc usually considered in the study of 'government'. 
Whilst prn;olls forms of state power made usc of punishment, and thus made the sovereign visible (as, for 
e:xamplC', in the ex('cutions and torture in OneState), governmentality constitutes a 'disciplinary' form of 
power that makes the subject (in this case, the student) visible by comparing them to a 'norm' to which 
tht'y art' supposed to Ii\'{' up to (although, as I will argue in the following section, sovereign power is still 
pre:sclIl ill cOlIscr\':Ili,,{' state utopian education). 
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claim that they are 'miniature communities' [1959: 41]). With this in mind, education - in 
both formal and informal institutions - must be understood as a vital terrain for struggle. 
What we learn and how we learn it (though as I will show, these cannot be fully separated) 
helps determine how we (re)create our world. It is a crucial form of utopianism. 
Education and State Utopianism 
Education and the Geopolitical State 
In Chapter Two I noted that - for J-C. Davis - the greatest triumph of what I am calling 
literary state utopianism was its influence on the development of the modern state, whilst 
in Chapter Four I noted that the development of the symphony orchestra formed part of 
the process of bourgeois state formation. Yet the importance of both these forms in the 
second stage and third dimensions of the state utopian system (the realisation and 
subsequent recreation of a utopian vision) is surpassed by the role played by education. Its 
importance in the second dimension of the system of state utopianism is evidenced in the 
central role it has played in the establishment of a number of state utopian forms. The 
'philosopher of fascism' Giovanni Gentile wrote extensively on the importance of 
education in implementing a successful fascist state (Gentile, 1922; cf. Clayton, 2010; 
Entwhistle, 2009) and was made Minister of Education in Mussolini's first cabinet, a 
position he used to introduce widespread reforms in education. In Mao's China the 
Propaganda Department declared the need for a new curriculum that would 'remold the 
old thoughts of the intellectuals and enhance the socialist awakening of the students' 
(quoted in Steiner, 1958: 286). Andy Green's Education and Stale Formalion, meanwhile, 
examines how the rise of universal education in England, France and the US functioned 
as 'a powerful instrument of political confixmity and an essential clement in the 
comtruction of an individualist, capitalist hcgrmony' (1990: 35-3G). G 
6 Theorists from a variety of perspectives have noted the link between education and social control. Sec, for 
example, Colin Ward (1995), William Godwin (1797), E.P. Thompson (1968), Vladimir Lenin (1965: 84-87) 
and M.D. Shipman (1968: 151-156). 
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Education is also a crucial component in the third dimension of the system of state 
utopianism (that of reproducing an established state utopia), though - as per my caveat in 
Chaptl"r Two it is not always possible to draw a clear distinction between the second and 
third dimt'nsion. In the early twentieth century - as compulsory schooling was being 
established in tht' United States - the American theorist of education Alexander Inglis 
wrote that a kt')· function of education is to 'assist...in the maintenance of [society's] 
stability and in the direction of its own progress' (1918: 360), whilst E. George Payne 
noted - in admiration - that '[e]ducation in the sociological sense may be identified with 
social control', adding that 'the process of developing social control is the same as that of 
education' (1927: 14-3). Contemporary critical theorists of education agree with these 
remarks, allx-it in a less celebratory manner, and highlight how education is complicit in 
reproducing the" hierarchies of life under late capitalism, socialising students into 
individualist, 1il)("ra1 ideology and an acceptance of their place within those hierarchies. 
ror Samuel 8owlt's and Herbert Gintis, American public schooling has - since its 
inct'plion: 
bet'n Sl"e"n as a method of disciplining children in the interest of producing a 
pmpt'rly subordinatt' adult population. Sometimes conscious and explicit, and 
at other times a natural emanation from the conditions of dominance and 
sulx)rdinancy prt'valt'nt in the economic sphere, the theme of social control 
pt'rvadt's t'ducational thought and policy (2011: 37, c( Aronowitz, 2004; 
Ward, 1995). 
At thl' kn'l of higher education, meanwhile, Bill Readings (1997) shows how the rise of 
till' lIniwr!lity d"wlnped in tandem with the rise of the nation state, whilst Stevphen 
Shllkaitis drawing nn Readings notes that the contemporary, neoliberal university: 
ili ilion' gl'ared to th., dl'wlopment of new forms of innovation and creativity. 
That is tu S " l ) ~ ~ of course, innovation and creativity understood primarily as 
Ihmc' li)flllS thai can he translated into new intellectual property rights, patents, 
and mmmodiliabk I()rms of knowledge and skills. Thus, there is no "golden age" 
of th.· uniwrsily Ihal one can refer to or attempt to go back to; it is not a 
"uniwrsity in ruins" that can be rebuilt to return to its former glory precisely 
I)('c·.msc' il is a span' that has always played a role in creating and maintaining 
CJllestionahlr Illrms of powrr. (2009b: 166; cf. Basole, 2009: 33). 
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Education in Literary State Utopias and Dystopias 
Education also plays an important role in maintaining the status quo in a number of 
literary state utopias and dystopias (that is, fictional portrayals of state utopias that are 
commonly recognised as 'bad' places), including .More's Utopia (1992), Kazuo Ishiguro's 
Never Let Me Go (2005f and Zamyatin's We. In Le Guin's The Dispossessed the fact that 'kids 
learn to parrot the sayings of Odo as if they were laws' (2006: 146) is indicative of the 
manner in which Anarres has slipped away from nomadic utopianism and towards state 
utopianism. Here, however, I want to turn briefly to explore how education functions to 
reproduce the system of state utopianism in Aldous Huxley's Brave New JVorld. Like 
Zamyatin, Huxley created his dystopian/state utopian society as a hybrid of both 
Bolshevism and capitalism and so manages to portray the operations of state utopian 
education without limiting it to a particular ideological form. His description of education 
is more thorough than in ue, however, and begins to demonstrate exactly how education 
can function as a form of conservative state utopianism. 
In the opening scene of the novel Huxley describes an educational encounter between the 
Director of Hatcheries - an important figure in the hierarchy of the novel's future global 
state - and a group of students who are touring a hatchery, where foetuses are artificially 
developed on an industrial scale. The students dutifully follow the Director as he shows 
them round his facility, each of them carrying 'a note-book, in which, whenever the great 
man spoke, he desperately scribbled. Straight from the horse's mouth' (1994: 2). The 
phrase 'straight from the horse's mouth' is then repeated on two further occasions (3, 24), 
emphasising the one-way flow of information from the expert to his students in this 
'brave new world'. One student does dare to ask a question, but this is a practice deemed 
7 The education in Nl!Ver Let Me Go constitutes an interesting counterpoint to more 'classical' forms of 
dystopian fiction. Whilst the dystopian societies in works such as Ray Bradbury's Farenheit 451 (2004) and 
the film Equilibrium (2002) are sustained through the censorship of works of literature that might stimulate 
the imagination, Nl!Ver Let Me Go's Hailsham school (in which much of it is set) actively encourages its 
cloned students (who are to be killed) to read classic works of literature. Far from having a utopian 
function that sees them realise their powerlcsness and actively engage in creating a more utopian state of 
affairs, their reading selVes to soften their oppression, reinforcing their powerlessness (Palmowski, 20 I 0). 
This suggests that an education with radical (or at least liberal arts) content is not sufficient to result in 
political change. 
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'foolish' (4) - dialogue is not to be encouraged. Later on, Huxley describes a process of 
'moral t'ducation', which offers no opportunity for dialogue at all as it is carried out via 
'hypnopat'dia' (sleep-teaching). For the Director, this is '[t]he greatest moralizing and 
socializing forct' of all time' (24) as it allows for complete manipulation of the individual 
such that the 'mind that judges and desires and decides [is] made up of ... [s]uggestions 
from the State' (25). 
The Epistemology of State Education: Knowledge as a 'Thing' 
Huxley's nowl is dearly characterised by the exaggerated extrapolation common to 
dystopian fiction, but it powerfully demonstrates the way in which form and content 
combint' in statt' utopian education. The classroom itself (the hatchery, in this case) is 
hierarchically structured, whilst the content - the knowledge to be transmitted - functions 
as a simple 'lack'; a 'thing' that the students do not have. As should be clear now, it is the 
proct'ss that dt'tt'rmines the features of a place and so - as the score functions to impose 
and regulate tht' hierarchy of a symphony orchestra - the understanding of knowledge 
central to state utopian education imposes and regulates the hierarchy in state utopian 
schools and classrooms. It also allows for (and again, I draw on the language of the 
previous chapter) 'predetermined' curriculums to be set, in order that knowledge(s) that 
may threaten tht" stability of the state utopia is not considered. The processes I consider 
here are recognisable in their most extreme form in schools that provide a compulsory 
education, but many of them exist in other forms of education. 
The basic premise of 'knowledge' in a state utopian system of education is that it is a 
noun; a 'thing' that exists independently of any mind that may know it, and has an 
'unproblematic connection with objectivity, or truth' (Andreotti, 2006a: no page number). 
It thus functions as a transcendent lack; something that students do not possess, and is 
positt'd as the objt'ct of education - abstracted from daily life and to be accessed through 
specific proct"sses of learning (often in isolation). In his important work Pedagogy tif the 
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Oppressed the Brazilian critical educator and theorist Paulo Freire argues that such an 
approach sees knowledge as 'a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves 
knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to know nothing' (2000: 72), a process he 
refers to as the 'banking' approach to education. Drawing on this, Paula Allman suggests 
that knowledge is seen as a 'static possession'; a commodity (in the l\larxist sense) and 
argues that it is 'perceived as a "thing'" which, 'if we possess ... affects who we are, our 
status and self-esteem, and if we do not possess it, [has] an equal and opposite effect on 
who we are and how we think about ourselves.' (1999: 97) Being is thus privileged over 
becoming, as Freire makes clear when he writes that such an epistemological approach 
sees reality as 'motionless, static, compartmentalized, and predictable' (2000: 71). 
Knowledge thus becomes 'technical'; it is something 'to be mastered' (l\lcLaren, 2009: 72) 
and can easily be measured and quantified through tests and examinations (l\1cLaren, 
2009: 64).8 
As I suggested above, this understanding of knowledge has two effects that I want to 
consider here. The first of these is that education becomes a form of state utopianism, 
oriented to the uncritical reproduction of the status quo, and incapable of producing the 
new. Students '''receive'' the world as passive entitites [and so] education should make 
8 'Yhilst contemporary developments such as 'flexible learning', 'problem based learning' and e-Iearning 
(particularly prevalent in higher education) are claimed to allow students a greater role in the construction 
of knowledge (Allen and van der Velden, 2007; Brown et al., 2008), the reality is that these often 
reproduce students as individual subjects, designed to compete with each other in the labour market upon 
leaving education. Meanwhile, the claim that students can direct their own learning under these regimes is 
thrown into question by the fact that higher education automatically excludes particular forms of 
knowledge through, for example, high fees (which allows only students from particular social backgrounds 
access in the first place) and the 'qualitative' analysis of research (which makes 'other' knowledges 
increasingly scarce in academia). Furthemore, as both Brown et al. and Allen and van der Velden make 
clear, demands for this increasing 'flexibility' of knowledge in education are driven by contemporary 
industrial forms - what I would understand as 'postfordism' (see Rikowski, 2008 for a brief reflection on 
postfordism's influence on English schooling), or what Brown et al. understand as 'the knowledge 
economy'. It is also important not to overstate the levels of transformation to 'postfordist' forms of 
organisation within contemporary education: a number of pro-business commentators have argued that 
schools' focus on traditional forms of knowledge, hierarchy and centralisation leave students ill-equipped 
for the challenges of the contemporary economic landscape (see Zhao, 2009; Gilbert, 2005). 
Despite my cynicism about such forms of education, Hardt and Negri's claim that postfordist organisation 
brings about the 'communism of capital' (2000: 157-180); and Virno's arguments that the increased 
emphasis placed on creativity and group-work in contemporary forms of workplace organisation (2004; 
and with Pinzin, 2010) are potentially applicable here, and would suggest a nomadic (communist) surplus 
lurking in contemporary forms of state education. This, I suggest, would be a productive area for further 
study. 
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them mort" passive still, and adapt them to the world' (Freire, 2000: 76). 9 The second effect 
is that schools and classrooms (the places in which education takes place) function as state 
utopias (which in itself constitutes a form of socialisation into the status quo). 
EdueaaoD aad State UtopiaaisD1 
The manner in which the epistemology described above reproduces the status quo can be 
evidenced in the practice of music king. In his essay 'Free Jazz in the Classroom', David 
Borgo notes that musical educators frequently view musical knowledge (of the kind that 
shapes and supposedly develops a musician's playing) as a 'stored artefact' (2007: 61-62). A 
heavy emphasis is placed on 'the absorption and imitation of pre-existing language and 
style' (2007: 65), with a particular focus placed on scales, modes and techniques used by 
'past masters' (2007: 66). This means that students frequently fall back on generic tropes 
and pre-established norms (reproducing a lack) when they music (Borgo focuses In 
particular on improvisation, but this can be extended to the performance of 
predetermined works or the practice of predetermined composition), meaning that the 
musicking becomes more concrete than it might otherwise be (Prouty, 2008: 1).10 
The particular knowledges privileged thus limit the world of the possible - they constitute 
a form of power-o\'er which limits the power-to of the learner to create the new in a 
nomadic manner. Foucault (1980) refers to this as an operation of power-knowledge, 
which Spivak builds on in noting that 'if the lines of making sense of something are laid 
down in a certain way, then you are able to do only those things with that something that 
are possible within and by the arrangement of those lines' (1996: 151). What this means is 
9 As 8owl1'5 and Gintis (20 II: 131) point out, this socialises students into the alienated labour central to 
capitalism. 
10 Thl' pianist Cecil Taylor expressed his frustrations at this process in response to a question about the 
inl'xperil'nced nature of his band: for him, '[t]he inexperience of some of the players is a virtue rather 
than a drawback. There an: fewer things to unlearn. My approach to the members of the band - which is 
similar to th(' kind of approach I use in the class that I teach- 'Black Music from 1920 to the Present' -
constitut('S a fundam('ntal attack against the whole structure of the way music is given to people and also 
against how our parents taught us and what they thought was necessary 'and important to teach us. All of 
us intuitivdy knew the things young people know today, but we could not implement our intuitions 
ix-caUSl' of the way we were taught. This is why people drop out of school. I don't tell people in the band 
how to play. I just tdl them: 'Play.' Then, by doing it, they begin to see how to play (Levin, 2010: online at 
http://allaboutjau.com). 
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that the power inherent to knowledge lies in the fact that what you can do with it lies not 
just in what you know but how you came to know it. Here, 'knowledge' is that 'something', 
and by positing it as a lack, educators are able to suppress difference, as I will now aim to 
show. I I 
Whilst musIc students being taught to repeat the techniques of John Coltrane might 
prevent them from discovering new ways of playing, it is not - in the grand scheme of 
things - a particularly politically troubling operation of power. Yet the seriousness of the 
issue at hand is apparent in the way that curricula impose a standard form of knowledge 
as 'correct' - and, to the extent that they are not open to questioning or revision, 'perfect'. 
These standard forms of knowledge are, invariably, those that support the dominant 
'regime of truth' (Foucault, 2000: 131). Alternative forms of knowledge are considered -
simply - to be imperfect, and therefore wrong. This is not to say that the knowledges 
taught are necessarily wrong, but rather that a limited worldview is taught and -
furthemore, echoing Spivak's point - the economic, cultural and social origins and 
consequences of the knowledge taught - and the roles that cultural and economic power 
have played in the privileging of certain truths over others - are not discussed (Aronowitz, 
2004: 20; Cherryholmes, 1987; Freire, 2001: 148; McLaren, 2009: 73; Andreotti, 2006; 
DeLeon and Love, 2009).12 This results in certain knowledges and critical perspectives 
being excluded from the curriculum, including those of students of colour (hooks, 1994; 
Sibley, 1995: 119-137; Graham, 2001; Hong, 2008; Palermo, 1996; Darder and Torres, 
2004; Atkinson, 2011: 1-2); indigenous and Aboriginal knowledges (Toews and Harris-
. Martin, 2007; Williams, 2009; Grande, 2008); poor and working class histories and 
experiences (Tiny/Gray-Garcia, 2006; hooks, 1994); feminist epistemologies and women's 
experiences (Weiler, 1991; Thompson and Gitlin, hooks, 1994; 1995; Haraway, 1988); 
11 Following Foucault (2000), it must be acknowledged that the curriculum is not the ultimate source of these 
forms of power-knowledge: they arc dispersed throughout society and history without an obvious point of 
origin: the curriculum designers themselves are thus subject to power-knowledge, even as they reproduce 
it. 
12 Critiquing this does not necessarily lead to relativism and the claim that there are no 'objective truths' (as I 
hope wilI become apparent). Rather, it means reRecting on how and why truths are produced, which 
truths are privileged and how some 'truths' may in fact be contestable. 
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queer t'xpistemologies and experiences (Tierney and Dilley, 1998); disabled epistemologies 
and experiences (Erevelles, 2000). The curriculum thus serves to eliminate difference from 
tht' classroom and limits education to an exploration of knowledge that reinforces the 
status quo (Atkinson, 2002: 105), 'perpetuating and reinforcing' the homogeneity that state 
utopianism demands 'by fixing the child' (Durkheim, 1956: 70) (or, indeed, adult). It also 
plays into statism's mind-body dualism, with education focussed almost exclusively on 
'rational' knowledge - to the exclusion of that which is affective or embodied (Motta, 
20l2a). 
The effects of this process are amplified as curriculum design becomes increasingly 
centralist'd at a state or governmental level (McNeil, 2000).13 This process is further 
reinforced in compulsory schooling by the use of standardised tests - often created in 
collaboration with 'business leaders' - which further reduce the critical exploration of 
knowledge (Darder and Torres, 2004: 82), and 'reduce ... the quality and quantity of what 
is taught and learned in schools' (McNeil, 2000: 3, emphasis removed). Whilst curricula 
may encourage students to collectively explore (and occasionally construct) different forms 
of knowlrdge; and teachers and students may well (and indeed frequently do) deviate 
from forms of knowledge laid down by the curriculum and/or interrogate why these 
forms of knowledge are considered essential, the standardised test itself makes genuinely 
critical exploration impossible on a large scale as teachers and schools themselves are 
mt'asured, managed and disciplined according to the results their students achieve (Bates, 
1985; Jones. 1990; Levidow, 2002; de Angelis and Harvie, 2009); a process, which -
especially wht'n combined with procedures such as student evaluation of teaching forms -
13 This is. of course, a simplification. Yel often, where different approaches to life are laught, they are 
labdled as 'different' (meaning 'different-from' the dominant identity), and taught in an assimilationist 
manner that does nol allow them to become on their terms, but seeks to incorporate them into the 
dominant identity (Andreotti, 2006b). In higher education, not all academic subjects subscribe fully to this 
,;ew of knowledgt'. of course, but those that promote critical interrogations of the status quo (or provide 
the skills and tools for students to do so) are often subject to ridicule and are considered less 'worthy' than 
'traditional' subjects (\oung, 2011) - not least by 'top' universities, which - in the UK - are less likely to 
admit students ",;th A Levds in subjects such as Media Studies, (Shepherd, 2011). Across the globe, 
departments that e n c o u r ~ ~ critical engagt'ment with the status quo, meanwhile, are struggling to remain 
open in an increasingly business-oriented academic environment (see universityincrisis.wordpress.com for 
a regularly updated account of neoliberal attacks on the university, or Levidow, 2002 for an academic 
account of thC' impacts of neoliberalism on the university). 
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not only discourages teachers from experimenting with different forms of education, but 
is deeply affective. Sara Motta makes this clear when she draws on Darder to state that 
the 'process contributes to disabling the hearts, minds and bodies of our students and 
ourselves.' (20 12a: 5) Thus, the standardised test has a great power, and recalls Foucault's 
claims that examinations (in the broad sense that might include - but is not limited to -
the educational exam) establish: 
a normalizing gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible to qualify, to classify and 
to punish. It establishes over individuals a visibility through which one 
differentiates them and judges them. That is why, in all the mechanisms of 
discipline, the examination is highly ritualized. In it are combined the ceremony 
of power and the form of the experiment, the deployment of force and the 
establishment of truth. At the heart of the procedures of discipline, it manifests 
the subjection of those who are perceived as objects and the objectification of 
those who are subjected (1979: 184-185). 
What Foucault is saying here is that the examination makes difference visible, but only in 
the sense of difference-from: the student who fails the exam has displayed a knowledge 
'different from' the 'perfect' form privileged in the exam itself (or is lacking that 
knowledge), and so identity is posited as ontologically prior to difference. Those who are 
not able to meet expected standards are likely to internalise this - seeing a poor exam 
result as their failing - rather than critically considering the system (Sekula, 1984: 226); 
and/ or display uncritical forms of (ultimately impotent) rebellious behaviour (Aronowitz, 
2004: 20). It also functions to construct the learner as an individual rather than a dividual 
subject - someone entirely responsible for their success or failure. 14 
The crippling effects of standardised tests on students' ability to create new ways of living 
is evident in the words of Francis Gilbert, a secondary school teacher of twenty years who 
works in a London secondary school, and stated that British National Curriculum 
Assessments (colloquially known as SATS): 
have made children better at passing abtruse exams, but in doing so have 
bludgeoned out all enthusiasm for learning, leaving them lacking in initiative, 
floundering when confronted with unexpected challenges, unable to construct 
14 Foucault's work on the way that liberalism constructs subjects is of relevance here (sec Ren, 2005 for an 
overview). 
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sustained arguments and powerless to think imaginatively.' (quoted in Cowden, 
2010: 25)1; 
In my own expenence teaching in secondary school, meanwhile, I have found that 
students ft'lt any It's sons that were not geared to the acquisition of knowledge they could 
use in t'xams were a waste of time. 
It is not only quantifiable knowledge that is taught in state utopian education, however. As 
in Brm.'( .. \tW "arid, there is also a focus on orienting students to a moral vision of the good 
that reinforct's tht' status quo. This is done through promotion of the individualist 
attributes thought to be necessary to succeed in the contemporary world (and the 
simultaneous failure to enhance attributes that might be utilised to go beyond it); and by 
'normalising' authoritarian power relations (Giroux and Purpel, 1983; Bowles and Gintis, 
2011: 131-132). This is largely fulfilled through what Giroux and Purpel (among others) 
refer to as 'the hidden curriculum'; a term which covers 'the tacit ways in which 
knowlt'dge and behavior get constructed' beyond the explicit content of a curriculum that 
is examined (McLaren, 2009: 7), and might include the values stressed by teachers in 
lessons and assemblies; classroom design and school architecture; systems of punishment; 
uniform codes; or the use of senior students as prefects. 'Good' students are not only those 
who do well in exams, but those who embody these attributes, meaning that such an 
education is oriented to a moral vision of the good that reproduces the dominant reality. 
\Vhen practiced in the manner described here, then, it is clear that education functions as 
a form of conservative state utopianism that is aimed at reinforcing and reproducing the 
status quo through the exclusion of forms of knowledge that may challenge it, by failing 
to critically interrogate the knowledge taught, and by socialising students to accept 
authoritarian power relations. It is an anti-vitalist philosophy governed by a moral good, 
I!) It is imponant 10 1101(' that schools, teachers and local government institutions are also subject to these 
procnst'S: th('y cannot risk allowing 'different' teaching methods out of fear that their students will be 
found 1acking'. The 'good' student is therefore one who can internalise that which they were previously 
lacking and the 'good' teacher is one who can successfully enable students to acquire that which they were 
lacking 
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which Freire - drawing on Erich Fromm - referred to as 'necrophily' (2000: 77). 
The ClassrooIn as State Utopia 
vVhen education functions as a form of state utopianism, the 'education system' operates 
as a state utopia: a hierarchical set of relations governed by a moral good that allows for 
(and indeed demands) 'progress' (in the form of ever-increasing exam results, or new 
teaching methods), but not for any change that may challenge the way in which it 
operates. At all levels, from the government down to the classroom, techniques of micro-
management are utilised, serving to limit the capacities of students and teachers to decide 
on the content and method of their teaching, thus limiting 'possibilities of action and 
meaning' in education (Ball, 1990: 197). Focussing on the school itself, M.D. Shipman 
notes that they as hierarchical spaces 'arrangt'd so that childrt'n feci the authority of staff 
as experts and models'. This authority 'comt's down from the ht'adtt'acher through the 
hierarchy of the staff, and is [also] delegated to selectt'd children' (Shipman, 1968: 159-
160). Here, I want to narrow the focus of this opt'ration of hierarchical power further, 
moving the focus to how the classroom is produced as a state utopia. I do this as the 
classroom function as the primary space in which students engage with teachers, and so 
their make-up has a profound influence on how education operates politically. It should be 
clear that I am absolutely not attacking teacht'rs here: as I have noted (and repeat below), 
they are themselves caught in hierarchical power rdations and have little agency to 
explore alternative forms of education. It is testament to their skill that many of them do 
nonetheless, and I can state with no uncertainty that were it not filr the skill of many of 
my teachers - from the start of compulsory schooling at the age of 4 to my studies at 
university - that I would not be writing this thesis. 
Recalling Dewey's claim that schools constitute 'miniature communities', my claim here is 
that the classroom functions as a state utopia. It is gowrned by hylomorphic principles, 
which state that without expert guidance (from the teaciwr) to give them the knowledge 
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that tht"y lack, students will produce only chaos (bad behaviour) and inertia (they will 
acquire no knowledge). Students thus constitute a tabula rasa ready to receive knowledge 
from an t'xternal, t'xpert source (Sarda, 2007: 227) - "'containers" or "receptacles" to be 
filled by thf' tf'acher' who, 'the more completely he [sic] fills the receptacles, the better a 
teacher hf' is', whilst, '[t]he more meekly the receptacles permit themselves to be filled, the 
better students they are' (Freire, 2000: 72). This hylomorphism is evident in the claim of 
the public school administrator (and theorist of education) Elwood Cubberley, who stated 
that that schools 'are, in a sense, factories, in which the raw materials are to be shaped and 
fashioned into products to meet the various demands of life' (quoted in Bowles and Gitlis, 
20 II: 199). Paulo Freire's description of the classroom displays this hylomorphism. For 
him, it is a placf' in which: 
(a) the teacher teaches and the students are taught; 
(b) the teacher knows everything and the students know nothing; 
(c) the tf'acher thinks and the students are thought about 
(d) thf' tf'achf'r talks and the students listen- meekly; 
(e) the teacher disciplines and the students are disciplined 
(0 thf' teacher chooses and enforces his choice, and the students comply; 
(g) the tf'acher acts and the students have the illusion of acting through the 
action of the teacher; 
(h) tht" teacher chooses the program content, and the students (who were not 
consu\tf'd) adapt to it; 
(i) the teacher confuses the authority of knowledge with his or her own 
professional authority, which she and he sets in opposition to the freedom of 
the students; 
(j) the teacher is the Subject of the learning process, while the pupils are mere 
objf'cts. ( 2000: 73)lti 
In such a hif'rarchically ordered environment, students work because they feel compelled 
16 This analysis is. of course, over-simplified and ignores the fact that the teacher in a state utopian system 
of c.-ducation ",;11 herself be subject to a hierarchical power structure. As I noted above, curricula and 
syllabi S("t Ollt what can and cannot be taught and so dictate what knowledge is to be valued (though in 
som(' C'ducational establishments the teacher will be involved in their creation), and formal and informal 
pOWt"f stru('tllrt"S inside educational establishments dictate that teachers must present an image of being 
tough on misbeha\;our and noncompliance from students: from my own experience of working in a 
compn-h('nsi\'t, S("condary school 1 am a11-too-aware of the alienation which teachers deemed insufficiently 
strict can fan' from thdr colleagues, and the actions their superiors may take against them. William T. 
Armalin(' adcnowlC'dgt"s thrse points, writing that both students and teachers 'must sacrifice their free will 
and unconstrainc.-d creative capacities to meet the goals and address the questions determined by 
authority' l2009: 138). To this I would add that I have had a number of empowering educational 
('xp<'ri('nc('S facilitatC'd by teachers who have encouraged their students to work together to create new 
ways of und('f5tanding. 
It can also be difficult fOf tc.-achers to introduce other forms of education into the classroom as students 
arc.- so used to the state utopian form of education. From my own experience teaching in both secondary 
and hig/lt"r rouc3tion, 1 am aware that attempting to utilise other forms of teaching often does lead to 
chaos and or inertia in the sense 1 have suggested here. 
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to: they fear punishment if they do not follow the t e a c ~ e r ' s s instructions and are socialised 
to believe that this form of education is good for them. As the photographer Allan Sekula 
put it in relation to his arts education, the student is constructed as 'subordinate, 
dependent [and] incomplete without the master's discipline and support' (1984: 116). This 
means that students rarely have an internal, immanent desire to learn (or at least, to learn 
what they are taught in the classroom) - they do so out of necessity and a reluctant 
acceptance that they are lacking that which they require to 'get on in the world'. Thus, 
they 'give themselves over to the hierarchy of meritocratic schooling - working only for 
the sake of meeting the requirements of an authority figure, grade, credential set 
standard, and so forth' (Armaline, 2009: 138).17 
The classroom is also created as a space in which the individual is considered to be 
subordinate to the collective: whilst a hierarchical system of setting (sometimes called 
streaming) may be used to differentiate between students of different 'abilities', within the 
classroom it is common for all students to be taught the same topic in the same manner, 
regardless of their interest in or ability to cope with the subject: the individual must learn 
to adapt or they will fail. And with the student held responsible for their failure or success 
in exams, they are constructed as an individual rather than a dividual - despite the clear 
influence that teachers and peers will have had on their performance. 18 
The classroom, then, functions largely as a state utopia: it is hierarchical and closed to 
change, with students constructed as individuals entirely responsible for their own 
education. "Vhat is particularly important to stress here, however, is that it is a state utopia 
17 Nomadic becomings are often formed even within such a system of education, however. Chris Carlsson 
makes clear the pitfalls of failing to acknowledge the possibilities inherent in today's flawed education 
system, noting that '[i]t is easy to criticize schools as institutions of social control which create unthinking 
zombies that will become the pliable workers and consumers of the future. But most of us who might 
make such a glib critique are living examples of the porous nature of schooling's social control agenda. 
For instance, almost everything of value I learned in school resulted from social interactions and 
experiences that took place in spite of the twisted logic of the school system' (1993: 46). 
18 This is not, of course, absolute, and group-work is still relatively common in schools - particularly during 
primary education the prevalence of group work - particularly in primary education - may well constitute 
an important counter-point to the prevailing individualism (Galton and Williamson, (992). 
200 
with a utopian fonction: it socialises students and teachers alike to believe that its particular 
form or organisation is the only possible form of organisation, thus limiting the possibility 
of experiments with nomadic forms of organisation (cf. Bowles and Gitlis, 2011: 131): not 
so much an 't'ducation of desire' as a 'repression of desire'. It is a totalising form to which 
common st'nst' would tt'l1 us 'there is no alternative'. In this sense, it forms an important 
part or the hiddt'n curriculum, which we would do well to make visible and challenge at 
every available opportunity. 
Nomadic utopianism and education 
Challenges to statist t'ducation are present in a variety of sociopolitical contexts. Here, I 
want to suggt'st what a nomadic utopian education might look like; how it would produce 
schools and classrooms as nomadic utopias; and how it might avoid tyrannies of habit and 
perpetuating statist power formations from outside the 'autonomist' space in which it 
operates. In so doing, I draw on a number of traditions - including the constructivist 
learning theory or George E. Hein; anarchist and autonomist free schools; critical 
pedagogy; feminist, queer, border and antiracist pedagogies; popular education; the 
'Opt'n Spact's for Dialogue and Enquiry' (OSDE) project; andJohn Dewey's progressive 
education· as well as critical debates within these approaches. There are a number of 
difTerenct's betwt"en these approaches, and all have grown out of specific socioeconomic 
contexts, which - were they to be considered in isolation and in greater depth - would 
nf't"d to be considered. Some of them - such as OSDE - are designed to function in 
'mainstream' schools (Andreotti, 2006a; 2006b)'9; others will operate in informal schools, 
and some may be adaptable for both. Many of them also have a mixture of state utopian 
and nomadic utopian features. Here, however, my intention is to draw methods and 
epistemologies from each of these approaches in order that the beginnings of a praxis of 
19 Th(' OSDE m('lhodoiogy was d ( ' \ ~ l o p c d d for use in the UK National Curriculum's citizenship lessons for 
11·16 yt'af olds (though it can also be utilised in other settings), and draws on critical pedagogy and 
popular ('ducal ion, posulructuralism and post-colonial theory (Andreotti, 2006a; 
osd('m('thodologrorg uk 1. 
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nomadic utopian education can be presented. "'hilst I consider debates between these 
approaches, this is done with the intention of extracting the most 'nomadic' features of 
each, which is to say that - for the most part - I focus on what is nomadic about these 
forms of education rather than what is not. 20 My reading of the thinkers utilised here is 
thus selective. 
This section should not, however, be seen as providing a 'blueprint' for nomadic utopian 
education: even notwithstanding nomadic utopianism's aversion to the blueprint, the 
contingent particularities of each situation where a nomadic utopian education might be 
called for must be given attention before any action is taken. As with improvisation, then, 
nomadic utopian education is a delicate, contingent and always-contestable task - indeed, 
given the importance of the task at hand, this is perhaps even more the case than in 
improvisation. This is clear in the words of Myles Horton - founder of the Highlander 
Folk School - who, in conversation with Paulo Freire, stressed that 
my ideas have changed and are constantly changing and should change and that 
I'm as proud of my inconsistencies as I am my consistencies. So I'd just like to shy 
away from the idea that somehow I've had these ideas and they've had such and 
such an effect. (in Freire and Horton, 1990: 9-10) 
For the nomadic utopian who seeks to work immanently with matter (rather than work 
'on' it from a transcendent position), inconsistent problems require inconsistent methods. 
The epistemology of nomadic education: education as a political act and 
knowledge in construction 
In the previous chapter, I noted that a number of improvising musicians saw their practice 
as political. The link between the forms of education I am engaging with here and politics 
is far more explicit: those whose views I will utilise here invariably see education as a 
necessarily political act. Ira Shor makes this clear in his essay 'Education is Political', in 
which he states that '[e]ducation is politics because it is one place where individuals and 
20 In this sense, I am following the approach taken by the editors of Utopian Pedagogy when they say that one 
of the purposes of the book (an edited collection of essays) is to trace 'affinities across disparate traditions 
[of radical education], (Cott\ Day et aI, 2007: 6). 
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society an' constructed. Because human beings and their society are developed in one 
direction or another through education, the learning process cannot avoid being political' 
(1993: 27). Thf' prt'tf'nce of neutrality underpinning liberalism's statist education is thus 
rejectf'd. as ~ f y l t " s s Horton makes clear when he states that: 
acadt"micians, politicians. All the people that are supposed to be guiding this 
country say you\'f' got to be neutral. As soon as I started looking at that word 
neutral and what it meant, it became very obvious to me there can be no such 
thing as neutrality. It's a code word for the existing system. It has nothing to 
do \\;th anything but agreeing to what is and will always be-that's what 
nC'lItrality is. Neutrality is just following the crowd. Neutrality is just being 
what thf' system asks us to be. Neutrality, in other words, was an immoral act. I 
was thinking in rt>ligious terms then. It was to me a refusal to oppose injustice or 
to takf' sidf's that are unpopular. It's an excuse, in other words. So I discarded the 
word nt'lltrality bt>fore I even started thinking much about educational ideas. Of 
coursf', when I got more into thinking about educational ideas and about changed 
socif'ty, it became more and more obvious that you've got to take sides. You need 
to know why you take sides; you should be able to justify it (in Horton and Freire, 
1990: 122) 
This discarding of nf'utrality does not, however, mean that the educator should seek to 
impose thf'ir own \;e'Ws on students (even if those views seek to go beyond the present) -
rathf'r, it means acknowleding that all knowledge will be constructed through particular 
framf'\mrks, and should be open to challenge. 
"or thf' nomadic educator, then, knowledge is 'fluid, unpredictable, and wonderfully alive' 
(Armaline. 2007: 144). It is not something 'out there' to be discovered, but to be 
COUf'ctiVf'ly constructt"d by students, an understanding that echoes Deleuze's view of truth 
as something that 'has to be created' rather than discovered (1995: 126). Such a view is 
f'videnced in a number of diverse approaches to education (and educational theory), 
many of which haw been set up to explicitly challenge statist forms. In the early twentieth 
cf'ntury John Df'we)" (1959) developed his concept of 'progressive education', which 
f'xplicitly n-jected the idf'a that knowledge existed beyond that constructed by 'active 
learnf'rs' who engagt'd in social interaction with peers and educators and - wherever 
possible' with thf' matt"rial they were learning about, whilst Neil Postman and Charles 
WC'ingartnt'r (1971) sef' education as a form of 'meaning making'. For the constructivist 
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educator George E. Hein, meanwhile, 'we cannot divorce our learning from our lives'. For 
him, education is based around the idea that 'learners construct knowledge for themselves 
- each learner individually (and socially) constructs meaning - as he or she learns' (20 II: 
44). 
Aihwa Ong, meanwhile, emphasises that 'theories of human emancipation, particularly 
emancipation of the oppressed, must see every human being as a knowledge producer' 
(42), and Sunil Sahasrabudhey draws a link between such an approach and 'ordinary life', 
stating that is a: 
vast bed where knowledge is produced hourly, daily. Ordinary life is the life 
without condition. It presupposes no technology, no religion, no state, no 
university. People constantly produce new knowledge based on their genius, 
experiences and the needs of everyday life. There has perhaps never been a 
greater source of knowledge than ordinary life.' (2009: 43) 
None of this, however, means that expert knowledgcs (in empirical, critical, theoretical, 
practical, etc. srnse) should be entirely shunned. Indeed, they may be called upon when 
the group finds that knowledge (in any of those senses mentioned previously) may help 
them go beyond what they already know (Kane, 20 I 0). In this, nomadic education reflects 
Bakunin's discussion of the authority of the expert in God and the Siale: 
Does it follow that I reject all authority? Far from me such a thought. In the 
matter of boots, I refer to the authority of the bootmaker; concerning houses, 
canals, or railroads, I consult that of the architect or the engineer. HJr such or 
such special knowledge I apply to such or such a savant. But I allow neither 
the bootmaker nor the architect nor the savant to impose his authority upon 
me. I listen to them freely and with all the respect merited by their 
intelligence, their character, their knowledge, reserving always my 
incontestable right of criticism and censure. (no date: 33) 
These challenges may claim that what has been established as true is not so, or they may 
question why certain truths are privileged over other truths: in encouraging them, 
nomadic education is not simply calling for a relativist approach to education (Andreotti, 
2006a), but it is acknowledging that education is always a political process marked by 
operations of power in all its forms. 
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EducatioD .. Nomadic Utopiaaism 
As \\;th imprm;sation, utopia(nism) is a concept less openly embraced by the theorists of 
education I draw on here. It is, however, used by many in manners that resonate with -
even if th«1' art" not identical to - nomadic utopianism. William B. Stanley (1992) and 
Henry Giroux (2003) talk of the potential for education to function as a form of 
utopianism that may help the world become otherwise; the latter explicitly drawing on 
Ernst Bloch to argut" for a utopianism that begins in the 'here and now' rather than in the 
dsewhert" and/or dsewhen (2003: 99-100). Meanwhile, in an essay entitled 'What is 
Utopian Pt-dagogy?', which serves as the introduction to their edited collection Utopian 
Pedagog); Mark Cote, Richard J.F. Day and Greig de Peuter develop a concept of 
'immant"nt utopia' that informs the essays in the collection. There, they state that 
we looked to utopia not as a place we might reach but as an ongoing process 
of Iwcoming. More specifically, the utopia that runs through this collection is 
both a critical attitude towards the present and a political commitment to 
t"xperimt"nt in transfiguring the coordinates of our historical moment. (Cote, et 
aI.,2007a: IS) 
This utopia consists of a: 
utopian impulse that. .. does not lead to a promised land. It knows that 
domination and exploitation can only be minimized, never eliminated; that 
strugglt" will persist; and that something like a state, like a corporation, like 
asymmt"trical power relations in any form, will forever be trying to emerge from 
within and \\;thout our communities and will therefore need to be warded off ... 
utopian t'xperiments today share a point of departure much more than a point of 
arrival. (2007 a: 16) 
This rt'sonatt's \\;th the understanding of utopia as process, and is echoed in Paulo Freire's 
own sophisticated conct"ption of utopia which, for Giroux and McLaren, constitutes a 
'crucial )'t"t g<"nt"rally overlooked' (1997: 138) feature of his work. In Pedagogy of Hope, he 
writes that: 
tht'rt" is no autht"ntic utopia apart from the tension between the denunciation 
of a prt"sent becoming more and more intolerable and the "annunciation", 
announct"mt"nt, of a future to be created, built - politically, esthetically, and 
ethie-ally by us women and men. Utopia implies this denunciation and 
pnx-Iamation, but it does not permit the tension between the two to die away 
with the production of the future previously announced. Now the erstwhile 
futun- is a new prt"sent, and a new dream experience is forged. History does 
nut Iwcom(" immobilized, does not die. On the contrary, it goes on (2004: 77). 
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In this, Freire neatly captures the tensions inherent to the nomadic utopia, and implicitly 
covers both the 'good' and the 'no' in utopia'S etymology. It is not clear, however what role 
there is for place in this definition - as Giroux and ~ I c L a r e n n note - it resembles Bloch's 
temporal approach to utopia (1997: 138). Freire's concept of utopia is further developed 
in another lengthy treatment of the concept in Politics cif Education, where, he talks of a 
'revolutionary utopia' - although again, it is not clear what the role of place is. The 
revolutionary utopia, he notes: 
[t]ends to be dynamic rather than static; tends to life rather than death; to the 
future as a challenge to man's creativity rather than as a repetition of the present; 
to love as liberation of subjects rather than as pathological possessiveness; to the 
emotion of life rather than cold abstraction; to living in harmony rather than 
gregariousness; to dialogue rather than mutism; to praxis rather than "law and 
order"; to men [sic] who organize themselves reflectively for action rather than 
men who are organized for passivity; to creative and communicative language 
rather than prescriptive signals; to reflective challenges rather than domesticating 
slogans; and to values that are lived rather than myths that are imposed (1985: 81-
82). 
This understanding IS shared by Joel Linares - a community popular educator in 
Venezuela, who argued that 'utopia is a constant process' in a talk at the University of 
Nottingham (2010). 
Given the overlooking of place in these definitions of utopia, I would argue (in keeping 
with the similarities with Bloch) that what they are actually dealing with is utopianism: a 
force that seeks to recreate the world as a better place. (Freire's similarities with Bloch do 
not end here, either: he shared Bloch's belief that education had to work towards a lack 
situated in the future. He argued that 'hope, detached from the future, becomes only an 
alienated and alienating abstraction. Instead of stimulating the pilgrim, it invites him to 
stand still' [1985: 121], and also shared Bloch's belief that this future must be the classless 
society of communism.) Yet there is undoubtedly something nomadic in this utopianism, 
. as there is in Cote et al.'s. As will become apparent, they - and many other educators and 
theorists of education - err towards understanding education as a collective force that 
brings the new into being through non-hierarchically organised difference. As Nirmal 
206 
Puwar and Sanjay Sharma state, education should be about 'what knowledge can 
do ... mobilizing unruly connections and ways of becoming' (2009: 46). 
What, tht"n. is needed in order for education to function as a form of nomadic 
utopianism? It is not enough simply to propose that the new is created through a 
dialogical bringing together of different knowledges - such an approach, if not deepened, 
runs tht' risk of equating 'difference' with the individual. Rather, nomadic utopian 
education must proceed from a rejection of the liberal, self-identical subject and 
acknowlt"dgt" two points: firstly that the individual is better thought of as a 'dividual' who 
is madt" and ft"made through interaction with others; and secondly that the individual is in 
fact a di,;dual ht"rself constituted by difference. Thus, the process of education remakes 
dividual It"arnt"rs as they proceed: knowledge is also something embodied which affects the 
knowt"r (Motta, 2012a). 
Tht" first of lht"st" two points is acknowledged in the traditions of popular education 
utilised by social movements, autonomists and activists across the globe (de Carvahlo, 
20 I 0; Motta, 2009) and in the work of the Soviet educational psychologist Lev Vygotsky, 
whose Mind in &.Ury (1978) stresses how learners develop not only knowledge but their 
sense of self communally. The sense of how a nomadic understanding of knowledge 
changes the It''arnt''r is also evident in the reflections of Meysalun, a student on the MA 
modult" 'Lo('a! Power in an Era of Globalisation', which I taught at the University of 
Nottingham with my coUeague Sara Motta, utilising a pedagogy devised from critical 
pedagogy, ft"minist though, border pedagogy and the approach of poststructuralist 
thinkt'1'S (including Ddt"uze and Guattari). On the module's feedback form, she wrote 
that: 
It IS Important to locate ourselves, find ourselves in what we are learning, 
olht"rwist", why are we learning it? .. .1 think that the way in which this module 
on local politics in an era of globalisation was given, made possible to answer 
somt" of tht"se questions, and made possible the location of myself, my. reality, 
thr I'l'ality around, as a subject and object of knowledge, that is not fixed, but 
207 
alive, changing, creating and reshaping itself and other knowledge, not as 
ends by themselves, but as means and tools of thinking, crrating, being, evolving, 
living. (quoted in Motta, 2012a: 15) 
Here, the dividual subject as well as knowledge is posited as existing In a state of 
becoming, and it is partly in this that nomadic education brgins to move away from 
functioning in the manner of a cosy liberal-humanism that Ben '\'atson rails against in 
improvisation. Megan Boler and Michalinos Zembylas stress the emotional dangers of 
that engaging with difference can bring, and argue for a 'pedagogy of discomfort' that will 
function: 
as an educational approach to understanding the production of norms and 
differences. As its name suggests, this pedagogy emphasizes the need for both 
the educator and students to move outside of their comfort zones. By comfort 
zone we mean the inscribed cultural and emotional terrains that we occupy 
less by choice and more by virtue of hegemony. (2003: 108?' 
The difference here is not the difference of the dominant 'philosophy that celebrates 
difference as neutral flavors of food', seeking only a 'benign multiculturalism [that] fails to 
address power' (Boler and Zembylas, 2003: 109); this is a form of education that seeks to 
disrupt tyrannies of habit wherever they are found. This is also clear in the words of the 
Indian edcuator Shveta Sarda, who makes clear (with reference to improvisation, and the 
statist hylomorph's fear of chaos) that nomadic education can be a decidedly 
uncomfortable task for both students and teachers alike: 
Knowledge is about the bold and simultaneous existence of a multiplicity of 
voices that fragment our conception of reality, decentre the very act of the 
production of knowledge, the translation of lifeworlds; this is where the edges of 
our worlds are in conversation with one another, not muted and silenced. The 
speech of millions is essential in this. What withholds and prevents speech is the 
fear of listening to too many voices, the fear of a resultant cacophony. But there is 
a richness in the multiplicity of a band when it plays myriad instruments, when 
there is improvisation, and more than one sound can be heard (2007: 231, cf. 
Motta, 2012a: 15-17). 
21 bell hooks also rails against too-comfortable education. Recalling her experience in Women's Studies 
classes at Stanford University, she writes that 'white professors talked about "women" when they were 
making the experience of materially privileged white women a norm. It was both a matter of personal 
and intellectual integrity for me to challenge this biased assumption. By challenging, I refused to be 
complicit in the erasure of black/and or working-class women of all ethnicities. Personally, that meant I 
was not able just to sit in class, grooving on the good feminist "ibes - that was a loss. The gain was that I 
was honoring the experience of poor and working-class women in my own family, in that very community 
had encouraged and supported me in my efforts to be better educated. Even though my intervention was 
not wholeheartedly welcomed, it created a context for critical thinking, for dialectical exchange' (1994: 
181). 
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Yet as E1izabt"th Ellsworth notes in her important essay 'Why Doesn't This Feel 
Empowering? Working Through the Repressive Myths of Critical Pedagogy', it is not 
enough to talk -- as Sarcla does - of 'the speech of millions'; we must also acknowledge 
that each indhidual will herself always already speak with a 'multiplicity of authentic 
voices' (199-1-: 305). If this is forgotten then 'radical' education runs the risk of being 
reliant upon statism's 'enforcement of rationalism as a self-evident political act against 
relations of domination' (Ellsworth, 1994: 305). Thus - addressing the second point raised 
above - nomadic l'ducation must proceed from nomadic 'subjects [who are] split between 
the conscious and unconscious and among multiple social positionings' (1994: 316). 
Drawing on Ddl'uze and Guattari and Trin T. Minh-ha, Sara Motta argues that students 
and teacilt'rs are 'alWi!1s multiple, intertwined and becoming and not singular, separate 
and fIxed' (20 12a: 5; cf. Semetsky, 2006: 13). 
\Vith neither knowledge nor learner a pre-given, then, nomadic education fulfils nomadic 
utopianism'S function of proceeding immanently. Education should thus be seen as a 
~ c o m i n g - o t h e r ' ; ; a force for constructing new knowledges and new affective relationships 
(Semetsky, 2005; 2006). In Pedagogy Against the State, Dennis Atkinson - a former art 
teacher in a UK secondary school - uses similarly Deleuzean language to call for a 
'Pl'dagogy against the state, or pedagogy of the not-known'. 'Immanent to such a 
pedagogy', he writes: 
is therefore a movement against itself. The ethical imperative for pedagogy 
tht'rt"rfore is concl'rned with maximizing the power of learning; it is not focused 
on uMJ l« art and should be, that is to say some transcendent position towards 
being, but upon the potentiality and "unknown" of becoming. An ethics of 
the unknown, an ethics of becoming (20 II: 12). 
When education functions in this way it is a movement seeking the creation of the new. 
Yet it dOt's so ",ithout reference to a predetermined ideal and through the interaction of 
difTt'rt"ncr-in-itsdf. l.earners are brought together as dividuals who are themselves 
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constituted by difference, and there is no opposition between the (in)dividual and the 
collective. Education is not just a way of fleeing from that which is unjust, but of making 
flight create: of remaking the world immanently. It is, in other words, a form of nomadic 
utopianism. I now want to turn to how such a form of education constructs the classroom 
as a nomadic utopia, and how this - in turn - performs a nomadic utopian function. 
Educational spaces as nODladic utopias 
Whilst nomadic education potentially plays a role in changing the world beyond the 
school and classroom, it also creates classrooms (and potentially schools) as nomadic 
utopias. Just as state utopianism's epistemology called a hit'rarchical space into being, 
nomadic utopianism's belief that knowledge is something constructed through the 
interaction of difference constructs the school and the classroom in a non-hierarchical 
manner, such that they function as prefigurative spaces open to becoming. This follows 
from and feeds back into nomadism's epistemological approach: in order for difference to 
be realised, social arrangements must be non-hierarchical, and non-hierarchical social 
arrangements create new forms of difference-in-itself through differentiation. There is, in 
other words, a reciprocal relationship between the nomadic utopia (the classroom) and 
nomadic utopianism (the education). The anarchist educator Alan Antliff quotes Hakim 
Bey to describe such spaces, arguing that they will 'realize (make real) the moments and 
spaces in which freedom is not only possible but actual (Antliff, 2007: 263). l\ly focus is in 
particular on the classroom: the immediate space in which education occurs, although I do 
touch on 'school' issues such as 'curriculum' design (which, in a nomadic institution may 
well be carried out within the classroom - at least in part). 
There can be no simple formula for creating such spaces, however: as with improvisation 
(and perhaps even more so here 22), there is not a single 'form' of nomadic utopia that can 
22 The key diffcrcnces between musical imprO\isation and the classroom is that the primary form of 
communication between dividuals in the lattcr is rcprescntational and conversational, whilst in the formcr 
it is non-reprcscntational and polyphonic, and so diffcrcnccs are discusscd in turn rather than playcd 
simultaneously. To utilise the Dclcuzean concept of specds and slownesses, this makes thc classroom a 
'slowcr spacc' than impro"isation: it is less prone to ecstatic, spontaneolls becomings and morc susceptible 
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be importt'd into different contexts as a 'once-and-for-all' solution, and even seemingly 
succt'ssful nomadic utopian spaces are always at danger of tyrannies of habit emerging 
and o s s i f ~ ; n g g into a statt' utopian form. It would thus be a mistake to take Myles Horton 
litt'rally whl"n hl" statt's that '[t]he thing to do was just find a place, move in and start, and 
let it grow.' (in th"ire and Horton, 1990: 53) Whilst such an approach mqy be possible in 
improvisation (though ('ven there careful reflection and contingent reassessment would be 
requifl"d), to do so in an educational setting would be to make the same mistake as the 
beaubourgians in The so-ca/ltd utopia of the centre beaubourg - it would construct the 
d a . ~ r o o m m only as a smooth space, not as a nomadic utopia, and would risk informal 
hierarrhit"S and silt'ncing students. 
It will com(' as no surprise, then, that I do not endorse a 'one-size-fits-all' blueprint for 
creating tht' classroom as a nomadic utopia, but rather stress certain tactical approaches 
that may be taken to overcome the problems associated with applying nomadic 
utopianism in a world ridden with statist identities, divisions and power relations: a 
cautious approach that 'says no' to simplistic claims on how to create a 'good place' for 
education. \'bilst this pragmatism is required in producing any form of nomadic utopia, 
it is perhaps particularly prevalent in education given the importance of the task at hand. 
As Sara Motta notes in relation to her experiences with the Nottingham Free School, 
those seeking to create educational spaces for nomadic utopianism and as nomadic 
u t o p i a . ~ ~ must be prepared (initially, at least) to work within constraints; contend with 
financial and t'motional problems; and change plans as they go (to improvise, in othe 
words!) (Motta, 20l2b: (46). It is also vital that such learning begins from where learners 
afl" . not all \\ill be ready to be plunged into the - at times highly disconcerting - world of 
to long. drawn-out arguments and conversations. In improvisation differences are expressed sonically: if 
onl" p1aYl"r disagrecs ",;th soml"thing another has done, or wishes to express an aspect of their difference, 
th'1' modi/)' thl"ir pla);ng accordingly, meaning that the space is modified immediately. In education this is 
not posaibll": in a constructi\"e com-ersation only one penon can speak at a time, and so difference takes 
moR' timc to Ix- introducl"d and is not immediately synthesised into a coherent whole. Self-order may be 
gt"nrratM. but it is a dra"'ll out process, and one that necessarily requires structure in order to remain 
opm. It is also imponant to note that there is likely to an (at least tacit) agreement that non-hierarchial 
organisation is prrfl"rabll" in impl'O\isation, but - as I make clear - this is often not the case in the 
dassmom. 
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nomadic utopian education. To paraphrase (and reject) Zamyatin (himself paraphrasing 
Nietzsche), the nomadic educator should not simply and suddenly kick away 'the crutches 
of certainty' (1991: Ill). 
The importance of improvisation in the process cannot be ignored, then - something 
acknowledged beautifully by the title of Freire and Horton's He Make the Road by mllking 
(1990).23 (I might paraphrase: 'we make the utopia by utopising'.) This walking cannot be 
a purely theoretical task, but must engage with the complexities of practice as well. It is a 
Deleuzean journey: one step for theory, one step for life. Kicking away crutches leaves 
people floundering lamely; teaching people to walk together enables them to embark on 
wonderful - and sometimes terrifying - journeys. 
To emphasise the importance of pragmatisim, then, is not to reduce the degree of 
nomadic utopianism possible; rather, it is to emphasise that the classroom - as with any 
nomadic utopia - must become through experimentation over time. It must constantly be 
made and remade by a nomadic utopianism that pays attention to circumstance. This is 
clear in Cote et al.'s description of some of the issues faced when establishing 'Critical U', 
a 'community education project' in Vancouver: 
\Ve strive to be participant-driven to the best of our abilities, but of course 
there are constraints. Typically, a group of organizers sketches in advance an 
overall course outline structured around a series of general workshop themes, 
with recruited volunteer professors, students, and community educators acting 
as facilitators for a specific evening. The general ethos is that the more specific 
course content is decided collectively by the participants who show up at the first 
meeting; in actual practice, it is a negotiated struggle between the needs and 
capacities of the organizers - what they are willing and able to teach - and the 
needs and interests of the participants. As such, we never know what to expect, 
and the resultant affinity or antagonism of the negotiation depends on each 
course's unique composition ... 
The initial meeting of our first course was exemplary of the dynamics of Critical 
U: because of unexpectedly large numbers, we had been moved from a smaller 
room at the community centre to a large auditorium, in which the "instructors" 
dutifully arrayed themselves at the front, and the "students" took up positions in 
rows of seats facing us. We apologized for the layout, which couldn't be changed 
because the chairs were literally bolted to the floor. Several participants wanted 
23 The title comes from Antonio Machado's poem 'We Make the Road'. 
212 
mort" than an apology, and suggested that we reassemble as a large circle on the 
floor of tht' stage. This was done, and throughout the evening, ideas went flying 
around the cirrlt', as the participants expanded on and delimited the suggested 
thf'nlt's. (2007b: 344-345) 
Had a snapshot of the social relations of that space been taken at certain points it may 
haw appt'ared as a statt' utopia; at others it may have appeared chaotically atopian - but 
takt'n owr time, the space can be read as a nomadic utopia. 
How, tht'n, dOt's tht' classroom or the school 'successfully' (re)produce itself as a nomadic 
utopia? Giwn nomadic utopian epistemology's belief that knowledge is something 
ronstructl'd roUl'cti\'dy, the starting point in creating a nomadic utopian education is to 
allow all It'arnt'rs and educators to operate together non-hierarchically to formulate a 
curriculum and dt'wlop a It'arning strategy appropriate to their mix of students and 
particular aims. This is dear in the 'identity statement' of the Anarchist Free School in 
Toronto, quott'd by AJan Antliff (who was involved in its founding and operation): 
Tht' Anarchist Free School is a volunteer-run, autonomous collective offering 
free courses, workshops, and lectures24 that cover a wide range of topics. 
Education is a political act. By deepening our knowledge of ourselves and the 
world around us, sharing skills, and exchanging experiences in an egalitarian, 
non-hil'rarrhical setting free of prejudice, we challenge dis-empowering habits 
and broadt'n our awareness of alternatives to the inequalities of capitalist 
socit'ty. 
Participation in the Free School is a commitment. The school's 'governing 
body' is a general meeting, open to all, which convenes once a month. At this 
mt't'ting problt'ms and proposals are brought to the attention of Free School 
participants, who arrive at solutions by consensus. 'Participants' are those 
attt'nding workshops/courses; facilitators of workshops/courses; working 
committt't' mt'mbers; and people who, having served as participants in the 
past, continut' to support our efforts in some capacity. 
Day-to-day logistics at the School are dealt with by working committees 
(answt"rablt' to the general meeting) which are self-organized and run by 
const'nsus. Working committees keep the School up and running by dealing 
\\;th finances, time and venue scheduling, publications, and other matters. 
2-4 Th('5(' indudnt a w('rld)' mr't'ting of the 'International BUf('au of Recordist Investigation' ropen to those 
"ith an intcrnt in Rrcordism, SUff('alism, and other currents of the Fantastic and Absurd in 
contcmporary an and cultuf(',); a film-making workshop; Yoga classes; a series of classes entided 
'Introduction to Anarrhism'; a 'hands on course' entided 'Wild Plants of Toronto'; a workshop entitled 
'Undrrstanding \iolrnce Against Women' (women-only from 6-7pm and open to all from 7-9pm); a 
collrcthT singing group; and 'salons' (,colourful intentional conversational forums where people engage in 
pasaionat(' diJcoufS(' about what they think is important') organised around a particular topic (with the 
topic for th(' f ( ) l l ~ i n g g salon decided at the end of each meeting) ([oronto Anarchist Free School Flyer, 
figllrr .... 2a ill AndilT. 2007: 256). Shantz (2012) also discusses the Toronto Anarchist Free School. 
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Committees report every month to the general mt'eting, where their needs 
and concerns are addressed. (quoted in AntlifT, 2007: 255) 
Here, there is an emphasis on the lack of hierarchy on both a curricula/organisational 
level and within the classroom itsel( It is stressed how all are welcome to make proposals 
at public meetings - where the curriculum is developed - and that skills and experiences 
are shared in a 'non-hierarchical setting free of prejudice'. 
In order to foster this non-hierarchy within the classroom, the Toronto Anarchist Free 
School adopts an tactic popular in critical pedagogy and popular education inspired 
approaches,25 advocating use of the terms 'facilitator' rather than 'teacher', and 
'participant' rather than 'student' (whilst making it clear that the facilitator is also a 
participant). Though I would not wish to denounce as statist spaces that retain the term 
'teacher' and 'student', I utilise the term 'facilitator'2fi to emphasise the 'artisanal' function 
of facilitators who - like the composers dealing in 'alternative' forms of score at the end of 
the previous chapter - coax bodies to self-organisation ratht'r than imposing order in a 
hylomorphic manner.27 The concept of the participant, meanwhile, suggests that everyone -
not only 'students' - is engaged in the process of directing education, and removes the 
vestiges of hierarchy that 'student' carries with it as the subordinate partner in a teacher-
student relationship. 
The form of education (as nomadic utopianism) taught in such a place means that there is 
no necessary opposition between the individual and the collective, and a set of reciprocal 
25 Sec, for instance, Andreotti (2006a), Trapese Collective (2007). Freirc hims('lf was against thc term 
'facilitator', believing that the tcachcr needed to retain their authority to a far greater dcgree than is being 
advocated here, and that the concept of the 'facilitator' would lead to a libertarian, laissez-faire approach 
to education which - as I suggest in fn.26 below - would not address issues concerning power (Freire and 
Macedo, 1995: 378). 
26 A 'person or thing which facilitates an action' (Oxford English Dictionary: oed.com), .... ith 'facilitates' defined 
as 'to make (an action, profess, etc.) easy or easier; to promote, hdp fOf'\\ard; to a",.,ist in bringing about (a 
particular end or result)' (.ibid) (although in nomadic education there would 1I0t be a 'particlliar end of 
result' predetermined). 
27 As Vanessa Andrcotti makcs clcar in articulating her concept of the classroom as an 'Open Space for 
Dialogue and Enquiry', thc rolc of thc facilitator is not to lead the group in a hylomorphic man ncr, but to 
create a 'safc spacc' in which studcnts feel as comfortablc as possihle sharing their experiences, fears, hopcs 
and knowlcdgcs; but also to disrupt any cosy consensus and providc focus where necessary (Andreotti, 
2oo6a; 2006b). 
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afft'ctin" powt"r relations to those in improvisation can be fostered, whereby the increase in 
tht' powt'r-to of ont' learner (by, for example, talking through an experience in their life, or 
bringing a particular piece of knowledge to the space) increases the power-to affect and be 
afft'ct of all in the space. 
The Deed (or strategic hierarchies 
Whilst tht" conct'pt of the facilitator represents an attempt to move away from the formal 
hierarchy associated with the teacher, it needs to be recognised that in settings where 
participants havt" been socialised to accept a hierarchical classroom as 'normal', the 
facilitator may still find themselves atop an informal hierarchy - a state of affairs that, if 
not recognised. can be extremely harmful, and which requires a certain set of skills on the 
part of tht" facilitator to prevent the classroom from becoming fully striated (a problem, 
then. that is particularly likely to be found in formal educational spaces, and particularly 
thost" of compulsory education). In my own experiences of utilising the OSDE 
mt'thodology dt"\'t"loped by Vanessa Andreotti with compulsorily schooled participants, for 
example, I ha\'t" found participants looking to me for the 'correct' way of thinking about a 
givt'n problt"m. Andreotti acknowledges this as a potential problem, stating that until 
studt"nts no longf'r look to the facilitator to provide answers, she should withhold from 
om-ring ht'r own opinion (2006a). 
In order to break down hierarchies between facilitator and participants, a certain skill set 
may 1)(' required by the facilitator. In my early experiences using the OSDE methodology 
I was able to identifY occasions when students were looking to me for answers, and was 
aware that this risked reproducing statism's banking approach to education; yet it was only 
aftt'r I had run a number of sessions (and spoken with other, more experienced OSDE 
facilitators) that I d('vdoprd a set of techniques which enabled me to 'coax the students 
into sdf-organisation' (which at times involved me leaving the space, but at others involved 
asking tht' right qut'Stions, moving on to a new discussion, etc.), and even after a number 
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of sessions I still felt that there was much I could learn to make me a more effective 
facilitator. 
Faced with such problems, Lilia I. Bartolome's (2009) concept of 'strategic teaching' is of 
use. It refers to 'an instructional model that explicitly teaches students learning strategies 
that enable them consciously to monitor their own learning' (2009: 348), and can be seen 
as a form of 'strategic hierarchy'. \Vhilst the reference to participants (or students), 
'consciously' monitoring their own learning sits uneasily with nomadic thought, the ability 
of skilled facilitators to utilise context appropriate methods to deterritorialise hierarchies 
between facilitator and participants such that collaborative knowledge production 
stemming from difference-in-itself can occur can be of great use in producing the 
classroom as a nomadic utopia28. 
Further problems regarding a hierarchy between facilitator and participants may result 
from the need for the facilitator to utilise 'charismatic authority'29 in order to inspire belief 
in the project among participants. This is less likely to be a problem in informal 
educational spaces, as participants will have attended voluntarily - but having taught in a 
secondary school I can attest to the apathy with which pupils often approach classes that 
do not directly help them get the exam grades they want, or that utilise non-standard 
teaching methods - seeing them either as a waste of time or as an excuse to exhibit 
disruptive behaviour (neither of which should be seen as surprising, given the great 
pressures placed on them to perform well in tests, as per Frances Gilbert's quote, above). 
The facilitator, then, needs not only to believe in the form of education they are offering, 
but to transmit this belief to potentially disruptive/ apathetic participants so that they will 
engage. This 'charismatic authority' should be seen as a form of strategic hierarchy, but 
28 Here, the element of time central to both the nomadic utopia and the Greek skholt comes into play: it is 
only by observing a classroom over time that one can see power relations smooth and striate, 
reterritorialise and deterritorialise. 
29 I use the term here to refer to 'specifically exceptional powers or qualities' (\Veber, 1978: 241) that get 
students to believe (collectively) in the project of education at hand. 
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must be tn'att'd \\ith extrt'me caution, given its tendency to perpetuate extreme forms of 
poWf'r-O\"('r ratht'r than facilitate power-to and affective relations of power-with (for more 
on charismatic authority and power in nomadic education, see Bell, 201Ib). 
Tht"rt' is also tht" danger of hierarchical relations emerging between non-facilitating 
participants and hf'rt', I suggest, the use of strategic identity and. strategic hierarchy may 
be n("ct"ssary. A .. I notrd in Chapter Four, musicians partaking in improvisation may be 
unablt' to fully t"scapt' the hierarchical roles they have been socialised into in wider society 
-- \\ith thr upshot that some musicians may feel less confident than others when musicking 
-- and tht' saol<' is undoubtedly true in the classroom, where students may feel less 
confidt"nl in participating as a result of experiencing relationships of domination in 
sodt"ty outside thr classroom. In order to escape this, effective facilitation is required in 
ordt"r that all can feel comfortable contributing to the learning process. This does not, 
howt"\'f'r, simply mt"an that a reversal of the hierarchies of domination should be 
implt'mt'ntffi, and bell hooks reflects thoughtfully on some of the difficulties that can arise 
from such a situation: 
Somrtimt"s students who want professors to grapple with class differences 
oftt'n simply desire that individuals from less materially privileged 
backgrounds be given center stage so that an inversion of hierarchical 
structurt"s takes place, not a disruption. One semester, a number of black female 
studt"nts from working-class backgrounds attended a course I taught on Mrican 
Amt'rican women writers. They arrived hoping I would use my professorial 
powrr to dt"center the voices of privileged white students in nonconstructive was 
so that thost" students would experience what it is like to be an outsider. Some of 
thesr black students rigidly resisted attempts to involve the others in an engaged 
pt'dagogy whrrt" space is created for everyone. Many of the black students feared 
that It"arning new terminology or new perspectives would alienate them from 
familiar social rt'lations. Since these fears are rarely addressed as part of a 
p r o ~ s s i v e e pedagogical process, students caught in the grip of such anxiety often 
sit in dassf's frt'ling hostile, estranged, refusing to participate. I often face students 
who think that in my classes they will "naturally" not feel estranged and that part 
of this frt'ling of comfort, of being "at home," is that they will not have to work as 
hard as thf')' do in other classes. 
Tht"st" studf'nts art" not expecting to find alternative pedagogy in my classes 
but mt"rdy "rt'st" from the negative tensions they may feel in the majority of 
otht"r courst"s. It is my job to address these tensions. (1994: 188-189) 
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Important here is hooks' claim that it is her job to address these tensions. Whilst I would 
argue that this should not rule out the possibility of the facilitator helping the class to self-
organise a solution (indeed, this would be preferable), the division of labour created by 
having a facilitator who takes responsibili!y for addressing this problem - and who brings 
their experience and expertise to bare on it (even if only by supplying suggestions that can 
be discussed, rather than by imposing a hylomorphic solution). Thus, a division of labour 
(which will often constitute a temporary hierarchy) is likely to be necessary to help the 
class move beyond such an impasse without the classroom resorting to state utopian forms 
of organisation or dissolving into an atopian chaos.30 
The importance of this division of labour is reinforced by Ellsworth, who - reflecting on 
her own experiences of critical pedagogy - notes that: 
[a] cting as if our classroom were a safe space in which democratic dialogue was 
possible and happening did not make it so ... we needed classroom practices that 
confronted the power dynamics inside and outside of our classroom that made 
[such] democratic dialogue impossible' (Ellsworth, 1994: 315?1. 
To facilitate such practices without restoring traditional hierarchies is clearly a difficult 
task, and Cox and Warner's metaphor of improvisation functioning as a utopian spider 
web could be utilised here: stretch the classroom too far in either direction (too much 
hierarchy, too little strategic hierarc?y) and it will no longer function as a nomadic utopia; 
but make it and repair it as you go and it can prove surprisingly durable. In some 
circumstances it may be appropriate for the facilitator to rotate between classes (Motta, 
2012b: 146), ensuring that power-over does not become concentrated in the hands of a 
particular participant. Given nomadic utopianism'S commitment to non-hierarchical 
forms of organisation, the aim should certainly be for the division of labour between the 
30 Similar approaches may be needed when the subject matter is particularly sensitive. Rcflecing on 
workshops on trauma run with the Nottingham Free School, Sara Motta talks of 'the necessity of having 
tightly organized, intensely thought out, and highly trained facilitators to work in situations and workshops 
related to trauma and other emotional issues affecting workshop participants (including the facilitator).' 
(2012b: 154) 
31 See also Judith Suissa (2009; 2010) and Justin Mueller's (2012) criticisms of Summerhill School's 
liberatarian attitude to education (based on its founder A.S. Neill's claim that 'without adult suggestion of 
any kind' a child can reach their potential [1992: 3]). 
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facilitator and tht" participants to become less noticeable over time - even to wither away 
emirdy ~ . . but t"\·t"n if achieved this could not be thought of as a 'once-and-for-all' solution, 
and should informal operations of power or tyrannies of hierarchy arise the division of 
labour ix-twt't"n tht" facilitator and the other participants may need to be made again. 
EdueatioDa! autoDomy aad degeDerate Domaclie utopias 
\\'hilst I have drawn on the experiences of Free Schools in discussing the classroom as a 
nomadic utopia, it should be dear from my use of experiments within formal educational 
institutions that nomadic utopian education should not be thought of as something that 
opt'ratt"s soldy outsidt" tht" formal academy. There are a number of good arguments for 
'dt'-schooling' and fft"e schooling (that is, enabling a form of education outside formal, 
hit"ran-hically structuft"d educational institutions) (see Hem, ed. 2008; TRAPESE 
col1('cti\'(', 2007; AntlilT, 2009; Shantz, 2012; Motta, 2012b) - and it is important to create 
autonomist spac('s away from formal institutions - but to restrict nomadic education to 
informal spac('s such as Free Schools necessarily limits the impact it can have (quite 
simply, it will ft"ach vt"ry few people - and by and large, will only reach those people 
a1rrady prrdispost'd to nomadic thought), and may well result in problems regarding 
rrsoun'(' and tim(' management (Motta, 2012b). Against this, formal educational 
institutions constitut(' one of the few communal public spaces in contemporary life, as 
Chris Carlsson makes dear: 
[a] social institution, like school, that is self-consciously public and subject to 
political/popular control, however compromised, is important to a radical 
agenda that hopes to extend democratic social control over the whole of 
public life.,. The public schools could be the best arena for us to learn what 
public lif(' is about, and how we can participate in it (1993: 46). 
Taking nn hoard the claim that education can never be neutral, then, I would encourage 
nomadic ally mind("d educators to work within formal educational institutions (state forms 
in th(' D('I('uuan 5("ns(', wh('ther private or publicly owned). Although it is important that 
eXpt'rimt'nts outside formal educational spaces are conducted, nomadic utopian educators 
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should heed the words of Stevphen Shukaitis, who - talking of a 'nomadic educational 
machine'- notes that 'one can find ways to make use of the institutional space without 
being of the institution, without taking the institution's goals as one's own' (200gb: 167, 
emphasis added to 'can')32. In so doing, educators can create 'under-commons and 
enclaves within multiple disciplines and spaces' (.ibid)33, all the while reflecting -
preferably collectively - on the role that formal educational institutions play in 
reproducing capital, and considering alternatives (Vidya Ahsram, 2009: 165; Olssen and 
Peters, 2005; Canaan and Shumar, eds., 2009; Lambert, Parker and Neary: 2007; 
Noterman and Pusey, 2012). It is important to note, then, that nomadic becomings may 
be begat from within state institutions.34 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how education is an important feature of utopianism. It 
establishes a complex relationship between education (conditioned by the epistemological 
approach taken); the classroom and the school; and wider society. I have argued that 
education is a form of utopianism that has two initial utopian functions. Firstly, it 
produces spaces of learning as utopias (either state or nomadic); secondly, it reproduces 
wider social structures either by reinforcing norms through strictly regulated forms of 
knowledge (state utopian education); or by challenging norms through collectively 
constructed knowledge (nomadic utopian education). The utopias created in the second of 
32 Paulo Freire, for example, worked within formal educational institutions, whilst the Brazilian Landless 
Workers' Movement ('Movimento Sam Terra') collaborates - critically - with the Brazilian state and 
universities in its facilitation of popular education programmes (Kane, 2000; de Carvahlo, 2010). Tom 
Moylan (2011), meanwhile, has spoken of the utopian becomings of the Milwaukee based 'Rethinking 
Schools' project, which has its origins in the state school system and continues to publish material aimed at 
teachers within the state education sector. 
33 The concept of the commons in education is also utilised by the Edu-Factory collective (see edu-
factory.org), who conceive of it using the Dcleuzean concepts of the virtual and the actual. For them '[t] he 
common isn't the umpteenth repositioning of a new dawn, or a weak preconfiguration of utopian hope. 
The common is that which lives in the present, a full virtuality, intended this time as the potentiality of the 
actual. The paths of self-education confronted in Edu-factory are not marginal spaces but, to use the 
categories of Chandra Talpade Mohanty, new spatial temporal coordinates for the production of 
oppositional knowledges and the organization of living knowledge's autonomy.' (2009: 11) 
34 This lends further weight to my suggestion on p.122, above, that the geopolitical state may be an 
important bulwark against the hierarchies and inequalities of global capitalism. Autonomist marxist 
theory, meanwhile, holds out hope for what I would call nomadic becomings emanating from the forms of 
organisation found within postfordist organisation of work (see Eden, 2012 for a sympathetically critical 
discussion of key strands of autonomist thought). 
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thf'Sf' structurt"s haw a further utopian function: in a state utopian society, a state utopian 
classroom or school Sl'n:es to repress desire and thus suggests to students (and teachers) 
that statist forms of organisation are the only possible forms; whilst a nomadic utopian 
spacf' of It'arning l'ducates desires so that they believe in forms of organisation that 
excf't'd tht" status quo. In a nomadic utopia, meanwhile, it is reasonable to speculate that 
education would st'r\"t' an important role in challenging tyrannies of habit that had 
f'ml"rgl"d. and would thus reproduce the utopia as a place of becoming. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has attempted to think through how it might be possible to have a utopian 
politics in an age that has ceased to have faith in the future. Drawing on the philosophy of 
Gilles Deleuze, it has developed a concept that I have called 'nomadic utopianism' - a 
force of 'ethically good' organisation that seeks to bring the new into being not in 
accordance with a transcendent lack, but through the immanent power of non-
hierarchically structured affective organisation. The nomadic utopia is the place produced 
(and continually reproduced) by these forces, although 'place' here refers to a form of 
organisation that has gained an identity through time, rather than simply a location on 
the surface of the earth; and the nomadic utopia cannot be considered separately from 
the forces that reproduce it. Nomadic utopianism, then, does not restore belief in the 
future so much as offer the future as a time and place unknowable in advance, but that is 
connected to the present. It is a temporally disruptive as well as spatial form. 
It is important to emphasise that the nomadic utopia is a spatial form, however. I believe 
that it avoids the dangers associated with Deleuze's ontological approach, as well as with 
approaches to utopia that view it as a process. Though I do not follow Saul Newman in 
claiming that Deleuze's thought is necessarily 'hysterical', there is certainly a danger that 
in the rush to validate desire, becoming and flux no gains will be made - resulting in a 
utopianism without a utopia: a philosophy embodied by the vision Zamyatin paints of the 
Mephi flying the INTEGRAL on ajourney npt to a good place, but to no place. Nomadic 
utopianism remembers - with Deleuze and Guattari - that de territorialization is nothing 
if it does not reterritorialize. 
This reterritorialization must never be absolute, however. I have shown how the concept 
of nomadic utopia retains an etymological fidelity to utopia, stressing the simultaneity and 
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consistrnc), (in the Deleuzean sense) of 'good', 'no' and 'place'. It states that there can be 
no 'good place' if that good place does not refuse the very name 'good place'. The utopia 
itsdf is nomadic: it knows no resting point and is reproduced through the repetition of 
differt'nct'-in-itsdf: it is a residual product of utopianism rather than calling the 
utopianism into being. It flees from finality, but as it does it 'makes flight create'. It is thus 
\;tally 'a1i\l"' in the inorganic sense of the term developed through Deleuze's thought; 
striving . at'Smn,: - to become other. 
It is c1rar. howt'\'('r, that a great deal of utopian thought does not correspond to nomadic 
utopianism, and I have also developed the concept of 'state utopianism'. In its 'purest' 
form, this corresponds to a number of colloquial and anti-utopian approaches to utopia 
(though I note that some pro-utopian thinkers adopt it as well). State utopianism proceeds 
by way of rationally designing a utopia and then orienting political action (utopianism) to 
the crt'ation and rt'production of this lack. Such a philosophy, I have argued, is necessarily 
hierarrhical and limits the capacity of subjects - both collective and individual - to affect 
and be aJTt'cted. It pits the individual against the collective and privileges stable identities 
O\'er tht' flux of difference-in-itself, which is seen as a threat to the perfection state 
utopianism claims for its vision, I have also argued that this form is more prevalent than is 
often assumed, and that the dominant neoliberal ideology constitutes a form of state 
utopianism. I ha\l" argued that from a nomadic perspective the state utopia is ethically 
bad, and so should be understood as a dystopia. 
Tht' statt' and the nomadic utopia should not simply be seen as opposite forms, however 
and I ha\'t' shown how state utopias can also emerge immanendy from nomadic utopian 
forms of organisation due to the formation of 'tyrannies of habit': a belief that 'the good 
placr' has l)("l"n achie\-ed and that no further becoming is necessary. In this, my approach 
goes bryond a number of accounts that identify two varieties of utopianism by 
considrring thl" rdationship between them. I have argued that at times a pragmatism may 
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be required in order to ward off statist forms of organisation, and have shown how the 
philosophy of nomadic utopianism must adapt to deal with particularity, contingency and 
the desires of those seeking to produce the place. 
Whilst my primary concern in this thesis has been to develop a sociological account of 
utopia, which is to sayan understanding of utopia that can be utilised to analyse forms of 
organisation in 'real life', I also believe that it is important my concepts are applied to 
utopian texts (and that these texts are connected back to 'real life'). As such, I have utilised 
the concepts of the nomadic utopia and the state utopia (as well as the relationship 
between these forms) to offer readings of three works of what might broadly be called 
'utopian literature'. In doing this, my interest was primarily to observe the operations of 
state and nomadic utopianism in the fictional places in which these works are set in order 
to flesh out and nuance the theoretical approach I had developed. Yet by utilising the 
conceptual framework developed in this thesis alongside the 'function based approach' to 
utopian texts, I also considered the ways in which these texts may impact on their readers, 
arguing that there was the potential for them to generate nomadic becomings and offer 
insights that may help guide nomadic utopian practice. 
Indeed, I referred back to these texts in my analyses of 'real life' utopian spaces in the 
thesis' final two chapters. In these, I engaged with practices that (with the exception of 
what I called nomadic utopian education) do not always see themselves as political. In so 
doing, I helped expand the terrain of 'utopian studies' beyond more frequently considered 
forms and practices (though this is not to say that others have not engaged with the 
practices I analysed), and helped to demonstrate - contra received wisdom - the ubiquity 
of utopianism. I showed how state utopianism - the form of utopianism so frequently 
derided - is central to mainstream educational practices and is also evidenced in the 
symphony orchestra; but argued that particular forms of educational practice and 
collective musical improvisation constitute nomadic utopianism and can create nomadic 
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utopias (whilst using the laller in particular to think through how a nomadic utopia can 
ossify into a state utopia/dystopia). I also argued that the ramifications of these places 
go<'"S lx"yond thf"ir immediate confines and that they function either to repress desires (state 
utopianism) or educate desires (nomadic utopianism). In this sense, the 'real life' places I 
haw consid('rt'd may have a utopian function in the manner so frequently associated with 
text bast"d utopias. 
In utilising Dd('uz("s thought to develop the conceptual framework utilised in this thesis, it 
is hopt'd that it \\ill also be of relevance to those seeking to think through how it is 
possiblf" to utilise Deleuze's thought in political praxis. By utilising the term 'state' to refer 
to ethically bad organisation, this thesis also implicitly positions itself as a work with 
anarchist f('sonanccs. although I would not wish to say that this is an anarchist work per se, 
and I bdi('\'(' that it can also be seen as operating in the tradition of autonomism. 
Suggestions for further engagement 
In Th, J ) i . J p o H m ~ s s final chapter, the reader sees Shevek return to his home planet 
Anarres. A .. much as this is the conclusion of the book, it is also the point at which a 
numbc"r of he-comings art' seen to take flight. Similarly, I do not want this conclusion to be 
5f"('n as 'th(' last word': nomadic utopianism resists closure, and there are a number of 
ways in which it . and tht' approach to utopia developed in this thesis - could be taken 
furthn Broadly spt'aking. these can be divided into two categories. Firstly, it could be 
applie-d to furthrr practic('s; and secondly, it could be considered alongside theoretical 
approach("s. d('bates and concepts that may diversify and/or problematise it. These are 
not distinct. however: as I have argued for a theoretical approach that responds to life, the 




There are a number of further forms and practices that might be considered in relation to 
the approach to utopia this thesis has developed: any form or practice, for example, where 
people are organised collectively could be analysed; as could any form or practice that 
influences the manner in which people relate to one another. Here, I want to suggest three 
such forms and practices that I believe could enter into a productive relationship with the 
approach to utopia I have developed. 
The broad (and related) fields of architecture, planning and housing is an area I believe it 
might be particularly fruitful to consider. The built environment clearly has an enormous 
influence on the manner in which people behave, and certain forms may be more 
conducive to nomadic organisation than others. Robert Neuwirth (2004), John Turner 
(1972, 1977) and Colin Ward (1976,2002 and with Dennis Hardy, 1984) have suggested 
that the practices utilised by squatters are testament to the ability of people to self-
organise a built environment and - whilst not wanting to fetishise the appalling conditions 
that many urban squatters people live in - this clearly has relevance for nomadic 
utopianism: could a community that encourages difference-in-itself develop immanently? 
Or - baring in mind Bakunin's claim that rejecting hierarchy does not mean rejecting the 
authority of the expert - is a more 'hylomorphic' approach desirable here? Might it be 
possible for an architect to function as an artisan, working with rather than on matter to 
help coax it to self-organisation in the manner of the Helen Papaioannou score featured 
in Chapter Four? 
Contemporary art practice is another field that might offer a rich seam for engagement. 
Nicholas Bourriaud's influential concept of 'relational aesthetics' (2002, 2005), in which 
the viewer of art no longer passively contemplates an artwork located in a transcendent, 
autonomous realm but instead participates in - and becomes the medium of - the work 
itself would initially seem to resonate strongly with nomadism, particularly in its claim 
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that artworks ('xist in time as much as in space. Resonances can also be detected in Joseph 
Ikuys' mnct'pt of social sculpture (2004), which argues that everyone is an artist and that 
the greatrst works of an are mass, participatory happenings that generate new forms of 
organisation, Y('t both Bourriaud and Beuys' approaches have been subject to powerful 
criticisms that suggest they offer little more than apolitical, hagiographic curatorial 
stratt"gi("s; provide escapt' and compensation rather than the transformation of 
subjt"cti\ity; and rt"pruduce the logics of neoliberalism (Gretarsd6ttir et al., 2012; Barok 
and Bishop. 2009; Hatherley, 2009; Bishop, 2012; Murphy, 2012). Is it possible to think a 
participator)' art that does not fall victim to these critiques, and which does fulfil the 
function of thr (,ducation of desires? And what should the status of art be? Do art 
institutions mrrdy offer 'dt'\;ant nomadic utopias'? These debates also relate to what the 
rt"lationship Ix-tw('t'n art and everyday life should be. Is art something that should be 
entanglt>d in t"\'t"ryday lift', working for the community; or need it maintain a position of 
rt"lativt" autonomy from which it can criticise life, shaking people out of too-comfortable 
habits? Should an seek to become an immanent, nomadic utopia within the present, or 
should it function in a heuristic manner akin to Jameson's anti-anti-utopianism or Levitas' 
'education of desire'? Laurence Davis' (2009) essay on the function of art in utopian 
fiction and throry would be of relevance here, I would suggest. 
I would also suggest that the framework I have developed here might be useful in 
analysing contemporary social movements and might provide them with a useful tool to 
t'nmuragr drh .. ue and articulate their political visions. For the sake of brevity I will use 
Occupy a . ~ ~ an ("xample here. Firstly, my approach could be utilised to frame the debate 
l)('twt"en tht" 'gtatt" utopians' who believe a vision needs to be articulated beforehand in 
ordt"r to gi\'t" mht'sion and identity to the movement (Zizek, 2012); and the 'nomadic 
utopian!!' who hdit'\'t" that the movement's strength lies in its prefigurative nature and the 
\'t"r)' fact that it does not haV(' a 'programme' in the conventional sense of the word (Razsa 
and Kurnik. 2012). Carr' would need to be taken to pay attention to the precise JUnction of 
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any utopian visions, however: they may, of course, be used heuristically rather than simply 
as blueprints directing action. Secondly, I would suggest that nomadic utopianism might 
offer those criticised for lacking a programme a useful conct'pt by which to articulate their 
vision of the coming community. '\\'e are utopian', they could say to critics, ~ u s t t not as 
you understand it'. In this sense the communities of occupy themselves function as the 
nomadic utopia - its forms of organisation prefiguring the society-to-come. I There may 
be a sense here, however, that visions of how this society mqy become would aid Occupy, 
and so heuristic visions of a future nomadic utopia may have an important function for 
the movement. 
Broadening the theoretical debate 
Given this thesis' use of Gilles Deleuze, it has been necessarily limited in its theoretical 
scope. Whilst his philosophical approach has provided a useful framework for rethinking 
the concept of utopia, it is not - of course - complete; and I have not explored all of its 
aspects. Here, I want to suggest three points of engagt'mt'nt that might be taken up in 
order to take this thesis' claims further. I have trit'd to draw attention to issues that would 
perhaps challenge - rather than deepen - nomadic utopianism here, though this is by no 
means a complete list. This would, of course, opt'n up the project to critical scrutiny, and 
may well result in the approach I have developed ht're being modified. No doubt some 
people would use these points of engagement to reject the approach I have deVeloped 
here, although it is my hope that none of these points for further engagement need prove 
fatal. 
Firstly, I would suggest that deeper engagement with property relations and economic 
organisation would be a worthwhile task. I briefly noted how private property has been 
abolished on Anarres, and that this made a large non-hierarchical society possible; and I 
For this to be true, I would suggest that Occupy necds to ccase reprodllcing dynamics from dominant 
society. There have, for instance, been startling incidents of misogyny within occupations that have not 
properly been addressed (Wiley, 2012). . 
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have also suggested that inequalities of wealth should be considered as hierarchical 
formations. Furthermore, private property clearly serves the statist function of opposing 
the indhidual to the collective, and frequendy serves as a limit on affective relationships. 
Yet I haw not interrogated the relationship between property and forms of utopia in this 
thesis, and I believe this would be an extremely worthwhile task. It would not be too much 
to suggest, for example, that a widespread nomadic utopianism would require the 
abolition of private property and workers seizing control of the means of production. In 
this, I agree with Alain Badiou (2010) and Zizek (2009) that the word 'communism' needs 
to be reclaimed from its associations with totalitarianism (much as a number of thinkers 
have sought to do for utopia). The question here, then, is whether it is possible to create 
prefiguratiw communist nomadic utopias within a capitalist society (not necessarily as 
self-contained islands, but as places whose becomings enter wider circulations of 
e x c h a n g e ~ , , or whether organisation should be oriented towards a rupture in which 
bourgeois property relations are shattered once and for all? The latter positions would 
likely judge nomadic utopianism under capitalism a philosophy of escapism; and see the 
nomadic utopia as a form possible only after the end of class based prehistory. Yet 
(unsurprisingly) I am inclined more towards the former position, and would point here to 
Marx's daim in TIlt German Idto/ogy that '[c]ommunism for us is not a state of affairs which 
is to Ix' rstablislll'd, an idC'alto which reality will have to adjust itself. We call communism 
the n'al ll1()wmrnt which abolishes the present state of things' (1970: 56). I would also 
suggest that Dan Hancox's Utopia and the Valley oj Tears (2012, 2013)3 (about the anarcho-
communist town of Marinadela in Spain) might be of relevance here; and believe it 
would be particularly worthwhile to think through how nomadic utopianism might 
function in light of autonomism and communisation theory's reactions to contemporary 
forms of capitalist organisation, and the debates between them (de Mattis, 2012; Dauve, 
2 Along \,;Ih AI .. x Andrews. I ha", .. co·founded Records on Ribs , a record label that releases music as 
('ommon PmJX"ny. Although problematic, we see this very much as a form of prefigurative communism: a 
utopian \;nual span' that ullpicks capitalism whilst pointing to a society beyond it (see BeU, 2010; 201ld 
for mOlT on Ihis\. 
3 TIl .. 2012 .. clilion is a shonened. digital version of a longer book that will be published in 2013. 
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1997; Theorie Communiste, 2005; Guattari and Negri, 1985; Berardi, 1980; Cleaver, 
2000; Virno, 2004; Hardt and Negri, 2008; Penzin and \'irno, 20 I 0; Eden, 2012). 
Of course a great deal of interesting communist experimentation has occurred in the 
global south in recent years, and this leads me on to the second point of engagement that 
I believe could be productive for the approach to utopia that I have developed here: an 
engagement with non-western political praxis (or at least fi)rms of political praxis that 
draw on non-western traditions: there should not be a dichotomy here). This is, of course, 
a broad category - and I will not do it justice here, but some brief points can be made. 
The first is to note that interest in non-western utopias is expanding. Although utopianism 
has often been seen as a peculiarly western, or Christian conn'pt (Kumar, 1987; Reis, 
2010), a number of scholars in and outside of utopian studies are challenging this and 
arguing that utopianism exists in other - if not all - cultures (Wu, 1995; Dutton, 20 I 0; 
Lauri, 20 I 0; Sargent, 2010; Mattiace, 2003). The second point is to suggest that forms of 
political organisation that resonate with 0>ut should not be confiated with) nomadic 
utopianism have been prevalent in the global south in r{'('ent years ( ~ f o t t a , , 2009; Sitrin, 
2007a, 2007b, 2012; Tormey, 200G; ~ I a t t i a c e , , 2003). In seeking to apply (or modify) the 
concept to take into account these movements a great deal of care must be taken into 
account not to overcode struggles that operate in very dim'rent political traditions, but this 
is not to say that these movements and nomadic utopianism might would have nothing of 
value to say to each other. On a less ambitious note, the arguments about musical 
improvisation made in this thesis might benefit from an engagement with non-western 
forms of improvisation, many of which function wry difTcf{'ntly from the processes I have 
described. 
Thirdly, I believe it would be interesting to consider the nature of life in a broader sense. 
In the first chapter of this thesis I noted that - for Dcleuze and Guattari - 'everything is 
alive', including inorganic matter. Yet this thesis has remained largely anthropocentric. In 
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light of work (much of it recent) on the vitality of matter and 'things' (Bennett, 2010), the 
nature of the ecological (Morton, 2012), the intelligence of plants (Marder, 2012) and 
geographies of the 'more-than-human' (Panelli, 2010; Lorimer, 20 I 0) it would be 
intert'sting to consider what it might mean for nomadic utopianism to include objects that 
are normally regarded as 'inert', as well as forms of life normally considered outside the 
domain of political organisation (the plant and animal kingdoms). Should nomadic 
utopianism's non-hierarchy lead it to reject What might it mean to have a nonhuman 
nomadic utopia, or an ecological nomadic utopia? 
Finally, this thesis has only touched on the issue of scale. In discussing improvisation I 
nott'd that the relatively small size of most improvising collectives makes nomadic 
organisation easit'r, if not possible (though there are improvising orchestras which may 
have up to fifty musicians playing at anyone time). It may well be that organising the 
numbt'"r of musicians that play in a symphony orchestra requires some form of state 
utopianism (though not, I would contend, to the extremes that symphony orchestras often 
take this), but I would not wish to extrapolate from this to suggest that nomadic 
utopianism requirt's small communities. It is a flexible form that can be adapted to suit the 
nt'eds and requiremt'nts of life (indeed, for it to do otherwise would see it embracing 
hylomorphism: imposing a form on life), and the chapter on education has shown that 
larger groups can bt> organised as nomadic utopias, whilst Anarres offers a heuristic vision 
of how a significantly larger nomadic utopia might function. These different scales of 
organisation dearly bring different organisational challenges and it would be an 
intert'sting task to consider what some of these might be, and how nomadic utopianism 
might deal \\;th them. 
Nomadic utopianism into the future' 
This is by no nwans tht' end, then. Nomadic utopianism must - I argue - go on. It must 
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go on so we can remedy the social depression of late capitalism, and it must go on so that 
we can once again talk of a future: not a future to which we must defer, but a future that 
arrives prefiguratively in the here and now. Utopia cannot simply make the present 
impossible, it must make the future possible. In so doing, it must respond to debates and to 
the pragmatics of application in the 'real world'. It must also beware the dangers of state 
utopianism - but acknowledge the strength that utopian visions can have in estranging 
certainty and educating desire. It must create nomadic utopias in the here-and now, and 
think how they too might educate desires such that they form part of a rhizome of 
nomadic utopianism: a force of becoming that increases the capacity of all to affect and 
be affected. We do not yet know what utopianism can do. 
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